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Abstract 
 
Cotton was the most important commodity in the economy of the industrialized 
Western world in the mid-nineteenth century, as vital then as petroleum is today. It was 
widely believed that a prolonged interruption of the cotton supply would lead not merely 
to a severe economic depression, but possibly to the collapse of Western Civilization. 
Three quarters of the world’s cotton supply came from the Southern states of the United 
States. When the American Civil War erupted and cotton supplies were cut off, the 
British Cotton Supply Association was faced with the difficult task of establishing cotton 
cultivation in other locations. In order for the effort to succeed, the British had to obtain 
and distribute millions of pounds of American cotton seeds. The United States 
government, the Illinois Central Railroad, and a number of organizations and individuals 
cooperated to obtain the necessary seeds that the British had to have. American farm 
equipment manufacturers assisted by designing, making, and distributing portable cotton 
gins and other implements needed by cotton growers overseas. U.S. consuls overseas 
sometimes assisted the Cotton Supply Association with seed and equipment distribution. 
This dissertation is about the implementation of the grand economic strategies of 
the United States and Great Britain. It is also about the people who implemented those 
strategies on the ground, people as diverse as Union agents who went into Confederate 
territory to procure cotton seeds, farmers in Illinois, British consuls who distributed seeds 
grown in Illinois to farmers in the Ottoman Empire, and English colonists who flocked to 
Fiji with high hopes of becoming cotton planters. It attempts to measure the impact of the 
cotton boom and subsequent bust that resulted from the American Civil War on societies 
around the world. 
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Dedication 
 
To every person, man, woman, or child, of any race, color, or nationality, who 
has ever toiled in a cotton field anywhere in the world. 
 
 1 
Introduction 
 
As Time moves on, the origin and the purpose of the four-
years-conflict…ceases to be a mere episode in the private history of a 
particular people, on a particular spot…it expands far beyond the 
narrow limits of the land upon which so many lives were sacrificed.
1
 
 
As was obvious to General Camille de Polignac when he wrote those words in 
October 1913, the American Civil War had lasting global ramifications. Speaking to a 
British audience at Oxford University in 1913, Union army veteran and historian 
Charles Francis Adams, Jr., remarked that, “Other and equally momentous struggles” 
had by that time effaced the American Civil War in the consciousness of foreign 
generations born during the interceding half century.
2
 Even greater struggles would 
further efface it in the next fifty years. Likewise, most ordinary Americans came to 
see the Civil War as a uniquely American experience, one that except for the Trent 
Affair and the exploits of the Confederate navy’s far-ranging raider Alabama was 
confined within the borders of the United States. Yet no matter where historians may 
focus their efforts, be it Victorian-era England, Latin America, Africa, India, Egypt, 
the lands of the former Ottoman Empire, or even the remote South Pacific islands 
they discover that the American Civil War was a critical strategic point of departure 
for subsequent history in locales far distant from its hallowed battlefields. The reason 
was cotton. 
 
                                                 
1
 Maj. Gen. Prince Camille de Polignac to Gen. Marcus J. Wright, Oct. 6, 1913, Marcus J. 
Wright Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, quoted in 
Jeff Kinard, Lafayette of the South: Prince Camille de Polignac and the American Civil War (College 
Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2001), 186. Camille “Prince Polecat” Polignac was the last 
surviving Confederate major general. 
 
2
 Charles Francis Adams, Jr., Trans-Atlantic Historical Solidarity: Lectures Delivered Before 
the University of Oxford in Easter and Trinity Terms 1913 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913), 59. 
 2 
When a little before sunup on the morning of Friday, April 12, 1861, the 
Citadel cadets manning the guns of Battery Stevens commenced firing on Fort 
Sumter, they set in motion a world crisis the seriousness of which can best be 
comprehended by comparing it with what the likely consequences would be today if a 
prolonged Middle East war were to cut off 75 percent of the world’s oil supply. In the 
mid-nineteenth century, cotton was the lifeblood of the Western world’s industrial 
economies, as vital then as petroleum is today. As Confederate Vice President 
Alexander Stephens told an audience at Augusta, Georgia, on July 11, 1861, cotton 
was “the great motor of the commerce of the world” that the nations of Europe could 
not do without, and added, “I cannot, today, tell you how the blockade is to be raised. 
But there is one thing certain—in some way or other it will be obliged to be raised, or 
there will be revolution in Europe—there will be starvation there.”3  
It was feared that a prolonged interruption of the cotton supply would trigger 
the complete collapse of Europe’s capitalist industrial economy, topple the 
institutions of Western civilization, and plunge it into revolution and anarchy. 
Further, replacing American cotton was not a simple matter of buying cotton grown 
elsewhere because the machinery in Europe’s mills was tailored specifically to the 
characteristics of American cotton. The machines could not be readily adapted to 
process the shorter, coarser, and differently shaped fibers of native Near Eastern and 
Asian cottons. Logic and reason suggested that Great Britain, then the world’s 
foremost industrial, economic, and naval power, would intervene in American affairs 
                                                 
3
 John S. C. Abbott, The History of the Civil War in America, vol. 1 (Springfield: Gurdon Bill, 
1866), 158. 
 
 3 
rather than allow an interruption of the essential raw material that drove the Western 
world’s industrial economy. 
The South’s strategy for winning its independence hinged on the interruption 
of cotton supplies forcing Great Britain to intervene in order to prevent the expected 
cataclysmic socio-economic collapse. However, British leaders had long recognized 
the danger inherent in reliance on the United States for three-quarters of their cotton 
supply. Prior to the Civil War, British cotton manufacturers formed the Cotton Supply 
Association, an organization whose sole purpose was to break the American cotton 
monopoly by sponsoring the growing of American-type cotton wherever around the 
globe that it might be possible to grow it. Although horticultural experiments were 
successful and labor costs in the undeveloped world were competitive with the 
American South’s slave labor, the low price paid for cotton and the expense and 
difficulty of transportation doomed those efforts to economic failure. American 
cotton was simply too plentiful, too easily obtained, and too cheap for anyone to 
compete successfully against it. 
The North needed only to be left alone long enough for its superior manpower 
and resources to wear down the South and win the war. Assisting British efforts to 
break the South’s monopoly on cotton by supplying the large quantities of American 
cotton seeds that the British could obtain nowhere else, cotton gins, agricultural 
implements, and technical support was complementary to the North’s war aims. This 
was accomplished through the combined efforts of the Lincoln government, a loosely 
affiliated group of American capitalists known as the Boston Associates, and the 
 4 
largely British-owned Illinois Central Railroad working in cooperation with the 
Cotton Supply Association.  
Controversy still surrounds the dramatic and long lasting effects that these 
efforts had on countries and peoples far from the battlefields of the American Civil 
War. A central contention of this study, in contrast to other recent scholarship, is that 
the Cotton Supply Association’s attempt to spread cotton production around the 
world and displace the United States as the world’s monopoly cotton supplier 
succeeded only while the Civil War kept American cotton off the market. With the 
single exception of Egypt, it failed as soon as American cotton production recovered. 
It was the failure of the effort to globalize commercial cotton growing, not its success, 
that caused the personal and national indebtedness that characterized cotton 
agriculture in the undeveloped world after the Civil War. 
Americans have written very little about the global cotton boom and 
subsequent bust that resulted from the Civil War. Brian Schoen examined the 
international context of the antebellum cotton economy in The Fragile Fabric of 
Union; Cotton, Federal Politics, and the Global Origins of the Civil War published in 
2009, but his book ends with the outbreak of war in 1861. James A. Field skipped 
over the Civil War years in his America and the Mediterranean World, 1776-1882, 
published in 1969. Edward Mead Earle addressed the subject in an article entitled 
“Egyptian Cotton and the American Civil War” published in Political Science 
Quarterly in 1926, but his analysis has a strong imperialist slant and leaves much to 
be desired. Earle portrayed the transformation of Egypt that took place as result of 
cotton cultivation as progressive and generally beneficial. Earl S. Pomeroy touched 
 5 
upon it in “French Substitutes for American Cotton, 1861-1865,” published in The 
Journal of Southern History in 1943. Frenise A. Logan made the best American effort 
to draw a direct connection between the Civil War and cotton growing abroad with a 
series of four articles about the 1861-1873 cotton boom in India written between 1956 
and 1974. However, Logan’s work remains obscure, and is generally considered 
Anglo-Indian history, with only a peripheral connection to American history. Temple 
University historian Arthur W. Silver addressed the subject thoroughly as it related to 
India in Manchester Men and Indian Cotton 1847-1872, published in 1966. However, 
though Silver was an American, he was a professor of British history and his book 
was published in England. His work, like Frenise Logan’s, is considered Anglo-
Indian history, with only a peripheral connection to the history of the American Civil 
War.  
More has been written in the context of non-American history, especially in 
Indian, Turkish, and Egyptian history. British historian D. A. Farnie touched briefly 
upon the subject at several points in his massive, wide-ranging East and West of Suez: 
The Suez Canal in History, 1854-1956, published in 1969. It was not the focus of 
Farnie’s work, however. Dharma Kumar touched upon the affects of the American 
Civil War in India at several points in the massive Cambridge Economic History of 
India, but did not devote a chapter specifically to it. Indian historian Laxman D. Satya 
explored the impact of the cotton boom on the Indian province of Berar in Cotton and 
Famine in Berar 1850-1900 published in Delhi in 1977. Satya blamed cotton for most 
of the ills that beset Berar after 1860. Dietmar Rothermund, a German historian 
 6 
specializing in Indian history, was much less critical of cotton’s adverse affects in The 
Indian Economy under British Rule published in India in 1983.  
Turkish historian Orhan Kurmuş addressed the subject in the context of 
Turkish history in “The Cotton Famine and its effects on the Ottoman Empire,” a 
chapter in Huri İslamoğlu-İnan’s book The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy 
published in Britain in 1987. Kurmuş acknowledged the American Civil War as the 
impetus to the cotton boom in the Ottoman Empire but attributed the direct outside 
influence to the British. He made no mention of American involvement. Charles 
Issawi, in his The Economic History of Turkey, 1800-1914 devotes a chapter titled 
“Cotton” to the Civil War era cotton boom but treats it as a temporary blip that was 
largely irrelevant in the long term. Alan R. Richards, an American economist who 
specializes in the Middle East, dealt with it extensively in “Primitive Accumulation in 
Egypt, 1798-1882,” a chapter in İslamoğlu’s book, and in his own book Egypt’s 
Agricultural Development, 1800—1980: Technical and Social Change, published in 
1982. Richards, like Kurmuş, deals with the subject in the context of Ottoman-
Egyptian history, with no mention of an American role nor linkage between British 
activities and American Civil War strategies. British economist Mary B. Rose 
touched upon the subject in Firms, Networks and Business Values: The British and 
American Cotton Industries since 1750 published in 2006, but the focus of her work 
is economic theory, not history. Israeli historian Michael B. Oren wrote in Power, 
Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present, “The Civil 
War’s long-term impact on Egypt could be compressed into one word: cotton.”4 
                                                 
4
 Michael B. Oren, Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to the 
Present (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2007), 190. 
 7 
However, Oren devoted only five paragraphs to the rise of cotton in Egypt during the 
American Civil War, and those paragraphs are a general overview lacking specifics. 
In all of the foreign accounts, the starting point is when a representative from the 
Cotton Supply Association hands a local farmer a free sack of American cotton seed 
and says, “If you grow it, we will buy it.” 
The only attempt at a global history is an article by Harvard University 
historian Sven Beckert, who published “Emancipation and Empire: Reconstructing 
the Worldwide Web of Cotton Production in the Age of the American Civil War,” in 
The American Historical Review in 2004. The paper focuses on the long-term global 
socio-economic macro-history of cotton cultivation as it relates to the impact of 
global capitalism and imperialism upon indigenous peoples. Beckert presents a 
soaring overview of what happened but rarely identifies the human actors involved 
nor give details about their activities. Beckert’s work has a strong anti-imperialist 
slant. 
Beckert’s thesis is that British cotton interests, “invented…a new system of 
mobilizing non-slave labor, characterized by cultivators enmeshed in debt, share 
croppers burdened by crop liens, and rural producers with little political power.”5 
Beckert, like Satya, leaves the impression that what happened in India, Brazil, Egypt, 
and elsewhere was part of a global strategic economic plan that succeeded and that 
the results were pre-planned and intentional. Beckert leaves the impression that the 
outcomes in Egypt and Brazil were nearly identical. In fact while Egypt did become 
                                                 
5
 Sven Beckert, “Emancipation and Empire: Reconstructing the Worldwide Web of Cotton 
Production in the Age of the American Civil War,” American Historical Review 109, no. 5 (Dec. 
2004): 1415. 
 
 8 
entrapped in the cotton economy, Brazil all but stopped growing cotton soon after the 
end of the American Civil War. 
Most historians would probably agree with Lenoir C. Wright when he wrote 
in his 1953 doctoral dissertation at Columbia University entitled United States Policy 
Toward Egypt 1830-1914, that if there was, “an active policy of the United States 
Government to stimulate cotton production outside the United States, there is no 
record in the Department of State correspondence to show that any concrete 
assistance was offered in Egypt or Turkey” or anywhere else.6  And indeed there is no 
one document nor one set of documents that spell out the Union’s global cotton 
strategy. To discern it this dissertation uses many widely separated sources that it 
would have been impossible for any one individual to locate before the Internet age. 
It uses archival sources from the United States, British and American government 
publications, newspapers and journals from the 1860s, contemporary travel accounts, 
and microfilms of the diaries and papers of individuals preserved in libraries as far 
away as Australia to discern the global cotton strategy that eluded historians in the 
past. It is written as world history for an American audience about the American Civil 
War’s place in that larger global history.
                                                 
6
 L. C. Wright, United States Policy Toward Egypt 1830-1914 (New York: Exposition Press, 
1969), 69-70. 
 9 
Chapter 1 
Cotton’s Peculiar Kingdom 
[W]ould any sane nation make war on cotton? Without firing a gun, 
without drawing a sword, should they make war on us we could bring 
the whole world to our feet. The South is perfectly competent to go on 
one, two, or three years without planting a seed of cotton. …What 
would happen if no cotton was furnished for three years? … England 
would topple headlong and carry the whole civilized world with her, 
save the South. No, you dare not make war on cotton. No power on 
earth dares make war upon it. Cotton is King.
1
 
 
When South Carolina’s fire-eating champion of slavery Senator James Henry 
Hammond spoke those words on the floor of the U.S. Senate on March 4, 1858, 
cotton was the lifeblood of the Western world’s industrial economies, as important 
then as petroleum is today. This was especially true in England, then the world’s 
leading industrial and commercial nation. On the eve of the American Civil War, 
500,000 people were directly employed in the English cotton mills. More than 4 
million of England’s 21 million people were dependent on the cotton industry for 
their daily bread. Britain’s need for raw cotton was stupendous: in 1859, it imported 
2,610,898 bales, more than 50,000 bales per week.
2
 Britain’s mills were dependent 
upon the southern states of the United States for three-quarters of that cotton. Nor was 
Britain the only European nation whose industrial base was dependent on American 
cotton. From September 1, 1859 to August 31, 1860, the U.S. exported 589,587 bales 
                                                 
1
 James H. Hammond, “Cotton is King” speech delivered on the floor of the U.S. Senate, 
March 4, 1858, in Selections from the Letters and Speeches of James H. Hammond (New York: J. F. 
Trow & Co., 1866), 316-317. 
 
2
 E. J. Donnell, Chronological and Statistical History of Cotton (New York: James Sutton & 
Co., 1872), 482-505. Hereafter cited Donnell, History of Cotton. At the time of the Civil War the 
average weight of a bale of American cotton was about 400 pounds. 
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to France, 295,072 bales to the countries of northern Europe, and 220,082 bales to 
other foreign ports.
3
 
The cotton trade also supported a multitude of people not directly employed in 
the mills. Britain exported 2,776 million yards of cloth and 197 million pounds of 
yarn in 1860. Yarn and cloth accounted for one-half of the value of all British 
exports. Handling that staggering quantity of cotton provided employment to a vast 
number of seamen, railroad workers, stevedores, clerks, etc. Cotton dominated the 
United States’ economy as well. In 1858, the total value of all U.S. exports was $238 
million; $161 million, or a staggering 68 percent, was cotton. In the decade before the 
Civil War, more than 2,000 U.S. merchant ships, totaling 1,100,000 registered tons, 
and 55,000 seamen were employed in the coastal navigation that brought cotton from 
southern ports to New York. Another 800,000 tons of American shipping and 40,000 
seamen were employed in the transoceanic cotton trade. Even the fast New York to 
Liverpool passenger packets relied upon cotton to fill their cargo holds on the 
eastbound voyage across the Atlantic. Without cotton outbound ships would have had 
to cross the ocean empty, other American exports being insufficient to fill the cargo 
space that on west bound crossings was taken up by British manufactured goods. 
Banks, ship-owners, railroads, and merchant houses in Great Britain and the northern 
                                                 
3
 Donnell, History of Cotton, 482-505; R. Arthur Arnold, The History of the Cotton Famine, 
From the Fall of Sumter to the Passing of the Public Works Act, (London: Saunders, Otley & Co., 
1863), 124; Times (London), Feb. 4, 1860; New York Times, Feb. 12, 1861; London Review 15 (Oct. 
1860 - Jan. 1861), 495-519.  
 
 11 
states of the United States were all heavily invested in or dependent in one way or 
another upon the cotton trade.
4
 
To understand the cotton-based political economy of the mid-nineteenth 
century and contemporaneous ideas about it, it is necessary to review the rise of the 
cotton industry. The seeds of the American Civil War were sown in England even 
before the independence of Britain’s thirteen American colonies by a series of 
innovations in spinning and weaving technology that made possible a quantum leap in 
the quantity of textiles manufactured and set the Industrial Revolution in motion. 
From the time when the first woven fabric was made more than 25,000 years ago, 
spinning yarn and weaving cloth was one of the most tedious and time consuming of 
all human endeavors, making clothing scarce and costly.
5
 The first innovation, the 
principle of the spinning wheel, in its original East Indian form a horizontal wheel 
twirled by hand, was introduced into Europe at the end of the Middle Ages. In 1530 a 
German baker, Johann Jürgens, invented the classic vertical spinning wheel powered 
by a foot pedal linked to the wheel by a reciprocating offset push rod. Although it 
spun only one thread, the spinning wheel did so at several times the speed of the 
traditional distaff and spindle. It was readily adopted in England, where manufacture 
of woolen textiles had been a major industry since ancient times. There, two hundred 
                                                 
4
 Robert Greenhalgh Albion, The Rise of New York Port, 1815-1860 (New York: Charles 
Schribner’s Sons, 1970), 95-121; R. Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain (London: Macmillan & 
Co., 1957), 332. 
 
5
 Colin Renfrew and Paul Bahn, Archaeology: Theories, Methods, and Practice (London: 
Thames & Hudson, 2004), 341. The oldest known evidence of spinning and weaving is an impression 
of coarse cloth preserved in the clay of a fired hearth found at Pavlov, Czech Republic, which has been 
dated to between 25,000 and 27,000 years ago. The oldest surviving cloth is a tiny piece of linen 
unearthed at Çayönü, Turkey, which dates to c. 7000 BC.  Scraps of cotton from South America and 
India have been dated to c. 4500 to 3500 BC. 
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years later, in 1733, John Kay, an English weaver, invented the fly shuttle, an 
improvement that allowed one person to operate a loom. This led to an increase in 
woolen cloth production to meet growing domestic and export demands and created a 
corresponding increase in the demand for yarn that could not be met by the spinning 
wheel.
6
 
Until the mid-1700s, sheep wool remained the staple material of the English 
textile industry. Cotton fabrics were luxury goods imported from India by the East 
India Company and from the Ottoman Empire by the Levant Company. English 
woolen makers and their mercantilist-minded supporters in Parliament took a dim 
view of this trade in cotton fabrics, so much so that in 1700 they made a serious 
attempt to ban importation of cotton cloth and make wearing cotton clothing illegal. 
Wearing cotton clothing could not be prohibited as the woolen makers wanted, 
however, because there was by that time a small English handicraft cotton spinning 
and weaving industry. To supply it with raw material, England imported about 2 
million pounds of raw cotton per year from 1700 until 1750, most of it from the West 
Indies and the Near East.
7
 
The rate at which fibers could be spun into yarn constrained the textile 
industry’s growth until 1769, when James Hargreaves, an illiterate woodworker and 
weaver, invented the spinning jenny, a simple, hand cranked improvement upon the 
spinning wheel that allowed one operator to spin multiple threads simultaneously. 
                                                 
6
 Donnell, History of Cotton (New York: James Sutton & Co., 1872), 1-80; James L. Watkins, 
King Cotton: A Historical and Statistical Review, 1790-1908 (New York: James L. Watkins & Sons, 
1908), 9-42; Benno Niess, Die Baumwollen-Spinnerei in allen ihren Theilen, Ein Handbuch für 
Spinnerei-Techniker, Beamte und Fabrikanten (Cotton spinning in all its aspects, a handbook for mill 
technicians, officials, and manufacturers) (Weimar: Bernhard Friedrich Voigt, 1869), 22-27. 
 
7
 Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain, 1-5; Donnell, History of Cotton, 16-25. 
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Shortly thereafter, wealthy mill-owner Richard Arkwright employed John Kay (no 
relation to the inventor of the fly shuttle), a clockmaker, to devise a spinning jenny of 
much greater capacity. Known as the spinning frame, this machine was operated by 
waterpower and later by steam engines. In 1785 another Englishman, Edmund 
Cartwright, invented the power loom. Power operated looms enabled cloth to be 
produced cheaply and in quantities never before possible, and created a demand for 
wool that outstripped supply. The pressing need for a fiber that was more plentiful 
and cheaper than wool became apparent. Cotton became the fiber of choice. Cotton 
imports increased more than tenfold between 1750 and 1790, to 25 million pounds. 
England’s cotton suppliers remained the Levant, the West Indies, Brazil, and Dutch 
Guiana. Cotton was a scarce and expensive commodity, however, because it was 
necessary to separate the seeds from the fiber by hand, a slow and tedious process. An 
American, Ely Whitney, overcame this last hurdle constricting the manufacturing 
process in 1793, when he invented the saw gin, a simple machine that separated 
cotton lint from the seeds.
8
 
The cumulative impact of these inventions on the political economy of the 
Western world was profound. In Britain, the production of textiles underwent a 
revolutionary change. From a cottage industry in 1700, before the end of the 
eighteenth century cotton textile manufacturing was transformed into a large-scale, 
factory-based industrial concern. Industrialization transformed the structure of 
English society from one whose political economy was largely rural agrarian-
handicraft mercantilist in nature to one that was urban capitalist-industrial. Cotton 
                                                 
8
 Donnell, History of Cotton, 25-69. 
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manufacturing became concentrated in the county of Lancashire in northwestern 
England because of a set of fortuitous coincidences. Lancashire’s towns were free of 
medieval restrictions that retarded the development of manufacturing and commerce 
in many other English towns. Lancashire was situated spatially and topographically 
so that barge canals could easily be constructed to nearby Liverpool and the Thames 
River, making transportation of raw cotton from and finished goods to the seaports 
easy and inexpensive. Lancashire also sat atop a coalfield that provided cheap, easily 
accessible fuel for the steam engines that powered the mills.
9
  
The rise of the British cotton manufacturing industry and invention of the 
cotton gin changed the trajectory of economic and political development in the United 
States. Prior to Whitney’s invention of the gin, cotton was a sideline crop grown 
mostly in small garden plots for making homespun cloth. Slave labor was not 
employed in cotton growing on a large scale. It appeared that slavery was becoming 
economically unviable as agricultural labor in the South as had already happened in 
the North. The cotton gin created a tremendous new demand for field hands to pick 
the cotton bolls, and thus reinvigorated slavery. Of equal importance to the gin was 
the introduction of a variety of Gossypium hirsutum cotton called “Petit Gulf,” the 
first seed of which were obtained from central Mexico at an uncertain date around 
1800. Prior to the introduction of Petit Gulf, the upland cotton grown in the United 
States was Gossypium herbaceum, the foundation seed of which came from the Near 
East in the 1600s. Petit Gulf cotton was a hardy upland plant that adapted readily to 
                                                 
9
 Arnold, The History of the Cotton Famine, 2-7; James A. Mann, The Cotton Trade of Great 
Britain; Its Rise, Progress, & Present Extent (London: Limpkin, Marshall & Co., 1860), 42-45; 
Watkins, King Cotton, 17; Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain, 1-62. 
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the soil and climate of the lower Mississippi Valley, and it provided the foundation 
stock of all subsequent American varieties known collectively as “New Orleans” 
cotton. Petit Gulf cotton yielded more per acre than the Near Eastern variety 
previously grown for domestic homespun, its seed were easier to remove, and its 
longer staple length and fiber characteristics imparted superior spinning qualities.
10
  
Geography and the advent of steamboats also facilitated commercial cotton 
growing in the United States. The Mississippi River system, with its more than 
16,000 miles of navigable streams, provided a huge area of undeveloped land that 
was ideally suited to cotton cultivation easy access to the sea at New Orleans, while 
the Tensaw-Alabama-Tombigbee River system gave Alabama’s hinterlands access to 
Mobile. Navigable rivers also gave the cotton lands of South Carolina and Georgia 
easy access to their Atlantic ports. Steamboats made the waterways useful in both 
directions, and, by the 1840s over three hundred boats were operating on the western 
rivers, almost all of them engaged in transporting cotton during fall and winter selling 
season. During the 1845-46 marketing season, steamboats carried more than 800,000 
bales of cotton to New Orleans for export.
11
  
A ready market, abundant slave labor, surplus land, a variety of cotton 
adapted to the environment and suited to manufacturing, and inexpensive riverine 
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transportation made possible an enormous expansion of cotton acreage in a very short 
time. The United States exported less than 500,000 pounds of cotton in 1793. Ten 
years later, 41 million pounds of American cotton was exported. Prices as high as 35 
cents per pound at New Orleans encouraged the rapid settlement and establishment of 
plantations in the new “Cotton Belt” states of Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, 
Arkansas, and Tennessee. By 1820, the United States was exporting almost 128 
million pounds of cotton; 90 million pounds of it went to Britain. As the quantity of 
cotton grown in the United States increased, production outpaced demand, and the 
price declined steadily. By the early 1840s the price dropped to 4 ½ cents per pound. 
Yet American production continued to increase, as did English imports, because the 
low-priced cotton and high demand for cloth meant that the mills returned a 
handsome profit on capital, as much as 30 percent per annum, and the profit was 
invested back into more manufacturing capacity. A cyclical positive feedback loop 
developed. Each increase in mill capacity caused a short-term increase in demand that 
raised the price of raw cotton slightly, encouraging American planters to grow more. 
Increased supply caused a subsequent dip in cotton prices. Low-cost cotton and 
increased mill capacity and efficiency brought down the cost of finished goods, 
enabling sellers to charge lower prices. Each decrease in price brought the finished 
product within economic reach of a greater number of end users, resulting in 
increased sales. The resultant profits encouraged English manufacturers to add still 
more mill capacity, thereby increasing demand that caused another short-term rise in 
cotton prices.
12
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In King Cotton’s peculiar realm, the basic economic law of supply and 
demand seemed to operate according to Say’s Law, which in its simplest form states, 
“Supply creates its own demand. Production creates demand sufficient to purchase all 
the goods and services produced.”13  The cotton market certainly behaved differently 
than did other commodities markets. Exports of American wheat varied drastically 
year-to-year, with frequent catastrophic collapses in demand due to big crops in 
Europe, and with corresponding swings in price. Grain shipments to Great Britain and 
Ireland dropped from over 21 million bushels in 1847 to 2 million the next year, rose 
gradually to 12 million bushels in 1854, dropped to 7 million in 1855, averaged 12 
million bushels for the next three years, and then collapsed to less than a million 
bushels in 1859. In years of high production and low demand, farmers sometimes 
could not find a buyer for their grain. Cotton exports on the other hand showed a 
steady increase, with temporary reductions in exports occurring only when the crop 
was short. The price of cotton rose when the crop was short and fell when the crop 
was large, but the mills never failed to take all the cotton that American planters 
could grow.
14
 
Corollary to this notion that demand for cotton was driven by its supply, there 
emerged another quirk in economic logic that was unique to cotton. Dictionaries of 
the mid-nineteenth century do not contain the modern economic term consumer 
goods, but they define the word consume in some variation of the way Noah Webster 
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did in 1857, “To destroy, by separating the parts of a thing by decomposition, as by 
fire, or by eating, devouring, and annihilating the form of a substance.”15 The French 
economist Jean-Baptiste Say wrote, “by consumption is meant the destruction of 
utility, and not of substance, or matter. When once the utility of a thing is destroyed, 
there is an end of the source and basis of its value.”16 In the peculiar case of cotton, 
the spinning mills, not the final end-users of cloth, were thought of as consumers. 
Comparatively little concern was given to end-user markets because India and China 
were thought to be bottomless economic sinks that could swallow limitless quantities 
of manufactured cotton goods provided there were no barriers to free trade and the 
retail price remained below the cost of homespun. An article from the U.S. Economist 
reprinted in The Southern Planter in 1860 called the potential of the Asiatic market 
“almost limitless.”17 In the thinking of the time, it was as if raw cotton was the fuel 
powering the economic engine. A letter to The Cotton Supply Reporter expressed this 
idea when the writer said, “Our own consumption of this article depends simply on 
the crop. We take all we can get, and desire only that the supply should be good, 
cheap, and certain.”18 An article published in 1860 in the Levant Herald, an English 
newspaper published in Constantinople, stated this belief even more succinctly: 
For whilst in other manufactures demand regulates the produce of the 
raw material, it is the reverse in this. Cotton wool can never become a 
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‘drug’ in Manchester, but the greater the supplies of it, the greater still 
the demand.
19
 
 
Field labor was the factor that governed how much cotton was grown, and 
cotton had its own peculiar economic logic when it came to calculating labor cost. To 
illustrate this, consider the following example. In the 1820s, as the cotton plantation 
economy was becoming established in Georgia, South Carolina, and the new states of 
the Old Southwest, diversified farmers in Ohio paid their year-round farmhands $12 a 
month plus room and board, making an employer’s yearly labor cost $144 in wages 
plus the expense of food and housing customarily provided to a farmhand. The Ohio 
farmer’s total labor cost per hand was thus approximately $165 per annum. 
Calculated from prices paid for various types of produce in the 1820s and estimated 
yields, a hired hand working on a farm that raised wheat, corn, and hogs would 
produce annually about $250 worth of goods. After the farmer paid his production 
costs exclusive of labor, he would be left with about $195, more or less depending on 
the vagaries of weather, other growing conditions, and the farmer’s managerial 
efficiency. After paying his hired hand’s $165 wages and upkeep, the Ohio farmer 
would realize a profit of around $30.
20
 
Cotton presented a very different cost calculation, however. The price of 
cotton, like that of any commodity, was set by market demand, which in the case of 
cotton was primarily the demand of the English mills. What the English mills could 
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pay for raw cotton was in turn set by what the market for cotton yarn and cloth would 
bear. Because three quarters of the cloth that the English produced was sold in India, 
China, Eastern Europe, Russia, South America, and the Near East, locales where a 
large proportion of the buyers were first-generation consumers of factory-made cloth, 
British manufacturers dared not raise the prices that they charged much above what 
was necessary to cover their production costs lest the people in those markets stop 
buying industrially manufactured cloth and revert to domestic homespun. English 
mill owners were squeezed because their cost for building, machinery and 
transportation was fixed, and they were already paying their laborers the bare 
minimum necessary for sustenance. The cost variable that most affected the price of 
finished goods was the price that spinners paid the American planter for his cotton, in 
1820 about 15 cents per pound. Using ante-bellum cultivation methods, one acre of 
cotton would yield about 250 pounds of lint. The general rule of thumb was that one 
field hand could tend three acres of cotton. Picking the bolls required by far the 
largest amount of labor in terms of man-hours. At those prices, one field hand could 
produce about $115 worth of cotton each year. Of that amount the planter cleared 
about $90, excluding labor cost. Were a cotton planter to pay a field hand at the same 
rate as an Ohio grain-hog farmer paid his hired hand, the planter would pay $85 more 
for labor than the cotton that laborer produced would sell for.
21
 
A $500 slave seemed at first to be more costly than a $12 per month free hired 
hand, but in fact the slave’s cost was less. That is because a prime male field hand 
was expected to yield at least ten years’ labor, so his purchase price could be 
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amortized over those ten years, making his labor cost $50 per annum. To this was 
added his upkeep of about $30, making the slave’s labor cost his master $80 per year, 
with the result that the planter realized a profit of $10 per year on his cotton. This 
peculiar situation also meant that for a Southern cotton planter to attain the same level 
of income as a Northern farmer who raised grain and hogs, he had to have three times 
as many field hands. 
Another peculiarity of cotton was the semi-barter system known as factorage 
through which production was financed and the cotton marketed. Whereas Northern 
grain farmers operated in a money economy, Southern cotton planters were at the 
bottom of a multi-tiered system of extended credit that took the form of goods 
advanced against future sales of cotton. Middlemen known as factors supplied the 
planters with needed manufactured goods on credit, with payment to be made when 
the planter’s cotton was sold. This sale the factor handled as commission agent. 
Factors in turn obtained advances against future sales of cotton from New York and 
Liverpool cotton brokers. The factors used the advances to purchase manufactured 
goods from Northern merchant firms, most of them in located in New York. 
Oftentimes the New York cotton broker advancing the money and the New York 
merchant supplying the factor with his manufactured goods was one in the same. 
Very little actual money from the sale of cotton ever found its way back to the South. 
This cashless system of exchange thwarted any form of economic activity in the 
South other than large-scale plantation cotton agriculture that relied on slave labor.
22
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Cotton growing by yeomen farmers was deemed economically impossible. At 
prevailing prices, the quantity of cotton that one man could raise on his own land 
simply did not earn an amount sufficient to sustain him. At best a man, his wife, and 
several working children might eke out a bare existence raising six to ten acres of 
cotton, while with the same amount of labor they could get a greater return from 
crops other than cotton. Nor could yeomen growing cotton as a sideline crop produce 
enough to satisfy the demand for it from the English mills. Contrary to popular belief, 
there was no environmental reason that precluded cotton being grown as far north as 
Springfield, Illinois. Cotton could be and was grown on diversified farms north of the 
Ohio River until the 1840s, when it became unprofitable for farmers there to grow 
it.
23
 
Moreover, while the advent of mechanical reapers and threshers greatly 
increased labor productivity on grain farms, the cotton plant defied repeated attempts 
to mechanize its harvesting because cotton plants bloomed and set seed bolls 
throughout their long growing season. This characteristic precluded a mechanical 
harvester making one pass over the field and gathering the entire crop. Cotton pickers 
had to make repeated passes through the field, hand harvesting the bolls as they 
ripened. Horse-drawn cotton-picking machines identical in mechanical principle to 
modern mechanized cotton harvesters were invented and tried in the 1850s, but the 
cotton plant thwarted their successful operation for the next one hundred years. Not 
                                                 
23
 John P. Reynolds, “Essay on the Importance of Cotton as a Crop, and its Cultivation on the 
Prairies of the South Half of the State,” The Journal of the Illinois State Agricultural Society 1, no. 2 
(Feb., 1862): 3-4. 
 
 23 
until the advent of chemical ripening agents and defoliants in the late-1950s did it 
become possible to mechanize cotton harvesting.
24
 
The downward trend in prices that occurred concurrent with the exponential 
increase in American production was disastrous for cotton growers in other parts of 
the world. Cotton prices fell below their costs of production and transportation, and 
they either stopped growing cotton entirely or reduced their planting to the amount 
needed to sustain local textile manufacture by traditional handicraft methods. The 
British West Indies, for example, exported 11,223,446 pounds of cotton to England in 
1815. The quantity had declined to half that in 1825, to a tenth in 1840, and to just 
427,735 pounds in 1850. In the Ottoman Empire, once continental Europe’s major 
cotton supplier, exports virtually ceased and production plummeted as English 
manufactured yarn and cloth forced local handicraft textiles out of the market. 
Brazilian planters, although they did not abandon cotton growing as did those in the 
West Indies, did not increase the size of their crop. England’s yearly imports from 
Brazil remained stagnant at around 20 million pounds for four decades. India’s output 
of cotton and the volume that it exported to Britain increased substantially, but 
because of high transportation costs and the low quality of indigenous Indian “Surat” 
cotton, its share of the English market declined from 26 percent in 1815 to an average 
of less than half that for the next forty-five years. That Indian cotton retained the 
share that it did is probably because it found a niche in coarse cloth used for making 
grain sacks. By the 1850s, Brazil, India, and the British West Indies, which between 
them supplied 49 percent of the cotton consumed in English mills in 1815 versus 46 
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percent from the United States, had shrunk to insignificance, leaving the United 
States as the monopoly supplier.
25
 
Lancashire cotton spinners came to prefer the American Petit Gulf and its 
derivative varieties over all other types of cotton except Sea Island and Egypt’s 
exceptionally fine and expensive arboreal “Jumel” variety, as did the end-users of 
cloth. American cotton could be spun into much finer yarn than could the Indian 
Surat or similar coarse, short-staple varieties from Brazil and the Near East. Finer 
diameter, softer yarn meant that cloth woven from American cotton was much softer, 
smoother, and more comfortable to wear than cloth made from Indian cotton. 
Spinners optimized their machinery to the characteristics of American cotton, an 
adaptation that made it extremely difficult to spin coarser, shorter staple Surat-type 
cotton. This further reinforced the American monopoly, since even if the economic 
and physical obstacles to obtaining cotton elsewhere could be overcome, that cotton 
was not suitable for the machinery in British mills. Modifying the machines was also 
a near impossibility. In 1860 it would have involved modifying or replacing more 
than 30 million individual spindles.
26
 
It would do well to remember that the period of rapid industrialization 
between the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 and the outbreak of the American 
Civil War were years of great social turmoil in Europe. Britain had escaped the worst 
of the revolutionary upheavals that convulsed Europe between 1830 and 1860, mainly 
through a combination of political reforms that admitted the burgeoning new 
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business-professional middle class into the governing elite, enacting laws that 
mandated improvements in working conditions in mines and factories, and repealing 
the so-called Corn Laws, a set of laws that kept the price of English grain high by 
limiting grain imports, in order to lower food prices. Most importantly, England 
preserved social peace by fostering full employment of its poor working class through 
industrial growth and economic prosperity based on cotton cloth exports. 
Revolutionary upheavals in Europe that coincided with unemployment in the mills 
caused by shortages of American cotton in 1830, when a severe drought damaged the 
crop, and in 1848, after army worms devastated the 1846 and 1847 crops, made the 
British ruling classes fearful that a prolonged interruption in the supply of American 
cotton that caused a crippling shutdown of the cotton mills would bring about 
working-class revolution. Some feared that such a revolution would lead to collapse 
of the liberal capitalist economic system. Indeed it was feared that a prolonged 
interruption in the cotton supply would cause the social order and institutions of 
Western civilization to collapse. It was this feared catastrophe that Senator Hammond 
alluded to in his famous “Cotton is King” speech.27 
Though laden with oratorical bombast, Hammond’s speech was grounded in 
the economic reasoning of the time. Although it is popularly attributed to Hammond, 
the term “King Cotton” actually comes from a book, Cotton is King: or Slavery in the 
Light of Political Economy, written by a Northerner, David Christy of Cincinnati, 
Ohio, in 1855. Although David Christy’s argument is almost invariably lumped into 
the “pro-slavery” category, he abhorred slavery, and his complex politico-economic 
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thesis is seldom examined. Reviewing it is worthwhile in order to better understand 
the role of cotton in the political economy and the ideology surrounding it. Christy 
was an officer of the African Colonization Society, an abolitionist organization 
dedicated to gradually emancipating the slaves and sending them to Africa. Cotton is 
King was the report of an overseas fact-finding mission that Christy undertook on 
behalf of the Colonization Society. In it, he examined the socio-economic effects of 
technological innovations in the cotton industry and alleged that the cotton-driven 
capitalist economy was a vicious circle of which slavery was an inescapable part. To 
sustain the high volume of production necessary to maintain full employment in the 
cotton mills so vital to social peace in Britain and return the profits needed to 
underwrite further industrialization, British manufacturers had to keep the price of 
cloth low enough to sell large quantities of it in undeveloped countries. With their 
other costs fixed, manufacturers had to keep the price of raw cotton so low that it 
could not be produced in sufficient quantity without slave labor. Slavery as it existed 
in the United States, Christy asserted, had resulted directly from the economic 
influence exerted by the British cloth weaving industry’s insatiable appetite for the 
labor-intensive, thin profit margin fiber.
28
 
Christy’s book was an indictment of the structure of Britain’s cotton-based 
industrial capitalist economic system and a condemnation of the hypocrisy of the 
British government’s support of abolition in light of its liberal economic policy and 
imperialism, not a defense of slavery. Christy argued that the “free” labor that 
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Britain’s Liberal industrialists and abolitionist elite advocated employing to produce 
cotton in Africa and India as a way to break the British economy’s dependence on 
slave-produced American cotton was not free at all. He wrote: 
Great Britain, in her efforts to promote cotton cultivation in India and 
Africa, now acts upon this principle [imposing a money economy on 
traditional societies, thus forcing them to grow cash crops], and that 
she thereby acknowledges the truth of the views which the author has 
advanced. It will be seen also, that to check American slavery and 
prevent a renewal of the slave trade by America’s planters, she has 
decided to employ the slaves of Africa in the production of cotton: that 
is to say, the slavery of America is to be opposed by arraying against it 
the slavery of Africa—the petty chiefs there being required to force 
their slaves to the cotton patches, that the masters here may find a 
diminishing market for the products of their plantations.
29
 
 
Christy asserted that Britain, because of its over-reliance on the cotton 
industry, and the United States, by allowing slave-produced cotton to become its 
principal export, had both fallen into an economically inescapable trap. He also 
inferred that the British government’s official support of abolition had less to do with 
moral opposition to slavery than it did with advancing the long-term strategic goal of 
breaking the United States’ cotton-growing monopoly in order to negate the threat 
that American control of the cotton supply presented to the British Empire.
30
  
Many knowledgeable people in Britain agreed with large portions of Christy’s 
economic argument, though most of them vehemently disagreed with his contention 
that employing low-cost native labor to grow cotton in undeveloped countries was 
slavery in another guise. Karl Marx, who both opposed slavery and considered the 
United States to be the most progressive nation in the world, asserted that, “Without 
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slavery you have no cotton, without cotton you cannot have modern industry.”31 Marx 
also wrote, “Cause slavery to disappear, and you will have effaced America from the 
map of nations.”32 
Fears of an interruption of the supply of American cotton appeared in Britain 
as a result of Thomas Jefferson’s trade embargo of 1807-1809. In February 1809 the 
Court of Directors of the East India Company warned that unless Britain secured a 
supply of cotton from its own colonial possessions the United States had the capacity 
to severely curtail British industry and commerce.
33
 The cutoff of American cotton 
during the War of 1812 increased those fears. Should Great Britain and the United 
States again go to war, all that the Americans need do to cripple Britain’s economy 
was close their own cotton exporting ports. The 1831 Nat Turner Rebellion reinforced 
fears that a massive slave insurrection might someday erupt in the United States. In 
addition, the disastrous potato blight that struck Ireland in 1845-1847 prompted 
worries that a similar disease might wipe out the American cotton crop. Alarms of 
immediate threat sounded in 1851 when several hundred American cotton planters 
met in Macon, Georgia, and formed the Cotton Planters’ Association. The 
organization was intended to function as a cartel that would buy all American-grown 
cotton at a predetermined price and then set the price charged to overseas consumers. 
The scheme failed to come to fruition because the American Cotton Planters’ 
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Association was unable to secure the $20 million capital needed to finance it. 
Nevertheless, the prospect that American cotton planters might organize a cartel 
haunted British cotton interests for the next decade. 
34
 
Attempts to address Britain’s dependence on American cotton began in 1813, 
when the East India Company hired Bernard Metcalfe, a Georgia planter and cotton 
ginner, to install and operate Whitney saw gins in Madras.
35
 The East India Company 
began experimental planting of American cotton seeds near Bombay in 1828. At that 
time the East India Company obtained six additional Whitney cotton gins from the 
United States. These were used as models to manufacture the iron work for twelve 
gins in Britain. This ironwork, which was to be mounted in its woodwork in India, 
was shipped along with American seeds to Bombay, Madras, and Bengal during the 
winter of 1829-30.
36
 This experiment resulted in about 500 bales of cotton each 
weighing 249 pounds.
37
 After the experiment’s conclusion, the East India Company 
compiled a 431-page illustrated report about its cotton activities dating from 1788 to 
1835. 
In April 1839, the East India Company began another, much larger, 
experiment with American seeds and gins in India. The Company sent Lieutenant 
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Thomas Bayles, a British officer with experience in India, on a mission to the United 
States to initiate the project.
38
 Bayles purchased a large supply of New Orleans seed, 
200 small hand-cranked gins, and other implements of the type used in the United 
States. Bayles hired ten American plantation overseers to go to India and establish 
cotton plantations where they would demonstrate American cultivation methods to 
the Indian farmers, called ryots. One American, Mr. W. R. Mercer, established a 
demonstration farm in the upland Dharwar district southeast of Bombay. Mercer 
supervised the planting of 600 acres of American cotton in 1842, and by 1845 the 
local ryots, encouraged by the promise that their cotton would be purchased at a 
preset price by the East India Company, had planted 15,000 acres. Mercer estimated 
that the district produced 1 million pounds of cotton from American seed that year. 
This was an impressive quantity, but at only 66 pounds per acre the yield was far 
below the normal yield in the United States. Low yield was not the only difficulty 
encountered, nor the hardest to overcome. Transportation was in an extremely 
primitive state. Bullocks were used to haul 700 bales of Dharwar cotton nearly 300 
miles to Bombay, on roads that “were mere tracks marked out by bullocks’ feet, 
without bridges and rendered impassable by the nullahs after rain.”39  
At Bombay, the cotton was loaded into the East India Company ship Quentin 
Leitch for the voyage round the Cape of Good Hope to Liverpool, where it finally 
arrived in August 1847. The Quentin Leitch was followed by other ships bringing 
cotton grown from American seed under the supervision of American overseers in 
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various Indian locales. At least eight East Indiamen arrived at Liverpool, bringing 
5,025 bales. Spinners pronounced the Indian grown cotton to be as good as that 
grown in America, and bought it at the same prices.
 40
  
Though successful from a horticultural standpoint, transportation costs 
doomed the cotton-growing experiment in India, and the East India Company 
abandoned the project in 1849. Without an assured market, the Indian ryots stopped 
growing cotton for export. The experiment also revealed another problem. Within 
three years the American cotton hybridized with the native Surat. The resultant fiber 
was unsuitable for the English spinning mills. Many people wrongly concluded that 
the physical changes in the cotton fiber were the result of the plant acclimatizing itself 
to the soil and climate of India. Newspapers in the United States trumpeted the 
experiment’s outcome, and declared that the East India Company had at great 
expense proven that, “the East Indies were not at all fitted for the production of 
cotton, and that the experiment was a failure.”41 
As a result, the American cotton monopoly seemed more secure than ever. 
Such was American confidence in the cotton monopoly’s continuance that in the 
spring of 1857 The American Cotton Planter and Soil of the South could boldly 
declare: 
England, ever watchful of her commercial and manufacturing 
interests, has been casting about for the last quarter of a century for 
some source from which she could obtain cotton independent of the 
United States. She has induced, at the expense of probably a million of 
                                                 
40
 J. Forbes Royle, On the Culture and Commerce of Cotton in India, and Elsewhere (London: 
Smith, Elder, & Co., 1851), 98-116. 
 
41
 Weekly Nashville Union (Nashville, TN), Oct. 28, 1846. Story “Cotton in India” reprinted 
from the Richmond Enquirer. 
 
 32 
dollars, to make the experiment in India, which ended in utter failure. 
… Those who entertain the theory that because a country is 
sufficiently hot, it therefore ought, with a favorable soil, to produce 
cotton, show a deficiency of practical knowledge of the subject. 
 It is so arranged in the order of Providence, that the United 
States possesses the only climate and soil adapted to the extended 
culture of cotton to be found, probably on the habitable globe. … The 
question at present as to the future supply of cotton is one of labor. 
The consumption of the article and its prices must be greatly 
influenced by the supply of labor. Our cotton lands…are yet extensive 
enough, if brought into full cultivation, to produce many millions of 
bales over the present yield just as easily as three million bales are 
now grown. … Have we the labor to produce it? Clearly not!42 
 
At the meeting of the Southern Commercial Convention held in Montgomery, 
Alabama, in 1858 William L. Yancey, who was later appointed to represent the 
Confederacy in England as a diplomat, advocated reopening the African slave trade. 
Yancey based his argument on the economic logic that the price of slaves was high 
because the labor supply was insufficient to meet the rising demand for cotton. More 
plentiful and thus cheaper slave labor would result in more and cheaper cotton. The 
Southern Commercial Convention subsequently approved a resolution calling for the 
repeal of all American laws banning the importation of slaves from Africa.
43
 
Yet at the same time American cotton planters’ confidence was soaring, a new 
effort to break the monopoly was being organized in England. That effort would 
prove far more adept at accomplishing its goal than had past English efforts, and it 
would contribute substantially to the South’s defeat in the Civil War by helping keep 
England on the sidelines. 
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Chapter 2 
Parameters of the Cotton Crisis 
 
 
The Cotton Supply Association was formed by an élite group of about forty 
prominent British cotton spinners, manufacturers, brokers, bankers, and members of 
Parliament who met in the Mayor’s Parlor in Manchester Town Hall in the spring of 
1857. The members elected John Cheetham, MP, as the Association’s first president 
and G. R. Haywood as secretary. The Cotton Supply Association’s stated mission 
was, “to obtain as full and reliable information as possible respecting the extent and 
capabilities of cotton cultivation in every country where it could be grown.”1 Its 
ultimate goal was to free England from her dependence on American cotton. 
The Cotton Supply Association rented offices at 1 Newall’s Buildings on 
Market Street in downtown Manchester and a small staff went to work collecting 
cotton intelligence from around the globe. To disseminate the information that it 
gathered the Association began publishing its own twice-monthly trade journal, The 
Cotton Supply Reporter, in August 1858.
2
 Isaac Watts, in his The Cotton Supply 
Association: Its Origin and Progress, written as a secretary’s report addressed to the 
Association’s president, council, and members in 1871, did not identify the working 
staff at the Newall’s Buildings office, nor did he say anything about the office’s 
organizational structure. Watts was editor of The Cotton Supply Reporter and was 
probably in charge of the office’s day-to-day operations. It is evident from Watts and 
from The Cotton Supply Reporter that the red brick building located adjacent to the 
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old Royal Manchester Exchange housed a politically well-connected and well-
financed organization with worldwide reach whose intelligence collection and 
analysis methods were adopted from contemporary journalism, and that also planned, 
financed, coordinated, and provided logistical support to multifaceted field operations 
on a global scale.
3
 
In addition to the overseas contacts and business agents of its members, the 
Cotton Supply Association had the assistance of the Foreign Office, which instructed 
British consuls to provide detailed reports about cotton production or the prospects 
for it in their areas. The Foreign Office forwarded these consular despatches to the 
Cotton Supply Association’s office, and selected reports and extracts were then 
published in The Cotton Supply Reporter. Using funds solicited from its members, the 
Association began sponsoring experiments in growing cotton from seeds bought by 
its agents in the United States. British consuls abroad assisted in these experiments by 
distributing seeds and instructional pamphlets sent to them by the Association.
4
 
British consuls acting on behalf of the Cotton Supply Association also 
occasionally engaged in activities that today would come close to being industrial 
espionage. In response to a query from the Association concerning cotton gins 
suitable for use in Africa sent through the Foreign Office to Consul William Mure in 
New Orleans, Mure replied, “The one most in favour among the planters is what is 
called ‘E. Carver’s Patent Improved Cotton Gin’”, a small, portable machine that was 
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simple, rugged, and inexpensive. Mure went on to tell the Foreign Office and the 
Cotton Supply Association: 
I have succeeded in procuring from the agent here a diagram of 
the cotton gin, accompanied by remarks and directions, a copy of 
which I beg to transmit herewith. … A good Manchester machinist 
might understand from this diagram and description the principle of 
this machine, but I would venture to suggest that it would be better to 
order one of the small sized ones…the cost of which would not exceed 
thirty-five pounds sterling, from which any number might be 
manufactured.
5
 
 
In addition to businessmen, the Cotton Supply Association also included 
among its members several prominent clergymen, and through them it established 
correspondence with British missionaries overseas. Missionaries in West Africa, in 
particular, took a keen interest in encouraging cotton growing, seeing it, as did 
Alexander Robb in Old Town, Kalabar, as a way to “civilize” the “degraded” natives 
by encouraging them to adopt habits of labor and industriousness.
6
 Writing about 
English missionaries’ attitude toward promoting cotton cultivation, the New York 
Times said, “every missionary explorer who leaves England to penetrate the African 
interior must…take with them the cotton-gin and cotton seed.”7 Indeed, the 
missionary societies saw the good of the cotton industry and their mission to 
evangelize and civilize native peoples as inseparable. In a speech in the House of 
Commons in July 1861 it was asserted that the American Civil War was, “the 
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opportunity of nations…it may clothe the world in garments cheap enough to 
evangelize it—for Christianity without clothes is impossible.”8 
The Cotton Supply Association’s efforts in Africa received some 
encouragement from abolitionists in the United States. In April 1859, Edward 
Atkinson, a wealthy Boston cotton manufacturer and prominent abolitionist who was 
reputed to be the foremost American expert on the cotton industry, placed an order 
for 4,000 pounds of African cotton at 14 cents per pound delivered at Boston with 
Thomas Clegg, a member of the Cotton Supply Association. Atkinson’s stated intent 
was to manufacture the cotton into cloth as a demonstration project to show other 
New England manufacturers that cheap African cotton imported via England could be 
used to undercut slave-grown American cotton. Atkinson hoped that low priced 
cotton from Africa would make slavery in America economically unviable. Nothing 
came of the effort, but Atkinson’s correspondence with Clegg indicates that American 
abolitionists and the Cotton Supply Association were aware of one another’s goals 
and that those goals were mutually compatible.
9
 
The Association’s primary focus was upon India, where it established 
relations with the British administration in India and with the Agricultural and 
Horticultural Society of India and its many gentlemen gardeners scattered throughout 
the sub-continent. In what was probably its most extraordinary move, the Association 
proposed that the government facilitate cotton production in India by expending 
£20,000,000 over the next five years to improve transportation infrastructure, with the 
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money to be recouped through user tolls. But the Association did not ignore any 
locale where it might be possible to grow cotton, no matter how remote it might be. 
At the Association’s second annual meeting, held in Manchester Town Hall on May 
10, 1859, it was reported: 
Grants of Cotton-seed, from one bag to two hundred each, have 
been made, and forwarded chiefly to Bombay, Madras, Calcutta, 
Singapore; Sydney, in Australia, Savanilla, and Baranquilla, in South 
America; Sonsonate, Belize, and San Miguel, in British Hondouras; 
Guatemala, Cuba, Jamaica, and Haiti, in the West Indies; Tunis, 
Lagos, Fernando Po, Sierra Leone, Cape Coast Castle, Cameroons, 
Bossessame, Monrovia, and Natal, in Africa; Macedonia, Aleppo, 
Jaffa, Sidon, Kaiffa, Broussa, Salonica, Serres, Constantinople, and 
Messina; and also to Attica, Argolide, Messinie, Laconia, Arcadia, 
Achaia, Phthiotis, Euboea, Cyclades, and the Agricultural School in 
Greece. 
Grants of Cotton Gins also have been made, and forwarded 
chiefly to Bombay, Hyderabad, and Ahmeabad, in India; Kanday, in 
Ceylon; Batavia; Singapore; Sydney, in Australia; the South Sea 
Islands; Peru, in South America; Sonsonate and Belize, in British 
Hondouras; Tunis, Morocco, Abbeokuta, Lagos, Cape Coast Castle, 
Cape Palmas, Sierra Leone, and Cameroons, in Africa; Dardanelles; 
Larnaca; Broussa, and Athens.
10
 
 
During the three years prior to May 1860, the Association expended £4,013 to 
distribute 591 barrels of cotton seeds and 254 cotton gins.
11
 These far-flung efforts 
were in the nature of small-scale experiment farms and demonstrations, not 
commercial cotton planting enterprises. John Cheetham told the Association’s 
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members optimistically, “If only we throw the seed broad-cast, as we have been 
doing, the fruits of industry and planting will inevitably result.”12 
The Association’s efforts met with strong opposition from the Manchester 
school of economists, who deemed it interference with the workings of the free 
market. In the words of Isaac Watts, the Manchester school’s laissez-faire belief was 
that, “If there was any country or any people fitted to rival America in cotton culture, 
that people would find it out for themselves without any suggestions of ours.”13 
Many of the Association’s own members despaired of breaking the American 
monopoly by substituting free labor in the West Indies, India, Africa, and elsewhere 
for enslaved labor in America. Speaking to the Association’s fourth annual meeting 
on July 11, 1861, one of its founding members, Mr. William Cross, recalled that there 
had been much criticism of the fact that in the first four years of its existence the 
Association had spent £17,000 on numerous experiments and demonstrations, but had 
gotten no cotton to show for it. Henry Ashworth, another founding member who 
spoke at the meeting, said, “For years past some have imagined no doubt that we, the 
members of the association, have been dreaming and alarming ourselves 
unnecessarily about some cotton event which might or might not occur in any of our 
lifetimes.”14  
In January 1861, The London Review expressed this sense of futility when it 
reported: 
                                                 
12
 Cotton Supply Association, The Second Annual Report of the Manchester Cotton Supply 
Association, 23. 
 
13
 Watts, The Cotton Supply Association: Its Origin and Progress, 112. 
 
14
 Cotton Supply Reporter 1, no. 68 (June 15, 1861): 531 and 537. 
 
 39 
[I]t cannot be argued that a sudden emergency in the American market 
could be counter-balanced by any prospective increase in [cotton 
growing elsewhere]. The amount of produce must always depend on 
the amount of coloured labour which can be made available, not as a 
spasmodic effort, but as a permanent employment, supervised and 
assisted by European agency and capital. … In a country where all the 
necessities of life are procurable without exertion, the habit of 
continuous labour has to be learnt. … The Negro working on his own 
patch of ground can only give garden quantities, and no individual 
efforts can compete successfully with the organized slave labour of 
America.
15
 
 
Others saw portents that the seemingly ironclad political economy that assured 
the American cotton monopoly’s continuance might be about to crack, and that the 
event would be cataclysmic. John Brown’s raid on the U.S. Arsenal at Harpers Ferry 
in October 1859 and subsequent news reports of slave conspiracies sent a shockwave 
through the British cotton industry that affected every sector of British society.
16
 
Writing during the summer between Brown’s raid and the election of Abraham 
Lincoln to the presidency in November 1860, British historian and political economist 
James A. Mann wrote: 
Ruinously low prices of cotton would extinguish slavery, but in 
the Southern States of America it is now more prosperous than ever. 
How long this can continue is a question which must arise in every 
mind, and one as difficult to find a reply to. While acknowledging its 
terrible strength from its deep rooted vitality, we must all dread the 
severity of the revulsion which must sooner or later arrive, and of 
which we have even lately received practical and unmistakable 
warning.
17
 
 
Reading with hindsight and from an American perspective, one perceives that 
Mann saw in John Brown’s raid a portent of a massive servile rebellion, the 
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impending Civil War, or both. However, Mann was writing from the viewpoint of a 
British political economist in the late summer of 1860. He did not specifically 
mention either Brown’s raid on Harpers Ferry or the approaching political rupture in 
the United States. The “revulsion” that Mann foresaw may have been something of an 
entirely different nature: a paralyzing systemic failure in the cotton economy itself. 
Demand for cotton outpaced supply in the years 1854-1857. Severe drought 
reduced the 1856 crop to slightly less than 3 million bales, and the price of cotton on 
the Liverpool market rose from the low 5 d. per pound prices common in 1849 to 
slightly over 9 d. per pound in September 1856—an increase of 80 percent.18 These 
prices on the Liverpool exchange translated into planters being paid as high as 12 ½ 
cents at New Orleans in 1856, the highest price paid for cotton since 1839. Planters 
were seized by what Frederic Bancroft called the “Negro Fever,” an obsession with 
securing labor to meet the increased demand for cotton that they anticipated in the 
near future. Competition for available slaves was intense, and prices for field hands 
rose to $1600 and $1800 in January 1857. Children under the age of ten years sold for 
$800 and women close to sixty years of age often brought $700 or more.
19
  
The 1857 crop was 20 percent larger than the one before it, yet demand for it 
held strong. The price at New Orleans reached 14¼ cents, and the general financial 
panic that struck in October 1857 did not greatly affect the cotton markets. This 
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further encouraged the planters’ belief that the demand for cotton was about to 
outstrip the supply of labor available to produce it, and they continued to bid up the 
price of slaves. The 1858 crop came in at 3,851,000 bales, 680,000 bales larger than 
the previous year’s crop. Prices declined slightly, but many attributed the drop to 
jitters in the European financial markets because of the short war between France and 
Austria that broke out in April.
20
 News that new mills were under construction in 
Lancashire convinced planters that demand for cotton was about to soar, and they 
continued their slave-buying binge. In Alabama, field hands sold for $2,100 in 
January 1859, and it was reported that slave traders were scouring the Border States 
for every available slave.
21
 
Weather that year was favorable, and there were no major insect infestations, 
with the result that the 1859 crop was the largest grown up until that date. A traveler 
passing through New Orleans wrote home to San Francisco on December 5, 1859, 
“Cotton…is coming down in quantities so vast, that all calculators as to the amount of 
this year’s crop find themselves entirely unable to form hardly more than a conjecture 
as to what it will be.”22 Less than a month later, New Orleans brokers were estimating 
that the 1859 crop might be 4,250,000 bales, a half million bales more than in any 
previous year. On May 1, The Cotton Supply Reporter predicted that the crop would 
be slightly less than that: it said 4,225,000 bales. By the end of the month receipts had 
surpassed both estimates and American newspapers were reporting that the crop 
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would be 4,500,000 bales. Actual receipts at the end of the marketing season on 
August 31, 1860 came in above even that estimate: a staggering 4,675,770 bales were 
brought to market. The excess supply led to a sharp decline in the price that factors 
were willing to pay planters for their cotton, which dropped to 5 ½ cents per pound at 
Mobile in July 1860.
23
 
English mills took advantage of the opportunity to purchase an enormous 
overstock of raw material at low cost, while speculators, gambling that the next year’s 
crop would be short, bought the excess. Production of yarn soared from 735,656,000 
pounds in 1857 to 770,000,000 pounds in 1858, to 869,250,000 pounds in 1859, to an 
incredible 983,650,000 pounds in 1860.
24
 Despite the inability of overseas markets to 
absorb the supply, British mills exported a far greater quantity of cotton goods in the 
years 1858, 1859, and 1860 than ever before. In 1860 the annual total of yarn and 
cloth exported reached 250,339,040 pounds in weight, a more than 70 percent 
increase over the previous high of 146,660,864 pounds in 1856. Exports would reach 
a staggering 298,287,920 pounds in 1861. In the years 1858 through 1861 British 
mills dumped 873,379,696 pounds of cotton goods on the world markets, most of it in 
India and China.
25
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Encouraged by the news that consumption of cotton in Britain was surging, 
the “Negro Fever” among the cotton planters raged on, as did the transfer of slaves 
from the Border States to the South.  Hunt’s Merchants’ Magazine and Commercial 
Review estimated that 60,000 slaves from the Border States were sold south to the 
cotton plantations in 1860. The magazine predicted that 70,000 additional field hands 
would be needed each year for the next ten years if the expected demand for cotton 
were to be met.
26
 
In Lancashire, the pressure exerted by the huge supply of cheap cotton was 
pushing yet another of the cotton industry’s characteristic mill-building surges. On 
January 5, 1860, The Times in its “The Trade of 1859” recap predicted that Britain’s 
consumption of raw cotton would increase as new mills then under construction 
became operational in the spring. As to the outlook for the trade, the newspaper said 
that during the upcoming year: 
[M]uch will depend upon the quantity that may be required for China, 
and the prices current in the market. Taking, then, all things into 
consideration, it does seem as though there would be an abundance of 
cotton for the requirements of the world, and if prices in America were 
only proportionate to the magnitude of the crop, we do not see why the 
new year should not be one of prosperity to all parties engaged in the 
trade, whether as importers or consumers.
27
 
 
This time, however, something was seriously awry: the cotton-fueled 
economic engine was running at full throttle in England, but the East Asian economic 
sinks were clogged. In China, the religiously inspired Taiping Rebellion was in its 
bloodiest phase. Some estimates place the number killed during the Taiping Rebellion 
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at 25 million, a number greater than the total population of England at the time, and 
more than double the number killed in the First World War.
 
Several Chinese 
provinces were devastated, infrastructure was destroyed, the economy was wrecked, 
and millions of people were deprived of their livelihoods. In addition, Britain herself 
was engaged in dealing the Chinese government’s forces a humiliating defeat in the 
second of the two Opium Wars.
28
 The Times correspondent in Hong Kong wrote on 
November 30, 1859 that, “The import market during the fortnight, both here and at 
Canton, has been dull, and the demand for cotton goods very limited.”29 On February 
16, 1860, a despatch from Hong Kong said, “The market has declined…in 
consequence of large arrivals. Stock large, and sales difficult.”30 A Canton despatch 
dated March 15 reported that the market for cotton yarn in China was “inactive.”31 
In India, where British troops had just finished crushing the Sepoy Mutiny, a 
drought-induced famine was in progress, and the market was glutted with unsalable 
cotton goods. In mid-April 1860, The Times reported that export demand from India 
was weak and that large stocks of cloth and yarn had accumulated. At the beginning 
of the fourth week in May, news arrived from a correspondent in India reporting that, 
“the demand for cotton piece goods has been dull and disappointing” and that “stocks 
are accumulating in the importers’ hands.”32 A “Commercial Intelligence” column 
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sent from Bombay on June 21 reported that there was, “little demand for cotton piece 
goods.”33 Demand was further reduced by a new tariff imposed upon imported cotton 
yarn and cloth by the Government of India.
34
 
Mercantile prospects in Eastern and Southern Europe were also dim. In the 
spring and summer of 1859, Austria, where finances had not recovered from the 
heavy costs incurred to pay for prolonged military mobilization during the Crimean 
War, fought a short, unsuccessful war with France and Piedmont, part of the ongoing 
wars of Italian unification. In Hungary, the Habsburg Monarchy’s difficulties inspired 
Magyar nationalists whose bid for independence in 1848 had been bloodily 
suppressed by Russian and Austrian troops, and another Hungarian revolt seemed 
likely. In addition, the Habsburg Monarchy’s peasants’ purchasing power was 
hampered by high taxes levied upon them to pay the compensation given to their 
former manorial lords after the abolition of corvée labor obligations that were the last 
holdover from the days of serfdom.
35
  
In Latin America, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela were fighting 
civil wars. Bolivia had just ended a bitter seven-year civil war between its Spanish-
descended upper classes and its Indian masses and another seemed imminent. Peru 
and Ecuador were also experiencing internal turmoil and were on the verge of war 
with one another. Mexico was embroiled in the latest round in the endless series of 
bloody multi-sided civil wars, military coups, and chaos that had plagued it since 
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1810. It appeared that a second Mexican-American War might be in the offing after 
injuries and material damages suffered by Americans at the hands of various factions 
in Mexico prompted President James Buchanan to ask Congress to “pass a law 
authorizing the President, under such restrictions as they may deem necessary, to 
employ military force against Mexico for the purpose of obtaining indemnity for the 
past and security for the future.”36 
Few people on either side of the Atlantic Ocean seem to have been concerned 
about the glut of cotton goods as it was developing, however. Most American planters 
were probably not even aware of it. In February 1860, a Liverpool cotton broker, 
Samuel Smith, told The Weekly Mississippian that the cotton supply would “probably 
be a little in excess” of consumption, but if nothing intervened to upset the market, 
prices for the crop that would be planted in the spring would not be appreciably 
different from those paid for the 1859 crop. Smith wrote to the newspaper: 
During the next few months, when an unusually large 
proportion of the supply will reach this port, a rather lower scale of 
prices may seem justified; but in the latter half of the year, the 
prospects of the next crop will be watched with much anxiety, for after 
the occurrence of two uncommonly large crops, the chances are 
certainly against a third, and a short crop next year would soon sweep 
away all the surplus stock accumulated during the two seasons of 
plenty.
37
 
 
Samuel Smith’s sentiments appear to have been widespread among British 
cotton spinners. At the third annual meeting of the Cotton Supply Association that 
was held in Manchester Town Hall on May 11, 1860, the time when American cotton 
fields were being seeded, identical fears were expressed that after two consecutive 
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record large American crops, a short crop like the one in 1845 was bound to follow. 
The Association pushed ahead toward its goal of breaking the American supply 
monopoly, hearing reports about the progress of its cotton-growing experiments 
begun the previous year. Its members voted to obtain cotton gins and bale presses that 
were inexpensive and suitable for use by farmers in India and Africa. Lastly, the 
Cotton Supply Association passed a resolution: “To offer to furnish SEED 
gratuitously or otherwise to all such persons as may desire to extend Cotton 
cultivation.”38  
American planters had ample reason to believe that the price of cotton would 
increase in the next marketing season, and continue to increase for years to come. On 
December 15, 1859, New York cotton brokers Messrs. Neill, Brothers and Company 
said in their circular that, although the current supply of cotton was adequate, “it must 
be considered that the maximum producing power of the present slave population has 
been attained, while consumption is everywhere stimulated to the utmost, and 
constantly expanding.”39 Prices for cotton and slaves bore out that assumption, or 
more correctly reflected it. On the day that Mississippi planters read Samuel Smith’s 
comments in The Weekly Mississippian, February 15, 1860, cotton was selling for 
11¼ cents on the New York Cotton Exchange, and it had been at 11 to 11¾ cents 
range for the entire 1859-60 marketing season. Further, although the market was 
described as “dull” in Cotton Belt newspapers, cotton did not drop below 11 cents 
                                                 
38
 Cotton Supply Association, The Third Annual Report of the Manchester Cotton Supply 
Association, reprinted in Cotton Supply Association, Cotton Culture in New or Partially Developed 
Sources of Supply: Report of the Proceedings at a Conference held on August 13, 1862 in London, 
Between a Deputation from the Cotton Supply Association, Manchester, and Commissioners with 
Other Representatives of Countries Showing Raw Cottons in the International Exhibition, 6-24. 
 
39
 Cotton Supply Reporter 1, no. 33 (Jan. 2, 1860): 3. Italics in original. 
 
 48 
until June 22, 1860, after the planting season was over.
40
 News that Lancashire’s 
spinning mills were running at full capacity and that new mills were being built 
encouraged planters in their assumption that demand would soon drive up the price of 
cotton to a level high enough to cover their greatly increased labor cost. After news 
that John Cheetham had told the Cotton Supply Association’s annual meeting that he 
expected the upcoming American crop to be short reached the United States, 
Harper’s Weekly declared: 
 
Never did cotton spinners do so well as they have done since 
last September. … Our own mills have been unceasingly active, yet 
have failed to supply the home demand and the inquiry for export to 
South America and Asia. … All over the world, in fact, the 
manufacture of cotton goods has been so very profitable that there 
must be an increased demand for the raw material this fall.
41
 
 
The Harper’s Weekly writer speculated that a crop of 5 million bales would 
soon be insufficient to meet demand.
42
 In its December 1860 issue, Hunt’s 
Merchants’ Magazine and Commercial Review predicted that consumption of cotton 
would increase 350,000 bales per year for the next ten years.
43
 Southern newspapers 
reflected this thinking in their market news.
44
 From reading the market news, cotton 
planters would be led to think that demand for cotton was strong when in fact it was 
not. 
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By the first quarter of 1860, English manufacturers began to worry about the 
glut of unsold goods. The chairman of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce 
warned its members in April 1860 that the current situation was abnormal. If the over 
production of goods continued, and prices for goods in the Asian markets continued 
to decline because of the glut, the manufacturers’ profit margins would soon shrink to 
the point that some of them would be forced out of business.
45
 Arthur Arnold, the 
British historian who wrote the first and definitive history of the Cotton Famine in 
1864, stated that during the two years preceding the firing upon Fort Sumter, “the 
excess of production over consumption amounted to at least 300,000,000 lb. weight 
of manufactured goods; which in raw material, would be equal to 842,000 bales of 
400 lb. each.”46 
By mid-summer, hints of the impending crisis in the economic cycle caused 
by over-production began to appear in the American press. In an article reprinted 
from the Boston Traveller on July 3, 1860, the Charleston Courier told its readers: 
The Cotton manufacture has been the most prosperous business 
in England and the United States for the last year, and it is increasing 
in England with a rush which must inevitably, at no far distant period, 
produce a disastrous reaction. … [T]he papers say that ten thousand 
more operatives are wanted at the present moment and 30,000 to 
40,000 will be needed before long. … New mills are rising and new 
companies are forming.
47
 
 
Confusion reigned in the American cotton markets as the 1860-61 selling 
season began in September. Despite a harvest time hurricane that tore into the Gulf 
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Coast and destroyed a sizable portion of the crop and an early frost in the northern 
third of the Cotton Belt, early estimates put the crop at 4 million bales. Prices on the 
New York exchange held steady at around 11½ cents, but it was reported on 
September 13, 1860 that factors in New Orleans, who were wary of a decline in price 
before they could sell the cotton in Liverpool, were paying only 6½ cents. On that 
same day the Charleston Courier indicated that cotton planters were feeling the cost 
pinch and were looking for ways to economize. On December 1, two large, long-
established cotton factorage firms in New Orleans, Fellowes & Co. and Walter Cox & 
Co., suspended operations due to Northern creditors’ refusal to provide operating 
loans because of the uncertainty of the market. On December 11 the Charleston 
Courier reported that the low prices being offered by factors was causing planters to 
hold back deliveries.
48
  
While the hectic cotton season of 1860-61 was underway, the United States 
was spiraling into political dysfunction, disunion, and civil war. The Cotton Supply 
Reporter expressed forebodings of trouble ahead and hope that the situation in 
America would somehow resolve itself when on June 1, 1860, its editorial page said: 
Cotton constitutes the leading element in the commerce of the 
world. This fibre forms the great commercial cable, whose messages, 
vibrating across the Atlantic, affect the remotest markets of the earth. 
Let us hope that this telegraph line may never be disrupted by the hand 
of social or servile convulsion.
49
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The November 16 issue of The Cotton Supply Reporter went to press before 
news that Abraham Lincoln had been elected president reached Britain, but there 
were already strong indications that the cotton-growing states of the Deep South 
would secede from the Union if he won the election. At that point, the future held 
great uncertainty, both for the continuance of the United States as a unified nation and 
for the cotton supply. Two weeks later, when the December 1 issue appeared, South 
Carolina had seceded, other states were on the brink, and, ominously, military 
preparations were underway in the South.
50
  
The sense of alarm in Britain continued to build through January. On January 
19, Lord John Russell, the Foreign Secretary, citing the extraordinary magnitude of 
the impending crisis, broke with precedent and the virtually sacrosanct doctrine of 
laissez-faire and wrote an official letter to the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, 
informing them that he wished “to place at the disposal of the cotton manufacturers in 
this country the service of any of Her Majesty’s Consuls residing in countries which, 
from the information now in possession of the Cotton Association, offer a prospect of 
immediate supply, if it be necessary to have recourse to them.”51 By putting Great 
Britain’s numerous consuls at its disposal, Lord Russell gave the Cotton Supply 
Association a global force of capable field operatives whose official standing lent the 
power and prestige of the British Empire to the projects that they undertook on the 
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Association’s behalf. Eventually, communications and liaison with the Cotton Supply 
Association became the responsibility of James Murray in the Foreign Office.
52
 
On January 22, a special meeting was held in Manchester Town Hall, with the 
Lord Mayor presiding, to discuss the American crisis and its potential impact on the 
cotton supply. At that meeting it was decided that in light of the dire consequences of 
an interruption of the cotton supply, the conventional laissez-faire notion that demand 
would automatically bring forth supply was inadequate. For cotton to be grown in 
commercially useful quantities in the places where the Cotton Supply Association had 
conducted its horticultural experiments, a wide array of physical, legal, economic, 
and socio-cultural impediments would have to be removed, and the Association 
committed itself to an organized, multi-faceted effort to address the full range of 
problems. To further that effort, it was decided to charter the Manchester Cotton 
Company, Ltd., an adjunct of the Cotton Supply Association “with capital of 
£1,000,000; in 100,000 shares of £10 each.” The company’s purpose was to promote 
cotton growing and “disseminate instruction as to the cultivation, to distribute seed, 
and contract for the purchase of the cotton.”53 It appears that the Manchester Cotton 
Company was intended to be a buyers’ cartel that would function in a manner 
resembling a vertical trust. 
News of the emergency meeting in Manchester Town Hall took two weeks to 
reach North America, and when it did it was badly misinterpreted, especially in the 
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South. On February 11, 1861, the Fayetteville Observer copied an alarmist story from 
The Times of January 22, that the North Carolina newspaper headlined “Effects of the 
American Revolution in England—A Panic in Cotton.” Should civil war break out in 
the United States, The Times columnist asserted, a slave rebellion (the Observer’s 
editor struck out the words “slave rebellion” and replaced them with dashes) was a 
virtual certainty. In that event the current cotton crop would surely be destroyed, none 
would be planted the next year, and probably none for years to come. Civil war in 
America, the article led readers to believe, would result in an almost immediate 
shutdown of the English mills, with catastrophic consequences. In the late spring, the 
Richmond Whig scoffed at the notion that British efforts to replace American cotton 
with cotton grown elsewhere could succeed, and recited a history of past failures and 
recounted the many obstacles that lay athwart the path to success. Readers were left 
with the impression that cotton was in high demand and critically short supply.
54
  
In fact, the opposite was true. Arthur Arnold wrote, “April, 1861, was a time 
of gorged markets, both at home and abroad. The India and China markets had been 
over-fed with manufactures until they threatened to burst with bankruptcy.”55 
Maurice Williams, a Liverpool cotton broker who published annual recaps of the 
market, remarked that in February 1861 there were, “large stocks of Goods, &c., in 
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the hands of the Trade, and an indication of short time being adopted by many 
Spinners and Manufacturers, but there was little demand.”56 
At the start of 1861 it appeared that unless the export trade revived soon, 
Britain might be headed for severe labor problems. Textile manufacturers in 
Lancashire reduced wages at their factories by up to 7½ percent shortly after New 
Year’s Day. Workers in Staleybridge, Glossop, Ashton, Bolton, and several smaller 
towns went out on strike. The strike at Bolton became particularly bitter.
57
 There was 
a general consensus that the overstock of cotton goods would soon force the spinning 
mills and weaving factories to begin operating on “short time,” the term used for 
reducing production and laying off workers.
58
 
The over supply of raw cotton on hand in England continued to grow through 
the spring of 1861. While the secession crisis was playing out through February and 
March and into April the American cotton markets remained open. Receipts and 
shipments were heavy. At New York, longshoremen at Brooklyn’s Atlantic Dock, the 
port’s cotton terminal, were busy unloading ships from Southern ports and loading 
others bound overseas.
59
 So great was the quantity of cotton that speculators did not 
bid up the price, as it might have been normal to expect in a crisis situation that 
threatened to interrupt the vital supply. The price remained nearly changeless 
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roundabout 11½ cents on the New York exchange. Prices on the Liverpool Exchange 
held steady at around 7¼ d. through January and February, and actually dropped to 
6¾ d. on March 1 and stayed below 7 d. for the entire month, a reaction to the 
enormous quantity of cotton arriving at the port. Liverpool was literally running out 
of warehouse space to store it. And still the heavy-laden cotton boats continued 
arriving in the Mersey Estuary from New Orleans, Mobile, Charleston, and New 
York to wait their turn to unload at one of Liverpool’s four long cotton docks. All the 
while, no one knew how large the crop would be. When the books were finally 
tallied, the 1860 crop that came to market before the outbreak of war closed the 
markets was 3,656,000 bales. Of that number, 1,842,000 bales eventually arrived at 
Liverpool, while 521,000 went to France and 516,000 to other nations on the 
Continent.
60
  
While the confrontation between Lincoln and South Carolina over Fort 
Sumter was building toward its climax, the Cotton Supply Association’s May 1860 
decision to secure American cotton seed and distribute them abroad was proceeding. 
On Wednesday, March 18, 1861, the American sailing ship Sam Dunning, Captain 
Thomas Skolfield master, put to sea from Mobile bound for Liverpool laden with 
5,620 bales of cotton. Along with the more than $288,000 worth of cotton in her hold, 
the Sam Dunning also carried 132 sacks of Alabama cotton seed, with a declared 
value of $198.
61
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The slow Sam Dunning was still plodding eastward across the North Atlantic 
when on the afternoon of Thursday, April 25, 1861, the Montreal Ocean Company’s 
packet steamer Nova Scotian arrived at Londonderry, Ireland, and Captain William 
Ballantine telegraphed urgent news to The Times in London:  A little more than 
twenty-four hours before the Nova Scotian departed Portland, Maine, on the morning 
of Saturday, April 13, 1861, the South Carolina batteries had begun bombarding Fort 
Sumter.
62
 
 The news that the American Civil War had begun did not break on Europe 
like a thunderclap, but came incrementally over the next five days. Captain 
Ballantine’s report was confirmed at 4 a.m. the next morning when the fast North 
German Lloyd Lines packet steamer New York that had sailed from New York on the 
afternoon of April 14 arrived at Southampton and Captain H. J. von Santen 
telegraphed the news that Fort Sumter had surrendered to the Reuter’s Telegrams 
news service. The Times printed notices of the Nova Scotian and New York telegrams 
on Friday, April 26. It reprinted sketchy stories from the April 14 editions of the New 
York Times and Herald that Captain von Santen put on the Friday night train to 
London in its Saturday, April 27 edition, but it remained unclear whether or not a 
full-fledged civil war had begun in America.
63
 
 Contrary to what might be expected, the news did not cause an immediate 
panic in the cotton trade. In the same Saturday edition in which it reprinted the New 
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York newspaper accounts of Fort Sumter, The Times reported that on the previous 
Friday in Manchester: 
The only effect of the American news received today seems to 
have been to suspend all business here that can possibly be deferred. 
The Liverpool market has again moved upward, in consequence of the 
reported hostilities, and spinners at Manchester are asking ¼ d. per lb. 
advance to-day. But scarcely anything has been done in yarns for any 
quarter. … In the cloth-market all descriptions of goods have become 
quieter since Tuesday. Buyers for the East are now holding back. The 
prices of some fabrics are hardly quotable at the rates that might be 
considered as established on Tuesday. … The demand here is dull, and 
prices are in favor of the buyer.
64
 
 
 The troubles in the cotton industry were dragging Britain into an economic 
crisis before the South Carolina batteries fired on Fort Sumter. Export orders were 
virtually non-existent. Domestic shopkeepers were wary of the economic situation, 
and were placing only small orders for finished cotton goods. The spinning mills were 
working at full capacity, but cloth manufacturers were cutting back production. The 
number of unemployed factory workers was increasing, while others were working 
short time. Other industries were affected as well. On the day that the news Fort 
Sumter had been fired upon reached Britain, The Times “State of Trade” feature 
reported that in Birmingham, home of the Birmingham Arsenal and Enfield Foundry 
Limited, Britain’s principal armaments manufacturers, “the gun makers are doing so 
little that many of the men are out of employment.”65 
Not until Sunday night, April 28 when the Hamburg-American Company’s 
steamship Borussia arrived at Southampton and Captain H. N. Trautmann sent 
Reuter’s Telegrams the news that President Lincoln had called for 75,000 troops to 
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suppress the rebellion and that the Southern states were preparing to resist coercion 
with armed force did anyone in Europe know for certain that the American Civil War 
had indeed begun. The Borussia arrived after the Sunday evening newspapers went to 
press, so the general public did not learn the news until Monday morning, April 29, 
when The Times reprinted lengthy stories from the April 15 editions of the New York 
Times and the Herald brought by the Borussia under the ominous headline, 
“Proclamation of War by President Lincoln.”66 
 Reaction to the news on the floor of the Liverpool Cotton Exchange on its 
next day of sales, May 3, 1861, was muted. There was no panic buying of cotton and 
no sharp spike in prices. Cotton had been selling at 7¼ d. on April 19, and prices on 
May 3 were only fractionally higher. Stocks of raw cotton on hand continued to 
increase daily, rising from 884,911 bales on the day that the news of Fort Sumter 
arrived to peak at 1,150,068 bales on June 7.
67
 As Maurice Williams put it in his 
circular, there was “little animation manifested” in the market in June.68  
There seems to have been considerable doubt in Britain as to exactly what the 
parameters of the civil war in America would be, and whether or not cotton supplies 
would be interrupted. The latter question was not answered until September, when 
President Lincoln announced that the blockade of the South would include cotton. 
The Confederacy pursued an active strategy to hasten the expected “cotton famine” in 
Britain. One of the first acts of the Confederate Congress was to place an embargo on 
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the export of cotton. This proved much more effective in keeping cotton off the world 
market during 1861 and 1862 than did the initially porous Union naval blockade.
 69
 
Cotton prices remained in the range between 7½ d. and 8 d. until the middle of 
July 1861, when a steady increase began that would see the year end with the price at 
11½ d.
70
 There was certainly apprehension about the future supply but the large stock 
of raw cotton on hand, uncertainty about whether or not next year’s American crop 
would be available, and the enormous stock of unsold cotton goods were a brake on 
cotton prices. Not until October 1861 was there an upturn in prices, the increase 
mostly driven by speculators anticipating a shortage after Lincoln’s interdiction of the 
South’s cotton exports. News of the Trent Affair and expectation that the Royal Navy 
would break the blockade caused the upswing to collapse in November. As Williams 
put it in his statement for 1861, the market ended the year on “a most depressed and 
desponding tone.”71 
On December 31, 1861, there was on hand in Great Britain 595,000 bales of 
unmanufactured cotton. This was enough cotton to keep Lancashire’s mills running at 
full capacity for twelve weeks.
72
 English mills began reducing production in October 
1861, well before a shortage of cotton forced them to do so. Throughout 1862 they 
were working at about half capacity.
73
 As mills went on short time or closed, 
                                                 
69
 Ibid. 
 
70
 Donnell, History of Cotton, 508-509. 
 
71
 Williams, “The Cotton Trade of 1861” in Seven Years History of the Cotton Trade of 
Europe, 1861-1868, 13-15. 
 
72
 Donnell, History of Cotton, 507. 
 
73
 Williams, “The Cotton Trade of 1862” in Seven Years History of the Cotton Trade of 
Europe, 1861-1868, 23. 
 60 
unemployment increased in the Lancashire cotton manufacturing cities. By the end of 
1862, half of Britain’s cotton mill workers and their families were in desperate straits.  
The picture of the Cotton Famine in American minds is frequently the one 
drawn by historian Frank Lawrence Owsley, who based his assumptions primarily on 
the despatches of Confederate diplomatic agent John M. Mason. Owsley graphically 
recounted the English mill workers’ plight when he wrote: 
These people were thrifty and self-respecting. They had saved 
their little pittance, some of them for a lifetime; they were members of 
co-operative aid societies, and looked with dread upon the work-house 
or public charity. When the mills began to stop in 1861 those who 
were thrown out of employment did not appeal to the Poor Law 
Guardians of the Parish, but curtailed their expenses, wearing old 
clothes and eking out a bare existence. When their savings were gone, 
they pawned their treasured pieces of furniture, article by article…the 
crockery and china followed, and then the utensils down to a pot and 
pan. The bedsteads were sold, then the beds, then the blankets, until 
nothing but piles of old straw littered the desolated floor. Still, no 
appeal, in most cases, would yet be made to the dreaded Guardians of 
the Poor whose aid would forever brand them as paupers. The mothers 
and little children grew undernourished, many of them dying from 
slow starvation. The father and older members of the family wearily 
tramped the streets…pathetically seeking a place to work during the 
winter and spring of 1862. … Many of the girls in dispair [sic] resorted 
to prostitution, selling themselves for a pittance with which to feed the 
aged parents or the helpless children who often lay slowly dying from 
want upon the piles of dirty straw.
74
  
 
  Writing in 1864, Arthur Arnold painted a picture that was much less desperate 
and bleak. Arnold wrote: 
‘The History of the Cotton Famine’ should be a welcome 
chapter in the annals of our country, for it records one of our greatest 
national triumphs.
75
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There certainly was suffering in the Lancashire mill towns. Mill owners 
fostered social peace by offering assistance to their unemployed workers. Some paid 
their idled workers one-and-a-half day’s wages each week. Many opened soup 
kitchens for their workers. Others rotated workdays, so that all of their workers had 
some employment during the crisis. Numerous mill owners funded schools for mill 
children and adults alike and either provided food or paid them a small wage to 
attend. Many ceased collecting rent from employees who lived in company housing.
76
 
Moreover, other sectors of the British economy experienced an economic upturn 
during the war. Outside of Lancashire, Britain enjoyed prosperity. Money was 
available from private donors to pay for the largest mobilization of public relief in 
Britain’s history up until that time. Parliament passed the Public Works Act on July 
21, 1863, which provided work to unemployed mill workers on infrastructure 
construction. By the end of 1863 the worst of the unemployment crisis was over. 
Britain never came anywhere near either economic collapse or revolution.
77
 
As can be seen from the table below, Great Britain had a larger stock of 
unmanufactured cotton on hand at the end of 1862 than it did in any of the previous 
five years. Its imports in 1864 exceeded those of 1858 by 144,000 bales. In 1865 the 
import increased another 168,000 bales.
78
 Most of that cotton came from new fields 
in India, the Near East, Egypt, and Brazil. 
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Table 1 
Imports in thousands of bales to Britain, Stock of unmanufactured cotton on hand as of  
Dec. 31 of each year, and Average price in British pence for 1857-1871. 
(E. J. Donnell, History of Cotton) 
 
                              Stock on hand as of Dec. 31
st
 each year 
         Year          Import         Britain        Europe         Total       Avg. Price 
1857  2,417  332  107  439    7.05 
1858  2,443  452  174  626    6.51 
1859  2,829  372  185  557    6.28 
1860  3,368  470  101  571    5.66 
1861  3,035  595  187  782    7.63 
1862  1,445  699  173  872  15.40 
1863  1,932  434    73  507  20.69 
1864  2,587  327    37  364  25.25 
1865  2,755  576    72  648  17.90 
1866  3,749  406    60  466  14.34 
1867  3,343  465    ---   ---  10.24 
1868  3,312  352    ---   ---    9.92 
1869  3,072  337    ---   ---  11.42 
1870  3,265  269    ---   ---    9.40 
1871  4,003  566    ---   ---    8.03 
 
Donnell’s statistics end in 1871. The first edition of Shepperson’s Cotton Facts was 
not published until 1876. 
 
 How Great Britain and the United States cooperated to accomplish that feat is 
one of the untold stories of the American Civil War. 
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Chapter 3 
The Warp and Weft of Grand Strategies 
 
  
When on May 3, 1861, the new Confederate States of America’s envoys 
William Lowndes Yancey, Pierre A. Rost, and Ambrose Dudley Mann arrived at the 
Foreign Office for their first meeting with Lord John Russell, the Foreign Secretary, 
they were under instructions from Confederate Secretary of State Robert Toombs to 
seek formal British diplomatic recognition of the Confederacy’s independence. 
Toombs’ instructions to the Confederate envoys reiterated: 
The Confederate States produce nearly nineteen-twentieths of 
all the cotton grown in the States which recently constituted the United 
States. There is no extravagance in the assertion that the gross amount 
of the annual yield of the manufactories of Great Britain from the 
cotton of the Confederate States reaches $600,000,000. The British 
Ministry will comprehend fully the condition to which the British 
realm would be reduced if the supply of our staple should suddenly fail 
or even be considerably diminished. A delicate allusion to the 
probability of such an occurrence might not be unkindly received by 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, an occurrence, I will add, that is 
inevitable if this country shall be involved in protracted hostilities with 
the North.
1
 
 
The strategy that Toombs outlined was blackmail expressed in polite 
diplomatic language, and it did not succeed. Lord Russell insisted that the meeting 
with the delegation of American secessionists be informal, meaning that Russell met 
with them as private citizens of a foreign country who were bringing a matter of 
mutual concern to the attention of the British government. The Confederate envoys 
were not, as they and Toombs had hoped, formally received as diplomats. Had they 
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been, it would have constituted de facto recognition by Great Britain that the 
Confederacy was an independent nation, since according to the internationally 
accepted standard of the time only representatives of a sovereign nation-state could be 
considered diplomats.
2
  
If the Confederates entertained hopes that the Cotton Supply Association 
would put pressure on the British government to intervene in the American conflict in 
order to secure the South’s cotton, they were badly disappointed. On May 7, the 
House of Commons took up a motion by Sir William Henry Gregory, a fiercely anti-
American member of the Anglo-Irish landlord class, calling for diplomatic 
recognition of the Confederate States. Almost immediately, the proposal, “at the 
request of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the representatives from 
Manchester, Liverpool, and others, was withdrawn.”3 On May 15, The Cotton Supply 
Reporter’s front-page editorial began with the declaration: 
The country to which the Cotton trade of Great Britain has so 
long trusted for their supply of the raw material is now convulsed with 
Civil War—from its centre to its coasts. This war is based upon the 
principle of Slavery or No-Slavery—not exclusively as to its internal 
traffic, but more particularly as to re-opening the slave trade between 
the Southern States and Africa. This, all along, has been the secret 
object of the South, and in the midst of the strife there is every reason 
to fear that the slaves will take advantage of the blind enthusiasm of 
their masters, or from being tampered with by the Anti-Slavery 
sentiment of the North, will rise in open rebellion. … The Cotton 
Supply Association was established purely from a knowledge of the 
now practically developed fact that the system of slave labour was not 
to be safely trusted to as a dependence, either as to numbers or 
                                                 
2
 Nannie M. Tilley “England and the Confederacy,” The American Historical Review 44, no. 
1 (Oct., 1938): 56-60. 
 
3
 W. L. Yancey and P. L. Rost to Robert Toombs, May 10, 1861, in Confederate Diplomatic 
Correspondence, 19-20. 
 
 65 
character, for the supply of raw material to meet the rapidly increasing 
powers of consumption.
4
 
 
That same day, the Palmerston government caused to be published in the 
name of Her Majesty Queen Victoria a “Proclamation of Strict Neutrality,” a lengthy 
document that spelled out Great Britain’s neutral position in the American conflict. 
Under accepted international law of the day, Britain, by declaring herself neutral, had 
accorded the Confederacy equal status with the Union, which amounted to quasi-
recognition that the South was an independent nation. However, the Queen’s 
proclamation stipulated that the United Kingdom was only recognizing the fact that 
the South was a belligerent in a fight that was undecided, and declared that Britain 
would take no side in that fight. It was less than the formal recognition of Southern 
independence that the Confederacy hoped for, but it was far better than nothing. 
Under international law as it then stood “rebels” or “insurgents” were not legitimate 
combatants and could not lawfully buy arms or secure loans in a foreign country. By 
declaring neutrality, the British government had recognized the South’s right to fight 
for its independence, but did not recognize that independence itself. That permitted 
the Confederacy to contract loans and buy arms in Britain, and made it legal under 
British law for British merchant ships to run the Union blockade at their own risk. 
Even that limited half-recognition of the Confederacy was not well received in 
Washington, where President Lincoln had referred to the war as an “insurrection” in 
his declaration of a blockade of the South on April 19, and it caused Secretary of 
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State William H. Seward to stop just short of calling for war with Great Britain. It 
was, however, presumably good news for the unemployed Birmingham gun-makers.
5
 
Behind the proclamation of neutrality lay a complicated, intertwined weave of 
British foreign policy toward the United States of more than a half-century’s 
standing, an assessment of the risks and cost of a potential war with the North, the 
general dynamics and current situation of the cotton economy as it was understood at 
the time, and British domestic politics. British imperial foreign policy provided the 
broad parameters. When the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars ended in 
1815, Great Britain was the principal beneficiary of the destruction of Europe’s 
ancien régime. Alliance with Spain against Napoleon and the weakening of Spanish 
control during the period of turmoil while Spain was occupied by French armies and 
ruled by Napoleon’s brother had led to opening of Spain’s American colonies to 
British trade. The Latin American revolutions and the emergence of independent 
states in Mexico and South America further opened the region to unimpeded British 
commerce. At the same time that the British economy was becoming dependent on 
the cotton textile industry, Britain’s trade policy was undergoing a shift from 
mercantilist protectionism to the new laissez-faire free-trade economics expounded 
by Adam Smith in his Wealth of Nations published in 1776. Moreover, the loose 
collection of common interests that bound Britons of different nationalities together 
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prior to the revolutionary upheavals had taken on a national identity that was self-
consciously British.
6
 
After the final defeat of Napoleon, Lord Castlereagh’s government began 
fashioning a new imperial policy intended to assure that Britain became economic 
hegemon over Latin America based on the new free trade paradigm. No longer was 
there thought of conquest and absorption of Spanish America into the British Empire, 
as had been the case during the eighteenth century. According to the new paradigm, 
the British sought a favorable free-market for their industrial goods and economic 
dominance but did not want the costly burden of ruling the turbulent Latin 
Americans. As a corollary to that policy, the British sought to forestall the possibility 
of any other power dominating the new Latin American republics. British 
policymakers anticipated that Great Britain’s most likely competitor for the role of 
hegemon in the Americas would be the United States.
7
 
 British policymakers realized that the United States was a country that had 
nothing to lose and everything to gain by disturbing the Pax Britannia. In particular, 
Britain viewed the prospect of American expansion westward to the Pacific Ocean 
with alarm. Possession of a Pacific seaboard, the British realized, would transform the 
United States from a coastal nation into what would be, in effect, a gigantic island 
nation. And island nations, the British knew from their own experience, inevitably 
became maritime powers. Moreover, with possession of the vast natural resources of 
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the North American continent available to it on secure interior lines of 
communication, the United States would be self sufficient and invulnerable to naval 
blockade.  
 American control of Britain’s cotton supply compounded the problem. British 
commercial interests recognized in the 1820s that income from cotton exports was 
rapidly paying off the United States’ national debt and would soon place the United 
States in a position of financial independence. Once that was achieved, the United 
States would be free to follow an expansionist policy if it desired to do so. British 
economic strategists anticipated that cotton revenues would enable the United States 
to industrialize far more rapidly than Britain had done. Further, it was thought that the 
Americans would industrialize beyond what was necessary to meet their domestic 
needs. It was thought that when American factories were producing an exportable 
surplus of goods, American merchants were virtually certain to challenge Great 
Britain’s global commercial dominance.8 
 For a time, Britain tried to use Mexico as a bulwark against American 
expansion, and then sought to sustain Texas as an independent republic so that it 
would serve as a bulwark between the United States and Mexico. When the Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo ended the Mexican-American War, Mexico was forced to 
renounce claims to Texas and cede California and the desert Southwest to the United 
States. It was a disaster for Britain’s containment strategy. Just as British strategists 
had feared, the United States had become an island nation continental in extent with 
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vast natural wealth capable of becoming Britain’s serious industrial, commercial, and 
naval rival.
9
 The situation was made all the worse by the fact that Britain was yearly 
paying an ever larger amount of money for American cotton and was more dependent 
on it than ever.  
Anglo-American relations improved during the 1850s, but many in the 
Cabinet harbored deep distrust of the United States. Lord Palmerston, the Prime 
Minister, had been principal architect of the containment policy prior to the Mexican-
American War, and was bitterly opposed to republicanism and vehemently anti-
American. He would have liked nothing better than to see the United States split 
apart. Gladstone’s stance was enigmatic. He did not think that the North could defeat 
the South militarily and publicly advocated British recognition of the South’s 
independence, but according to confidential information passed to Charles Sumner by 
Richard Cobden his sympathies were with the North because of his opposition to 
slavery. Lord John Russell, who as Foreign Secretary had the most control over what 
in Britain was called the “American Question,” also favored recognition of Southern 
independence. Secession of the Southern states presented Palmerston and Russell an 
opportunity to restore the geostrategic balance in North America that Britain had 
sought to maintain prior to American victory in the Mexican-American War. They 
had to be careful not to do anything that would offend the North, however. Russell 
and Palmerston were particularly distrustful of U.S. Secretary of State William H. 
Seward, a man known for his anti-British views that they considered the real power in 
the Lincoln administration. They feared that Seward might try to involve the United 
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States in a war with Britain as a way to bring about reconciliation between North and 
South.
10
  
Three Cabinet members, the Duke of Argyll, Charles Villiers, and Milnes-
Gibson, though they held less powerful posts than Palmerston, Gladstone, and 
Russell, formed a solid anti-slavery, pro-North triumvirate. The Duke of Argyll was 
an especially staunch abolitionist, and carried on a correspondence with Harriett 
Beecher Stowe and other prominent New England abolitionists during the war. This 
group vehemently opposed recognition of the South, and shared Palmerston’s and 
Russell’s wariness of Seward. In a private letter to his son, Charles Francis Adams, 
the U.S. Minister to Great Britain said, “The impression is general that Mr. Seward is 
resolved to insult England until she makes a war. … [The popular impression was 
that] Mr. Seward is an ogre fully resolved to eat all Englishmen raw.”11  
Opinion in Parliament was similarly divided. Sir William Henry Gregory, 
A.J.P. Beresford-Hope, W.S. Lindsay, and J.A. Roebuck were at the center of a pro-
South group of Conservatives whose support for the Confederacy was based on 
aristocratic dislike for republicanism and fear of democracy. Opposing them were the 
middle-class Liberals and a small number of Radicals centered around John Bright 
and Richard Cobden, whose support for the North was based primarily upon 
opposition to slavery, but who also admired American democratic institutions. Bright 
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and Cobden, like the Duke of Argyll, carried on correspondence with prominent 
Northern abolitionists. Indeed, Cobden’s list of contacts during his 1859 trip to the 
United States is a veritable who’s who of American society and politics. Cobden had 
particularly strong ties to Senator Charles Sumner, the radical Massachusetts 
Republican. Cobden’s relationship with Sumner provided an unofficial channel of 
communication to the Lincoln administration that by-passed Seward. Cobden had 
close ties with Northern businessmen associated with the Illinois Central Railroad, in 
whose stock almost his entire personal fortune was invested. He also enjoyed good 
relations with Charles Francis Adams.
12
 John Bright also had cordial relations with 
Adams, who called Bright, “my favorite Englishman.”13 
British public opinion divided along social class lines. Conservative 
aristocrats were generally supporters of the South, insofar as supporting the South 
meant supporting dissolution of the United States. Abolitionists and Radicals who 
adhered to the reformist democratic ideas expressed by Bright and Cobden were 
natural supporters of the North, as were Chartists and Socialists. Middle class 
capitalist Liberals, whose free labor ideology made them oppose slavery, also 
supported the North, although as advocates of free trade they disliked its tariff 
policies and were opposed to democracy. Most of England’s cotton industry elite fell 
into this category. The English working class, which did not have the right to vote, 
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was taken into consideration only insofar as its potential for proletarian revolution or 
riot and anarchy was concerned, with anarchy probably seen as the greater threat. The 
North’s supporters could not, however, make effective use of anti-slavery as a 
rallying point early in the conflict because of President Lincoln’s initial refusal to 
make abolition a Northern war aim lest it alienate Kentucky’s slave-owning 
Unionists.
14
   
From the amount of coverage that the British press devoted to it during the six 
months leading up to the firing on Fort Sumter, it is evident that the deepening crisis 
in the United States was being watched with keen interest, and that a loose consensus 
had been reached as to what course Britain should follow. The Times was very 
thorough in its coverage of what it termed “foreign intelligence” about political 
affairs in nations around the world and paid close attention to developments in the 
United States that might affect the British economy. The Times’ most concise 
examination of the deepening rift between the American national government and the 
Southern states was an essay headlined “Disruption of the Union as it would affect 
England” that was reprinted from the influential Economist on January 21, 1861: 
The first question that arises is, “Will England recognize the 
independence and sovereignty of the new State?” The natural and 
spontaneous answer is, of course, in the affirmative. Our principle is, 
and long has been, to recognize, and to enter into amicable relations 
with, all de facto States and Governments. The moment the severance 
is complete and admitted, we have no concern either with antecedent 
causes or proceedings. But here a difficulty arises…15 
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The “difficulty” was, of course, really two difficulties. First, it was not at all 
clear whether or not the passage of acts of secession by the state legislatures of the 
Southern states of the United States constituted “complete and admitted” dissolution 
of the Union in either legal or real terms, a situation that was cast even more in doubt 
by the outbreak of war. Between the lines of legalistic quibbling about the 
internationally recognized definition of independence could be read the real thrust of 
British thinking: while Great Britain would be glad to see the United States split 
asunder, Her Majesty’s government did not want to risk American anger by extending 
premature recognition to a breakaway Southern Confederacy and then its 
independence prove to be short lived. The second difficulty, slavery, was a matter of 
domestic British politics. British politicians, no matter how advantageous they 
thought a breakup of the United States would be to the British Empire, were loath to 
incur the wrath of Britain’s abolitionist elite by extending recognition to a “slave 
state.”16 Only if the South had already effectively won its independence by defeating 
the North’s attempt to conquer it could Britain extend recognition without this 
domestic political difficulty.
17
 
Gladstone outlined the difficulties that diplomatic intervention in the 
American war entailed in a secret memorandum for the Cabinet on October 25, 1862. 
In it, he asserted that Britain could not act alone with much hope of success. Neither 
could Britain and France act in concert, since Napoleon III’s actions in Mexico had 
by that date aroused considerable anti-French hostility in Lincoln’s cabinet and 
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among the Northern public. Only in the event that Russia, with her historic friendly 
relations with the United States, became a partner with Britain and France would a 
European mediation effort have any chance of success. The Russians gave no 
indication of willingness to do so.
18
 
As to the supposed immediate devastation that a disruption in the supply of 
American cotton would wreak upon the British economy, the Economist article said: 
It is easy to over-estimate the extent or gravity of the consequences to 
Great Britain of a cessation, or even of any large or sudden diminution, 
of the supply of cotton from the United States.
19
 
 
The gist of it was that the best-informed minds in Britain did not believe that 
the American crisis presented an immediate danger to British economic security, nor 
were its leaders prepared to immediately intervene in the American war to secure the 
supply of cotton. Either the United States would break up or it would not; better for 
Britain to wait until the probable outcome became clearer. In addition, there was a 
widespread belief that the time frame for the American dispute to work itself out 
would be short. Most thought that the issue would be resolved before the next cotton 
crop came to market. Only a massive slave rebellion, The Times article warned, 
would cause a disruption in the cotton supply of sufficient duration to shut down the 
cotton industry and have “unforeseeable” consequences.20 
                                                 
18
 Memorandum by Mr. Gladstone on the War in America, Oct. 25, 1862, in Philip Guedalla, 
ed., The Palmerston Papers, Gladstone and Palmerston, being the Correspondence of Lord 
Palmerston with Mr. Gladstone, 1851-1865 (London: Harper and Brothers, 1928), 239-247; 
Palmerston to John Russell, Oct. 2, 1862, in G. P. Gooch, The Later Correspondence of Lord John 
Russell, vol. 2, 326-327; Sir G. C. Lewis to John Russell, Oct. 26, 1862, in Gooch, The Later 
Correspondence of Lord John Russell, vol. 2, 328-329. 
 
19
 Times (London), Jan. 21, 1861.  
 
20
 Ibid. 
   
 75 
To understand the American strategic perspective in the global effort to break 
the South’s monopoly on cotton production, it is necessary to consider that civil wars 
are by definition peoples’ wars. The American Civil War was no exception, a fact that 
was more evident to participants than to succeeding generations to whom it became a 
clash of armies in blue and gray. Civil wars are also battles over and between 
conflicting social ideologies. The popular issue that leads to the taking up of arms is 
often only an easily identifiable component that provides the emotional flashpoint. As 
seen by the New England Republican elite, the underlying cause of the Civil War was 
not slavery per se, but class conflict between themselves and the aristocratic planter 
elite of the South. Elite New England Republicans saw themselves as the only 
legitimate heirs of the American Revolution, and, in the larger scheme of history, 
inheritors of the legacy of the Puritan Roundheads and the English Glorious 
Revolution of 1688. At the pinnacle of this New England elite stood the wealthy 
capitalist elite of Massachusetts, about eighty men of Puritan descent from a circle of 
interrelated families called the “Boston Associates.” The term was originally applied 
to a limited partnership composed of wealthy Boston ship owners and merchants that 
was formed to establish the Boston Manufacturing Company in 1813. The company 
built and operated the Waltham cotton mill.
21
 During the half-century before the Civil 
War the investors expanded their holdings into other manufacturing industries, 
railroads, and banking. By the start of the Civil War the first generation descendants 
of the original Boston Associates controlled a large percentage of the United States’ 
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industry and capital.
22
 At the core of the second-generation Boston Associates was a 
small inner circle that included wealthy merchant, ship owner, and railroad magnate 
John Murray Forbes, his cousin Paul Forbes, a banker, merchant, and vice-president 
of the Suez Canal Company, cotton broker and mill owner Edward Atkinson, 
businessman Amos A. Lawrence, and lawyer-politician Eli Thayer. Charles Francis 
Adams, Sr., the U.S. Minister to Great Britain, was also a member of this inner circle. 
Senator Charles Sumner was another. Though a New Yorker, wealthy businessman 
William H. Aspinwall can be considered a close affiliate of the Boston Associates 
because of his connections with John Murray Forbes in commerce, shipping, and 
railroads. Their hatred of aristocracy in general, and of the slave-owning Southern 
agrarian aristocrats in particular, was palpable.
23
 
John S. C. Abbott, a Connecticut Yankee who wrote a partisan two-volume 
history of the Civil War while it was still being fought began the preface of his first 
volume with a condemnation of the Southern planters’ “baronial arrogance” and 
devoted the first nineteen pages of his first chapter entitled “Cause of the Conflict” to 
a recounting of the wrongs and abuses committed by the European aristocracy since 
Roman times. Of the nature of the American conflict Abbott wrote: 
It is impossible that two such antagonistic systems as 
democratic equality and aristocratic privilege, should live in peace 
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under the same Government, or even side by side. … The antagonism 
between the two systems is deadly and universal. The history of the 
world has proved that there can be no reconciliation between them. … 
And there can be no peace in our land, until this aristocratic element is 
banished effectively from our government. … As a class, the wealthy 
cotton growers are insolent, they are proud, they are domineering, they 
are ambitious. They have monopolized the government in its honors, 
for forty or fifty years. … When they saw the sceptre about to depart 
from them, in the election of Lincoln, sooner than give up office and 
the spoils of office, in their mad and wicked ambition they determined 
to disrupt the old Confederation, and erect a new one. … There is 
indeed one cause, and but one cause, for this animosity. It is the 
antagonism between the system of aristocratic privilege and 
democratic equality.
24
 
 
The thinking expressed by John S. C. Abbott was particularly pronounced 
among the Massachusetts elite. In a letter to British economist Nassau William Senior 
written in the summer of 1855, John Murray Forbes said: 
The real danger will come, if ever, when the North, strong and 
growing, shall wake up to find itself bound through corruption and 
fraud to the will of the aristocratic minority. Then the North may insist 
upon being put back where they were, even at the cost of revolution. 
The Southern politicians have undoubtedly been aiming at securing 
enough new slave States to give them a majority in the Senate, which 
would then become practically a House of Lords, with a veto on all 
legislation and with a claim to a large share of the patronage of 
government…the safety of the North and of the Union consists in a 
firm resistance to the further extension of slavery or the increase of 
slave States.
25
 
 
In another letter to Senior written in September 1861, Forbes wrote that the 
North “was not fighting to subjugate the South, but to put down a small class who 
have conspired against the people, and who are a thousand times worse enemies of 
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the people of the South than the North.”26 In December 1861, Forbes said of the 
Southern planter elite that there were “one million, of all ages and sexes, who, 
through owning slaves and connection with slaveholders, may think they have a class 
interest in the success of the rebellion. This class we can crush out.”27 Six months 
later, Forbes said that the Civil War was a fight between “the government of the 
people vs. Aristocratic government; in other words, the people vs. a class.”28  
New England abolitionists who shared this sentiment saw themselves as 
revolutionaries, and were prepared to take matters into their own hands if necessary. 
In his posthumously published reminiscences, Forbes revealed that he had, at the 
invitation of Samuel Gridley Howe, met John Brown before the raid on Harpers 
Ferry. Forbes gave Brown $100, although he claimed ignorance of Brown’s 
intentions. Forbes also admitted that he had allowed, indeed organized and helped 
finance, shipments of Sharps rifles to Kansas over the Hannibal and St. Joseph 
Railroad, of which he was managing director. Along with the breech-loading rifles 
had gone, “free men from Massachusetts, bent on preventing the dreaded institution 
of slavery from gaining a foothold” in Kansas.29  
After the secession crisis began, this group considered compromise with the 
South surrender to the slave-owning Southern aristocracy. In his memoirs Forbes 
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boasted that Massachusetts radicals were responsible for thwarting the so-called 
Washington Peace Conference, the last-ditch attempt to avert the Civil War led by 
Kentucky’s elderly Whig Senator John J. Crittenden and Ohio’s Republican 
Congressman Thomas Corwin. In cooperation with Governor John Andrew, Forbes 
and a group of unnamed Bostonians began making plans to send supply ships to Fort 
Sumter if Lincoln did not. Their aim was to either force the South to back down or 
provoke war.
30
  
Almost immediately upon commencement of hostilities, Forbes and a group 
of prominent Bostonians, “raised a subscription among the Boston merchants for half 
the needful amount and the banks advanced the other half to the governor; and so in 
partnership with the State we bought the steamers Cambridge and Pembroke, 
borrowed guns from the navy yard” and sent the two armed civilian ships to hunt for 
a suspected Confederate privateer flying the French flag that was reportedly stalking 
shipping in the approaches to Boston. In his written instructions to Captain Matthews 
of the Cambridge, Forbes ordered, “take the responsibility carefully, of hailing 
vessels, and if you find one that you feel sure is a privateer or a pirate, take her, or 
better still sink her, but be sure you are right before you fire.”31 This freelance naval 
warfare entailed potentially disastrous consequences. A mistaken attack upon a 
French or British ship could have provoked the aggrieved foreign power to war. 
Forbes seems to have recognized the questionable legality of the venture, and in his 
instructions to Captain W. P. Lee of the Pembroke cautioned that care should be taken 
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to ensure that the joint private-Massachusetts state naval activities did not get into the 
newspapers.
32
  
The initial decision to cooperate with and assist the Cotton Supply 
Association in breaking the South’s cotton monopoly was evidently made in similar 
fashion, by private individuals, rather than by officials in the Lincoln government. 
Indeed, it probably came about through a harmony of ideas among men like Edward 
Atkinson and John Murray Forbes, rather than as a deliberate decision. Members of 
the New England elite clearly understood that the cotton monopoly was the basis of 
the hated Southern aristocracy’s wealth and power, and they saw the strategic need to 
destroy it as going far beyond merely forestalling British recognition of the 
Confederacy and possible interference with the blockade. In their view, cotton and the 
culture that it had spawned was antithetical to republican virtue. Henry Adams, the 
son and private secretary of Charles Francis Adams, reflected this thinking when he 
said in a letter to his brother Charles Francis Adams, Jr.: 
The nation has been dragged by this infernal cotton that had 
better have been burning in Hell, far away from its true course, and its 
worst passions and tastes have been developed by a forced and bloated 
growth. It will depend on the generation to which you and I belong, 
whether the country is to be brought back to its true course and the 
New England element is to carry the victory, or whether we are to be 
carried from war to war and debt to debt and one military leader to 
another, till we lose all our landmarks and go ahead like France with a 
mere blind necessity to get on, without a reason or a principle.
33
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This ideology meshed readily with that of British Radicals like John Bright 
and Richard Cobden, and with the Cotton Supply Association’s goal of freeing 
Britain from the American cotton monopoly. Four months after the firing on Fort 
Sumter, Charles Francis Adams, Jr. wrote to Henry, advising him: 
Look into the cotton supply question and try to persuade the 
English that our blockade is their interest. If they raise it and transfer it 
to our coasts, they have the power to do so, but they ally themselves 
with slavery—give it the victory, give the lie to their own protestations 
and secure to the South for years with the advantage of their system of 
labor and production that monopoly of cotton under which England 
groans. If the blockade lasts and forces supply, England will purchase, 
at the price of one year’s suffering, freedom and plenty for ever.34 
 
Two days later, Charles Francis Adams, Jr., followed the first letter to his 
brother with a second devoted to how he should approach the English with a proposal 
that would counter the South’s “King Cotton” diplomatic strategy: 
Start at once with the paradox that, instead of desiring to break 
this blockade, England should pray it might last for two years…[as] its 
inevitable result must be, after one or at most two years of high prices, 
to forever break down the price of cotton to a reasonable profit over 
the cost of its cheapest possible production. This opens the whole 
question of supply. Two things are necessary to the production of 
cotton—an abundance of labor and a cotton soil.35 
 
Charles Francis Adams, Jr. suggested to his brother that he read “Mann’s 
Manual of Cotton, a book of about one hundred pages; the third annual report of the 
Manchester Cotton Supply Association and the numbers for May and June of the 
Cotton Supply Reporter of Manchester” for background information. He went on to 
suggest that India had the labor and soil, but that its seasonal monsoon rains could not 
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be depended upon for watering cotton at the right time in its growing season. He 
suggested that, “all Africa (which is not desert), Australia and the Fiji Islands are 
better than our cotton states and need only organized labor.” Breaking the cotton 
monopoly, Adams made plain, was the only way to end slavery and destroy the power 
of the Southern aristocracy. Transferring cotton growing to the undeveloped world 
“would bring cotton down to the cost, with a profit, of its production in cheap labor 
countries, say three pence a pound.”36 
Henry Adams replied from London on September 14, 1861, immediately after 
the first letter concerning cotton reached him: 
The main principles which you aim at demonstrating, that the 
American monopoly of cotton is in fact a curse both to America and to 
Great Britain, and its destruction might be made the cause of indefinite 
blessings to the whole range of countries under the torrid zone, this 
principle is and has always been an axiom here. It needs no proof. … 
The real difficulty with regard to cotton does not lie there…37 
 
The real question, the younger Adams son told his soldier brother, was 
whether or not England would be ruined during the two years that it took to get cotton 
cultivation established in the new locales, and added, “My own belief is that she will 
be ruined.”38 Henry Adams foresaw the Cotton Famine that would strike in 1862, but 
said that he did not think that Britain would attack the blockade. And even if Britain 
did go to war with the North, he thought that “it would only complicate matters still 
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more” and would not bring forth any great quantity of cotton.39 Two weeks later he 
was confident enough of that conclusion to write, “we are no longer uneasy about the 
blockade.”40 
Sometime prior to the end of September 1861, Henry Adams began what 
would in modern terminology be called a psychological warfare campaign in England 
aimed at undercutting the South’s “King Cotton” diplomatic strategy. Using aliases or 
agents to hide his involvement, Adams sent letters to various English newspapers that 
were, “if not my writing, at least my hand.”41 According to Adams, The Times 
published at least fourteen of them. The possibility exists that Adams paid bribes to 
have letters and articles planted in British newspapers. In a cryptic note to his brother, 
Henry Adams said in reference to the matter, “I wish you could manage to get the 
money from Raymond without letting the subordinates into the matter. I doubt if I can 
carry it on much longer without being known.”42 
During the second week in November 1861, Henry Adams set out for 
Manchester to in his words, “see everything that is to be seen and learn all that is to 
be learned.”43 He carried with him letters of recommendation to prominent people in 
Manchester, and his plan was to “report with as much accuracy as possible all my 
conversations and all my observations” and to send them to his brother. Charles 
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Francis Adams, Jr., subsequently sent Henry’s report to the Boston Courier. Other 
American newspapers reprinted the article.
44
 
 Henry Adams spent several days in Manchester, staying in the home of an 
American, whom he identified only as Mr. Stell, and talked with a number of cotton 
merchants, spinners, and manufacturers. Stell told him that the majority of the “solid 
people” of Manchester were anti-North in their sentiments. However, one cotton 
merchant that Adams talked to told him, “The present pressure on the spinners is an 
excellent thing, provided that it does not last too long.” That was because the markets 
were flooded with yarn and cloth, and a temporary interruption in production would 
enable spinners to sell off the overstock of yarn lying unsold in their warehouses. 
Cotton was available, but almost all of the activity in the market was by speculators. 
Spinners were buying very little. About one-quarter of the spindles were idle, and a 
proportionate number of mill workers had been discharged to as Adams put it, “starve 
as they best might.” Adams also paid a call on the Cotton Supply Association’s 
offices, examined its displays of cotton samples and cotton gins, and discussed 
prospects for cotton in India and elsewhere with some of the Association’s staff and 
members, whose identities he obscured.
45
 
That Henry Adams established cordial relations with the Cotton Supply 
Association’s leadership and reached a consensus of opinion with them at the moment 
when he did may have been more fortuitous than history recognizes. News that Captain 
Charles Wilkes of the U.S.S. San Jacinto had stopped the British mail steamer Trent 
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and taken captive Confederate envoys John M. Mason and John Slidell broke in the 
British press on November 28, 1861, and the incident was immediately perceived as an 
insult to Britain’s national honor. There was much indignation and popular clamor for 
war with the United States. On November 30, writing from London, Henry Adams told 
his brother, “This nation means to make war. Do not doubt it.”46 Adams expected that 
Britain would break diplomatic relations with the United States by New Years Day. 
The price of cotton on the Liverpool Exchange fell by 2 d. per pound as speculators 
reacted negatively in the belief that the blockade was about to be broken and the 
supply of cotton from America resumed.
47
 On December 20, Charles Francis Adams 
penned an ominous warning to his eldest son, “War with the United States seems 
imminent. It may spread itself all over Europe.”48  
The Cotton Supply Association vehemently opposed war, however. On 
December 16, when British anger toward the United States was at its height, The 
Cotton Supply Reporter’s front-page editorial declared: 
Fear of the American crop, by reducing prices, must remove a 
powerful stimulus to efforts which are being made in India and 
elsewhere to liberate us from dependence on one source of supply. … 
Should war intervene, the excitement amongst speculators would of 
course be intensified to the highest pitch, prices would fall with 
unprecedented rapidity.
49
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 War with the United States, the Association contended, would not only 
preserve the American monopoly in the long-term, but was likely to greatly worsen 
the immediate shortage of cotton. The unsigned editorial’s author offered the 
presumption that the U.S. Navy would not meet the Royal Navy in battle off the 
blockaded Southern ports, but that its ships would disperse far and wide across the 
oceans to wage a devastating campaign against British merchant shipping. Sinking 
cotton boats would be the American cruisers’ primary task. The editorial also said 
that Northern armies in the Western theater were preparing to invade the South by 
pushing down the Mississippi Valley, a strategy that would probably result in cotton 
from the upper South becoming available for export via Northern ports. In the event 
of war with Britain, however, the objective of those Northern armies would be to 
forestall any chance of cotton falling into British hands by burning it.
50
 
Peaceful resolution of the Trent Affair marked a significant improvement in 
relations between the North and Great Britain. At the end of the third week in 
February 1862, Henry Adams wrote to his brother: 
The Trent affair has proved thus far somewhat in the nature of 
a sharp thunderstorm…and the consequence has been a decided 
improvement of the state of the atmosphere. … The natural effect is to 
reduce the apparent dimensions of all other causes of offense. The 
Manchester people are patient and uncomplaining. The distress is not 
yet of such a kind as to give rise to much uneasiness, and the blockade 
shuts up the expectation of cotton enough to stimulate the prospect of 
production in other quarters, so that England shall not be again subject 
to a similar catastrophe.
51
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Concurrent with resolution of the Trent Affair came a better understanding of 
the parameters of the crisis in the cotton economy as well. While Henry Adams was 
in Manchester, George Francis Train, a wealthy Massachusetts merchant and railroad 
builder who was a long-time acquaintance of Lord John Russell was in England 
engaged in pro-Union propaganda.
52
 Train mailed a letter from Manchester to the 
editor of the New York Herald in which he said: 
The cotton famine has saved the manufacturers from ruin and 
put the burthen [sic] upon the masses. The world’s hongs are stocked 
with Manchester goods, and another year of plenty of cotton would 
have ruined half Lancashire. High prices of cotton on hands clears off 
nearly all their renewed bills.
53
 
 
Another letter from someone identified only as “an intelligent American 
merchant” was mailed from Manchester to the North American and United States 
Gazette on November 16. Its anonymous writer said:  
Great apprehension appears to be felt that England will 
interfere with our blockade. Let me assure you this will never be. Not 
even the most violent advocate of the south suggests such an 
alternative, and England is only too happy to increase the importance 
of her own colonies by encouraging the growth of cotton. … It is not 
cotton that is wanted at the moment—it is customers for manufactured 
goods.
54
 
 
 There is no way to know whether or not Henry Adams had a hand in these 
letters, but it certainly appears that someone in Great Britain was trying to manipulate 
American opinion about the cotton crisis in the same way that Adams was trying to 
manipulate opinion about it in England. 
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There is an intriguing possibility that freelance American agents were engaged 
in a deliberate effort to manipulate the English cotton market at the same time Henry 
Adams and George Francis Train were conducting their propaganda campaigns. 
American speculators appeared at the Liverpool exchange around the end of June 
1861 and began buying cotton and shipping it to New York. As The Times reported 
on July 19, 1861, this was, “a circumstance before unknown in the present century.”55 
The Americans bought in small lots, the total amounting to over 1,000 bales during 
that week.
56
 Karl Marx spotted this strange activity and on September 21, 1861, 
mentioned it in an article written for the New York Daily Tribune, for which he was a 
correspondent. Marx described what was happening as “a feature hitherto unknown in 
the English cotton market, viz., American operations in cotton at Liverpool, partly on 
speculation, partly for reshipment to America.”57 Marx reported that as a consequence 
of the American buying the Liverpool market had become “feverishly excited” as 
speculators and manufacturers fearing a shortage bid up the price.
58
 The market’s 
behavior at this time made no economic sense to Marx, because China and India were 
enormously overstocked with unsold cotton cloth, and the oversupply of goods was 
increasing, resulting in a sharp decline in prices paid for cloth. He wrote, “Under 
these circumstances, the demand for the British cotton manufactures decreasing, their 
prices can…not keep pace with the progressive rise in the price of raw material; 
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but…the spinning, weaving, and printing of cotton must…cease to pay the costs of 
production.”59 
 Massachusetts cloth manufacturers were behind the American cotton buying. 
On January 9, 1862 the Lowell Daily Citizen and News reported that Lowell’s 
manufacturers had ordered 50,000 bales of cotton from England.
60
 Eight days later 
the newspaper reported the arrival in New York of the steamer Saxonia with 675 
bales of cotton purchased in England.
61
 Other observers besides Karl Marx could not 
understand the economic rationale of this cotton buying. On March 10, 1862 the San 
Francisco Daily Evening Bulletin reported that, “The London Economist is of the 
opinion that the American manufacturers are insane in working cotton, costing nearly 
40 cents a pound.”62 The California newspaper cited the Economist in saying that 
16,000 bales of cotton had been bought in Liverpool and shipped to the United States 
by December 31, 1861. Another 20,000 bales were purchased and shipped to New 
York and Boston in the first two months of 1862.
63
 These purchases continued 
throughout 1862 and into 1863, as shown by the arrival at Portland, Maine, of the 
ship Norwegian from Liverpool with 1,735 bales of cotton in December 1862.
64
 
During the week preceding February 20, 1863, ships departed Liverpool for New 
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York with 6,000 bales of cotton.
65
 Maurice Williams put the total American purchase 
for 1861 at 25,000 bales.
66
 In his 1862 circular Williams stated that 60,000 bales were 
re-exported to the United States and predicted that the North would buy 150,000 bales 
of cotton on the Liverpool exchange in 1863. Williams attributed the American 
speculator’s buying to the pull of the New York market, where cotton had shot up to 
38 cents, making it higher there than in Liverpool.
67
  
At the time it was assumed that the Massachusetts manufacturers were using 
this cotton in their mills, as the comments of Marx and the Economist show. 
However, of the 60,000 bales bought by Americans on the Liverpool exchange in 
1862, only 12,048 bales came to Boston.
68
 At the beginning of the Civil War the 
Massachusetts mills had a full year’s supply of cotton on hand.69 A large portion of 
the cotton that Americans purchased in Liverpool came to New York, where it 
remained for a time and was then shipped back to Liverpool and resold.
70
 No doubt 
some and perhaps all of this trans-Atlantic buying and selling was the work of private 
speculators motivated purely by profit as Maurice Williams thought, and with the rise 
in cotton prices that took place it certainly was profitable. The enterprise also 
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furthered the strategic goals of both the Cotton Supply Association and the Lincoln 
government. Whether planned or not, the run-up in prices encouraged other countries 
to grow cotton. Artificially raising the price of cotton also helped alleviate the 
financial distress of the Manchester manufacturers by allowing them to sell the large 
stocks of raw cotton that they had on hand to speculators at a substantial profit.
71
 
Circumstantial evidence to support the supposition that Americans 
deliberately manipulated the market comes from three sources. First, at the same time 
American speculators were active in Liverpool, Americans were buying cotton in 
distant foreign markets in what appears to be an effort to spur cotton growing in those 
places by bidding up prices. For example, the ship Levanter arrived in New York on 
June 11, 1862 from Macao with 735 bales of Chinese-grown cotton.
72
 Sometime in 
1863, Edward Atkinson purchased 15 bales of Egyptian cotton on the Alexandria 
exchange, paying 28½ d. per pound for it. The cotton arrived in Boston in January 
1864.
73
 If this cotton was purchased between May and August 1863, Atkinson paid a 
premium of 6 d. to 8 d. over the current Liverpool market price.
74
 In early 1863, 
Atkinson told the Boston Board of Trade that during 1862 about 30,000 bales of 
cotton had been received from “India, Smyrna, Hayti (sic), Jamaica, Brazil, Peru, 
Honduras, China, and Japan.”75 In the instance of Smyrna (Izmir, Turkey), the U.S. 
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consul suggested that the purchases be made to William H. Seward, with the stated 
purpose of encouraging Turkish farmers to grow cotton.
76
 This foreign cotton was not 
suitable for making clothing, but was in Atkinson’s words, “useful for making grain 
bags.”77 Atkinson’s statement leaves the impression that Boston manufacturers were 
buying cotton for which they did not have an immediate need and could not use. 
Second, there were men among the activist New England elite who already 
had practical experience in doing something similar. In the fall of 1855, Louis 
Napoleon (Napoleon III) approached John Murray Forbes with the proposition that J. 
M. Forbes & Company make large purchases of wheat on the American markets to 
alleviate a food shortage in France. Louis Napoleon wanted to hide the French 
government’s involvement so as not to drive up prices, as it was feared would happen 
if government intervention in the market were to become known. Using French 
government funds laundered through Barings Bank to hide their source, J. M. Forbes 
& Company purchased $5 million worth of wheat through intermediaries in Michigan 
and Illinois. The wheat was then sold in France at a pre-agreed price, alleviating the 
food shortage and the social unrest that it caused, while still keeping the French 
government’s intervention in the market secret. Forbes wrote in his memoirs that, 
“Our secret was so well kept that nobody dreamed of any government being behind 
us.”78 
                                                 
76
 Julius Bing to William H. Seward, Jan. 24, 1862, in Commercial Relations of the United 
States with Foreign Countries for the year ended September 30, 1862 (Washington: GPO, 1863), 572. 
 
77
 Littell’s Living Age 21, no. 992 (June 6, 1863): 464. 
 
78
 Hughes, Letters and Recollections of John Murray Forbes, vol. 2, 145-146. 
 
 93 
Later in the war, in March 1863, John Murray Forbes and William H. 
Aspinwall were sent to England on a secret mission to buy the so-called Laird rams, 
the two powerful ironclad warships that were being built for the Confederacy by the 
Laird shipyard. Forbes and Aspinwall were provided with $10 million in U.S. 
Treasury bonds to finance the purchase. The bonds were to be used as collateral to 
secure a £1 million loan from Baring Brothers. A cover story that Forbes and 
Aspinwall were buying the ships for China or some other country was used to conceal 
the involvement of the United States government. The scheme, which involved 
espionage and possibly bribery, was kept secret from Charles Francis Adams, the 
United States minister to Britain. The mission’s secrecy was compromised to The 
Times by an unidentified source in New York and the plan to purchase the two 
warships was never put into action. William H. Aspinwall’s obituary in the New York 
Times and recent research by Walter Stahr suggests that the Forbes-Aspinwall 
mission was more successful than it appeared, however.
79
 
Increased cotton prices actually helped the British mill owners. During the 
first few months of the American Civil War, the English mills continued running at 
full capacity, depleting the supply and adding even more surplus cotton goods to the 
already glutted markets. Arthur Arnold reported that at the time of the first battle of 
Bull Run, July 21, 1861, the rate of cotton goods production in England had never 
been greater.
80
 Robert Baker, the Inspector of Factories, wrote on December 2, 1861: 
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I have been informed that, irrespective of the causes which 
have interrupted our usual supplies of cotton from America and our 
exports, short time must have been kept during the ensuing winter in 
consequence of the great increase in production during the last three 
years, and the unsettled state of the Indian and Chinese markets.
81
 
 
English manufacturers began 1862 with an eight months’ stock of unsold 
goods on hand.
82
 The backlog of unsalable cotton goods persisted into 1863.
83
 Mills 
were operating at only two-thirds capacity due to the large stock of unsold yarn on 
hand, a situation worsened by stoppage of cloth exports to the United States. There 
was in Britain a stock of almost 800,000 bales of cotton. According to Maurice 
Williams, this was the largest stock on hand at any year’s end since 1853. This was 
enough cotton to keep the spinning mills running at the 1860 rate of consumption for 
seventeen weeks.
84
 When he compiled his statistical data in 1872, E. J. Donnell put 
the total stock of raw material on hand at slightly less, giving an inventory of 622,565 
bales as of December 31, 1861.
85
 Spinners returned a large proportion of their raw 
cotton to the market for resale, where it was bought by speculators at prices 
considerably above what the mills paid for it. 
                                                 
81
 Great Britain. Parliament. Reports of the Inspectors of Factories to Her Majesty’s Principal 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, for the half year ending 31
st
 October 1861 (London: Her 
Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1862), 19. 
 
82
 Arnold, History of the Cotton Famine, 81. 
 
83
 Williams, “The Position of the Cotton Trade at the close of February, 1863” in Seven 
Years’ History of the Cotton Trade of Europe, 1861 to 1868, appendix (pages not numbered). 
 
84
 Williams, “The Cotton Trade of 1861” in Seven Years’ History of the Cotton Trade of 
Europe, 1861 to 1868, 1-17. 
 
85
 Donnell, History of Cotton, 508-509. 
 
 95 
 Writing one year later, on December 31, 1862, after the crisis that brought 
unemployment, destitution, and near starvation to millions of mill workers and their 
families had struck and the worst of it had passed, Maurice Williams wrote:  
Such a rapid increase in Manufacturing power naturally 
produced a great accumulation of Stocks of Goods not only in Europe, 
but also in the various ports of in [sic] the world; for Merchants, in the 
expectation that the then relative cheapness of Cotton fabrics would 
lead to an increased Consumption, went on shipping (more especially 
to India and China) far more than was required. Up, therefore, to a 
certain point, the stoppage of the American supply, and consequent 
curtailment of the production of Cotton Goods, proved of essential 
service to our Manufacturers,—for it enabled them, in many instances, 
to realize very handsome profits on previous accumulations of Stocks, 
whilst, had the supply continued as abundant as before, it is natural to 
anticipate such a panic in consequence of over production as would 
have entailed even far more serious losses to them, as Manufacturers, 
than they have, so far, experienced by the forced closing of their 
mills.
86
 
 
In short, the American Civil War could not have come at a better time insofar 
as the British cotton manufacturers were concerned. The mill owners and the British 
government clearly recognized that the stoppage of American cotton was beneficial to 
themselves, since it allowed them to deflect the working class’s dissatisfaction 
aroused by conditions at home by pointing to a foreign war in which Britain had no 
part as the cause of their misery. One year after the Civil War began, the animosity 
between labor and mill owners was gone. Factory Inspector Alexander Redgrave 
wrote, “The feelings between the masters and the operatives has never been better.”87 
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At the same time, the stoppage allowed Britain’s manufacturers a way out of 
the economic disaster facing them because of the large supplies of unsold cotton 
goods on hand. Prices would surely rise, and they could sell these goods at a 
substantial profit and meet their financial obligations while their mills sat idle.
88
 
The prevailing situation in the cotton trade and the blockade of American 
cotton broke the economic paradox that had heretofore assured that the United States’ 
cotton monopoly would continue. As the statements of David Christy, Karl Marx, and 
others show, it had long been thought that without slavery cotton growing in the 
United States would cease. Previously, it had been thought that only “ruinously low 
prices” as described by James A. Mann could end slavery in America. But low prices 
prevented other countries where low cost labor might allow cotton to be grown more 
cheaply than in the United States from doing so because cotton prices low enough to 
bring about the demise of slavery would not pay the transportation costs. That now 
changed, because with American cotton kept off the market by the war, the price 
would be sufficiently high to encourage others to grow it and pay the cost of 
transportation. Further, many people in Britain believed from the onset that if the 
American war continued for any length of time, the North would make abolition a 
war aim.
89
  
It was recognized that the Civil War was aiding Great Britain in other ways as 
well. W. C. Corsan, an English merchant, traveled through the South in 1862 and 
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reported a conversation that he had with an unnamed Confederate leader in 
Richmond. The Confederate told Corsan: 
Yours is a rich aristocratic country, and you can afford to keep 
the poor caused by the Cotton Famine for twenty years, if necessary, if 
at the end of that time you shall have made yourselves independent of 
the world for cotton, and such discredit has been thrown on republican 
institutions by our ruin, as to render their rise for another century 
impossible.
90
 
 
Manchester cotton men were making huge fortunes from selling their stocks 
of cotton to speculators and investing the proceeds in Northern industries. The 
ironworks in Sheffield and the armaments makers in Birmingham were making 
armour and weaponry for both sides. Confederate naval raiders like the Alabama 
were driving the United States merchant marine off the seas, with the result that 
British ships were acquiring the American share of ocean trade.
91
 American gold in 
staggering amounts poured into Britain to pay for the arms. To illustrate the amounts, 
in just one installment of hundreds, the ship Persia carried over $80 million in Union 
gold to Britain.
92
 Much of that gold went to pay for cotton overseas, which in turn 
stimulated British trade and manufacturing by bringing goods that had previously 
been unaffordable to them within reach of buyers in India, Egypt, the Ottoman 
Empire, and elsewhere.
93
 
American leaders were understandably unhappy with what was happening to 
the United States merchant fleet. But they discerned the parameters of the strategic 
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economic situation and recognized that the interests of the Union and those of Great 
Britain converged when it came to cotton. Speaking to a Rhode Island audience in 
1862, Caleb B. Smith, Lincoln’s Secretary of the Interior, echoed Henry Adams and 
the Cotton Supply Association when he said: 
A few years’ continuance of the war, by the high prices 
resulting from the sudden loss of the American crop, will stimulate the 
production of the staple in numerous parts of the world where it is not 
now raised, and then the Southern monopoly will be gone, and with it 
will go Southern slavery forever. Without cotton, what is slavery 
worth?
94
 
 
Very early in the war, a decision was made at the highest levels of the Lincoln 
administration to assist the British in their efforts to efforts to encourage overseas 
cotton growing. William H. Seward wrote in a letter to the U.S. Consul-General in 
Egypt: 
Under the circumstances it has seemed to the Government an 
obvious duty to cast about and examine the capacities of other 
countries for cotton culture and stimulate it as much as possible, and 
thus to counteract the destructive designs of the factious monopolists 
at home.
95
 
 
To accomplish that goal there was one indispensable component that the 
Union had to supply and which it did not have readily at hand: large quantities of 
American cotton seed. Had the North not obtained those seeds and sent them to 
England, the Cotton Supply Association could not have carried forward its plan to 
break the American cotton monopoly, and the South’s “King Cotton” strategy might 
well have succeeded. 
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Chapter 4 
Seeds of Destruction 
 
There is no evidence that any large supplies of American cotton seed existed 
outside the South at the beginning of the Civil War. The Cotton Supply Association 
certainly possessed some cotton seed stocks, but nowhere near enough to plant cotton 
acreage sufficient to replace the American crop. No significant commercial seed 
industry existed in either the North or South. Cotton planters generally saved seed 
from one year to the next. Ginners considered excess seed a waste product and threw 
them away or sold them to local farmers for livestock feed. There were a few 
Northern firms that engaged in the crushing of cotton seed for oil, which was burned 
in lamps. The first such firm appears to have been established at Providence, Rhode 
Island, in 1856, and it was reported at that time that factories for crushing cotton seed 
were being built in Boston. These facilities probably had small stocks of uncrushed 
cotton seed on hand, but they could not have furnished seed in quantity since their 
supplies from the South were cut off by the outbreak of war.
1
 
Yet during the Civil War between 8 and 10 million pounds of cotton seeds 
were exported through the port of New York, most of them to England. The cotton 
seed was “intended for distribution abroad, in different new quarters where cotton 
cultivation has recently been entered on.”2 Obtaining that quantity of cotton seeds 
was a major wartime undertaking that involved at least two major operations. One 
was located at Atlantic Dock, Brooklyn, New York, and overseen by the Treasury 
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Department through the New York Custom House. The other was centered at Cairo, 
Illinois, and extended as far as southeastern Kansas. It was begun with funds 
appropriated by Congress and run by the Illinois Central Railroad. The War and Navy 
Departments provided considerable assistance to both operations. New Orleans 
provided a third outlet through which cotton seed could reach Britain after Union 
forces captured the city in April 1862. 
Documentation directly relating to the North’s cotton gin at Atlantic Dock is 
extremely sparse. Henry S. Stiles said nothing about cotton related activities at 
Atlantic Dock during the Civil War in his History of the City of Brooklyn published in 
1869, nor did Ellen M. Snyder-Grenier in her 1996 book Brooklyn! An Illustrated 
History. The Brooklyn Historical Society has no information about it in their 
collections. As a result of this dearth of documentation, the cotton operations at 
Atlantic Dock can be viewed only indirectly, through British sources and the 
documentation generated during a post-Civil War congressional investigation of 
rampant corruption in the New York Custom House. In that investigation, Congress 
was never able to locate the New York Custom House’s accounting records relating 
to its cotton activities.
3
 
Cotton ginning at Atlantic Dock evidently began as the result of a 
convergence of circumstances, rather than by deliberate plan. From the beginning of 
the war, the Navy sent captured blockade runners to Atlantic Dock where the ships 
and their cargoes were condemned in U.S. District Court and sold at auction. Seized 
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cotton was taken to T. M. Wheeler & Company, known as “Wheeler’s Stores,” an 
Atlantic Dock storage warehouse, where it was sold at public auction by Daniel H. 
Burdett, of the firm of Burdett, Jones & Co., Auctioneers. Seven auctions were held 
between February 5 and September 12, 1862, in which Burdett sold 1,117,234 pounds 
(3,325 bales) of cotton for $676,340.71. Hiram Barney, government cotton agent at 
the New York Custom House was responsible for the cotton and funds raised from its 
sale.
4
 Unginned cotton seized by U. S. Treasury agents after Union forces captured 
Port Royal, South Carolina, in November 1861 was shipped to Atlantic Dock in 
January or February 1862. To prepare the Port Royal cotton for sale, several Brown’s 
“Excelsior” gins were acquired and installed at Atlantic Dock, probably in or near the 
Wheeler’s Stores warehouses.5 That small start grew into an industrial-scale cotton 
ginning facility. The Brooklyn Daily Eagle listed the Atlantic Dock ginnery in its 
“Statistics of Manufactures” in 1864 as a “cotton seed” establishment having $20,000 
capital invested. This gives the impression that the ginnery was operated by a 
contractor, rather than directly by the federal government.
6
 
Subsequent to the installation of cotton gins at Atlantic Dock, considerable 
quantities of unginned cotton was seized by Union forces in the South and shipped to 
New York. According to the one small article that The Cotton Supply Reporter 
devoted to the “government” cotton ginnery at Atlantic Dock, by August 1862, five 
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million pounds of cotton had been received at the facility, and two million pounds of 
it had been ginned. At the generally accepted ratio of at least two parts seed to one 
part fiber, one million pounds of cotton “in the seed” would yield more than 660,000 
pounds of seed. Given these figures, Atlantic Dock should have had available well 
over three million pounds of seed by planting time 1863. The Union’s cotton agents 
were discriminating in the kind of cotton that they chose to seize and send to 
Brooklyn, and evidently kept the lots of cotton and the seed obtained from each lot 
segregated by place of origin. This would not have been necessary if obtaining cotton 
fiber was the only concern, but would have been of critical importance if the 
objective were obtaining seed for planting in different climatic regions. The Cotton 
Supply Reporter article made especial note that the Atlantic Dock ginnery had 
received a large shipment of “what is called ‘Coffin Cotton’, a species cultivated on 
Col. Coffin’s plantations at Beaufort, S.C., and which is stated to be the largest and 
most beautiful staple that comes to market.”7  
This mention and advertisements for cotton seed in The Cotton Supply 
Reporter provided the clue to ascertaining how cotton seeds from the federal ginnery 
at Atlantic Dock found their way to Britain. Purchases of American cotton seed were 
apparently not direct transactions between the Cotton Supply Association and the 
federal ginnery at Atlantic Dock, but were handled by commercial intermediaries. In 
January 1863, James Madden, who was associated with the London trading firm of 
Messrs. Bevan, Cole, and Harris, advertised the arrival in Liverpool of “about thirty 
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tons” of the “Best Variety (Coffin Brand)” cotton seed, described as “for planting.”8 
As the war progressed, Madden advertised “New Orleans cotton seed for planting.”9 
James Madden also became the British sales agent for American Brown’s “Excelsior” 
cotton gins, which by January 1863 were being made under license in England.
10
 A 
Liverpool trading firm, Stuart and Warry, also advertised cotton seed, “Just landed, 
per ship ‘Resolute’, from New York, a quantity…new seed, from the last crop of 
Cotton—selling in the Liverpool market from four to six shillings per pound.”11 By 
the spring of 1864, D. Stuart & Company in the Manchester Buildings, Liverpool, 
was advertising “Cotton Seed—New Orleans, Choice, for Planting” in 30-ton lots.12 
Whether these English trading firms dealt direct with the federal cotton gin at Atlantic 
Dock or through American commercial agents is unknown, but in early 1863 there 
was at least one trading firm in New York that dealt in cotton seeds, Sheppard & 
Seward, with offices at 214 Pearl Street.
13
 Another New York firm, T. Bourne, 
located at 116 Nassau Street, was advertising cotton seed in The Cotton Supply 
Reporter in the spring of 1866.
14
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The Cotton Supply Association had some cotton seeds shipped direct from 
New York to overseas consignees. On February 23, 1863, G. R. Haywood informed 
Michael Mulhall, the editor of the Standard, a British newspaper published in Buenos 
Aires, Argentina, that the Association’s Executive Committee had instructed its agent 
in New York to purchase seed and forward them to Mulhall in monthly shipments. 
That this actually was done is evidenced by correspondence concerning safe arrival of 
the ship Friedrich Martin at Montevideo, Uruguay, from New York on October 8, 
1863, with 20 bags of seed sent to the British consul there by an agent of the 
Association. Another ship from New York delivered 270 sacks of Sea Island and 
upland seed, 6 American cotton gins, and a bale press consigned to President Lopez 
of Paraguay.
15
 James Monroe, the United States consul in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 
reported the arrival there of the Danish-registered sailing ship Anna Jane from New 
York with “169 barrels of cotton seed for the Brazilian government” on December 27, 
1864.
16
 
The Atlantic Dock cotton ginnery operated in an environment of pervasive 
graft, corruption, and lawlessness. As the cotton enterprise grew ever larger, the New 
York Custom House became a center of malfeasance and corruption. The central 
figure was Simeon Draper. Draper was of Puritan descent, the son of a Revolutionary 
War militia captain of the same name who moved his family from Massachusetts to 
New York in the early 1800s. The elder Simeon Draper attained some wealth, and his 
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son rose to prominence as a merchant and investor, but overextended himself and lost 
the fortune that he had inherited speculating in railroad bonds in the 1850s.
17
 He was 
active in New York Whig politics, became a personal friend of William H. Seward, 
and followed Seward into the new Republican Party after the demise of the Whigs.
18
 
When the Civil War began Draper was president of the Republican Central Club, the 
organization of Lincoln partisans in New York City. In April 1862 Draper helped 
raise funds to subsidize The London American, a newspaper that Thurlow Weed was 
using to disseminate pro-North propaganda in England.
19
 Draper’s prominence as an 
abolitionist was enough that The Times of London named him in the same sentence 
with Horace Greely and Rev. Henry Ward Beecher.
20
 
At face value, Simeon Draper appeared to be a typical Union patriot activist. 
He was also a financial schemer and war profiteer who conspired to evade the law in 
order to enrich himself. General La Fayette Curry Baker, Chief of the National 
Detective Police, alleged that not long after all trade with the South was prohibited, “a 
party, composed of D. Randolph Martin, General W. P. Dole, Indian Agent, Mr. 
McCulloch, Mr. Harrington, and Simeon Draper and his brother, met on several 
occasions, to devise some plan to make money on cotton.”21  This corrupt ring’s 
activities eventually became so intertwined with the government’s efforts to obtain 
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cotton that it is almost impossible to distinguish one from the other. The “Mr. 
McCulloch” was Hugh McCulloch, who later became Secretary of the Treasury. The 
“Mr. Harrington” was George Harrington, who also became a high-ranking Treasury 
Department official. In early 1863, Hiram Barney was promoted to Collector of the 
Port of New York. Simeon Draper used his political connections to gain appointment 
as Barney’s replacement as Cotton Agent, in charge of disposing of seized Southern 
cotton.
22
 
As the war progressed, Draper’s control over cotton operations steadily 
increased, as did his independence from oversight. In the spring of 1864, an article in 
the Brooklyn Daily Eagle complained of his political influence over the operations of 
the New York Custom House. That autumn, Hiram Barney resigned as Collector, 
reportedly pressured to do so by McCulloch so that Draper could be appointed to the 
position. At that point, Draper was in virtually complete control over efforts to seize 
cotton in the South and sell it on government account.
23
 The graft, corruption, 
extortion, and outright thievery involved in those cotton seizures is well documented, 
and need not be reiterated here.
24
 Congressional investigators later accused Simeon 
Draper of embezzling enormous sums of money from the proceeds from sales of 
seized Confederate cotton. By the time those charges were made, Draper was beyond 
the reach of Congress, having died in November 1866. From near bankruptcy at the 
time of his appointment as Cotton Agent in 1862, Draper was a multi-millionaire at 
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the time of his death.
25
 No audit of the New York Custom House’s cotton accounts 
was ever made, however. Draper’s assistant, Francis Robinson, testified before 
Congress that he sent the New York Custom House cotton account books to the 
Treasury Department shortly after Draper’s death, but Treasury officials insisted that 
the ledgers never arrived there. No satisfactory explanation of what happened to the 
books was ever forthcoming, and investigators implied that someone, either Robinson 
or one of Draper’s accomplices at the Treasury Department, destroyed them.26 
It is also possible that some of the records pertaining to federal cotton 
activities at Atlantic Dock were destroyed in a fire on the night of December 1-2, 
1865. That night a five-story brick storage warehouse located at No. 15 State Street, 
Brooklyn, was completely destroyed in a blaze of suspicious origin. More than 2,000 
bales of government-owned cotton valued at $200,000 burned in the building. Seven 
Brooklyn fire fighters and a policeman were killed when an exterior brick wall of the 
burning structure buckled and collapsed into the street, crushing them beneath the 
rubble.
27
  
The culture of lawlessness at Atlantic Dock was not confined to Simeon 
Draper and his ring of white-collar criminals at the New York Custom House. Thefts 
of cotton from Atlantic Dock warehouses and ships were common. On April 4, 1862, 
the Brooklyn Daily Eagle reported: 
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Stealing Cotton—Two boys named Edward Smith and Edward 
Donnelly [were arrested for stealing 40 lbs. of cotton from Atlantic 
Dock]. A large quantity of cotton is stolen every year in this manner 
by boys who go around the docks, fill their pockets with cotton, and 
then deposit it somewhere and come back and repeat the operation, 
until they accumulate a large quantity, which they sell to junk 
dealers.
28
 
 
 On that date cotton was selling for 27½ cents on the New York exchange, 
meaning that the two boys cost the Treasury $11.00 in lost revenue.
29
 This petty 
pilfering by delinquent boys was nothing compared to the thefts that followed. In 
March 1863, James Johnson, a laborer at Atlantic Dock was arrested for stealing two 
bales of cotton valued at $400. A police investigation revealed that Johnson had 
accomplices among the sailors on the ship from which he stole the cotton.
30
 Ten days 
later, another Atlantic Dock laborer, Thomas Doud, was apprehended in the act of 
stealing cotton.
31
 A Brooklyn police detective identified as “Officer Holliday” 
observed laborers Patrick Graham and Charles Collins in the act of stuffing cotton 
into their pockets on August 21, 1863. In this instance, Holliday followed the thieves 
to their fence, Owen Gilmartin, and arrested him for receiving stolen goods.
32
 On 
Christmas Eve 1864, Holliday caught 34-year old Atlantic Dock laborer Michael 
Croonin in the act of stealing “$50 worth” of cotton from the schooner Alabama.33 
The thieves that Holliday caught were small fry, however. As the price of cotton 
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soared to the phenomenal high of $1.89 per pound in August 1864, an organized gang 
of cotton thieves began rowing boats from the East River into the Atlantic Dock ship 
basin under cover of darkness. The thieves came alongside ships moored in the 50-
acre basin, climbed aboard, intimidated the crews, and lowered bales of cotton over 
the side into their boats. Detectives finally managed to surprise the gang in the act of 
pilfering a ship and arrested them on the night of March 15-16, 1865.
34
  
A great deal more information is available about the North’s other effort to 
obtain cotton seed, this one in southern Illinois. The efficiency and businesslike way 
that it was managed and the civic mindedness of the leaders of the project stands in 
sharp contrast to the operation at Atlantic Dock. The Illinois cotton project apparently 
originated with William H. Osborn, president of the Illinois Central Railroad. Soon 
after the outbreak of the Civil War, Osborn approached William H. Seward and 
Senator Jim Lane of Kansas with a proposal that the federal government should 
secure a supply of cotton seed from the South, preferably from the most northerly 
cotton-growing regions, with the stated aim of growing cotton in southern Illinois and 
the southerly portions of other Northern states.
35
  
Though there is no documentation of it, the idea may have been suggested to 
Osborn by someone in Britain. Although the Illinois Central was the prototype 
American land grant railroad, the majority of its stockholders were British and it was 
financed by London banks, to which the Illinois Central pledged its land holdings as 
collateral to secure the loans. Among the Illinois Central’s stockholders were many 
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prominent British names, including Richard Cobden, John Bright, William Gladstone, 
Robert Gladstone, William Peel, James Caird, Lawrence Heyworth, William Moffatt, 
Charles Paget, Alexander Haldane, Joseph Paxton, and Stephen Cunard. Osborn made 
frequent trips to London to raise funds and confer with stockholders and creditors 
before and during the Civil War.
36
 Richard Cobden and James Caird, who was 
regarded as Britain’s foremost agronomist, visited the United States on Illinois 
Central related business in the summer of 1859. During that trip, George B. 
McClellan, then the general manager of the Illinois Central, and Ambrose E. 
Burnside, then the railroad’s treasurer, briefed Cobden about the railroad’s operations 
and prospects. McClellan accompanied Cobden on a tour in the director’s car down 
the tracks from Chicago to Cairo. At Cairo, Cobden and McClellan were met by 
Senator Jefferson Davis of Mississippi. The three men boarded a steamboat for an 
excursion to the cotton growing areas in western Tennessee and northern Mississippi 
where cotton seeds would later be procured. Cobden also met M. L. Dunlap, the 
editor of The Illinois Farmer who would later play a leading role in the effort to grow 
cotton in Illinois.
37
  
So strong was the British influence in the Illinois Central that on the eve of the 
Civil War some in the United States had begun to suspect that the railroad was a 
tentacle of British imperialism thrust into America’s heartland. By 1860, British 
investors had poured $17 million into Illinois Central stock and bonds. Further, the 
Illinois Central routed its Atlantic-bound freight and passenger traffic to Port Huron, 
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Michigan, on the Michigan Central Railroad, in which British investors also held a 
large stake. A railway ferry at Port Huron passed Illinois Central traffic over the St. 
Claire River to the Canadian Great Western Railroad. Freight and passengers bound 
for New York and the U.S. Atlantic seaboard re-entered the United States across the 
great new Victoria Bridge over the St. Lawrence River.
38
 Critics complained that 
grain and meat from the Midwest was traveling this rail route to Montreal, where it 
was loaded on Quebec Line steamers to Liverpool. It was further alleged that the 
cargo traveled on through Chicago-to-Liverpool bills of lading issued by the Illinois 
Central. This meant that the profits accrued to British brokers and freight forwarders, 
not to New York and Boston merchants. In January 1860 a New York Times editorial 
headlined “A British Seizure in Earnest” complained that, “it is by no means certain 
that in another year the Cotton of Tennessee and North Mississippi will not be made 
to take the same extraordinary direction, say from the planting States to Manchester 
through Canada.”39 
As the secession crisis built toward war, it appeared that the New York Times 
editor’s prediction was in process of becoming a reality. In a speech delivered before 
an audience of prominent New York merchants, industrialists, and financiers that 
included Illinois Central investor and director William H. Aspinwall in February 
1860, naval officer, explorer, and geographer William Francis Lynch reported that 
during the 1858-1859 marketing season, steamboats delivered 80,000 bales of cotton 
to Cairo, Illinois, where it was loaded onto Illinois Central trains for shipment to the 
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eastern seaboard.
40
 In January 1861, the exporting firm of Messrs. Graham, Haliday 
& Company entered into a contract with the Illinois Central to ship cotton grown in 
Tennessee and Arkansas, both of which were at that time still in the Union, to Cairo 
by steamboat, and then to Detroit and the Atlantic seaboard on the railroads.
41
 During 
February and March 1861, more than 10,000 bales of cotton traveled the Illinois 
Central-Canadian Great Western route and crossed the Victoria Bridge to New York. 
Cotton also came to Cincinnati, Ohio, by steamboat, and went to Boston by way of 
the Baltimore and Ohio and New York Central Railroads at a cost of $18.00 per ton. 
This river-rail freight rate was cheaper than the all-water route through New Orleans, 
and it took a month less time.
42
 At the same time this new cotton route was coming 
into use, the Illinois Central was accepting “millions of bushels” of wheat as 
payment-in-kind from cash-short farmers to whom the railroad had sold land along its 
tracks on credit. This wheat was destined for the European market.
43
 
The Illinois Central Railroad was also well connected to the U.S. government, 
the Union army, and the New England elite. Abraham Lincoln was in the Illinois state 
legislature when the railroad received its first charter in 1836, he supported its land 
grant bill while in Congress, and the Illinois Central retained him as its lawyer from 
1853 until 1860. William H. Osborn and Secretary of State William H. Seward were 
long-time acquaintances. Seward was heavily invested in Illinois Central bonds. The 
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governor of Illinois was an ex officio member of the railroad’s board of directors and 
the state of Illinois received a percentage of the railroad’s gross income in lieu of 
taxes. In addition to George B. McClellan and Ambrose E. Burnside, Union generals 
Nathaniel Banks, John A. Logan, Grenville M. Dodge, Thomas E. G. Ransom, Mason 
Brayman, and James Lane were at some time employed by or had some connection 
with the Illinois Central.
44
 
Immediately after Richard Cobden’s 1859 visit, the Illinois Central Railroad 
began sponsoring cotton growing experiments in the southern counties of Illinois 
similar to those sponsored by the Cotton Supply Association overseas. Appollos 
Cooper, a migrant from Tennessee, raised a few acres of cotton in Jackson County 
near Carbondale in 1860. Cooper reported harvesting 1200-1600 pounds of seed 
cotton per acre. This would have yielded one 400-pound bale of clean cotton per acre. 
Cooper’s yield was on par with the best achieved in the South. Isaac Ford 
successfully raised small plots in 1860 and 1861 in Washington County about 50 
miles southeast of St. Louis.
45
 French Canadian immigrants planted ten acres of 
cotton near Assumption, a whistle-stop village on the Illinois Central tracks 
immediately south of Springfield in the spring of 1861, using seed from Tennessee.
46
 
The Illinois Central Railroad sent samples of cotton grown in these experiments to the 
Cotton Supply Association for evaluation. The Manchester spinners reportedly 
                                                 
44
 Corliss, Main Line of Mid-America: The Story of the Illinois Central, 104-129; Walter 
Stahr, Seward: Lincoln’s Indispensable Man, 168. 
 
45
 Illinois Farmer 7, no. 1 (Jan. 1862): 19. 
 
46
 John P. Reynolds, “Essay on the Importance of Cotton as a Crop, and its Culture on the 
Prairies of the South Half of the State,” The Journal of the Illinois State Agricultural Society, vol. 1, 
No. 2 (Feb., 1862): 4. 
 
 114 
deemed the Illinois product better than the average New Orleans, and stated that they 
would like to have “10,000 or 20,000 bags per week.”47  
Upon the outbreak of war, the Illinois Central began a publicity campaign to 
promote cotton growing in southern Illinois. On December 23, 1861, the Chicago 
Tribune ran a lengthy article entitled “Cotton Culture on the Prairies—Historical 
Facts and Proofs” in which it printed information furnished by the railroad. The 
article included numerous testimonials from men in their sixties who recalled how 
they or their families had raised cotton in southern Illinois in the early 1800s. At that 
time, settlers from Kentucky, Tennessee, and North Carolina grew cotton as far north 
as Springfield. Several gins had remained in operation until the early 1840s. Old 
cotton growers repeatedly cited the low prices paid for cotton, not the climate as the 
reason that they quit planting it.
48
 
The press campaign to promote cotton growing in Illinois soon spread to 
eastern newspapers. In a letter to the New York Times dated Tuesday, January 21, 
1862, John Law, a member of the U.S. House of Representatives who represented the 
district of Indiana that included Vincennes, reported that when he was a boy “45 
years past” cotton had been grown on the Wabash River in southern Indiana. At that 
time farmers in Law’s immediate neighborhood shipped 20-30 bales downriver to 
New Orleans each year. Commenting on Law’s letter, the New York Times editor 
expressed the opinion that cotton could be successfully grown in southern Illinois and 
Indiana “whenever the price is high enough to give it greater value as a crop than 
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wheat or corn.”49 To support his contention, the editor cited John A. Kennicott, an 
“eminent agriculturist of Illinois” who verified that cotton had indeed been grown 
commercially in southern Illinois and Indiana prior to 1820, before the price declined 
to the point that cotton became less profitable than grain. Letters offering to plant 
cotton came to the New York Times from even farther afield. W. H. Scofield wrote 
from Wyandotte, Kansas, to say that farmers in his area had tried small garden 
plantings of cotton the previous year, and that there were Kansas farmers willing to 
“put in two acres this season, if seed can be obtained.”50 
By the time these appeals appeared in the New York Times, Senator Lane had 
already asked Congress for an appropriation of $20,000 to be used for the purchase of 
cotton seed for distribution to farmers in the North. After substantially reducing the 
amount of money and adding a proviso that tobacco seed also be purchased, the final 
amended bill, designated H. R. 255, was passed by unanimous consent of the House 
of Representatives on January 29, 1862. President Lincoln signed it into law on 
February 13, 1862.
51
 The Act, remarkable for its brevity, read: 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled, That there be, and is 
hereby appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise 
appropriated, the sum of three thousand dollars, for the purchase of 
cotton seed, and one thousand dollars for the purchase of tobacco seed, 
under the superintendence of the Secretary of the Interior, for general 
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distribution: Provided, That said cotton seed shall be purchased from 
places where cotton is grown as far north as possible.
52
 
 
Secretary of the Interior Caleb B. Smith designated the Patent Office as the 
agency responsible for implementing the Act, and commissioned two Special Agents 
to actually purchase the seeds, Walter Collins and D. C. Donnohue. Interestingly, 
Smith noted in his subsequent report to Congress that, “No specific compensation 
was agreed upon with the agents employed. They will be paid a reasonable 
compensation for the services actually rendered.”53 
Little biographical information could be discovered about Walter Collins, 
except that he was a Virginia Unionist. Collins was allocated four hundred dollars and 
sent to Union occupied territory in the vicinity of New Bern, North Carolina, where 
Army units under command of General Burnside assisted him in acquiring 1,400 
bushels of cotton seed. A military supply ship transported the seeds to Baltimore. 
Upon arrival in Washington on April 28, 1862, the seeds became the responsibility of 
William T. Dennis, described in a New York Times article as, “the working man of the 
Agricultural Department” at the Patent Office. One hundred women were hired to 
clean the cotton seeds and package them in sacks. The bagged cotton seeds were then 
made available to members of Congress, who used their franking privileges to 
distribute them through the mail to farmers in their districts.
54
 These seed packages 
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were probably small. A double-thickness cloth bag containing one quart was the 
standard size packet used for wheat and other cereal grain seeds given to 
Congressmen and Senators by the Patent Office for free distribution through the 
mail.
55
 Printed planting instructions accompanied the seeds. The Patent Office also 
sent small quantities of cotton seed to the Agricultural Society in Cleveland, Ohio, 
and to the Pennsylvania Agricultural Society for free distribution to their members for 
experimental planting.
56
 Representative Timothy G. Phelps sent North Carolina 
cotton seeds to California, entrusting them to the editor of the San Francisco Daily 
Evening Bulletin for distribution.
57
 Some of the North Carolina seed were planted 
experimentally as far north as Burlington County, New Jersey, where a wealthy 
gentleman, Edward G. James, planted three acres on his estate. Frost cut this 
experiment short.
58
 The State Department sent a few packets of cotton seeds to 
American consuls overseas.
59
 
The other Special Agent, Dillard C. Donnohue, was a resident of Greencastle, 
Indiana, where he practiced law. Census records indicate that Donnohue was born in 
Kentucky in c. 1815-1816, probably in the vicinity of Mount Sterling, where he 
married Mahala Tipton in 1833. The Donnohue family, which by 1860 included eight 
children, moved to Putnam County, Indiana, sometime between 1840 and 1850. D. C. 
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Donnohue represented the Seventh District of Indiana (Indianapolis and surrounding 
counties) as a delegate at the 1860 Republican Convention in Chicago, as did Caleb 
B. Smith.
60
  
Donnohue was allocated one thousand dollars, later increased to fifteen 
hundred, and sent to Paducah, Kentucky, with instructions to buy cotton seeds 
anywhere along the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers where he might find them 
available. He was also provided with letters of authorization from the Secretary of the 
Interior and the Secretary of War that enabled him to carry out his task in areas under 
military jurisdiction and to use military transportation. Donnohue departed Paducah 
on February 28, 1862, aboard a military steamboat and proceeded up the Tennessee 
River, which was by then under Union control.
61
 Two weeks later Donnohue wrote to 
the Secretary of the Interior to report that he was with General C. F. Smith’s army 
encamped at Savannah, Tennessee, about 15 miles north of the Mississippi state line. 
Donnohue reported that he had, “found cotton seed plenty—& will buy them after a 
battle is fought—I cannot have them brought to the boats until the rebels are either 
driven off or captured.”62 Next day, March 16, 1862, Donnohue sent a message down 
river to Paducah for transmission to Caleb B. Smith by military telegraph, “I can 
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procure cotton seed—in great abundance—so soon as the country is occupied by our 
troops—cotton plenty and cheap. Dispatch to me care of Genl. Smith.”63 
Donnohue did not wait for an answer from Washington, but proceeded on his 
own initiative to contract purchases of cotton from local planters. Little of it had been 
ginned, however, because the Union’s blockade of the rivers prevented local gins 
from obtaining the coarse jute bagging material used to wrap the bales. His initial 
effort at buying cotton seeds from gins in the Savannah neighborhood netted about 
three hundred bushels at a cost of 13 cents per bushel. The cost increased to 20 cents 
when wagon transportation from the gins to the steamboat was paid. Donnohue’s 
major difficulty was securing containers for the seed. Cloth bags were unavailable 
locally because of the blockade. He was forced to scavenge old wooden barrels to 
ship the first lot, and many of these fell apart in transit. Writing from Paducah on 
March 28, 1862, Donnohue reported to Caleb B. Smith that in future strong gunny 
sacks would have to be provided, and that he had, “advised the Ills. Central R.R. it is 
utterly impossible to ship seed in anything that can be procured up the Tenn. River.”64  
Obtaining the necessary sacks may have been the reason for Donnohue’s return to 
Paducah. He also availed himself of the opportunity to complain that an Army officer, 
Quarter Master Lyman, was being uncooperative in arranging transportation.
65
 
As soon as a shipment of empty grain bags arrived in Paducah, Donnohue 
again steamed up the Tennessee River. He arrived at Pittsburg Landing on the 
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morning of April 6, 1862, just in time to witness the Battle of Shiloh. Undaunted by 
either the carnage or the threat presented by Confederate forces in the area, Donnohue 
continued his cotton seed buying. He eventually obtained about eight hundred bushels 
of seed. Donnohue was careful in choosing the seed that he purchased, selecting a 
variety of cotton that “is the only variety that fully matures in this climate.”66  
 Donnohue delivered the cotton seed to Cairo, where he turned them over to 
the Illinois Central Railroad. The railroad’s station masters were responsible for 
distributing the seed to farmers along the tracks. Farmers were charged only for the 
cost of bagging and freight; the cotton seed themselves were free. Seeds were 
dispensed in one-bushel bags, each weighing 22 pounds net. Farmers were advised 
that 22 pounds of seed was enough to plant from two to four acres if they planted the 
seeds individually in spaced hills like corn instead of thickly broadcasting them in 
rows and thinning later, as was the normal practice in the South. Farmers who wished 
to try only a small experiment could order half-pound packets of cotton seed through 
the mail for 8 cents each. Station agents accepted postage stamps in payment for mail 
ordered seed. The Chicago Tribune advised farmers that the Illinois Central’s 
personnel would, “spare no pains to have all who wish supplied with the seed.”67 
M. L. Dunlap, editor of The Illinois Farmer and a contributor to The Journal 
of the Illinois State Agricultural Society joined the Illinois Central’s publicity 
campaign to promote cotton planting in February 1862. Dunlap held out hopes that 
eventually 20,000 acres of cotton would be planted in the southern part of Illinois 
                                                 
66
 D. C. Donnohue to Caleb B. Smith, April 25, 1862, in The Letters of D.C. Donnohue. 
 
67
 Chicago Tribune (Chicago, IL), May 7, 1862. 
 
 121 
known as Egypt and looked forward to the development of a variety of cotton that 
was acclimatized to the region. Dunlap told his readers that, “at fifteen cents a pound 
it will be one of our best paying crops.” Dunlap assured his readers that the Illinois 
Central Railroad would install equipment to gin and bale the cotton crop at locations 
along its line, as it was already doing at Assumption in expectation that eighty 
farmers there would plant 12 acres each in 1862. Dunlap cautioned inexperienced 
growers against planting an excessive amount of cotton to start, however. He 
recommended that farmers start with three acres or so, what one bushel of seed would 
plant. Dunlap revealed that he was corresponding with the Cotton Supply Association 
in Manchester, and that he was conferring regularly with officials of the Illinois 
Central Railroad.
68
 In December 1862, The Cotton Supply Reporter published an 
anonymous article about Illinois cotton that bears a striking resemblance in style and 
content to articles written by Dunlap in The Illinois Farmer.
69
 
The Illinois State Agricultural Society joined the Illinois Central Railroad’s 
cotton promotion campaign, using an appeal to patriotism mixed with the prospect of 
profit. In the March issue of its Journal, the Society printed a lengthy front page 
article about the physical characteristics of the cotton plant, cotton economics, and 
advice about its cultivation by C. Thurston Chase, an agricultural expert in Chicago.
70
 
The Journal also printed an exchange of letters between John P. Reynolds, the 
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corresponding secretary of the Agricultural Society, and Caleb B. Smith, in which 
Smith informed Reynolds of D. C. Donnohue’s cotton seed buying mission to 
Tennessee.
71
 Donnohue wrote to Reynolds from Paducah on April 12, 1862, 
informing him that he was sending 75 sacks of cotton seed to Cairo by steamboat, 
consigned to the Agricultural Society in Springfield. Donnohue informed Reynolds 
that he had sent planting and cultivation instructions to William H. Osborn for 
publication by the Illinois Central.
72
 Subsequent issues of the Journal reported on the 
progress of the first Illinois cotton crop.
73
  
Press reports of how much cotton was planted in southern Illinois in the spring 
of 1862 vary wildly. East coast newspapers reported that a company of wealthy 
Cincinnati investors employed Unionist refugees from Tennessee and Georgia to 
plant 7,000 acres of cotton in the Cairo area. These reports indicate that the Cincinnati 
company used seed purchased in Tennessee for 30 cents per bushel. This implies that 
the company did not rely upon seed supplied by the government, but bought its own. 
It was also stated that the company had “several large cotton-gins and warehouses at 
different points for the purpose of packing and storing cotton.”74 At the other extreme 
the Chicago Tribune complained that Illinois had been supplied with only 75 bushels 
of seed, and that only “small patches have been planted.” These small plots, the 
Tribune said, were capable of producing only small amounts of cotton for use in 
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making homespun.
75
 The correspondence between John P. Reynolds and Caleb B. 
Smith in the Agricultural Society’s Journal indicates that the real acreage was 
somewhere between the two extremes presented by the newspapers, with the acreage 
closer to the low end of the scale. The Journal reported that an unnamed farmer at 
Rosemond, near Springfield, planted ten acres using government-furnished seed. This 
presumably was the largest single planting.
76
 It was also reported that in 1862 a “large 
number of small patches from one to five acres were planted in Union and Alexander 
counties.”77 Cotton gins were in operation at Carbondale, Vienna, and Jonesboro in 
time to gin the 1862 harvest.
78
 About 3,000 bushels of seed were saved from these 
three gins.
79
 At 22 pounds per bushel, this amounts to 66,000 pounds of seed, 
indicating that the fiber yield was about 30,000 pounds, or about 75 bales. 
Substantially more cotton was planted in Illinois in 1863, though again firm 
statistics are lacking. As planting time approached, there were numerous complaints 
about inadequate seed supplies.
80
 In March, The Illinois Farmer expressed hope that 
20,000 bushels of seed would be available, though it was doubtful that the supply 
would be anywhere near that amount. This shortage of seeds in Illinois is telling, 
given that large supplies should have been available from Atlantic Dock unless the 
bulk of the seeds from the Brooklyn ginnery were being shipped overseas. The 3,000 
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bushels of cotton seeds saved from the Carbondale, Vienna, and Jonesboro gins the 
previous year were enough to plant “about two thousand acres.”81 
In April, as farmers were getting ready to plant, M. L. Dunlap commented that 
cotton was “becoming one of the regular crops” in southern Illinois. Dunlap offered 
advice to farmers on how to use horse drawn mechanical corn planters to plant cotton 
seeds, indicating that he expected them to plant considerable acreage.
82
 The Illinois 
Farmer reported that one large landowner was planning to require all of his tenants to 
grow the maximum possible acreage of cotton in the coming year, “taking into 
account the number of children, whose services will turn to good account in 
picking.”83 Isaac Newton, the Commissioner of Agriculture, sent 1,500 bushels of 
North Carolina cotton seed to Illinois in time for planting in May. Newton urged that 
Illinois merchants purchase cotton seeds from Tennessee and market them to 
farmers.
84
 The New York Times reported in September that “tons of seed” had been 
bought and “hundreds of acres” planted along the line of the Illinois Central south of 
Springfield.
85
  
An effort was even made to grow a variety of cotton native to northern China 
on Illinois farms. In the fall of 1862, John A. Griswold, William H. Osborn’s 
predecessor as president of the Illinois Central Railroad, imported 3,000 pounds of 
Chinese cotton seeds. In January 1863 these were advertised for sale at the Great 
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Western Railroad depot in Springfield “at the net cost of the seed and 
transportation.”86 The announcement in The Illinois Farmer noted that other 
domesticated plants native to north China had done well in Illinois, and implied that 
Chinese cotton should perform equally well.
87
 The Illinois Farmer later expressed 
reservations about planting Chinese cotton, however, citing concerns about the age 
and poor condition of the seeds.
88
 
A small quantity of Peruvian cotton seed were also planted in Illinois. These 
were obtained in England by Charles Francis Adams and sent to the State 
Department. The Peruvian seed were then turned over to the Patent Office for 
distribution through the mails by members of Congress in the same manner as the 
North Carolina seeds obtained by Walter Collins.
89
 
As planting time approached, preparations were underway to process a larger 
crop. In March 1863, Stratton & Ferguson, a grain mill in Mount Vernon, installed a 
newly purchased cotton gin in their mill.
90
 Cotton gins were eventually operating in 
Mount Vernon, Assumption, Cairo, Jonesboro, Du Quoin, and Carbondale. There 
were probably others, as cotton was being shipped from virtually every town on the 
Illinois Central tracks south of Springfield by the time the Civil War ended. Cairo and 
Carbondale became the largest ginning centers, with more than one gin facility 
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operating in each city.
91
 Little information survives about the Illinois cotton gins 
because of various catastrophes, including the 1937 flood that destroyed Cairo. 
A picture of the Northern cotton gins such as the one in the Stratton & 
Ferguson grain mill can be obtained from similar gins that were operating in Kansas 
at the same time. J. M. Piazzek, a Polish immigrant living in Valley Falls, Kansas, 
was a grain mill operator. In 1862, while the push to grow cotton in the North was 
gathering momentum, Piazzek ordered a cotton gin from the Southern Cotton Gin 
Company in Bridgewater, Massachusetts. The gin cost $60, plus $40 freight to 
Kansas. That machine still survives in near working condition, and is now in storage 
at the Kansas State History Museum in Topeka. Piazzek’s gin is a ruggedly-built 
machine with a cast iron housing that stands 29 inches high, is 34 inches long, and 27 
inches wide. It is a saw-type gin with 18 circular saws driven by an external power 
source via a belt pulley. Mr. Piazzek installed the gin in his grain mill and used the 
same power source to operate it as ran the grain grinding equipment, probably a water 
wheel.
92
 It is obvious from the factory pre-assembled, self-contained unitary design of 
this machine that its manufacturer intended it to be used in this fashion. The machine 
arrived ready to use as soon as it was removed from the shipping crate. It did not 
require a special building or assembly. 
Several Northern manufacturers produced gins similar in design to Piazzek’s 
machine. The models most often mentioned in newspapers and in consular reports 
from abroad were the Brown’s “Excelsior” and machines made by the American 
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Eagle Company, New York Cotton Gin Company, and Emery Brothers Agricultural 
Works in Albany, New York. In its full-page advertisement in the 1865 edition of 
Trow’s New York City Directory, Emery Brothers listed four different models of 
hand-cranked gins. These had from 13 to 19 saws and the sale price ranged from $78 
to $114. Hand-cranked gins were “capable of cleaning from 25 to 35 pounds of 
cleaned cotton per saw per day of ten hours.” Emery’s power gins ranged in size from 
25 saws up to 69, and sold for prices from $137.50 to $379.50. The company 
advertised that its “Power Gin will clean from 35 to 50 pounds per saw per day of ten 
hours, requiring about one indicated horse power per every 20 saws.” Emery Brothers 
also manufactured “Horse Powers of all sizes and kinds, for different countries and 
adapted for driving Cotton Gins.” Although the advertisement is not specific, the 
“Horse Powers” were apparently small stationery steam engines. The company 
trumpeted the fact that it had exported its cotton gins to “China, Burmah [sic] and 
Africa, Native India, or Surat, Smyrna, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Egypt, Jamaica, Brazil, 
Hayti [sic], Hondouras [sic], Central America, Monte Video [sic], and Australia.”93 
Kansas gins afford insight into cotton gins’ mode of operation in remote areas. 
According to a clipping from an unidentified newspaper dating to August 1915 when 
Piazzek donated his cotton gin to the museum, he used it to clean 1,000 pounds of 
cotton from the 1862 crop and larger amounts in subsequent years. To sell the cotton, 
Piazzek hauled it 30 miles from Valley Falls to Leavenworth in a wagon.
94
 Another 
cotton gin, probably a Brown’s “Excelsior” model, operated in a water-powered grain 
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mill housed in a large three-story stone building located on the bank of the Neosho 
River at the end of Kennebec Street in Burlington, Kansas. As of this writing the 
building is still standing, now transformed into a private home.
95
 Farmers hauled 
cotton to the Burlington gin from more than 30 miles away in wagons. This was the 
case with Mr. M. Pruett, who brought 5,000 pounds of seed cotton harvested from 10 
acres in Anderson County to have it ginned in 1865. Cotton from the Burlington gin 
was taken to St. Louis for sale, most likely by boat down the Neosho River.
96
 
Boosted by the Illinois Central Railroad’s promotion campaign and with seed 
and gins available, cotton production in Illinois increased rapidly during the Civil 
War. The yield reached 30,000 bales in the 1865-66 marketing season.
97
 Though 
there was never any direct mention of what was done with the seed obtained from 
Illinois cotton, The Illinois Farmer declared that, “Every seed will be saved.”98 Given 
the Illinois Central Railroad’s British affiliations and the ease with which seeds from 
southern Illinois could have been freighted to Montreal or New York, it is likely that 
some of them were sent to Liverpool for distribution abroad. Further, though 12 
million pounds of cotton fiber was miniscule in comparison to Britain’s needs, the 30 
million pounds of cotton seed that came from it was enough to plant a million acres of 
cotton. 
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Chapter 5 
The Ottoman Centre 
 
One destination for American cotton seeds was the Ottoman Empire. When 
the Civil War began in America, the Ottoman Empire was at a critical phase in the era 
of reform and modernization known as Tanzimat (the Turkish word “tanzimat” means 
both “reorganization” and “regulations”) that spanned from 1839 to 1876. The aim of 
the Tanzimat was to strengthen the Ottoman state and reestablish the central 
government’s authority over the provincial peripheries. The Tanzimat reformers also 
sought to modernize the Ottoman state’s institutions in order to preserve the Empire’s 
integrity against European encroachment and European inspired separatist 
nationalism among its non-Turkish ethnic groups, particularly the Christian Greeks, 
Armenians, and Balkan Slavs. To accomplish those goals required substantial 
investment in modern infrastructure.  
In the spring of 1861, the Ottoman Empire was in the midst of multiple crises. 
The Tanzimat’s initiator, Sultan Abdul Mejid, was debilitated by illness and died on 
June 25, 1861. He was succeeded by his half-brother, tall, robust, thirty-one year old 
Abdul Aziz. At the time there were widespread fears in the West that Abdul Aziz was 
a throwback to the old-time “strict Mussulman” Turkish rulers, what in twenty-first 
century terminology would be called an Islamist reactionary. In its obituary for Abdul 
Mejid, The Living Age, a Boston weekly news magazine associated with American 
missionary organizations, stated that if the fears about Abdul Aziz’s Islamist 
inclinations proved true, “the catastrophe so long dreaded in Constantinople is 
assuredly at hand.”1 This fear was rooted in two thwarted plots, one hatched in 1853 
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and the other in 1859 among Islamic theological students, called softas, to overthrow 
Abdul Mejid and put Abdul Aziz on the throne. Abdul Aziz was not personally 
involved in either conspiracy.
2
 The fact that Abdul Aziz was a large, physically 
imposing man who projected a grim, intimidating persona probably contributed to 
fears about him, as it appears that the authors of articles about him tended to 
extrapolate his political character from his personality traits. Other Western observers 
deemed Abdul Aziz a potentially more progressive ruler than Abdul Mejid. Abdul 
Aziz was known to possess strong personal will, a trait that would enable him to 
enforce his decisions whereas his older brother was often manipulated by courtiers.
3
 
Sultan Abdul Aziz surprised even his admirers with the burst of 
progressivism, energy, and ability that marked the first year of his reign. He began by 
dismissing Abdul Mejid’s ministers. Most of them had been in office for many years 
and were reportedly corrupt. Abdul Aziz replaced them with younger men of his own 
choosing. This made the infamously lethargic Ottoman government remarkably 
responsive to his direction at the critical time in the cotton crisis.
4
  
Debts incurred to pay for the Crimean War were the Sultan’s major immediate 
concern. In 1861, the Ottoman foreign debt stood at slightly over £15 million. Annual 
interest on the debt amounted to slightly over £1 million. Principal payments were in 
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the form of a 2 percent sinking fund, amounting to about £300,000 annually.
5
 The 
problem was serious, but not insurmountable. According to J. Lewis Farley, a British 
subject who in 1860-61 was Accountant-General of the British-backed Ottoman Bank 
in Constantinople, the Empire’s foreign debt at that date amounted to only about three 
years’ tax revenues.6 The foreign debt problem was compounded by the Free Trade 
Treaty of 1838, an agreement with Great Britain which severely limited the Ottoman 
government’s ability to levy tariffs on imported goods. Because of it, the Ottomans 
were forced to rely on high export tariffs, internal tariffs on their own manufactures, 
and direct taxes on agricultural producers for revenue. The cumulative result was a 
flood of imported European manufactured goods without offsetting exports. This 
caused a severe drain of specie out of the country.
7
 Sultan Abdul Aziz grasped the 
opportunity that the American Civil War gave the Ottoman Empire to seize a share of 
the English cotton market, correct the trade imbalance, service the debt, and raise 
surplus funds to pay for modern infrastructure.  
Much of the groundwork for expanding Ottoman cotton production had 
already been laid during the fifteen years leading up to the cotton crisis. The Ottoman 
Empire had a historic reputation as a premier cotton-growing region. It had once been 
England’s largest cotton supplier. Queen Elizabeth I established diplomatic relations 
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with the Sublime Porte, as the Ottoman government was called, in 1583 specifically 
so that the Levant Company could buy Turkish cotton goods.
8
 The Ottomans did not 
lose this important cotton trade until after the rise of the American monopoly. When 
weather and caterpillars badly damaged the American crop in 1845, the Ottomans 
sought to redress their imbalance of trade with Britain and the related decline in 
domestic prosperity by revitalizing their cotton growing industry.
9
 For help they 
turned not to Great Britain, but to the United States. 
In 1846, Sultan Abdul Mejid’s Grand Vizier Reschid Pasha wrote to President 
James K. Polk asking that an experienced cotton planter from the American South be 
sent to Turkey to give instruction in American cotton growing methods. To undertake 
the mission, Polk chose Dr. James Bolton Davis, a wealthy, politically well-
connected South Carolina physician who had retired from medical practice to pursue 
scientific agriculture. Davis took six African-American slaves from his plantation in 
Fairfield County, South Carolina, with him to Turkey.
10
 Described as “intelligent and 
experienced” cotton growers, the men were probably drivers, or slave foremen, rather 
than ordinary field hands.
11
 Davis spent three years in Turkey and while there 
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founded an Ottoman government agricultural school and a two thousand acre 
demonstration farm especially dedicated to cotton growing at Scutari (Üsküdar) on 
the Asia Minor shore of the Bosporus directly across the strait from Constantinople. 
Classes of one hundred peasants at a time were put through a yearlong course of 
classroom and practical field instruction in cotton growing. The students came from 
all parts of the Ottoman Empire and represented all of its ethnic groups.
12
 U.S. Navy 
officer and explorer William Francis Lynch visited in 1848 and implied that the 
slaves that Davis brought with him would be freed and remain in Turkey.
13
 Lynch’s 
remarks, a report that the Semi-Weekly Natchez Courier reprinted from the 
Philadelphia Ledger in 1847, and a conversation between Davis and one of them, a 
man named Abram, reported in History of the State Agricultural and Mechanical 
Society of South Carolina make it seem likely that the African-Americans were the 
agricultural school’s field instructors.14 In 1848 Sultan Abdul Mejid toured the farm 
and spent the following night with Dr. Davis, his wife, and their children. This was 
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reportedly the first time that an Ottoman Sultan was ever an overnight guest in the 
household of a Westerner.
15
  
The keen interest that Abdul Aziz later displayed in cotton probably dated 
from this time. The days when heirs to the Ottoman throne were kept imprisoned in 
the so-called “Golden Cage” had ended, but they were still kept out of the public eye 
and away from involvement in governmental affairs. Prior to becoming Sultan, Abdul 
Aziz spent much of his time on a large agricultural estate at Beicos, a village on the 
eastern shore of the Bosporus near Scutari, pursuing agriculture as an avocation.
16
 
Contemporary sources that mention Abdul Aziz in connection with his agricultural 
interests present a very different picture of him than the one history usually presents, 
which portrays him as having received only “a simple Muslim education.”17 In fact, 
he studied the latest Western agricultural methods and established a model farm on 
his estate.
18
 Although no direct link can be established, Abdul Aziz was sixteen years 
of age when James Bolton Davis arrived and founded the agricultural school in close 
proximity to his Beicos estate, so it is reasonable to suppose that either Davis sparked 
the young Ottoman heir apparent’s interest in agriculture or Abdul Aziz’s pre-existing 
interest lay behind Sultan Abdul Mejid’s request to President Polk for an American 
cotton expert. 
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Poor health forced Davis to return to the United States in 1849, but the 
agricultural school and its model farm continued to operate under the direction of Mr. 
J. Janesco, about whom nothing more than his name could be discovered. Sultan 
Abdul Mejid kept the school under his personal supervision and sometimes presided 
when formal final examinations were administered.
19
 Experiments with different 
kinds of cotton seed continued for fifteen years. Test plantings of seeds purchased in 
the United States were conducted over a wide geographic area, and achieved some 
success.
20
 Evidence for this comes from the Ottoman exhibit at the great world’s fair 
held at the Crystal Palace in Hyde Park, London, in 1851 which featured specimens 
of high quality cotton gown in the Empire’s southern provinces.21 A British 
government report written in 1862 briefly mentioned the Ottoman seed trials, and 
noted that an Ottoman pamphlet about growing “Orleans” cotton said that a “large 
portion” of those who tried the imported seed, “rid their places of every kind of seed 
but the pure Mexican or Gulf Hill Mexican seed.”22 This suggests the possibility that 
some of the cotton grown from “native” seed in the 1860s was in fact local varieties 
derived from American Petit Gulf or from the same Mexican foundation stock from 
which Petit Gulf was developed. 
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From Great Britain’s perspective, the Ottoman Empire was ideally situated 
geographically, economically, and politically to become a cotton field. Because of the 
geostrategic position of the Sultan’s domains and the fact that they shared a common 
enemy, Russia, British-Ottoman relations, though at times strained, were historically 
friendly. British strategists saw preservation of the Ottoman Empire as essential to 
containing Russian expansionism into the Balkans and the Near East, and it was for 
that geostrategic reason that Great Britain fought the Crimean War with Russia in 
1854-56. In 1861 the British-Ottoman strategic relationship had never been stronger. 
The impressive new High Renaissance style British Embassy in the Pera 
neighborhood of Constantinople housed the largest diplomatic staff of any British 
legation in the world, a total of thirty-seven persons. These reported to the 
ambassador, Sir Henry Bulwer. In addition there were fifty-one British consulates 
scattered in towns and cities throughout the sprawling Ottoman Empire. Great 
Britain’s Levantine consuls were generally a very experienced group, many of them 
with more than fifteen years of service at their posts. The consuls reported both to 
Consul-General Abraham C. Cumberbatch in Constantinople and directly to Sir 
Austen Henry Layard at the Foreign Office.
23
 
The Cotton Supply Association’s 1859 experiments with American seed in the 
Ottoman lands were generally successful.
24
 Plans to establish model farms in the 
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Smyrna hinterland were begun at that time.
25
 The beginnings of the necessary 
institutions for incorporating the Ottoman Empire into world commerce were already 
in place. The first Ottoman Bank, founded in 1856, was funded by British capital. Its 
first branch was located in Smyrna, the Ottoman Empire’s traditional cotton port.26 
British merchants had entrée into the Ottoman cotton market because English candle 
makers imported a small quantity of Smyrna cotton, which they used to make 
candlewicks.
27
 A colony of English merchants had existed in Smyrna for several 
generations, and in May 1861 they formed a company for the purpose of buying and 
exporting cotton.
28
  
In terms of communications and travel Turkey was much closer to England 
than was the United States. It took about two weeks for communications to travel by 
fast steamer from England to New York. High priority messages could reach 
Constantinople instantaneously because from 1855 the Ottoman capital had 
telegraphic communications with England via a submarine cable beneath the English 
Channel to Ostend on the Belgian coast, where it connected to an overland line that 
ran through Germany, Austria, and the Balkans.
29
 Mail and passengers could travel 
from London to Constantinople via the Channel ferry-Calais-Paris-Marseille rail 
route and from Marseille to the Ottoman capital by regularly scheduled steamship in 
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about ten days. A sailing ship could make the trip from the Dardanelles to Liverpool 
with bulk cargo in about six weeks. This was about the same length of time as it took 
a cotton boat to reach Liverpool from New Orleans.
30
  
Britain possessed capabilities to disseminate information in the Ottoman 
Empire as well. The Turkish-language weekly newspaper Ceride-i Havadis (Register 
of Events), on which the Ottoman ruling class depended for Western news, was 
British owned and managed.
31
 Editorial control of the influential Constantinople-
based dual language French-English Levant Herald was in British hands. Two British 
educational institutions were located in Smyrna, Burnabat English College and the 
English Commercial School.
32
 
Substantial improvements had already been made to communications within 
the Ottoman Empire. These were begun at the initiative of the Ottoman government 
in the 1830s and financed by British and European investors. Steamboat navigation 
began on the lower Danube River and Black Sea in 1847, the vessels owned and 
operated by the Austrians. In 1851 steam ferries operated by the Ottoman state began 
carrying passengers and freight on the Bosporus. Five years later a London-
headquartered British company headed by Sir Macdonald Stephenson began building 
a railroad from the port of Smyrna on the Ægean Sea to Aidin, 70 miles to the 
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southeast in Anatolia. The Ottoman government guaranteed the company 6 percent 
annual return on £1,200,000 capital for 50 years. Difficulty raising the needed capital 
impeded progress, and the British engineer in charge, a Mr. Meredith, was initially 
able to employ only 45 laborers to lay track. All the necessary preparations had 
already been made before the American Civil War began, however, and in July 1859 
a new contractor, T. R. Crampton, took over responsibility for building the railroad. 
Crampton advanced funds from his own resources and pushed ahead with 
construction. Over 70 miles of track had been laid by the end of 1861, and, just as 
importantly, a harbor station and wharf had been completed for the handling of 
railroad cargo to and from ships.
33
 Telegraph construction was British-backed as well; 
the line from Constantinople to Baghdad that began operating in 1861 was part of an 
intended overland line through Iran to India.
34
 
The Smyrna-Aidin Railroad took a prominent role in promoting cotton 
growing as early as 1858, when its officials assisted in the Cotton Supply 
Association’s seed experiments. The railroad subsequently established a 
demonstration farm near Smyrna. One of the railroad company’s stated goals was to 
lay tracks 150 miles beyond Aidin up the fertile cotton-growing Meander River 
Valley. Hyde Clarke, who was to head the Association’s efforts in the Ottoman 
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Empire during the Civil War, was affiliated with the railroad company. In a 
promotional article written for the railroad in 1860, Clarke recommended that the 
Ottoman government hold an agricultural exhibition in Smyrna in 1861, with the 
consuls representing Britain, France, Russia, Austria, and the United States as 
commissioners. He further proposed that annual exhibitions be held in subsequent 
years at towns at end-of-track on the railway. Clarke wrote that, “The exhibition will 
be the means of calling the attention of the agricultural interests to that important 
subject the Cotton question.”35  
The United States provided considerable material assistance to the British 
cotton-growing effort. The United States enjoyed a relationship with the Ottoman 
Empire that was in some ways as well developed as that of Great Britain, though the 
American diplomatic and consular staff numbered fewer than twelve persons in 
1862.
36
 Boston merchant ships began trading with Ottoman seaports in 1786.
37
 
Official American relations with the Ottomans dated back sixty years, to November 9, 
1800, when Captain William Bainbridge sailed the ship-sloop U.S.S. George 
Washington up the Dardanelles and anchored in the Golden Horn, the famous harbor 
of Constantinople. American naval tradition holds that until the George Washington 
anchored beneath the windows of his palace Sultan Selim III did not know that the 
United States existed, though this is almost certainly a fable. In any event, the 
Ottoman ruler was impressed, and his Grand Vizier extended official recognition to 
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the United States by granting a firman, the Ottoman equivalent of a diplomatic 
passport, to Bainbridge.
38
 During the first decade of the nineteenth century a 
significant trade developed between the Ottoman Empire and the United States.
39
 The 
Sultan permitted the United States to establish a consulate in Smyrna in 1824, with 
David Offley, a merchant, as consul.
40
 American warships were frequent visitors to 
Ottoman ports in the 1820s. After the Ottoman fleet was sunk by the British, French, 
and Russians at Navarino Bay in 1827, the Ottomans sought closer relations with the 
United States. Commodore David Porter, a naval hero of the War of 1812, became 
the first United States Minister to the Ottoman Empire, arriving in Constantinople in 
April 1831.
41
  
A few weeks later, Henry Eckford, a New York shipbuilder, arrived and was 
hired to build warships for the Ottoman navy in the Constantinople naval arsenal by 
Sultan Mahmoud II, known as “The Reformer.”42 One of the men who came with 
Eckford, Warren Hidden, a twenty-year old New Yorker with Massachusetts roots, 
became an official in the Imperial Ottoman Mint. By all accounts a mechanical 
genius, Hidden made and installed machinery that made it possible for Ottoman coins 
to be standardized. He also oversaw the printing of the first Ottoman paper currency. 
Hidden wielded considerable behind the scenes influence with four successive 
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Sultans and their officials for more than a half century. American missionaries, 
almost all of them from New England, also arrived in the 1830s and quickly gained 
influence through their educational activities. Boston and New York trading 
companies established agencies in the Ottoman Empire’s seaports.43 In 1861 there 
were American consulates in Constantinople, Smyrna, Beirut, Jerusalem, Candia 
(Heraklion) on the island of Crete, and Cyprus. Vice-consulates or consular agencies 
were located in the Dardanelles, Jaffa, Aleppo, Adana, and possibly elsewhere.
44
  
The United States’ most valuable human asset was probably John Porter 
Brown, the Secretary of Legation and dragoman-interpreter. In European embassies, 
the office of dragoman was normally filled by Greek, Armenian, or Levantine 
Christian subjects of the Sultan who through their employment acquired the 
extraterritorial immunity from Ottoman law extended to foreigners. John Porter 
Brown was a Turkish-speaking American, a native of Ohio and the nephew of 
Commodore David Porter. A dragoman functioned not merely as interpreter, but as 
the go-between who conducted routine business with Ottoman officials on a day-to-
day basis. The dragoman conferred informally with lower ranking Ottoman officials 
about important matters, felt out their opinions and offered informal proposals before 
formal diplomatic discussions at the ministerial level took place. United States 
ministers to the Ottoman Empire came and went with each change of administration 
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in Washington, but John P. Brown was the constant American diplomatic presence in 
Constantinople from 1836 until his death in 1872.
45
  
John P. Brown’s rapport with high Ottoman officials and his access to them 
was extraordinary. A few episodes in Brown’s long career illustrate his access, 
influence, and the trust that the Ottomans placed in him. In August 1847, Sultan 
Abdul Mejid heard about the Morse electric telegraph and asked Brown for a 
demonstration. Brown, Dr. John Lawrence Smith, a Nashville, Tennessee, geologist 
employed as the Sultan’s mining engineer, and Rev. Cyrus Hamlin, a missionary 
known for his technical ingenuity and mechanical skills, strung copper wires from the 
front entrance of the Sultan’s palace to the harem door. With Hamlin at one telegraph 
key, Smith at the other, and Brown standing by the Sultan’s side at the harem door, 
Abdul Mejid tested the telegraph by exchanging messages with one of his household 
officials.
46
 In 1850-51, Brown accompanied an Ottoman naval officer, Amin Bey, on 
an eight-month tour of the United States that included an inspection of naval facilities 
in New York, Boston, and Charleston, an official reception in Washington, a journey 
west to Cincinnati, Detroit, and Chicago, and a steamboat trip down the Mississippi 
River to New Orleans.
47
 After the Ottoman navy’s flagship Medjidieh was destroyed 
by an accidental gunpowder explosion in 1857, Brown convinced Abdul Mejid to 
seek a replacement in the United States. Though he did not succeed in buying an 
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American-built warship, Admiral Mehmet Pasha, commander of the Ottoman Navy, 
traveled to the United States and discussed the matter with President Buchanan.
48
 In 
1859, Brown leveled charges of malfeasance at John Reeves, an American employed 
as Chief Constructor in the Ottoman naval arsenal. The Sultan promptly dismissed 
Reeves and deported him. Reeves subsequently brought counter-charges against 
Brown before the U.S. House of Representatives. Reeves alleged that Brown had 
conspired with the British to arrange his dismissal so that a British engineer could be 
named to his job at the Ottoman naval arsenal.
49
  
Brown was well acquainted with the Ottoman agricultural school and its 
cotton-growing activities, as shown by his reporting about it to Hunts’ Merchants’ 
Magazine and Commercial Review in 1852.
50
 Brown was current on political 
developments in the United States as well. In the spring of 1860, he came to 
Washington and successfully defended himself against the allegations made by John 
Reeves. Brown then spent the summer vacationing in Brattleboro, Vermont.
51
  
When the Civil War began, the United States was represented in 
Constantinople by James Williams, a Chattanooga, Tennessee, businessman, banker, 
and newspaper editor appointed by President Buchanan. When Tennessee seceded 
from the Union, Williams resigned, leaving United States representation in the hands 
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of John P. Brown, acting as chargé d’affaires.52 President Lincoln first nominated 
James Watson Webb, a New York newspaper editor and member of the Seward 
faction of the Republican Party to the post.
53
  Though confirmed by the Senate, Webb 
declined the post. Lincoln then appointed Edward Joy Morris, a Whig-Republican 
Congressman from Pennsylvania with prior diplomatic experience in Italy. E. Joy 
Morris was an exceptional linguist, conversant in Italian, French, and Turkish.
54
 
Morris had made an extensive tour of the Near East and published a two-volume book 
about it in 1842.
55
 During that trip he became acquainted with John P. Brown.
56
 In 
conjunction with Brown, he developed extensive contacts and sources of information 
inside the Ottoman government. Morris kept in close contact with Warren Hidden and 
American missionaries, apparently using them as intelligence sources. It does not 
seem that Morris involved himself very much with the six United States consuls, 
however, but left them to deal directly with Secretary of State Seward.
57
 
Close personal relationships often existed between American and British 
consuls and between the consuls and local people. For example, James Calvert, who 
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served as the United States vice-consul at Erenköy on the Asia Minor side of the 
Dardanelles from 1846 until 1862, and his younger brother Frank who served as U.S. 
vice-consul from 1862 until the 1880s, were the sons of an English merchant-trader 
who came to the region in the early nineteenth century. Their older brother, Frederick 
Calvert, was British consul until 1862. Another brother, Charles Calvert, was British 
consul at Salonika. A brother-in-law was editor of the Levant Herald. The Calvert 
brothers owned a 4,000-acre estate at Akça Köy, a village five miles up the Mendere 
River from Hissarlik, the site of ancient Troy, and they were already engaged in 
efforts to introduce Western agricultural implements and practices there before the 
Civil War began. The Calverts had contacts with the British textile industry through 
their business, which was buying and exporting vallonia, a substance extracted from a 
species of acorns that was used to make dye. Their acquaintances included Nassau 
William Senior, the British political economist who corresponded with John Murray 
Forbes about the cotton situation. Frank Calvert enjoyed extraordinarily intimate 
relations with the Turkish landowners with whom he did business. Some Turkish 
families that had known Frank Calvert since he was a small child treated him like an 
adopted son when he visited their homes.
58
  
American abolitionists recognized the Ottoman Empire’s potential to undercut 
the South’s cotton monopoly and by so doing contribute to ending slavery well before 
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the Civil War. William Lloyd Garrison reported James Bolton Davis’s activities in 
Turkey in The Liberator and praised the effort, saying: 
Well—the probability is, that cotton will, ere long, be cultivated in 
many parts of the world, that Europe will be less and less dependent 
upon our market for it—and then, as this demand diminishes, the value 
of the slave will decrease! In this event, the increase of slavery will 
prove a burden to the South, which it cannot bear!
59
 
 
E. Joy Morris did not arrive in Constantinople until October 1861. When news 
that Fort Sumter had been fired upon was telegraphed from London on April 26, John 
Porter Brown did not wait for Morris nor for instructions from Washington. He 
conferred immediately with officials of the Ottoman government, and was pleased to 
hear them express a fierce opposition to rebellion against government authority in 
general.
60
 Brown kept in close contact with Aali Pasha, the foreign minister, and 
Mehmed Kibrish Pasha, the Grand Vizier, meeting them several times between early 
June and mid-July 1861. They assured Brown that should Confederate emissaries 
appear in Constantinople, the Porte would not give them a hearing. Brown discovered 
that Abdul Aziz was taking energetic action to set the Ottoman Empire’s 
governmental and financial affairs in order. Brown’s appraisal of the new Sultan was 
favorable, and in his reports to Secretary of State Seward he did not reveal any 
misgivings about Abdul Aziz’s intentions like those expressed by The Living Age.61 
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On August 28, 1861, Seward instructed E. Joy Morris to request an 
appointment with the Sultan and told him to seek ways to strengthen relations 
between the United States and the Ottoman Empire.
62
 Seward’s letter and one from 
Morris written two days earlier informing Seward that John P. Brown had already 
made moves in that direction crossed in the Atlantic mails.
63
 The meeting took place 
on October 22, 1861. The result was a new commercial treaty with the Ottoman 
Empire that gave very favorable tariff treatment to American manufactured goods.
64
 
Morris met the Sultan again in June 1862, on the occasion of Abdul Aziz receiving 
the entire foreign diplomatic corps at a formal reception at Dolmabache Palace to 
commemorate the first anniversary of his coming to the throne. This European-style 
royal diplomatic reception was a first-of-its-kind event in the Ottoman Empire. 
Morris spoke with the Sultan, and reported that Abdul Aziz expressed sympathy with 
President Lincoln because of the rebellion.
65
 
Preliminary steps to increase cotton growing in the Ottoman Empire were 
taken before the Civil War began. As the secession crisis was developing in America, 
William Sandford, an agent of the Cotton Supply Association, was in Constantinople 
promoting cotton growing.
66
 As Abdul Mejid was very ill, it is likely that Sandford 
dealt with Abdul Aziz. Americans were also involved. In April 1861, Cyrus Hamlin, 
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the missionary who had helped demonstrate the telegraph to Abdul Mejid, was in the 
United States engaged in a lecture tour to raise money for the founding of Robert 
College.
67
 In the course of those lectures, Hamlin promoted Turkish cotton to New 
England textile manufacturers as a replacement for that of the South.
68
  
Publicity was a key element of the campaign to promote cotton growing in the 
Ottoman Empire. In addition to the British owned Ceride-i Havadis, the Ottoman 
government had at its disposal the official Journal de Constantinople. Its French 
editor, M. Baragnon, was “a constant advocate of cotton.”69 An Ottoman delegation 
headed by Nazim Bey took about thirty samples of cotton grown in six Ottoman 
provinces to the international exposition held in Kensington Gardens in London in 
1862.
70
 Nazim Bey then convinced the Sultan that the Ottoman Empire should hold 
its own National Exhibition. To house it, a temporary building with about two acres 
of floor space was erected in the Hippodrome in Constantinople. Several of the 
square’s famous historic monuments were enclosed within the exhibit hall and 
incorporated into the exhibition’s industrial theme. The Serpentine Column, a 25-feet 
high masterpiece of fifth century B.C. bronze working skill served as the foreground 
to a display of railroad locomotives. The Ottoman Embassy in London announced the 
National Exhibition to the world and invited exhibitors to participate on December 
16, 1862. Sultan Abdul Aziz personally opened the Exhibition on February 20, 1863. 
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It ran for three months. The National Exhibition’s dual purpose was to showcase 
Ottoman industrial artistry and agricultural produce and to provide European and 
American manufacturers of agricultural implements, industrial machines, and railroad 
equipment a venue in which to display their wares.
71
 A working display of American-
made cotton gins was one of the exhibition’s most popular attractions.72 
Sultan Abdul Aziz cast himself in the role of principal booster of Ottoman 
cotton at home and abroad. When local officials obstructed the effort or proved 
incompetent to carry it out, Abdul Aziz intervened decisively. In April 1863 he 
visited Smyrna and gave an address to the Imperial Cotton Commission. In the course 
of that visit to Smyrna, the Sultan summarily dismissed the province’s governor-
general, Mehmet Reshid Pasha, for displaying “insufficient vigour in the promotion 
of cotton growing.”73 In the summer of 1867 Abdul Aziz became the first Ottoman 
Sultan to visit Western Europe, traveling to London to discuss infrastructure 
development and cotton with officials of the British government. On Monday 
afternoon, July 15, 1867, Abdul Aziz met with a high-ranking delegation from the 
Cotton Supply Association at Buckingham Palace.
74
 
American consuls took an early and active role in encouraging the cotton 
growing initiative, and transmitted a stream of intelligence about its progress to 
Secretary of State Seward. The most proactive of the American consuls was Julius 
                                                 
71
 Times (London), Dec. 16, 1862 and March 18, 1863. No trace of the exhibition hall remains 
except possibly for the ornamental wrought iron guardrail around the Serpentine Column. 
 
72
 Cotton Supply Reporter 1, no. 112 (May 1, 1863): 1241. 
 
73
 Cotton Supply Reporter 1, no. 112 (May 1, 1863): 1241-1257. 
 
74
 Cotton Supply Reporter 1, no. 162 (July 1, 1867): 2057; Cotton Supply Reporter 1, no. 163 
(Aug. 1, 1867): 2075-2077. 
 
 151 
Bing, at Smyrna. Little is known about Bing prior to the Battle of Bull Run on July 
21, 1861, except that he was a German immigrant and a freelance journalist. On that 
day Bing accompanied Connecticut Senator Lafayette S. Foster and New York 
Congressman Alfred Ely on an excursion to Manassas to witness the battle. They 
became separated in the rout of the Union forces and Bing was taken prisoner by the 
Confederates. Bing convinced Confederate authorities in Richmond that he was a 
British subject, a claim that was supported by the British consul. Bing was released 
and returned to Washington on August 1, 1861, and received something of a hero’s 
welcome. He brought with him dispatches from the British consul in Richmond to 
Lord Lyons, the British minister in Washington. Newspaper stories hint that he may 
have also brought valuable intelligence about the strength and disposition of 
Confederate forces.
75
  
Julius Bing may or may not have been a British subject. He was a United 
States citizen. President Lincoln appointed him to be consul at Smyrna on September 
30, 1861, and the law required that all United States consuls be American citizens.
76
 
The Senate promptly confirmed Bing, and he departed for Smyrna on December 3, 
1861. Prior to departure, Bing met with Secretary of State Seward and received 
instructions, evidently verbal.
77
 The State Department provided Bing with ample 
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funds. In addition to his annual salary of $2,000, he could submit expenses for 
reimbursement from a $2,500 contingency fund appropriated by Congress specifically 
for consulates in the Ottoman Empire.
78
 Interestingly, Bing made the journey to 
Turkey as a passenger in the Andrew Carey, a sailing ship owned by a Boston 
shipping company that made the trip direct from Boston to Smyrna, not by the faster 
steamer-rail-steamer route via Liverpool, Paris, and Marseille.
79
 Later, he frequently 
called on Boston merchant ship captains and trading companies for assistance. 
Within days of his arrival in Smyrna, Bing suggested to Seward that Boston 
manufacturers buy Turkish cotton from the 1861 crop as a way of encouraging 
increased planting in the coming spring. On January 24, 1862, Bing informed Seward 
that, “The actual price of Turkish cotton delivered in Boston or New York would be 
from 15 to 17 cents per pound.”80 Bing ended his letter to Seward with a brief 
explanation of the marketing system for Turkish cotton and noted that he was sending 
two samples to Washington. Bing’s suggestion was promptly acted upon, and in mid-
summer 1862 he informed Seward that:  
                                                                                                                                           
Civil War naval diary of Moses Safford, U.S.S. Constellation (Charleston: The History Press, 2004), 
349; Michael Burlingame, ed., At Lincoln’s Side: John Hay’s Civil War Correspondence and Selected 
Writings (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University, 2006), 214; Ari Hoogenboom, Outlawing the 
Spoils: A History of the Civil Service Reform Movement, 1865-1883 (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1968), 12-16. 
 
78
 The Statutes at Large, Treaties, and Proclamations, of the United States of America. From 
December 5, 1859 to March 3, 1863, vol. 12, 335; The National Almanac and Annual Record for the 
year 1863 (Philadelphia: George W. Childs, 1863), 79; The United States Consular System: A Manual 
for Consuls, and Also for Merchants, Shipowners and Masters in their consular transactions; 
comprising the Instructions of the Department of State in Regard to Consular Emoluments, Duties, 
Privileges, and Liabilities, 50. 
 
79
 Boston Daily Advertiser (Boston, MA), Dec. 6, 1860 and Dec. 3, 1861. 
 
80
 Bing to Seward, Jan. 24, 1862, in Commercial Relations of the United States with Foreign 
Countries for the year ended September 30, 1862, 572. 
 
 153 
[T]he first shipment of Turkish cotton ever made from Asia Minor to 
the United States had been made [in February 1862]. … This shipment 
having proved highly advantageous, an impulse has been given to the 
cultivation of cotton which will lead to an increased production and 
bring up the year’s crop to about 40,000 to 50,000 bales. … I would 
suggest that a committee of merchants be formed in the United States 
with a view of assisting to a moderate extent the cotton-growers in 
Asia Minor with capital and laborers for the production of American 
cotton. … With assistance such as I venture to suggest, Asia Minor 
might speedily be enabled to contribute powerfully towards a relief of 
the cotton famine.
81
 
 
 
American trading firms bought cotton in small lots on the Smyrna market 
throughout 1862. Bing reported that at as of December 1, 1862, the value of 
American cotton purchases amounted to $200,000.
82
 If Bing’s price of 15 to 17 cents 
per pound delivered to Boston held, American firms could have bought close to 2 
million pounds of Turkish cotton, the equivalent of about 5,000 American-size bales. 
This was about a tenth of the total crop, which Bing later estimated as being about 24 
million pounds.
83
 The actual weight of cotton bought by Americans was probably less 
than 2 million pounds, however, because the price of cotton more than doubled 
between January 1 and December 31, 1862.
84
 Whatever the American purchase might 
have actually been, high prices had the desired effect. Farmers in the Smyrna area 
were encouraged to increase their cotton acreage. The quantity of cotton exported 
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from Smyrna in 1862 was reportedly 40,000 bales greater than in 1861.
85
 The 
pressing need was American cotton seed. Bing told Seward: 
American seed is preferred to all others, and we could not take more 
efficacious means for the promotion of the growth of cotton than by 
furnishing supplies of the same to the planters in Asia Minor, and I 
trust that measures to that effect will be taken by our government.
86  
 
Bing reminded Seward that in 1858 the Cotton Supply Association had 
furnished New Orleans seed to farmers on the island of Rhodes, and that the 
experiment had been successful. Rhodes is very similar in soil and climate to southern 
Anatolia, and success of the cotton growing experiment there implied that American 
cotton would grow well in the Smyrna region.
87
 In the spring of 1862, the Cotton 
Supply Association distributed a quantity of Egyptian cotton seed free to farmers at 
Smyrna. Bing secured samples of the Egyptian and native Turkish seeds and sent 
them to the U. S. Patent Office in care of the captain of a merchant ship owned by the 
Boston trading firm I. Amory.
88
 The Association also reportedly distributed 47,040 
pounds of American seeds, though Bing made no mention of these in his letter to 
Seward.
89
 Julius Bing repeatedly urged that a “Turkish Cotton Committee” composed 
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of American merchants be formed to assist in developing cotton growing in the 
Ottoman Empire.
90
 
Safvet Pasha, the 46-year old Minister of Commerce and Public Works, was 
the Ottoman official directly responsible for overseeing Sultan Abdul Aziz’s cotton 
growing initiative. Safvet, who some sources identify as “Safvet Musa Pasha” and 
who signed his name simply as “Safvet” or “E. Safvet Effendi” began his career at an 
early age working in the Translation Office, an Ottoman government institution that 
translated Western technical literature into Turkish. He became First Dragoman of the 
Divan, a position roughly equivalent to First Secretary in the Executive Office of the 
Sultan during the reign of Abdul Mejid. Safvet was an enthusiastic reformer and 
modernizer and served in a series of successively higher offices throughout the 
Tanzimat period.
91
 
Safvet chartered an Imperial Cotton Commission on August 28, 1862. Colonel 
Reshad Bey, an Ottoman army officer serving as imperial commissioner of the 
Smyrna and Aidin Railway, was named its president pro tem. Reshad Bey
 
was a 
landowner, and had at some time in the past experimented with planting American 
cotton seeds. His presidency of the Imperial Cotton Commission appears to have been 
honorary. Mr. Hyde Clarke of the Cotton Supply Association was named the 
Commission’s vice-president, and he managed its operations. The Commission’s 
members were two officials in the Smyrna government, Neshet Effendi and Diran 
Effendi, four British merchants, and the French manager of the Ottoman Bank’s 
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Smyrna branch, Frederick La Fontaine. The Commission met every Tuesday at the 
English Club in Smyrna. As the Ottoman partner to the Cotton Supply Association, 
the Imperial Cotton Commission concerned itself with every aspect of cotton 
production, including securing and distributing seeds, gins and other equipment, 
publicity, transportation, land tenure, tax reform, and finance. One of the 
Commission’s first acts was to print and distribute pamphlets in Turkish, Greek, and 
Armenian urging farmers to plant cotton and instructing them in its cultivation.
92
  
It is unclear whether or not Julius Bing attended meetings of the Imperial 
Cotton Commission. Hyde Clarke certainly kept him informed of its activities. Bing 
in turn sent frequent updates to Seward. These included copies of communications 
with Clarke and the full text of Ottoman proclamations as well as Bing’s own 
observations.
93
 News of events in Smyrna and text of the Ottoman proclamations 
were subsequently published in the official Washington Daily National 
Intelligencer.
94
 Hyde Clarke solicited American support, telling Bing that “American 
manufacturers can best supply our requirements” for cotton gins and other 
agricultural implements.
95
  
Meantime, the Ottoman government was moving with remarkable speed and 
energy to obtain the needed American cotton seeds. On September 27, 1862, Safvet 
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wrote to Musurus Bey, the Ottoman Ambassador to Great Britain, informing him that 
Sultan Abdul Aziz “was desirous of encouraging the culture of cotton in his Empire, 
and of restoring to it the importance it had in former times.”96 In the letter, Safvet 
detailed Abdul Aziz’s thoroughgoing plan to bring that wish to fruition. The plan 
included an overhaul of the Ottoman Empire’s tax system that entailed putting an end 
to the tithe, or tax-in-kind, that farmers paid and replacing it with a fixed land tax. 
Under the old system Ottoman lands were owned by the State and were farmed on a 
system that resembled post-Civil War American sharecropping. Tax and land rent 
were combined into a tax-in-kind, called the tithe. Different fields within the same 
local district were often taxed at different rates. This meant that the tax collector had 
to look at the field, estimate the yield, and determine the amount of produce to be 
paid in tax before the farmer could harvest his crop lest the farmer claim that produce 
grown on a high-taxed field came from one that was taxed at a lower proportion of 
the crop.
97
 This could not be done with cotton because of its growing characteristics 
and long harvesting season. Safvet admitted that this reform could not be immediately 
put into effect in all provinces, because in some of them tax farmers paid the 
government a fixed sum for the right to collect taxes from the peasants, but “it will be 
put in practice, commencing with the present year, in the province of Adana, as well 
as in part of that of Aidin; and, until it can be extended to the other parts of the 
Empire, a strict watchfulness will be exercised to diminish as much as possible the 
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pernicious action of the tithe system.”98 Adana and Aidin, inland from Smyrna and 
soon to be connected to it by the new Smyrna-Aidin Railroad, were the two most 
important cotton provinces in Anatolia. The official letter was accompanied by an 
explanatory note in which Safvet informed Ambassador Musurus: 
In order that that the cotton produced may be conveyed with 
facility to the seaports, the roads in districts where cotton is grown 
shall, where necessary, be repaired, and put into a good state, 
according to the regulation already promulgated for that purpose. The 
implements and machinery imported from Europe, which are requisite 
for cultivating cotton, for cleaning it, and for separating the seed, etc., 
shall be exempt from all customs duties. The State shall, at its own 
cost, procure from America and other countries, to serve as specimens, 
a suitable quantity of implements and machines, as well as cotton 
seeds of the best and choicest qualities, and cultivators will be enabled 
to try experiments with them. Instructions and treatises will be issued 
as to the most profitable methods of cultivating cotton and of 
augmenting its production, and these will be distributed in districts 
where cotton is grown.
99
 
 
Musurus Bey was given an initial appropriation of £4,000 to purchase seeds 
and implements.
100
 Musurus began making inquiries about obtaining American cotton 
seeds six weeks before Safvet provided the funds to buy them.
101
 In response to a 
request for 12 tons of American cotton seed from the governor-general of Adrianople, 
Musurus wrote to the Cotton Supply Association in October to place the order. He 
instructed that the cotton seeds be sent to Pierre Mussabini, the Ottoman consul in 
Liverpool, who would arrange shipment to Constantinople or Gallipoli. Musurus 
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closed the letter with detailed invoicing instructions, and added casually at the end, “I 
will remit you a check for the amount.”102 
The Manchester postman must have delivered numerous similar letters from 
Musurus Bey to the Cotton Supply Association’s offices during the fall and winter of 
1862-63. According to Turkish historian Orhan Kurmuş, who cited Ceride-i Havadis 
and British Foreign Office correspondence between Sir Henry Bulwer and British 
consuls as the sources of his very exact figures, the Cotton Supply Association 
furnished 295 tons of American cotton seed to the Ottoman government for free 
distribution in Anatolia for planting in the spring of 1863. Out of that total, Smyrna 
received 311,715 pounds, along with another 684,485 pounds of Egyptian seed. 
Musurus Bey ordered another 800,000 pounds of American seed from the Association 
for Âkif Pasha, the governor of Salonika, for planting in Macedonia.
103
  
Kurmuş reports that in Anatolia 480,000 acres were planted in cotton in 1863, 
most of it in the region served by the port of Smyrna. Most was grown along the 
tracks of the Smyrna-Aidin Railway. About 29,000 acres were planted in western 
Anatolia, most of it on the shores of the Bosporus. Another 310,000 acres were 
planted in a 200-mile long arc round the Gulf of Iskenderun that extended from 
Adana northeast to Maraş about 60 miles inland, and from there southeast 100 miles 
to Aleppo in northwestern Syria. In 1864 the acreage increased to 1,145,000 acres in 
the Smyrna hinterland, 53,750 near the Bosporus and Dardanelles, and 745,000 in the 
Adana-Maraş-Aleppo arc. Kurmuş states that most of this acreage was planted using 
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native Turkish seeds.
104
 This is supported by the fact that the 4,421,000 pounds of 
American and Egyptian seeds distributed for planting in 1864 would be sufficient to 
plant only about 75,000 acres at the seeding rate of 50 to 60 pounds per acre reported 
by the British consul in Smyrna.
105
 
A question arises as to whether or not these acreage figures are accurate. E. J. 
Donnell reported that the “Turkish dominions” exclusive of Egypt produced 824,240 
pounds of cotton in 1862.
106
 This figure cannot be correct. It might, however, come 
close to the $200,000 worth of cotton that Julius Bing reported being bought in 
Smyrna by Americans. In reply to a Foreign Office circular questionnaire sent to all 
British consuls in the Ottoman Empire by Sir Austen Henry Layard in 1864, the 
British consul at Smyrna reported that in the port’s immediate vicinity there were 
29,000 acres in 1863 and 53,750 acres in 1864. According to this report, 30,000 
pounds of imported seed were distributed in 1863 and 29,400 pounds in 1864. Yield 
of clean cotton was 18 million pounds in 1863 and over 30 million pounds in 1864.
107
   
Acting Consul De Heidenstam’s reply to Layard for the Adana-Maraş-Aleppo 
arc matches Kurmuş’s acreage figure exactly: 310,000 acres in 1863 and 745,000 
acres in 1864. Imported seed amounted to 57,000 pounds of Egyptian and 1,300 
pounds of American in 1863. De Heidenstam reported that seeds were used at the rate 
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of 40 to 45 pounds per acre. Native seed was used on the great portion of the acreage 
planted. De Heidenstam estimated the yield for both years at around 21½ million 
pounds per annum.
108
 This would indicate a yield of about 69 pounds per acre in 
1863. The yield per acre for 1864 would only be about 29 pounds, which at first 
seems far too low. However, 1864 was a year of locusts, and the voracious insects did 
severe damage to crops all over the Near East.
109
 In the Mersine-Tarsus-Adana area a 
worm or caterpillar “never seen in this province before” did severe damage to the 
crop as well.
110
 
Income from cotton soared. Expectations soared even higher. In July 1864, 
The Cotton Supply Reporter copied a story from the Smyrna Mail that predicted that 
the Ottoman Empire’s 1864 crop, exclusive of Egypt, would be at least 500,000 bales 
and said that, “should the present high prices continue, it will give the startling result 
that Turkey will receive nearly one quarter of the value of the American crop of 
cotton sent to England four years ago.”111 This represented an expected annual 
income from cotton of more than £6 million. A month later The Cotton Supply 
Reporter said in an editorial, “The stagnation of Turkey has given place to a 
marvelous degree of activity, and cheering signs of improvement and progress are 
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presented.”112 Tax revenues, which were slightly less than the Ottoman government’s 
expenditures in the four previous years, exceeded expenditures by 11 percent in 1862-
63 and remained ahead of expenditures through 1864-65 despite an increase in 
spending of about 6 percent each year.
113
  
The Cotton Supply Reporter’s optimistic prediction about the quantity of 
cotton proved accurate. Charles de Scherzer, the Austrian consul at Smyrna reported 
that in 1866 the Smyrna-Adana-Aleppo arc produced approximately 536,470 
“quintaux” of cotton. If one assumes that de Scherzer was using the standard metric 
measure of 100 kilograms per quintal, this amounts to 118,270,176 pounds of cotton, 
or the equivalent of about 295,000 American-size (400 lbs.) bales. Nine-tenths of this 
quantity came from Smyrna and Adana.
114
 This corresponds to an estimate of 500,000 
bales for the entire Ottoman Empire exclusive of Egypt made by U.S. Consul-General 
J. H. Goodenow.
115
 
In expectation that the cotton boom and the revenue that it generated would 
continue, the Ottoman government borrowed an additional £25.6 million at 6 percent 
interest from British and French banks during the years 1862-1866. Most of the 
money was used to redeem bonds and various kinds of paper currency and scrip held 
by domestic creditors. If imports of such things as telegraph wire, rails, and 
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machinery is any gauge, much of the remainder was spent on internal 
improvements.
116
  
The cotton boom brought profound changes to an area where the technology 
and agricultural methods had changed little from what they were at the dawn of 
recorded history. In early spring the soil was tilled with simple wooden “hoe” ploughs 
drawn by oxen. These cut a shallow furrow in the soil but did not turn it over as 
moldboard ploughs do. Brush was dragged over the field to pulverize clods and to 
cover the seed after sowing. All cultivation was done with hand hoes. Seeding 
practices and rates appear to have varied greatly by locality. Some British consuls 
reported that farmers used as little as 40 pounds per acre, while others said that 
farmers spread the seed broadcast at 140 pounds per acre.
117
 These cultivation 
methods, though primitive, were generally similar to those employed on slave-worked 
cotton plantations in the American South. Growing cotton thus did not require Near 
Eastern farmers to make any great alteration in their tillage practices. 
A native cotton gin technology already existed. The nature of these machines 
is difficult to determine from the descriptions and reports of them. It is likely that 
several different types were in use in different regions. Some appear to have been 
more advanced and effective than others. In Thessaly, farmers used locally made 
copies of a small hand-cranked American gin provided by the Agricultural School in 
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1851.
118
 The British consul in Baghdad described the native cotton-cleaning machine 
used there as “simply a bow” that allowed one worker to clean 30 pounds of cotton 
per day.
119
 The consul in Smyrna informed Austen Henry Layard that, “In most 
districts the women are employed for ginning with the old description of wooden 
machines.”120 To Layard, with his many years of personal experience as an 
archaeologist in the Near East, this was probably a sufficient explanation. 
Unfortunately, it does not tell the modern reader very much about the gin technology 
in use. Whatever their design, the native instruments were not adequate to process the 
greatly increased quantity of cotton grown after 1862. 
American farm implement manufacturers and Boston merchants partnered to 
supply the needed cotton gins.
121
 An American merchant in Smyrna received a 
shipment of American-made cotton gins in the winter of 1862-63.
122
 American cotton 
gins and ploughs were placed on exhibit at train stations along the Smyrna-Aidin 
railroad. These drew much interest from local farmers. Those who saw the American 
ploughs favored them over English ones because the inexpensive American 
implements were “light, strong, well made, and easily repaired by our country 
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smiths.”123 Hyde Clarke urged that American manufacturers send iron ploughs in 
large numbers. Clarke suggested that someone train a Turk in the use of an American 
plough hitched to oxen and send him into the interior to demonstrate the implement to 
local peasants.
124
 John Zohrab, a Smyrna resident, suggested that the Cotton Supply 
Association recruit Southern Unionists and “some of the coloured men from the 
United States, who are accustomed to cotton” to come to Turkey.125 In the spring of 
1863 English merchants established a large depôt at Smyrna where English and 
American cotton gins, both hand-cranked and steam powered models, and other farm 
implements were for sale at discount prices. By harvest time of 1864, four gin 
facilities powered by steam engines were in operation in Smyrna.
126
 More than seven 
hundred cotton gins were imported and put into operation in the Smyrna area before 
the end of the 1860s.
127
 It cannot be determined how many of them were American 
made, but it should be noted that during the year ended September 30, 1865, 230 
American-made cotton gins valued at $21,510, or an average $93.52 each, cleared 
through Ottoman customs at Constantinople.
128
 Another 240 American gins valued at 
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$27,972.75, or an average $116.55 each, were imported during the year ended 
September 30, 1867.
129
 
The low cost of the American cotton gins leads one to surmise that American 
manufacturers were targeting their sales to small producers. It was widely reported 
that peasants and local leaders accepted small hand-cranked cotton gins that they 
could use on the farm, but they resisted the construction of large, steam-powered 
commercial ginning facilities.
130
 None of the consuls, British or American, who 
mentioned the widespread opposition to steam-operated cotton ginning facilities gave 
a reason for it beyond the power of tradition and the supposed stultifying effects of 
Islam upon the “lower Mussulman” elements in the population. A more reasoned 
explanation might be that while a hand-cranked gin could be integrated into the 
household-based peasant economy and greatly increase its productivity with little 
affect on the existing social structure, large commercial facilities employing wage 
labor required drastic social changes. It appears that the further one was from 
Constantinople, the stronger the tendency to reject steam-operated ginning facilities 
became. At locations along the Dardanelles and Bosporus, close to the capital, several 
steam-powered gins and hydraulic cotton presses were in operation or under 
construction by the end of 1864, and the consular reports do not mention opposition 
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to them.
131
 Opposition also seems to have lessened rapidly in areas where the 
Ottoman central government’s control was strongest and communication with the 
West was the most highly developed. Charles de Scherzer wrote that by the end of the 
1860s there were thirty-four steam-powered ginning facilities in operation at towns 
along the Smyrna-Aidin Railroad.
132
 
The most rapid and revolutionary change was in transportation. Since ancient 
times, primitive solid-wheeled oxcarts and pack animals, mainly camels, had been the 
principal mode of transporting freight on land in Asia Minor.
133
 Cost and lack of pack 
animals meant that bulky agricultural products could not be exported from inland 
areas. During the cotton boom, European investors poured capital into overseas 
railroad development projects. By the end of the Civil War the Smyrna-Aidin 
Railroad had 379 miles of track and operated 8 English locomotives, 178 freight cars, 
16 cars for livestock, and 43 passenger coaches. In 1866 it hauled 66,029 metric tons 
of freight, the equivalent of 290,000 camel-loads. In addition to freight, the railroad 
carried an incredible 209,080 passengers. These statistics are startling when one 
considers that Smyrna province had only 155,000 people.
134
 Nor was the Smyrna-
Aidin line the only Anatolian railroad. In 1863 Sultan Abdul Aziz granted another 
British company a concession to build a railroad from Smyrna to Kasaba (Turgutlu), a 
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town about 30 miles to the east. This railroad, which was completed in 1866, 
followed a roundabout route about 60 miles in length through the rich cotton growing 
areas in the Gediz River Valley. According to historian Peter Mentzel, both Smyrna 
railroads “turned out to be reliably, though only moderately, profitable” in the long 
run.
135
 In 1866, they seemed fabulously profitable and misled Sultan Abdul Aziz and 
European investors alike to think that income from freight on cotton would be 
sufficient to pay for a comprehensive Ottoman railroad system. 
Several facts emerge about the parameters of the cotton boom in the Ottoman 
Empire’s Anatolian heartland. First, it was from start to finish a state-sponsored 
project undertaken by the Ottoman government with foreign encouragement and 
assistance. It is also apparent that local farmers did not abandon their traditional crops 
in favor of cotton monoculture, as British cotton interests would have liked. They 
increased the ratio of cotton to other crops in the mix that they were growing while 
the price was high and reduced it when the price fell. Though no accurate statistics 
are available, Charles de Scherzer provides a glimpse into this with his annual recaps 
of the tonnage and kinds of freight hauled by the Smyrna-Aidin Railroad. Of the 
66,029 metric tonnes hauled in 1866, one-third was cereal grains. Cotton and cotton 
seeds were 10,055 tonnes, or a little over one-sixth of the total. In subsequent years 
the cotton tonnage declined as the price of cotton fell but cotton continued to be a 
substantial part of the crop mix. The proportional tonnage of grain and agricultural 
products other than cotton remained fairly constant.
136
 As the demand for cotton was 
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falling, that for opium was rising.
137
 Opium surpassed cotton as Smyrna’s most 
valuable export in 1870, when a mere 800,000 pounds of opium brought in 
$2,800,000 vs. $2,750,000 for 17,500,000 pounds of cotton.
138
 
King Cotton’s reign as Sultan Pamuk was brief and the wealth that he 
promised illusory.
139
 With the end of the American Civil War, Anatolian cotton 
production collapsed as rapidly as it had risen. Anatolia produced about 200,000 bales 
of cotton in 1869, most of it on lands adjacent to the Smyrna-Aidin and Smyrna-
Kasaba Railroads.
140
 In 1873 the total declined to 50,000 bales weighing 330 pounds 
each. The price paid that year was slightly over 13 cents per pound.
141
 The next year, 
cotton acreage was reduced by half. Only 700 bales of cotton were exported in 1874. 
The total return from it amounted to $11,000. If the bales weighed 330 pounds each, 
the price that Anatolian farmers received for their cotton that year was a mere 4 ¾ 
cents per pound.
142
 Farmers continued to grow small amounts of cotton for home 
consumption, but exports did not again reach 100,000 bales until 1908.
143
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Chapter 6 
The Ottoman Peripheries 
Looking at the Euphrates River Valley in northern Syria in 1858, traveler and 
guidebook author John Murray exclaimed, “What a noble cotton-field would this 
valley make!”1 The Cotton Supply Association agreed. In the words of Isaac Watts, 
the Association entertained hopes that, “the whole northern half of Mesopotamia, and 
the great plains which stretch eastwards from the Tigris to the base of the Kurdish 
mountains, might be turned into one vast cotton field, extensive enough to place 
Manchester once and for ever in complete independence.”2 Experiments with 
American cotton seed in Syria had “proved that this country is as well adapted for the 
growth of cotton as the United States.”3 Further, cotton was not a new, unfamiliar 
crop. Farmers in Syria and Mesopotamia had been growing it since ancient times. Sir 
Austen Henry Layard, who was responsible for Ottoman affairs in the Foreign Office 
during the American Civil War, undertook two archaeological expeditions in 
Mesopotamia in the mid-1840s and wrote glowingly of the area around Mosul, where 
he said, “Winding streams irrigate fields of cotton, tobacco, and rice, and turn 
numerous corn mills.”4  
All that appeared to be needed to transform Mesopotamia into England’s 
cotton field was American seed, improved cultivation methods, organization, and 
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transportation to get the cotton to market.
5
 Cotton promoters looked to the 
transformation of Syria and Mesopotamia into a cotton field with religious zeal. In 
January 1861, William Sandford wrote: 
Cotton cultivation, which flourished in the East till superseded 
by Western enterprise, is capable of being resuscitated. The white 
wool of Damascus, which contributed to the wealth of Tyre in the time 
of Ezekiel, still grows in the fertile plains of Syria, and is susceptible 
of extension and adaptation to the wants of European manufacturers. A 
good road from Damascus to Beyrout [sic] is progressing rapidly 
under the direction of French Engineers; and were men of an energetic 
stamp, such as the old cotton planters of the Southern States of 
America, to seek cotton in Syria, this road might facilitate export of a 
considerable quantity before this year is terminated. Men of the right 
sort are wanted, with command of capital, and with sufficient energy 
and intelligence to superintend the labour of the native population, and 
also direct the application of those processes, and of those implements 
and machines, by adoption of which in America Eastern industry has 
been beaten in the race of competition, and in many respects 
annihilated. The social and industrial conditions of Eastern life have 
been revolutionized by the effects of Western mechanical progress, 
and have not recovered from a shock which has inflicted much social 
evil, as well as brought some germs of good.
6
 
 
Missionaries took a keen interest in the region because of its association with 
the Bible. For some of them, Mesopotamia was literally the Promised Land, and 
cotton was an integral part of that promise. Rev. Benjamin Willis Newton, a British 
missionary who worked at Mosul in the twenty years prior to the American Civil 
War, suggested that Bible prophecy preordained that the lands of ancient Babylon 
would eventually come under British rule and be colonized. When that came to pass, 
a “New England civilization” would be established there, and the reclaimed desert 
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would be “covered with cotton, and tend to the employment of the many-million 
spindles of our land.”7  
Cotton was not the only crop that Europeans looked forward to growing in 
Syria and what was to later become Iraq. In the mid-nineteenth century it was a 
commonly held belief that Western Europe’s population had outgrown the continent’s 
food producing capacity. Transforming Mesopotamia into a granary was suggested as 
a better and more secure alternative to reliance on American or Russian wheat.
8
 
Proponents of this view pointed out that even without agricultural improvements and 
hampered by the primitive state of transportation the region produced enough surplus 
grain to export 50,000 tons to Europe each year.
9
 Substantial quantities of sheep’s 
wool, tobacco, dates, and other agricultural commodities were also exported to 
Europe.
10
 
Moreover, the Euphrates River Valley was seen as the natural highway from 
Western Europe to India. Britain’s presence in the area dated back to the late 
sixteenth century, when the Levant Company established a “factory” or trading post 
at Aleppo in northwestern Syria, the exchange point for goods moving between the 
Mediterranean littoral and the upper Euphrates Valley. The East India Company 
established a permanent trading post at Basra in 1763 and not long afterward began 
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operating a Mediterranean-Aleppo-Baghdad-Basra mail route to India.
11
 Beginning 
early in the nineteenth century British consuls, missionaries, archaeologists, and East 
India Company surveying expeditions explored and mapped the sparsely populated 
region. In the course of their explorations, British travelers discovered an extensive 
network of ancient irrigation canals that had been abandoned for thousands of years. 
It was widely believed that thousands of acres of fertile alluvial soil could be restored 
to cultivation if only someone were to “reopen the mouths and clean out the 
channels” of the ancient canals. Some of the main canals were 200 feet in width, 
which was wide enough for barges and steamboats. It was estimated that reopening 
the canals would cost only £200,000 to £300,000.
12
 Insofar as engineering was 
concerned, that optimism was not necessarily misplaced. Sometime around 1850, 
while the rivers were in flood, an East India Company steamboat actually entered an 
ancient canal from the Euphrates River and steamed through it to emerge into the 
Tigris near Baghdad.
13
 
A railroad from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf was first proposed 
around 1835. In 1851, Dr. James Bowen Thompson, a British army surgeon, 
proposed that a railroad be built from Vienna to Constantinople, across Anatolia to 
Aleppo, and down the Euphrates River Valley to the Persian Gulf. Thompson 
envisioned that the railroad would eventually be extended across southern Persia 
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(Iran) to northwestern India. Thompson’s scheme was largely visionary, but the idea 
gained traction among Britain’s imperial-minded railway developers.14 In 1856 the 
directors of the Scinde Railway, a line then under construction from Karachi in 
present-day Pakistan to a point near Hyderabad on the Indus River where it would 
connect with a planned line from Calcutta to Delhi, met in London and suggested that 
a railroad be built “to unite the Euphrates at some accessible point with the 
Mediterranean.”15 Following the Scinde Railway directors’ suggestion, General 
Francis Rawdon Chesney, who had led an East India Company exploring expedition 
to the Euphrates Valley in 1835-1836, conducted a feasibility study for a railroad 
from various points on the Mediterranean coast to the Persian Gulf. Chesney saw 
cotton growing as key to the economic success of the Euphrates Valley Railway. The 
railroad, Chesney said, would open up a vast area of abandoned but fertile land 
“admirably adapted for the growth of cotton” to cultivation. Chesney reported that the 
British consul at Mosul, Hormuzd Rassam, a native-born Nestorian Christian 
educated in England, “cultivates cotton rather extensively, and is now introducing the 
Sea Island plant.”16  
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A joint stock company proposal was floated in London to finance construction 
of the railroad in that same year.
17
 Its backers apparently never raised the needed 
capital, but the idea of a Euphrates Valley Railroad remained alive throughout the 
Civil War and beyond. In 1864 the legal process was begun to charter a limited 
liability corporation with £800,000 capital raised by selling shares at £20 each. The 
projected route began at the port of Alexandretta (Iskenderun) on the Mediterranean 
and ran to Aleppo and then to “Ja’bar Castle on the Euphrates, below which point 
there is water communication by the Euphrates and Tigris to the Persian Gulf.”18 It 
was seen as a risk free investment, since the company’s directors were confident that 
the Ottoman government would grant a 99-year concession that guaranteed investors 
a minimum annual dividend of 6 percent on the capital.
19
 
Americans who adhered to the “Young America” philosophy, an ideology 
best described as a global commercial and cultural version of Manifest Destiny with 
some millennial religious overtones, entertained their own version of Great Britain’s 
imperial vision. In 1860, explorer William Francis Lynch told an audience of leading 
American businessmen that included William H. Aspinwall, builder of the Panama 
Railroad, that if a railroad such as James Bowen Thompson had proposed were to be 
built, the Persian Gulf would become the “centre of eastern trade.” Lynch envisioned 
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that trade flowing not to England, but to New York. Lynch thought that the nomadic 
Arabs could be transformed into agriculturalists if only the deserts of the Euphrates 
Valley were irrigated.
20
 
Around the same time Lynch delivered this lecture, an unnamed American 
engineer suggested a Euphrates Valley development project far more extensive and 
ambitious than anything the British had proposed. The American suggested that a 
navigable irrigation canal be dug from the upper Euphrates River in northeastern 
Syria by a circuitous route dictated by the topography to the desert south of Aleppo. 
A branch of this canal would go west to the Mediterranean Sea by way of the Orontes 
River to Samandaği, Turkey, a port city just north of the present day Turkish-Syrian 
border. Another navigation canal was to be dug between the Euphrates and the Tigris 
at an unspecified location further downstream, probably in the vicinity of Baghdad. 
Water from the rivers was to be diverted to irrigate the once-fertile desert land 
between them. The navigable canals and canalized Orontes River would enable cotton 
grown in Mesopotamia to be transported to the Mediterranean in steamboats. The 
scheme included construction of one or more large lakes on the upper Euphrates 
River to furnish a sufficient head of water to supply the canals.
21
 Fantastic as it may 
seem, the canal and irrigation scheme was topographically and hydrologically 
feasible and could have been built with the technology available at the time. A French 
engineer, M. Emile Ende, proposed an almost identical project in the 1880s.
22
 Modern 
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dams and irrigation canals in Turkey’s Southeast Anatolia Water Project and Syria’s 
Ghab Project are in the same locations and follow the same courses suggested by the 
American in 1861.
23
 
Less than three weeks before the First Battle of Bull Run, ancient 
Mesopotamia experienced a quantum leap in communications. It was a dramatic 
moment. On the morning of June 27, 1861, Governor-General Namick Pasha, the 
British consul, and prominent local dignitaries gathered at the new telegraph office in 
Baghdad, expecting to receive Sultan Abdul Mejid’s ceremonial first message 
officially opening the just completed Constantinople-Baghdad telegraph line. Instead 
of the expected formal greeting, the first message that flashed over the wire informed 
them that Abdul Mejid was dead and Abdul Aziz had assumed power. The stunned 
Ottoman officials composed a 120-word reply in which they expressed loyalty and 
support for the new Sultan, and an operator sent it to Constantinople, more than 1,300 
miles away. Its receipt was acknowledged within seconds. Unknown to anyone in 
Baghdad, a telegraph operator in the Ottoman capital forwarded the message on to 
London.
24
 
Telegraphic communications with England caused economic ripple effects of 
the American Civil War to be felt in Syria and Mesopotamia almost immediately. At 
the end of 1861, James H. Skene, the British consul in Aleppo, reported that imports 
of English manufactured textiles decreased from 1860 levels due to “The rise in 
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prices occasioned by the American war, and the comparatively small rise in value 
here.”25 European mercantile firms, alarmed by the precarious state of the Ottoman 
economy and fearful that the recent outbreaks of sectarian violence in Lebanon and 
Damascus would spread throughout the region, ceased supplying goods to the Aleppo 
market on credit. Withdrawal of the English trading houses enabled local Christian 
and Jewish merchant families who had earlier sent members to England and France 
and established export-import firms to take over their role. Expatriate Syrian 
merchants sent more than £1 million worth of European goods to their kindred 
business partners in Aleppo in the twelve months following the outbreak of the war in 
America.
26
 More Lebanese and Syrian merchants arrived in Manchester as the war 
progressed. Among them was ‘Abd Allāh Tarād, a Lebanese who in 1862 established 
a trading firm that was known in Manchester as “Abdoullah Trade” and remained in 
business for decades. Saul Bigio, an Arabic-speaking Jew from Aleppo, established 
Bigio Brothers in 1862. The Bigio Brothers trading company remained in business in 
Manchester until 1893, when the firm went bankrupt.
27
 The trading networks of 
which these firms were part served not only as importers and distributors of goods, 
but also as buyers and exporters of cotton. 
For all its promise, the Euphrates Valley did not become Lancashire’s cotton 
field. American cotton did well in northern Syria, but it required irrigation. This was a 
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major drawback, because people preferred to use their irrigated land for growing 
vegetables.
28
 Local farmers’ preference for growing food crops changed as the price 
of cotton soared, so that by the spring of 1864 diversion of land from food to cotton 
combined with the ravages of locusts caused a substantial increase in food prices. 
Cotton nevertheless wrought remarkable rejuvenation in the region’s stagnant 
economy. At the end of November 1862, American Vice-consul J. de Picciotta 
reported that Aleppo’s merchants had never before “seen such animation and activity 
in the market.”29 Camel caravans carried 18 million pounds of Syrian cotton to Beirut 
for export in 1863.
30
 Another 2 million pounds of short staple native cotton valued at 
US$1,700,000 passed through the small port of Alexandretta on its way to France.
31
 
The prospects for cotton were doubtful, however, and trading in it was risky. 
Telegraphic reports from Britain that an end to the American war might be imminent 
caused periodic panics in the market.
32
 Everyone seemed to recognize that Syria’s 
cotton-funded prosperity would last only so long as the American war continued.
33
  
Cotton acreage in the immediate vicinity of Aleppo peaked at 25,000 acres in 
1864, up 10,000 acres from the pervious year. Merchants and exporters had difficulty 
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financing cotton purchases in 1864 because the Imperial Ottoman Bank in Beirut 
stopped making operating loans when rumors that the war in America was about to 
end caused a fear that prices would collapse.
34
 Acreage planted dropped to 20,000 
acres in 1865, and to 18,500 in 1866.
35
 That year, U.S. Consul J. Augustus Johnson 
made no mention of cotton in his report of exports from Beirut.
36
 In 1868 the crop 
dropped to 5,000 acres.
37
 Consul Skene blamed the decline in part on the market, but 
laid the heaviest blame on “onerous taxation, vexatiously [sic] collected” that 
deprived the peasants of capital needed to finance expansion of cotton growing or any 
other agricultural improvement.
38
 Cotton continued to decline until in 1871 Skene 
wrote, “its cultivation has given place…to sesame. During the American war the 
latter was replaced by the former on account of the demand for cotton at Liverpool. 
Now, however, the previous relative proportions of those two summer crops have 
been restored.”39  
Tobacco was a formidable competitor to cotton. Syria’s Latakia tobacco, 
sometimes called djebel or “tobacco of the mountain,” a unique type of tobacco cured 
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with a combination of sun drying and smoke from oak wood, was already world 
famous. Latakia was one of the key ingredients in so-called “Egyptian” or “Turkish” 
blend cigarettes, which were fast gaining popularity in France as Frenchmen switched 
to cigarette smoking in emulation of Napoleon III, who was a cigarette aficionado.
40
 
The Ottoman government recognized that with competing types of American tobacco 
kept off the market by the blockade, Turkish tobaccos had an excellent opportunity to 
capture the European market. Tobacco was promoted alongside cotton at the National 
Exposition in 1863, with special emphasis on the French market.
41
 Export duties on 
tobacco were removed to make it more attractive to foreign buyers.
42
 Heavy internal 
taxes on tobacco remained, and were an important source of revenue for the Ottoman 
government. For example, of 7,680,000 piasters tax revenue collected at Sidon in 
1863, slightly more than half came from the tobacco tax.
43
 Of the £73,436 worth of 
goods exported through the port, tobacco accounted for £50,000. Cotton did not even 
appear in Sidon’s exports.44 As the price of cotton declined after the Civil War ended, 
Syrian farmers’ preference for tobacco increased. In 1869, the port of Tripoli 
exported tobacco valued at 1,310,000 French francs, but only 20,000 francs worth of 
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cotton.
45
 Cotton sold for 15 piasters per oke (2 ¾ lbs.) while tobacco sold for 20-25 
piasters per oke.
46
 Tobacco also enjoyed an environmental advantage over cotton. 
Locusts, the scourge of cotton plants in the Near East, will not usually eat tobacco 
leaves until after they have exhausted all other food sources. 
Turkish historian Şevket Pamuk noted that the high price of imported cotton 
goods during the Cotton Famine slowed the decline of home spinning and weaving in 
many parts of the Ottoman Empire.
47
 In Syria, a unique and overlooked aberration 
occurred. The rise in price of English manufactured textiles coupled with increased 
income from cotton growing prompted an abortive attempt at industrialization. In 
1860 the native weaving industry was in fast decline, driven out of business by the 
flood of cheap English cloth pouring into the country. Sharp price increases for 
imported cloth brought about a revival of domestic weaving in 1861 and thereafter.
48
 
The revival of local weaving caused an increase in demand for yarn. In an attempt to 
meet the demand, “a Moslem gentleman, who has represented the Ottoman 
government for many years as consul at Manchester” imported steam-powered 
English machinery and put a spinning mill into operation in Beirut. United States 
Consul J. Augustus Johnson deemed the factory successful at the time of his writing 
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in October 1864. Machinery was on order for spinning mills in Damascus.
49
 In March 
1866, American Vice-Consul John Griffith in Damascus reported that “some native 
merchants have successfully established cotton factories, but the cotton crop of 
Damascus is not sufficient to furnish them enough stock.”50 Another new mill with 
English machinery purchased at a cost of £40,000 opened at Antioch in 1871.
51
 
Ottoman tax policy and the restrictions of the Free Trade Treaty doomed these 
factories in the next decade by taxing their goods at the rate of 31 percent while 
imported English goods could be charged only 8 percent.
52
 
Mosul seems to have been too remote for it to become a cotton exporter. 
Ottoman authorities there gave farmers 3,000 pounds of American upland cotton seed 
in the spring of 1865 but locusts devoured the plants as soon as they sprouted.
53
 As at 
Aleppo, cotton required irrigation. Farmers planted 3,500 acres of their 18,000 acres 
of available land in cotton, but preferred to use their irrigated fields for wheat and 
other food crops. Cotton was grown as a sideline and it was used locally, not 
exported. Local craftsmen produced roughly made but workable cotton gins to 
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process the increased crop. Women spun and wove it into cloth to replace the British-
made cloth that they could no longer afford.
54
 
Baghdad province followed a pattern similar to that in Mosul. No imported 
seed were received in time for planting the 1863 crop. Locusts destroyed the crop that 
was planted using native seed. A small quantity of American seed and 1,500 pounds 
of Egyptian seed were received in 1864, and daily telegraphic news of high prices 
being paid in England encouraged planting, with the result that total acreage was 
doubled. In 1865 the Ottoman government distributed 150,000 pounds of Egyptian 
seed, and acreage was again increased. Governor-General Namick Pasha imported a 
few cotton gins for demonstration purposes. As happened in Mosul, craftsmen in 
Baghdad used the imported gins as models to make small, simple and inexpensive 
hand-cranked gins that could clean 60 pounds of cotton per day. Steamboats owned 
by the British-owned Tigris and Euphrates Steam Navigation Company operated 
between Basra and Baghdad at ten-day intervals. Yet no cotton was exported from 
Baghdad. This was due in large part to the sharp increase in price for factory-made 
English cotton goods and the resultant revival of indigenous cotton textile 
manufacturing by traditional handicraft methods. Even in the absence of industrial 
spinning factories, not enough cotton was grown locally to meet the demand. As a 
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result, Baghdad used all of its increased production and imported cotton from Persia 
during the cotton crisis.
55
  
Basra presented another anomaly. Though the British presence there was well 
established and the Persian Gulf seaport was well served by British shipping, the 
cotton boom had almost no affect. Only 200 acres of cotton was grown in the 
province in 1863. Some of it was grown from American seed sent to the governor of 
Baghdad by the Cotton Supply Association.
56
 Acreage increased to 250 in 1864, with 
28,000 pounds of cotton sold. Without offering any explanation for his conclusion, 
the British vice-consul in Basra, W. P. Johnston, informed Layard that further 
increase was unlikely. Cotton was planted only in small, enclosed plots tilled with 
hand tools. Imported seed were used, but Johnston neglected to say whether the seed 
were Egyptian, American, or from some other source. Two cotton gins were 
operating in Basra. Johnston did not say who supplied the gins nor did he provide any 
information about their operation. The local people, it seems, were simply not 
interested in growing cotton. Johnston provided no explanation for this situation aside 
from the “native dislike to innovation.”57 
The real reason was probably to be found in the relative values of cotton, 
dates, and wheat in the area. In the nineteenth century, dates from Basra were a high 
value luxury food condiment sold in the American market. Every August a fleet of 
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clipper ships anchored in the Shatt al-Arab waterway to load dates and then set out in 
a race around Africa to reach New York before Christmas.
58
 In addition to the export 
to the United States, British ships carried 9,000 tons of dates to India each year.
59
 In a 
routine annual report sent to the Foreign Office in 1866, Johnston reported that in the 
1864-65 shipping season Basra exported cotton valued at 4,600 piastres. In contrast, 
the province exported 33,000 tons of dates valued at 8,679,240 piastres. Half the 
district’s 80,000 laborers, the vast majority of whom worked on large estates in a 
system that resembled sharecropping, were engaged in growing dates. The other half 
of Basra’s labor force was growing grain. Surplus wheat was bought by the Ottoman 
government for Egypt. In addition, the Egyptian grain order increased each year, as 
did the price paid for it.
60
  
Cotton was much more labor intensive than dates or grain. According to 
statistics compiled by the Egyptian Ministry of Agriculture in 1964, when cultivation 
methods and labor utilization were little changed from what they had been a century 
earlier, growing one feddan (1.038 acre) of cotton required 129 person-days of labor. 
Cultivating one feddan of a fruit crop like dates required 68 person-days. Growing 
one feddan of wheat required 31 person-days of labor.
61
 With a lucrative cash crop 
already established, no source of food other than what was grown locally and a 
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market for the surplus, and with no surplus labor, there was no incentive for Basra’s 
landowners and tenant farmers to grow cotton. Johnston hinted at this when he told 
Layard, “Probably 2,000 or 3,000 men might be induced to cultivate cotton by a 
slight addition to their average wages or gain.”62 
The Cotton Supply Association’s efforts in southern Iraq may have simply 
been a case of too little and too late. In May 1866, Johnston reported the arrival and 
distribution of 10,000 pounds of American cotton seed from the Association and a 
larger quantity of Egyptian and Persian seed furnished by the Ottoman government. 
At that time Johnston informed the Association that small fields of cotton were 
“scattered for 100 miles from the mouth of the Shat El Arab [sic] upwards.”63 This 
cotton came to market just as prices began their dramatic post-Civil War decline, a 
circumstance certain to discourage farmers from expanding acreage in subsequent 
years. 
No one single factor caused the cotton boom to fizzle in the Euphrates Valley. 
Lack of modern inland transportation was certainly a major factor. Camel caravans 
traveled from Baghdad to Aleppo in about a month, but the number of pack animals 
limited the amount of freight that could be carried.
64
 The caravan trails were 
dangerous. In the summer of 1862 a caravan bringing 400,000 piasters in cash from 
Alexandretta to Aleppo was robbed.
65
 Ottoman officials in these distant provinces 
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were largely beyond the Sultan’s control, and their independence contributed to the 
outcome. Even if the Sultan dismissed an official, as he did the governor of Aleppo in 
1862, the decision was difficult to enforce.
66
 When local officials did obey 
instructions, they often did so to the letter and no more. This was displayed at 
Damascus in 1863, when officials distributed Egyptian cotton seed and ordered 
farmers to plant them without offering any further instruction or incentive. Farmers 
refused to plant the unfamiliar seeds and continued planting their traditional crops.
67
 
In Baghdad province, Namick Pasha encouraged cotton growing but was “averse to 
any change of the administrative system, or to the admission of foreign capital.”68  
Foreign capital was needed to develop facilities for handling cotton, especially 
transportation and seaports. Alexandretta as a good anchorage, but the city was little 
more than an inhabited ruin located next to a malarial marsh. Norie’s navigation 
guides advised ship captains to avoid it during the fever season it if they cared for the 
health of their crews. At Tripoli there was, “no harbor, but merely a roadstead” where 
the “anchorage is by no means safe.”69 At Latakia, the port was merely two ancient 
stone jetties, the basins of which were so filled with sand deposited by the sea that 
only small vessels could dock. Beirut’s harbor was “little better than an open 
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roadstead.”70 There were no dock facilities of any kind at Basra. Cargoes had to be 
ferried out to ships anchored in the Shatt al-Arab in small boats.
71
 
Nowhere did British or American consuls or agents of the Cotton Supply 
Association provide energetic leadership comparable to that supplied by Hyde Clarke 
and Julius Bing in Smyrna. In Aleppo, Britain’s Consul James H. Skene and his 
American counterpart J. de Picciotta observed and reported in considerable detail, but 
their reports show no evidence that either of them did anything to encourage cotton 
growing. The reason for American inactivity probably grew out of the arrangement of 
Ottoman administrative districts, the locations of American consulates, and personnel. 
The United States consulate responsible for Syria and the Euphrates Valley was in 
Beirut, which was in a different Ottoman province and under a different governor-
general than Aleppo, Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra. Consul J. Augustus Johnson was a 
Buchanan appointee with modest Vermont and Rhode Island ancestral roots who 
came of age on a farm in Ohio. He was not a Republican activist nor was he a 
member of the New England elite. Johnson’s memoirs indicate that he devoted most 
of his time and energy during the Civil War years to protecting American Protestant 
missionaries in Syria and assisting them in their evangelical efforts. He mentioned the 
Civil War only in rare passing references.
72
 J. de Picciotta, although he represented 
the United States as vice-consul at Aleppo, was not an American citizen. He probably 
                                                 
70
 Ibid, 325. 
 
71
 Vice-Consul Johnston, Answers to Queries, in Circular to Her Majesty’s Consuls in the 
Ottoman Dominions regarding Cotton Cultivation; together with A Summary of their Replies, 
Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty, 1865, p. 8. 
 
72
 J. Augustus Johnson, The Life of A Citizen at Home and in Foreign Service (New York: 
Vail-Ballou Press, 1915), 1 and 134-162. 
 
 190 
did not have any great personal interest in the Civil War. Picciotta did not draw a 
salary, but was paid on a fee-for-service basis. He did not have access to U.S. 
government funds. In 1872, Consul-General John Baldwin Hay urged Secretary of 
State Hamilton Fish to replace Picciotta with a salaried American citizen, saying that 
he and another foreign consular agent were “by no means so efficient as American 
officers would be.”73 
Lackluster performance by British consuls is difficult to explain. The report 
that Vice-Consul Johnston submitted to Sir Austen Henry Layard from Basra is 
perfunctory, with no evidence that Johnston had any personal enthusiasm for 
promoting cotton cultivation. Consul Rogers in Damascus told Layard that, 
“European settlers ought to be encouraged to come out and erect model farms for the 
cultivation of cotton; the natives would benefit by example.”74 There is no evidence 
that Rogers did anything to provide that example, however. The reason may have 
been lack of money. In 1868 Skene and several other British consuls complained that 
their salaries had not been increased in twenty years, while the rise in prices caused 
by the American war had caused their expenses to increase considerably.
75
 Nowhere 
in their published reports is there any indication that Skene, Rogers, Rassam, or 
Johnston were provided with special funds to promote cotton. But neither is there any 
indication that they ever applied to the Cotton Supply Association for assistance. 
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Lack of law and order in the region probably limited their freedom of action. At one 
point, the Italian consul in Aleppo was attacked on the street by a rock-throwing mob 
and only narrowly escaped.
76
 
On the island of Cyprus, R. H. Lang, a merchant temporarily serving as Great 
Britain’s acting vice-consul, displayed considerably more energy. The Cotton Supply 
Association’s 1859-60 trials of American seed, overseen by Lang and a resident 
Scottish merchant, William Riddell, were outstandingly successful.
77
 The trials 
resulted in 1,320,000 pounds of cotton, shipped in 6,000 bales of 220 pounds each. 
More important than the quantity, however, was the phenomenal acceptance of and 
preference for American seed by Cypriot farmers.
78
 Lang could not obtain the 
quantity of seeds needed for planting in the spring of 1862. In November 1861 he 
addressed a letter to the Cotton Supply Association in which he outlined a carefully 
thought out, indeed ingenious for its understanding of human nature, step-by-step 
plan to assure a sufficient supply of seed for planting in 1863. Lang planned to 
distribute the available seed to agents in the central market villages, who would sell 
them for a token 1 d. per oke  (2¾ pounds), with a proviso that the buyer must save 
and return double the quantity of seed purchased after his 1862 crop was harvested. 
Upon receipt of the seed, Lang promised to refund the original purchase price. Lang 
also guaranteed those who purchased his seed that he would buy their American 
cotton at a premium of 5 percent over the price paid for the best quality native cotton 
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grown in their district. Lang had the forethought to order a number of “small gins 
specially adapted for cleaning American cotton” well in advance, and in December 
1861 was expecting their imminent arrival aboard the sailing ship Cyprian Queen.
79
 
The Cyprian Queen sailed to Cyprus from England, but the ship arrived in Liverpool 
from North America on August 31, 1861, so it is conceivable that the cotton gins 
were American-made.
80
 
 In March 1862 Lang planted about two acres of cotton on a plot of leased land 
near Larnaca. His triple intent was to advertise the ploughs that he and William 
Riddell hoped to sell to the natives, demonstrate improved cotton cultivation 
methods, and compare the results achieved with American and Egyptian seeds. 
Locusts proved a serious problem but the American cotton fared better than Egyptian 
because it matured sooner, a characteristic that minimized the insects’ damage. Lang 
continued the seed multiplication scheme, but complained to the Cotton Supply 
Association that “progress in this way is slow.”81 
 Progress was faster than Lang perceived it to be. In his reply to Layard’s 
questionnaire, Lang reported that 16,460 acres were planted in 1863 and estimated the 
1864 planting at 22,000 acres. By value, cotton became Cyprus’s single largest export 
in 1863, providing £75,896 of the island’s total £276,700 in export earnings, more 
than 27 percent.
82
 According to U.S. Consul J. Judson Barclay this came from 
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1,820,000 pounds of cotton, which indicates a price of 10 d. per pound. Barclay 
thought that the island was capable of producing twenty times that amount of “this 
most important plant.”83 
Ginning facilities to process the crop kept pace with the increase. By the time 
the 1864 crop was harvested a British firm was operating a steam-powered ginnery 
that had the latest English-made Platt & Richardson 40-inch Macarthy gins. These 
machines were among the largest and most modern cotton gins manufactured. Two 
other ginneries each had four saw gins run by steam engines. At least a half-dozen 
saw gins operated by mules were in use in interior areas of the island. Three modern 
hydraulic bale presses were in operation, and two more were on order from England. 
At that juncture insufficient labor was the problem preventing further expansion of 
Cyprian cotton production. As a result, the ordinary structure of the labor market was 
upset. Ordinarily women earned only half as much as men. But in the cotton-induced 
labor shortage women, who comprised most of the labor for hoeing and picking, were 
earning the same wage as men, or 13 d. to 18 d. per day.
84
 The Ottoman Imperial 
Cotton Commission sought to alleviate the labor shortage by importing foreign 
laborers. Early in 1863 the Sultan granted a 50,000-acre concession in Cyprus to a 
member of the Anglo-Irish landlord class whose intent was to establish a plantation 
and bring in Irish laborers to cultivate cotton.
85
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Whether any Irishmen came to Cyprus is unknown, but cotton acreage and 
exports continued to increase. American-type cotton superceded native varieties by 
the summer of 1864.
86
 In 1865, Cypriot farmers planted 23,500 acres of cotton, 
almost all of it from American seed.
87
 Three factors contributed to the initial success 
of cotton in Cyprus. First, of course, was the very high price paid for cotton. In 
December 1862, Cypriot growers were being paid 10½ d. for their cotton. One year 
later the price was up to 20 d. per pound. Simultaneous to the high prices for cotton, 
there was a glut of another of the island’s staple export crops, madder root, which 
lowered prices to the point that growing madder was not profitable. Tobacco 
cultivation, which was well established in Cyprus, was discouraged by high taxes 
recently imposed upon it. Cotton, however, was charged a duty of only 1½ percent.
88
 
As the American Civil War was ending, Cyprus seemed destined to become a 
major cotton field. Infrastructure necessary to support expanded cotton production 
was either in place, under construction, or in the planning stage. The British laid a 
submarine telegraph cable to the island in 1863. The Imperial Ottoman Bank opened 
a Cypriot branch specifically to provide financial services to the cotton trade. An 
American engineer in the employ of a British company was building a wagon road 
from Larnaca to Nicosia to facilitate hauling cotton from the interior to the seaport. 
British investors were seeking a concession from the Ottoman government to build a 
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narrow gauge railroad.
89
 Looking at the situation in Cyprus on August 1, 1866, The 
Cotton Supply Reporter deemed it “very satisfactory.”90 
 All was not as satisfactory as it seemed, however. The average price of 
American-type Cyprian cotton in Liverpool fell from 17 d. per pound in 1863 to 15 d. 
in 1864 to 13 d. in 1865.
91
 Ottoman provincial officials, who had been cooperative up 
to that point, began to obstruct and delay permits for Europeans to operate additional 
steam powered cotton gins. The problem became so severe in Cyprus that in the 
spring of 1867 Hyde Clarke felt compelled to ask the Ottoman Minister of Commerce 
to intervene. The Commerce Minister sent a circular letter to provincial officials 
instructing that in the future “not the slightest delay will be caused” in granting 
approval for cotton gins and other cotton related investments by Europeans.
92
 
Provincial officials paid it not the slightest heed. In addition to bureaucratic 
obstruction, officials in Cyprus began levying exorbitant taxes on cotton at a time 
when the price was falling sharply.
93
 The quality of Cypriot cotton may also have 
declined because of hybridization with native cotton, a possibility indicated by Lang’s 
continual requests for fresh American seed.
94
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On August 26, 1866, newly appointed U.S. Consul Luigi Palma di Cesnola 
reported a very different picture to Washington than the one published in The Cotton 
Supply Reporter twenty-five days earlier. Cesnola wrote, “Since it has fallen in value 
[the Cypriots’] inherent indolence returns, and they prefer to do nothing rather than 
gain but little.”95 Cesnola’s own report refutes his judgment of the Cypriots’ supposed 
indolence. The island took in 35 million piasters income annually from a wide variety 
of agricultural produce in 1866. The price of madder root rebounded so that it again 
became profitable. In addition, Cyprus’s salt mines exported $400,000 worth of salt. 
Cypriots’ indolence, it seems, was simply self-interested unwillingness to labor to 
produce cotton for the export market unless it profited them to do so. When the price 
of cotton fell, their combination of self-sufficiency in food, diversified mix of cash 
crops, and income from non-agricultural pursuits enabled them to abandon it.
96
  
The Ottoman Empire’s European provinces appeared to offer good prospects 
for cotton as well. Though Macedonia lies at the same latitude as New York, it was a 
premier Old World cotton producer. The British and Americans alike long knew of its 
potential for revival. Two types of Macedonian cotton, called Uschur and Zelent after 
the locales where they were grown, came closer to matching the characteristics 
sought by British spinners than any other Near Eastern cotton.
97
 Early in the 
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development of cotton in the United States, Macedonian cotton was deemed good 
enough to be a possible northern complement to the southern Petit Gulf. In 1822, two 
barrels of Macedonian cotton seed were brought to New York and planted 
experimentally on Long Island.
98
 In the early 1800s, an estimated 70,000 bales of 
cotton was grown for export in the area around Serres (Sérrai, Greece), a major 
market town in the center of the Strimon River valley about 25 miles inland from the 
Ægean Sea. The amount of cotton grown in the Serres district decreased during the 
rise of the American cotton monopoly, but its cultivation was never completely 
abandoned. Cotton valued at £200,000 annually was still being exported from 
Macedonia in the mid-1850s, most of it to Germany.
99
  
Facilities for exporting cotton were relatively good. Macedonia’s provincial 
capital and seaport, Salonika (Thessaloniki, Greece), was one of the Ottoman 
Empire’s most populous cities, with about 70,000 people. Salonika’s harbor was one 
of the best natural anchorages in the eastern Mediterranean. The port was well 
equipped with quays, warehouses, and other facilities. French and Austrian steamers 
served the port on regular schedules. Cavalla (Kavála, Greece), 80 miles to the east of 
Salonika and accessible to Serres was a seaport and market town of about 12,000 
people. It was already a well-established commercial center, with six English firms 
engaged in the tobacco trade. Three French and three Austrian trading companies also 
had offices in Cavalla. Its rocky headlands sheltered a bay with water 50 feet deep, 
more than deep enough for the largest steamers. Substantial port facilities already 
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existed, including a wharf and a warehouse owned by the Salonika-based English 
firm of Abbott Brothers that had 33,000 square feet of floor space. In addition to 
tobacco, the English trading companies exported a small amount of cotton. The old 
Roman road to Constantinople passed through Salonika, Serres, and Cavalla and was 
usable by wagons. The road was flagstone paved and must have been in fairly good 
condition, since John Murray reported in 1840 that a horse drawn carriage could 
cover the 80 miles between Salonika and Cavalla in 25 hours of travel time.
100
  
The necessary human assets seemed to be in place. Musurus Bey, the Ottoman 
ambassador in London, was a Greek Orthodox Christian of Macedonian origin. 
Musurus owned a large estate at Sklatina, a small town near Trikala, in Thessaly, 
about 80 miles southwest of Salonika. From London, Musurus guided a considerable 
amount of aid in the form of cotton seeds and cotton gins to his homeland. During the 
winter of 1862-63 Musurus sent New Orleans seed for his own plantation care of Mr. 
Henry Suter, the British vice-consul in Volo (Vólos, Greece). Musurus also sent 
“twelve sets of the patented double-action Macarthy cotton gin, with six sets of 
driving wheels.”101 The cotton gins were installed in rural villages on and near 
Musurus Bey’s estate, where peasant farmers could use them in return for a 
percentage of the cotton.
102
 The following year Musurus sent out a steam engine, 
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eight Macarthy roller gins, and an English engineer to install and operate them.
103
 In 
addition to supplying seeds and materiel, Musurus kept the attention of the Cotton 
Supply Association focused on Macedonia by giving frequent speeches and lobbying 
in England.
104
 
Salonika’s most prominent resident was John “Jackie or Djeky” Abbott, 
described as “Greek by religion, British by nationality.”105 John Abbott was the scion 
of a family of long-established English “Turkey merchants” from Smyrna that had 
relocated to Salonika around 1800. He was thoroughly integrated into Salonika’s 
Ottoman-Greek society as well as a member of the interrelated British merchant 
community. Historian Mark Mazower described Abbott as “the real architect” of 
Salonika’s rise into an important seaport and entrepôt for British goods during the 
thirty years prior to the American Civil War. John Abbott was an unscrupulous 
manipulator who had amassed great wealth and used it to gain immense power and 
influence through bribery and money lending. The Ottoman governor and practically 
all of the province’s officials were deeply indebted to him, as were many other 
people. In 1860, John Abbott owned “more than twenty-five landed estates and 
numerous villages whose peasants laboured to repay the extortionate interest rates he 
charged.”106 Abbott was related by marriage to James Calvert, the United States vice-
consul at the Dardanelles whose brother Charles Calvert was British consul at 
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Salonika.
107
 Another relative, identified in consular documents only as “R. Abbott,” 
also served in a consular capacity at Salonika.
108
 
Every town of any size in the Ottoman Empire’s European domains had a 
British consul or vice-consul in residence. Charles Calvert and R. Abbott seem to 
have been the most active in promoting cotton, most likely because they were 
domiciled in the port of Salonika and forwarded cotton seeds, gins, and other 
equipment to consuls in inland locations. Although his reports are not as numerous or 
as detailed, it appears that Abbott undertook activities similar to those of R. H. Lang 
in Cyprus.
109
 Vice-Consul Henry Suter in Volo, the small port that served Thessaly, 
was particularly active, as was Consul J. E. Blunt in Adrianople (Edirne, Turkey).
110
 
British agents were energetically promoting cotton growing and distributing free 
American cotton seeds at several locations around the northern littoral of the Ægean 
Sea. Of these agents, Vice-Consul D. A. H. Lazzaro at Serres appears to have been 
the most active, or at least the one who kept the Cotton Supply Association best 
informed about his activities.
111
  
The British cotton seed distribution network based in Salonika reached into 
the remotest parts of the Balkan hinterlands. In 1861 J. E. Blunt sent small 3 pound 
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sample parcels of American cotton seeds to farmers in Bulgaria.
112
 Blunt later sent 
American cotton seeds to the Ottoman provincial governor in Belgrade.
113
 In the 
winter of 1863 British consular officials assisted in sending 11,000 pounds of New 
Orleans cotton seeds by packhorse caravan from Salonika to the estates of two 
Ottoman officials near Janina, in Albania.
114
 
Efforts to introduce American cotton into Macedonia began in 1858, when the 
Cotton Supply Association sent Charles Calvert a consignment of seeds to distribute. 
In May 1860, Calvert reported that three local cultivators, two Turks and one Greek, 
grew cotton from American seed the previous summer. One of the Turks, Salih Bey, 
planted 100 pounds of American seed. So successful were the results that all three 
growers asked Calvert to order small hand-cranked gins for them from the 
Association. This Charles Calvert did, specifying that the machines were to cost no 
more than £4 plus the ocean freight.
115
 A few bales of cotton grown in these 
experiments were shipped to England from Salonika during the winter of 1861-62.
116
 
High prices received for the first cotton sent to England encouraged Macedonian 
farmers to increase their acreage in the spring of 1862.
117
  
At that early date, Macedonian farmers had expectations that cotton would be 
profitable, as evidenced in a rise in land prices. On April 15, 1862, The Cotton Supply 
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Reporter copied a letter written to the European Times by an unnamed Englishman in 
Serres: 
A farmer of my acquaintance was some time since desirous of 
selling his farm for 80,000 piasters, and at that time he could find no 
buyer; now, from the introduction of this improved culture, he has 
been able—from cotton alone—to raise this year sufficient to yield 
him a net profit of 70,000 piastres, and next year he expects to treble 
this sum. I need not say how much the value of his property has thus 
become enhanced. But this is not a solitary instance. I can mention 
other cases of greater or less proportions.
118
 
 
Farmers in Macedonia rapidly accepted and came to prefer imported 
American and Egyptian seed over indigenous varieties.
119
 The 1863 cotton crop 
yielded 35,000 bales, 15,000 bales American and the remainder Egyptian. American 
was deemed the better product. D. A. H. Lazzaro estimated that the Serres area could 
easily grow 150,000 to 200,000 bales. Gins, iron ploughs, and other farming tools 
were needed, however. So was know-how. Enthusiastic booster of cotton growing 
though he was, Lazzaro admitted in a letter to the Cotton Supply Association that he 
did not understand cotton cultivation and asked the Association to send him 
instructional literature.
120
 
Agricultural instruction was desperately needed. American seeds were in short 
supply, and farmers’ planting practices did not make the most efficient use of the 
limited quantity that was available. At spring planting time in 1863, R. Abbott wrote, 
“The seed is thrown in the ground in the same manner that wheat is sown, so that it 
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requires about 60 lbs. weight of cotton seed for each acre of land.” Abbott told the 
Cotton Supply Association that he had “with my own hands” planted a small field of 
cotton with 3 or 4 seeds to the hill with the hills spaced 2½ feet apart. This method 
required only 20 pounds of seed per acre. It could have been only coincidental, but 
Abbott’s planting method matched the printed instructions furnished with sample 
packets of seed from the U.S. Patent Office. Abbott remarked that the local peasants 
were having trouble making straight furrows with the new English ploughs that the 
Association had furnished, but were learning how to use them.
121
 Consul S. Stuart in 
Janina reported that in Albania the American seeds sent from Salonika were “sown 
broadcast, like wheat or barley” and that this sort of planting required about 90 
pounds of seed per acre. Stuart stated the details as simply a matter of fact, and gave 
no indication that he was aware that this was not the most economical way to plant 
cotton.
122
 
In the spring of 1863, Ottoman officials placed an order with the Cotton 
Supply Association for American and Egyptian cotton seeds earmarked specifically 
for the European provinces.
123
 Cotton acreage nearly tripled in Macedonia between 
1863 and 1865, from 50,000 acres to 140,000.
124
 European buyers purchased 250,000 
bales of 1863 crop cotton at Salonika.
125
 If the acreage-to-yield ratio held, the 1865 
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crop should have produced 700,000 bales. A Macedonian cotton bale was smaller 
than an American bale, about 220 to 248 pounds.
126
 This was still a very substantial 
quantity of cotton, something on the order of 165 million pounds or about 410,000 
American-size bales. For comparison the states of South Carolina and Georgia each 
produced 556,000 bales in 1860.
127
 
Expectations that Macedonia would soon be producing cotton in even larger 
quantities encouraged British interest in building railroads. The scenic Vardar River 
Valley provides a level, nearly straight corridor from Salonika 150 miles north past 
Skopje and Priština to the market town of Mitrovitza (Kosovska Mitrovica, Kosovo) 
in the hilly borderland between Serbia, Albania, and Montenegro. Only a small rise of 
elevation separates it from the valley of the Morava River, which flows north 150 
miles to empty into the Danube River a few miles downstream from Belgrade. All of 
the corridor, and especially the Vardar River Valley, which resembles the 
Shenandoah Valley in soil and topography, was deemed prime cotton growing 
country. British engineers surveyed a railroad route from Salonika up the Vardar 
Valley to Priština in 1864. It was confidently expected that cotton would make a 
railroad profitable.
128
 
Cotton’s position was economically precarious, however. As in Syria, cotton’s 
major competitor was tobacco. Further, Macedonia’s tobacco was a unique air-cured 
type called Yenidze, the demand for which was rising as cigarette manufacturing 
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increased. Yenidze was grown nowhere else, and because it was used as a flavoring in 
the cigarette blend it had no direct competitor.
129
 Tobacco production was increasing 
before the American Civil War began, rising from slightly over 10 million pounds in 
1847 to 22 million in 1857.
130
 In 1866, one eighth of the cultivated land in Macedonia 
was devoted to tobacco. Twenty thousand families were dependent on it for their 
livelihood. Seventy percent of Macedonia’s tobacco was exported. In his report for 
1866, U.S. Consul-General J. H Goodenow in Constantinople predicted that if the 
price of cotton fell 20 percent from what it was then bringing farmers would abandon 
cotton for other cash crops.
131
 Prices at Liverpool dropped 28 percent in the next 
twelve months.
132
 Cotton prices continued to decline over the next decade, while 
during the same timeframe prices paid for Macedonian tobacco increased 
substantially. In 1863, the very finest quality Yenidze tobacco sold for 16 d. per 
pound, while common quality sold for from 4½ to 7½ d. per pound.
133
 Fifteen years 
later the highest quality Yenidze tobacco sold for as much as 80 piasters per oke, or 
the equivalent of about 58 d. per pound. Common quality Yenidze tobacco sold for up 
to 20 piasters per oke, or about 14 d. per pound.
134
 Cotton, in comparison, was selling 
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for between 5 and 6½ d. per pound in Liverpool in 1878.
135
 Tobacco yielded 400 to 
900 pounds per acre, the same or more weight per acre than cotton.
136
  
Macedonia’s land tenure system was more suited to a premium value crop like 
tobacco than it was to a low priced, high volume crop like cotton. The vast majority 
of peasants owned the land that they tilled in absolute freeholds. Peasant holdings 
were small, usually five to ten acres. Family members provided the field labor. In 
these circumstances, food production took precedence over cash crops. Peasant 
smallholders naturally chose the cash crop that gave them the greatest monetary 
return for the least amount of land taken away from food production. This subsistence 
strategy held true on the few larger estates that were farmed on a sharecropping 
system, because the tenant peasants still had to grow their own food.
137
 
When growing cotton did not profit them, Balkan peasants could not be 
persuaded to plant it except under compulsion. When compulsion was tried, it 
inflamed nationalism and inspired rebellion among the Sultan’s subject peoples. 
Serbia was the prime example. Ottoman officials in Belgrade gave the American 
cotton seeds that J. E. Blunt sent there in 1863 to the chief of police in each district. 
For the next three years, Ottoman police forced the Serbian peasants to plant cotton 
and supervised its cultivation. Cotton thus came to be identified with the oppressive 
Ottoman authorities. The British consul-general in Belgrade wrote of the episode in 
                                                 
135
 Todd, The World’s Cotton Crops, 431. 
 
136
 Mr. Maling, British vice consul, “On the Tobacco Trade and Cultivation of the District of 
Cavalla, Turkey,” in Peter Lund Simmonds, ed., The Technologist, 78. 
 
137
 Mr. Maling, British vice consul, “On the Tobacco Trade and Cultivation of the District of 
Cavalla, Turkey,” in Peter Lund Simmonds, ed., The Technologist, 71. 
 
 
 207 
1866, “it will be very difficult to again induce the peasants to attempt cotton 
cultivation.”138 
Cotton also suffered a curious environmental disadvantage in Macedonia that 
may have favored tobacco. As the first cotton from the 1866 crop was being picked, a 
species of woodland rodent suddenly became so numerous as to be a crop-destroying 
plague in the Vardar River Valley and in neighboring Thessaly. Richard Wilkinson, 
the British consul in Salonika, informed the Cotton Supply Association: 
The sudden appearance of immense swarms of rats in several districts 
of this province, and of Thessaly, is a phenomenon which has not yet 
been satisfactorily explained. The havoc committed by these vermin 
on the grain crops of the last-named province has reduced the rural 
population to great poverty.
139
 
 
The rats seemed to have a particular fondness for cotton seeds, and shredded 
the unripe bolls to get at them.
140
 Rodents will not eat tobacco. 
Relations between British cotton interests and Ottoman provincial officials 
deteriorated over time. At Serres, where the Liverpool-based Asia Minor Cotton 
Company built a large steam powered ginnery during the Civil War, the operators 
used low-quality lignite coal dug from local hillsides to fuel the boilers. Local 
authorities initially levied a tax or royalty on the coal equivalent to 5 British shillings 
per ton. In the midst of the 1868 cotton season, the authorities raised the tax to 20 
shillings per ton, a price that Nathaniel Buckley, chairman of the Cotton Company, 
complained was, “nearly the price of Newcastle coal delivered in Smyrna.” A dispute 
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erupted between the Asia Minor Cotton Company and local officials, with the result 
that the provincial governor prohibited the delivery of coal to the factory. The ginnery 
was forced to suspend operations. At another Macedonian ginnery, a tax collector 
arbitrarily levied double the official excise tax on cotton. When the manager (who 
was evidently an Ottoman subject, otherwise he would have been protected by the 
Capitulations) refused to pay, the tax collector had him thrown in jail. It took the 
Cotton Company twelve months’ effort and £400 in bribes to get him released. In a 
pattern that was familiar throughout the Ottoman Empire, Buckley’s complaint 
triggered a protest from the British Foreign Office to the Ottoman ambassador that 
led in turn to an ineffectual memorandum to the local officials from the Porte in 
Constantinople.
141
 
Macedonian cotton cultivation may have conflicted with the personal interests 
of John Abbott as well. Consul General Abraham Cumberbatch reported to 
Parliament in 1865 that one of the major impediments to cotton growing in the 
Ottoman Empire was lack of an “Agricultural Loan Bank” to finance the peasant 
planters. Cumberbatch wrote, “cultivators of cotton are greatly embarrassed by the 
exorbitant demands for interests of money advanced to them to cultivate their land, 
which finally becomes a mortgage so that they may be considered in worse position 
than the Government serfs were formerly in Russia.”142 Establishment of a lending 
bank in Salonika would not have been to Abbott’s self-interest, since he was the 
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province’s largest money lender and usurer. Circumstantial evidence suggests that 
Abbott was in position to manipulate the availability of credit after the Imperial 
Ottoman Bank opened a branch in Salonika in May 1864. The Bank’s office was 
located in Abbott’s house. Almost nothing is known about the Bank’s operations in 
Salonika until 1870 because the records for its first five years no longer exist.
143
 
None of the signs that the cotton-fueled prosperity that the Ottoman Empire 
had experienced during the previous five years was about to end were heeded when 
Sultan Abdul Aziz arrived in Great Britain on his historic state visit in the summer of 
1867. At that moment, cotton was selling for only about one-third the amount that it 
had sold for at the same time of the year in 1864. More ominously, the prices being 
paid in 1867 were almost 29 percent lower than in 1866.
144
 Britain’s imports of cotton 
from Smyrna had declined from 79,803 bales in 1865 to 32,770 in 1866. The year 
1867 would see only 16,995 bales of Smyrna cotton arrive at Liverpool.
145
 At the 
very moment Abdul Aziz set foot on English soil, the cotton crop in Anatolia and 
Syria was withering under a drought and the Liverpool market was in turmoil.
146
 
Abdul Aziz was feted and lionized everywhere he went, including at 
Buckingham Palace where Queen Victoria made him a Knight of the Garter. Nor was 
the outpouring of adulation reserved for the Sultan. At a breakfast for the officers of 
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the Imperial Ottoman Bank, Sir Austin Henry Layard, referring to his role in 
promoting cotton growing, hailed Mehmed Fuad Pasha, the recently retired Grand 
Vizier, as “the regenerator of Turkey.”147 The Ottoman Empire’s finances appeared to 
be in good order. Abdul Aziz sought to continue modernizing the Ottoman Empire’s 
infrastructure, especially railroads. With bankers willing to extend credit, and 
seemingly confident that cotton would generate revenue to repay the loans, Abdul 
Aziz granted a series of railroad concessions and guaranteed the foreign 
concessionaires a set annual percentage return on their investment. While the first 
tracks were being laid, the price of cotton was plunging to record lows. England 
imported only 53,715 bales of Turkish cotton in the two years 1868-69 and none in 
1870.
148
 Expected freight and tax revenues from cotton never materialized. In 1875, 
the Ottoman Empire defaulted on its foreign debts. 
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Chapter 7 
Palestine 
 
Jaffa on the coast of Palestine provides the best-documented example of the 
rise and fall of cotton in a discreet provincial locale in the Ottoman Empire. It also 
provides a vivid portrait of one of the Cotton Supply Association’s agents and 
illustrates how the introduction of cotton sometimes depended upon the energy and 
efforts of one individual.  
Guidebooks for travelers going to the Holy Land published just prior to the 
American Civil War typically describe Jaffa thus: 
 
Joppa is a very ancient town—an existence is claimed for it 
prior to the Deluge, and tradition assigns this spot as the place where 
Noah built his ark. Rabbinical writers derive its name from Japhet, 
while the classical geographers refer it to Jope, daughter of Æolus, and 
affirm that it was on this shore that Andromeda was rescued by 
Perseus from the sea monster. … Joppa was the only port possessed by 
the Israelites till Herod formed the harbour at Cæsarea; and hence it 
was that the timber from Lebanon destined for both the first and 
second temples was landed here… In the time of the crusades, Joppa 
was besieged and taken by Baldwin I., and was recovered by the 
Moslems under Saladin in A.D. 1186. From the first crusade down to 
our own day, Joppa has been the landing-place of pilgrims going to 
Jerusalem. … Josephus describes the natural unfitness of Joppa for a 
haven, in terms very familiar to those which modern travellers employ. 
The fact is, the port is so dangerous from exposure to the open sea, that 
the surf often rolls in with the utmost violence.
1
 
 
Seen from the deck of an arriving ship like the French Messageries Maritimes 
steamer Osiris that regularly called there, Jaffa was a pretty Near Eastern town of 
about 1,200 flat-roofed limestone buildings enclosed by an old wall perched atop a 
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steeply sloping hill that overlooked the ancient harbor. King Solomon’s harbor was a 
funnel-shaped bay barely nine hundred yards long and four hundred years wide at its 
broadest northern end. It was enclosed within a jagged chain of dangerous offshore 
rocks that broke the waves of the Mediterranean. The bay was too small and shallow 
for modern ships to enter. Jaffa was home to about 6,000 permanent residents, plus a 
small Ottoman garrison, a few Turkish officials, and their families. The Arab 
residents were composed of Muslims and Eastern Orthodox Christians in about equal 
proportions. There was a small number of long-established Arabic-speaking 
Armenian Christian families. There were also 26 Jewish families, fewer than 200 
people, immigrants that had arrived from South Africa in the 1820s and gone into 
business as shopkeepers and tradesmen. A small number of assorted foreigners 
formed their own enclave. Getting ashore was an adventure. Steamers had to anchor 
on the seaward side of the rocky breakwater around the old harbor, exposed to the full 
force of wind and waves. Passengers and cargo were ferried between ship and shore 
in boats. The one boat dock was a rickety wooden jetty 11 feet long and 9 feet wide at 
the Ottoman Custom House, which was itself little more than a shed. Once travelers 
were ashore, Jaffa lost its beauty, and proved to be a tightly packed huddle of 
dilapidated buildings and dirty, narrow streets that were overcrowded with men in 
native Arab attire, veiled women, barefoot children, donkeys, and camels. The road 
that led out Jaffa’s arched, tower-guarded eastern gate and across the Plain of Sharon 
through Ramle to Bab al-Wad at the foot of the Judean hills and on to Jerusalem 40 
miles away was a donkey path too rough and narrow for carts or wagons. No wheeled 
conveyances were to be seen anywhere in Palestine. Camels transported freight, up to 
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eight hundred pounds in a load. Bandits were a real danger, and guidebooks of the era 
advised European pilgrim-tourists who made the trip to Jerusalem to arm themselves 
with revolvers. The approximately 55,000 fellahin, or peasant farmers, who inhabited 
Jaffa’s hinterland lived by subsistence farming, using implements and agricultural 
methods little changed from those of biblical times. At one side of Jaffa’s bazaar, it a 
square about half the size of a football field, was located the British Consulate, also 
the private home of Her Britannic Majesty’s Consul, Dr. Assaad Yakub Kayat.2 
In a consular service that included many colorful and exotic characters, 
Assaad Kayat stood out as perhaps the most exotic and colorful of them all. A 
handsome man with a curled moustache who dressed in Turkish-Balkan fashion in 
wide trousers, short coat, waist sash, and red tarboosh, Kayat said of himself, “Some 
take me for a prince, or at least a chief; others for a Chinese ambassador, a merchant, 
or an interpreter. Some think I am a Jew; others, a Turk, a missionary, a philosopher, 
or a lecturer; Christians of every denomination appointing to me a station or an office 
according to their own preconceived notions.”3  
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Assaad Kayat was in fact born into an Eastern Orthodox Levantine Arab 
family in Beirut in 1811, the son of a merchant. Kayat’s father apprenticed him at an 
early age to Salem Bassila, a tobacco merchant, from whom he learned the tobacco 
trade. His father’s younger brother taught him to read and write his native Arabic, and 
also imparted the wisdom that, “Clever boys teach themselves.” The Kayat family, 
like most Levantine merchants, were multi-lingual. Assaad’s father spoke Arabic as 
his first tongue, and also Greek, Turkish, and Albanian. His father’s older brother 
spoke Italian and English, and had been employed as interpreter by Admiral Sir 
Stanley Smith, commander of British naval forces in the eastern Mediterranean 
during Napoleon’s invasion, and from him Assaad learned spoken English. Though 
his family was Eastern Orthodox, when Assaad was around twelve years old they 
arranged for him to attend a Roman Catholic school run by Capuchin friars, where he 
studied Italian, the traditional language of trade in the Mediterranean region. All the 
while, young Assaad earned spending money by hanging around the Beirut waterfront 
and offering his services as interpreter to merchant ship captains and other foreigners. 
There he chanced to meet two American missionaries, Rev. Isaac Bird and Rev. 
William Goodell, almost immediately upon their arrival in Beirut. His family 
subsequently befriended them, and another American missionary, Rev. Pliny Fisk, 
taught Assaad to read and write English. Through them, Kayat became acquainted 
with the first British Consul-General to Syria, John William Farren and his wife. 
Kayat became Consul-General Farren’s horse-boy and interpreter and traveled with 
him to Damascus to set up the British consulate. In his autobiography, Assaad Kayat 
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proudly claimed that he and John W. Farren were the first Christians to ride through 
the gates of Damascus on horseback in more than a thousand years.
4
 
After returning from Damascus, Kayat was hired by two Swiss merchants, 
Brelaz and Gauthey, as interpreter and storekeeper, a job whose duties were those of 
stock clerk and office boy. In the course of his short career with Brelaz and Gauthey, 
Kayat learned to speak and write French. After an international flotilla of British, 
French, and Russian warships destroyed the Ottoman-Egyptian fleet at its anchorage 
in Navarino Bay, Greece, on October 20, 1827, an event that caused Europeans to flee 
the Levant, Kayat found employment with a Muslim trader, Hadji Abdallah. Abdallah 
sent him on several trading expeditions in the Syria-Iraq region, one going as far as 
Baghdad. In the course of these travels Kayat became acquainted with many 
prominent Muslim merchants, and also with Arab Christian and Jewish merchants 
who imported English cloth.
5
 
Sometime later, Charles Farren arrived in Beirut as the new British Consul-
General for Greater Syria, and Kayat was appointed second dragoman, a position that 
extended the extraterritorial protections and privileges accorded Europeans by the 
Capitulations to him. Consul-General Farren’s duties included promoting English 
goods in local markets, with cotton cloth and yarn the predominant articles. Kayat 
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accompanied Farren on his excursions into the Damascus bazaars, and in the process 
learned something about British commerce.
6
  
Kayat’s employment with Charles Farren led to him being hired as interpreter 
for a British diplomatic mission that was escorting a Persian prince-ambassador, 
Najaf-Kuli Mirza, and his entourage to England. Kayat sailed from Beirut in the early 
spring of 1836 with the diplomatic mission in the Royal Mail steamer Africane. Storm 
damage and a near-disastrous engine breakdown forced the Africane to limp into 
Malta under sail. After enduring forty days in quarantine there the diplomatic mission 
completed its journey to Falmouth, England, in a Royal Navy warship, the 
paddlewheel steam gunboat H.M.S. Spitfire. Arriving in April, Kayat spent six 
months in England, and while there served as interpreter for Najaf-Kuli Mirza when 
he was introduced to several prominent British personages, including Lord 
Palmerston, the elderly Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington, old King William IV, 
and his diminutive seventeen-year old niece that was soon to be crowned Queen 
Victoria. When the diplomatic visit was completed, the British Foreign Office treated 
Najaf-Kuli Mirza to a tour of Europe on the journey home. Traveling by stagecoach, 
the party went from Calais to Brussels, Liège, Aix-la-Chapelle, Cologne, Frankfurt, 
and Linz to Vienna. After sightseeing in Vienna, the party pressed on to Pest, into 
Transylvania, and over the mountain road to Bucharest, the capital of Wallachia, a 
former Ottoman province that was then a principality under Russian protection. News 
that an epidemic was raging in Constantinople forced the diplomatic mission to tarry 
two months in Bucharest before resuming its journey to the Ottoman capital on the 
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Austrian steamer Ferdinando. After some time in Constantinople, the mission sailed 
to Smyrna and then to Beirut, whereupon Kayat resigned his employment with the 
British consular service.
7
 
Historian Kamal S. Salibi has suggested that Kayat’s relationship with the 
British Foreign Office did not end when he resigned as dragoman and interpreter, and 
that the subsequent trip that he made to Iraq in 1837 was an intelligence mission 
undertaken at the behest of Charles Farren. Kayat’s purported reason for making this 
grueling trip across the Syrian Desert with a camel caravan whose leader, a Bedouin 
chief named Jaad, had a contract to operate a camel express carrying the British India 
mail to Baghdad, was to purchase turquoise and pearls. When Kayat wrote the 
account of the trip in his autobiography ten years later, he revealed that, “I had a great 
object in view—I wished to ascertain the possibility of this route becoming the 
highway to India and central Asia, and I can see no reason why it should not. There is 
no natural impediment to a railway being made from Damascus to Baghdad.”8 While 
in Iraq, Kayat met Colonel Taylor, the British consul in Baghdad, and renewed his 
acquaintance with Najaf-Kuli Mirza. Mirza introduced him to a delegation of mullahs 
who were on a pilgrimage to the Shrine of Ali at Karbala. During this trip Kayat 
turned down a tempting proposition: Jaad offered Kayat his beautiful young daughter 
                                                 
7
 Kayat, A Voice from Lebanon, 107-173; J. J. Colledge and Ben Warlow, Ships of the Royal 
Navy: The Complete Record of all Fighting Ships of the Royal Navy from the 15th
 
Century to the 
Present (London: Chatham Publishing, 2006), 330; Najaf Kuli-Mirza, Journal of a Residence in 
England, and of a Journey from and to Syria, vols. 1 & 2 (London: Printed for Private Circulation. 
Reprint by Gregg International, 1971), passim. Najaf Kuli-Mirza was the son of the vassal Prince of 
Shiraz and Fars, not of Mohammed Shah, the Persian ruler. 
 
8
 Kayat, A Voice from Lebanon, 164. 
 
 218 
in marriage and a gift of ten camels if he would convert to Islam and become his 
business partner.
9
 
Soon after returning to Beirut, Kayat met a party of British missionaries who 
were returning home to England. Learning that they were planning to sponsor a 
number of Syrian youths to study in England, Kayat departed in company with them 
on this second trip to England, traveling by way of Marseilles, Paris, and Calais to 
London, where he arrived in April 1839. Kayat spent the next six months in England 
at his own expense, soliciting Church Missionary Society sponsorship so that he 
could attend medical school. Kayat also renewed his friendship with Charles Farren, 
who had by then been recalled home. Soon after meeting with Farren, Kayat returned 
to Beirut and almost immediately set out on a trip to the volatile Ottoman-Persian 
borderland, this time ostensibly to buy tombac; the mild-flavored Persian tobacco 
smoked in water pipes. His activities seem to have gone far beyond those normal for a 
tobacco trader, and yielded the kind of information about the region that the Foreign 
Office would have been interested in.
10
 
The second trip to Mesopotamia was Assaad Kayat’s last adventure as a 
footloose bachelor. No sooner had Kayat returned to Beirut in 1840 than fighting 
broke out between Druzes and Maronites. The European Great Powers intervened; 
and British, French, Austrian, and Ottoman Turkish warships appeared at Beirut. 
Beirut’s Christians and Jews, along with some of the city’s Muslim residents, fled to 
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the hills. There, while they were refugees sheltered at the Eastern Orthodox convent 
of Dayr al-Harf, Kayat married Martha Giammal, the young daughter of H. Khooja 
Habib Giammal, a wealthy Beirut merchant that he had known since boyhood.
11
 
The missionary sponsorship to study medicine in England materialized in 
1842, and Kayat, along with his wife and infant son, Habib, sailed for England, where 
he began training at St. George’s Hospital, Cambridge. While in England, Kayat 
found time to write and publish two books in addition to his autobiography, The 
Eastern Traveller’s Interpreter; or, Arabic Without a Teacher and a translation of the 
travel journal written in Persian by Prince Najaf-Kuli Mirza during the diplomatic 
mission. Kayat also became father of a second son, William. Kayat was admitted to 
the Royal College of Surgeons of England in July 1846, meaning that he was licensed 
to practice medicine. He also became a naturalized British subject. During his four 
years sojourn in England, Kayat visited Liverpool and wrote of it, “This great 
place…ranks next to London as a commercial town; nothing is thought of but 
business, the funds, and public securities… Cotton is the favorite word.”12 
Dr. Assaad Kayat became British consul in Jaffa in 1848, and he soon gained 
a reputation as a source of intimate knowledge of the region, as well as becoming 
well known for his generous hospitality. Missionary publications and guidebooks for 
pilgrim-tourists often cited and praised him, as did many travelers including 
American naval officer and explorer William F. Lynch. Herman Melville toured the 
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Holy Land in 1857, and he was one of the few Westerners that Kayat did not impress. 
Melville’s impression was apparently influenced by an American missionary who 
portrayed Kayat as being a cunning merchant well versed in the craftiness of 
Levantine commerce who had knacks for languages, for getting along with people, 
and for self-promotion. Those were useful qualities, however, and in 1858 Kayat used 
them to help calm matters after Edwin De Leon, the fiery United States Consul-
General in Alexandria, came to Jaffa and threatened the Ottoman provincial governor 
with bombardment by an American warship unless he took vigorous action to 
apprehend and punish five bandits who murdered an American missionary, injured 
another, and raped their wives. After sectarian violence again broke out in Lebanon 
and spread to Damascus in 1860, Kayat headed the Anglo-American Relief 
Committee’s effort to distribute food to destitute refugees who had fled to Jaffa, 
bringing him further notoriety. It also made him acquainted with J. Augustus 
Johnson, the U.S. Consul in Beirut, who was the Committee’s secretary.13 
Precisely when and how Kayat became interested in growing American cotton in 
Palestine is unclear. In 1847, Kayat wrote that, “The Syrian cotton and silk might, by 
commercial enterprise, be improved to suit the Manchester market; and British goods 
might be taken in return, both for the country itself and for Mesopotamia, Arabia, and 
Persia.”14 According to economic historian Charles Issawi, who cited as his source 
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correspondence between Kayat and the Foreign Office, Kayat planted some American 
cotton seeds obtained from an undisclosed source in 1850. American-type cotton was 
successfully grown in this experiment, but it was not profitable because of high 
shipping costs. Kayat was among the recipients of the American seeds that the Cotton 
Supply Association sent out for experimental planting in 1859.
15
  
It is possible, even probable, that Kayat and William H. Seward were 
acquaintances. Seward visited Palestine as a tourist in September 1859. The U.S. 
Navy frigate Macedonian was detailed to transport then-Senator Seward, and it is 
inconceivable that Kayat would not have met a visitor as obviously important as 
Seward. While in Jaffa Seward stayed in the home of the United States consular 
agent, Charles Saunders.
16
  
There is no documentary evidence to substantiate the assumption, but it is 
reasonable to suppose that Assaad Kayat may have been encouraged to promote 
cotton cultivation by Charles Saunders. Saunders was a Rhode Islander who came to 
Palestine in 1854 as a Seventh-Day Baptist agricultural missionary. In a letter written 
home to his family from Jaffa in 1859, William H. Seward described Saunders as a 
man who was, “of my own political school.”17 Records for the U.S. Consular Agency 
in Jaffa in the U.S. National Archives begin in 1866, so almost nothing is known of 
Charles Saunders’s activities during the Civil War years. Herman Melville reported 
that Saunders was in very bad health in 1857, so it is possible that the U.S. Consular 
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Agency in Jaffa was inactive during that time. American travelers to the Holy Land 
often mentioned Kayat in accounts of their travels and their references suggest the 
possibility that he functioned as unofficial substitute United States vice-consul in 
Jaffa.
18
 Such informal arrangements were not uncommon. This is shown by the fact 
that in 1858 Noel Temple Moore, the British consul-general in Beirut, served as 
“Acting American Consul” there in the American consul’s absence.19 
Kayat also had high-level encouragement from Britain. No less a personage 
than the Prince of Wales, the future King Edward VII, visited Jaffa in April 1862, and 
dined with Kayat. What they discussed over dinner went unrecorded, but Prince 
Edward encouraged cotton growing while in Egypt during the same tour.
20
  
On January 27, 1863, Kayat addressed a long despatch intended for the Cotton 
Supply Association to the Foreign Office, and reported that he had recently toured the 
Jaffa district and spoken to many of the village sheikhs and landowners about the 
profits to be realized from cotton growing. To sway them, he cited the example of a 
farmer in the village of Mugar, who had planted a small field in cotton the previous 
year and had harvested a quantity that sold for £100, several times more money than 
the land could have earned growing wheat or sesame seeds. Kayat reported that the 
                                                 
18
 Mary Eliza Rogers, Domestic Life in Palestine (Cincinnati: Poe & Hitchcock, 1865), 21. 
 
19
 Ruth Kark, American Consuls in the Holy Land, 1832-1914 (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 
The Hebrew University), 111-112; Melville, Journals, 81-92; Seventh-Day Baptist Missionary Society, 
Jubilee Papers: Historical Papers Commemorating the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Seventh-Day 
Baptist Society, and the Centennial of the William Carey Foreign Mission Movement (Westerly, RI: 
Seventh-Day Baptist Missionary Society, 1892), 89; N. Moore to the Earl of Malmesbury, Sept. 16, 
1858, in House of Commons, Accounts and Papers, State Papers: China; Japan; Syria, “Despatches 
from Her Majesty’s Consuls in the Levant Respecting Past or Apprehended Disturbances in Syria: 
1858 to 1860.” Session 24 January—28 August 1860, vol. 31 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery 
Office, 1860), 38. 
 
20
 Times (London), March 28, 1862, April 4, 1862, April 10, 1862, and April 21, 1862. 
  
 223 
headmen of the villages of Yibna Katra, Salamieh, Sakieh, Ibn, Abiak, Yalmdieh, and 
Cufo Aanah had decided to use two-thirds of the land that they normally planted in 
sesame for cotton in the coming year. Kayat was himself a landowner, and he planned 
to plant his fields in Sea Island and Egyptian cotton. The great need was for American 
seed, and Kayat asked the Cotton Supply Association to send him a quantity to 
distribute. Shrewdly judging that money would be the most effective way to motivate 
farmers to increase their cotton acreage, Kayat recommended that the Manchester 
Cotton Company, “import a few bales of cotton grown here from native seed, for 
anyhow it is as good as that of Surat.”21 
The Cotton Supply Association was forthcoming with the cotton seed that 
Kayat requested, apparently sending both American and Egyptian seeds. A total of 
5,290 acres were planted, but it is unknown how much was American seed, how 
much Egyptian, and how much native. Kayat named twelve Jaffa area villages where 
farmers planted cotton in 1863: Kafarhana, Bet Nabala, Hulé Naalin, Bashit, 
Mosmiet, Falvoje, Maghar, Kuhibe, Sarfand, Zarmka, Salamé, and Baabrak. 
American cotton flourished in the rich soil of the Plain of Sharon, and in November 
sold for 10 d. to 16 d. per pound, an incredibly high price. Kayat said that after selling 
their cotton the farmers, “look happy, and their wives are dressed on their heads with 
silver coins and some with valuable gold coins.”22 
If the tillers of the soil were getting rich, the merchants were probably getting 
richer. In response to a circular that asked twenty-five very specific questions sent to 
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all British consuls in the Ottoman Empire from the Foreign Office on June 27, 1864 
by Austin Henry Layard, famous as the archaeologist who discovered the ruins of 
ancient Assyria, Kayat reported that the merchants advanced operating money to the 
growers in return for a fixed quantity of cotton.
23
 A common practice in the Jaffa area 
was for merchants to finance the entire costs of production in return for 50 to 75 
percent of the crop. In some parts of Palestine merchants lent money to the cultivators 
at annual fixed interest rates ranging from 33 to 50 percent. Land, livestock, and 
implements were pledged as collateral.
24
 
Seeing the great prosperity that income from cotton brought to their neighbors 
encouraged others to plant it in the spring of 1864. Cotton seeds doubled in price 
from the year before, to 8 piasters for a 25 pound bag of native seed, but the supply 
was plentiful, and seed sellers were doing a brisk business. In addition the Ottoman 
government distributed 13,750 pounds of American seed free.
25
 In mid-March 1864, 
as preparations for planting were underway, Kayat, whose despatches exhibit 
considerable literary flair, described the scene at Jaffa’s marketplace in vivid detail: 
The market and the warehouse of the merchants who sell the 
cotton seeds are situated very near my house. Thus, within the last 
three weeks the number of camels and donkeys which crowd the large 
space opposite my consulate were so numerous, loading cotton seeds 
for the country, that they scarcely left room for foot passengers till 
noon.
26
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During the week when bloody events were transpiring at Fort Pillow in west 
Tennessee and Confederate infantrymen were ineffectually peppering Admiral David 
Dixon Porter’s ironclad gunboats with small arms fire as they steamed up Red River 
into the heart of northwestern Louisiana’s cotton country, Assaad Kayat was riding 
round the villages near Jaffa, where 31,700 acres, or almost 50 square miles, were 
planted in cotton. It was a gloriously pleasant week to be riding horseback among the 
patchwork of citrus orchards, olive groves, and long, narrow fields on the Plain of 
Sharon. The wheat was green, the gentle breeze blowing in from the Mediterranean 
was fragrant with the sweet scent of orange blossoms, and spring rain showers had 
sprouted the cotton seeds. Kayat “found with delight, in all directions, the young 
cotton plants shooting forth and healthy. The peasants assured me that they could not 
look better.”27  
American cotton was growing elsewhere in Palestine as well. In the autumn of 
1861, the Cotton Supply Association sent James Finn, the legendary British consul at 
Jerusalem, a small parcel containing New Orleans cotton seeds, described by Finn as 
“a few handfuls.” This sample was sown in a garden at Jericho during the winter, and 
in the spring Finn wrote to the Foreign Office to tell them that the plants’ “gigantic 
and prolific produce is astonishing the natives of this country.”28 A sample from this 
or another planting of American seed was sent to England sometime before July 1862 
and its quality was judged to be “fully equal to American growth.”29 By that time the 
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Cotton Supply Association had sent Finn a barrel of New Orleans seed, and Finn 
wrote that he planned to make a larger experiment at cotton growing “on the plain of 
the Jordan.”30 A sample of cotton from the Pashalik of Jerusalem was exhibited at the 
Ottoman National Exhibition in Constantinople in the spring of 1863 and was 
described in the semi-official French language Journal de Constantinople as, “bien 
que la fibre sort courte, elle a un lustre et solidité peu commune.”31 The sample had 
an uncommonly bright lustre, but the fiber was short, indicating that it was a native 
variety or a native-American hybrid rather than American. Writing from Jerusalem on 
August 26, 1863, Noel Temple Moore, who became consul upon James Finn’s 
retirement, reported that cotton acreage in the Jerusalem area had been increased 
fourfold from the previous year, with plantings of native and Egyptian seed. He 
expected a harvest of 4,250,000 pounds, up from 1 million in 1862. It was even 
reported that some nomadic Bedouins had settled down near Gaza and started 
growing cotton.
32
 
In the late spring of 1864 Mary Eliza Rogers, the daughter of an American 
missionary family, observed cotton growing along the road from Nazareth to Haifa. 
She described it thus: 
The large fields of cotton had a very pretty effect, for they were 
in their full beauty. The bushes are about two feet high, the stems are 
reddish, the leaves are of the color of maple in spring-time, the 
blossom looks as if it were made of butterflies’ wings, white and 
spotted.
33
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It appears that the summer of 1864 was nearly perfect for growing cotton in 
Palestine. Writing to Austin Henry Layard on August 12, Kayat reported that he had 
ridden throughout the district as far north as Mount Carmel and that “the state of the 
crops is all that could be desired.”34 Everyone was looking forward to a handsome 
profit. Writing to the Foreign Office on behalf of his ailing father on August 26, 1864, 
Consul Kayat’s son Habib reported that he expected the Jaffa district’s 1864-crop 
cotton harvest to be 8,590,000 pounds. Local cotton merchants were paying growers 
29 piasters per oke, or the Ottoman equivalent of about 19 ½ d. per pound in British 
money. At that time native type cotton was selling for 23 ¾ d. in Liverpool, a price 
that afforded the Jaffa merchants enough margin to cover ocean freight and make a 
profit.
35
  
The quantity of cotton that was exported from Jaffa and the income derived 
from it is impossible to determine. In statistical data for Jaffa’s exports for the period 
1857-1882 compiled by German historian Alexander Schölch, cotton is listed for 
1859, 1860, 1862, and 1863, but there is no data for 1861 or 1864. According to 
Schölch, the quantity exported in 1863 amounted to 190,678 okes, or 527,364 
pounds, with a value of 3,813,560 Turkish pounds. There are problems with this 
figure, however. Although the quantity of cotton is reasonable for the 5,290 acres that 
Kayat said were planted, the amount of money is far too much for the stated quantity 
of cotton. The unit of money commonly referred to by Westerners as the “Turkish 
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pound” was the 500-piaster gold coin, also sometimes called a lira, which contained 
6.6147 grams of gold. At the official exchange rate, this coin was worth 
approximately 0.90 British pound sterling. This would make the cotton worth 
£3,432,204 sterling. One British pound sterling was 240 pence, meaning that the 
cotton was worth 823,728,960 British pence. This sum divided by the average price 
paid for cotton on the Liverpool market for 1863-64, 22.97 d., works out to 
35,861,077 pounds of cotton. This is far too high a yield even for the 31,700 acres 
that Kayat reported planted in 1864, and it also conflicts with his estimated 8,590,000 
pounds yield for the 1864 crop, a figure that amounts to a reasonable 270 pounds per 
acre. If the value of cotton exported in 1863 was 3,813,560 piasters instead of 
“Turkish pounds” then the amount would be equal to £6,864 or 1,647,458 pence, 
which calculates to 71,722 pounds of cotton, far below the stated quantity exported, 
and only a fraction of the approximately 1,300,000 pounds that the 5,290 acres that 
Kayat reported planted in 1863 might be expected to yield.
36
 
Kayat encountered difficulties in his effort to encourage growers to plant 
American cotton. The fellahin were reluctant to accept the American seed offered to 
them free by the Ottoman government, fearing that it was a ruse by local officials to 
increase the tithe, the one-fifth part tax-in-kind that they paid on the crop. As men, 
women, and children were swarming into the fields with sacks and baskets to pick the 
first ripe cotton bolls from the waist-high plants in August, Habib Kayat informed the 
Cotton Supply Association that the farmers had little inclination or incentive to 
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improve the quality of their produce because, “the present high prices pay them so 
well that they do not care about troubling themselves with experiments.”37 Rumors 
that the war in America might end before the crop went to market dashed hopes that 
the high prices anticipated at planting time would be realized. Writing as the first 
camel-loads of cotton were arriving at the Jaffa market in early November, Assaad 
Kayat reported that the price had fallen by half, from 29 piasters per oke to 14 
piasters, or a little over 9 ¼ d. per pound. Seeing the abundance of their own crops 
and the decline in prices, farmers began to worry that more cotton was being grown 
than there would be a market for.
38
  
Cargo handling facilities were grossly inadequate to accommodate the greatly 
increased volume of cotton and other goods moving out of and into Jaffa. Everything 
still had to pass over the one tiny jetty at the Ottoman Custom House. After being 
inspected by customs officials and export duties collected, each bale of cotton was 
manhandled onto a harbor lighter, a whaleboat about 30 feet in length crewed by six 
oarsmen and a steersman at the tiller. The boatmen threaded their heavy-laden craft 
through narrow gaps between the rocks to a waiting ship, most often a French 
Messageries Maritimes
 
steamer bound for Marseille, whose crew used block-and-
tackle hung from a yardarm to hoist the bales aboard. Ships sometimes loaded more 
than a thousand bales, as was the case with the British sailing ship Volunteer, which 
took aboard 1,400 bales in April 1864. A harbor boat could carry at most two or three 
bales of cotton per trip. Loading was a slow process in the best of conditions. Even 
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moderate-sized waves halted loading operations. Stormy weather forced the ships to 
weigh anchor and head out to sea lest they be driven onto the rocks and bashed to 
pieces. These conditions not only caused frustrating delays to Jaffa’s cotton 
merchants; it wrought havoc with steamship schedules. Nevertheless, the cotton 
shortage was so severe in France that the Messageries Maritimes
 
assigned its newest, 
fastest steamers to the Jaffa-to-Marseille cotton run.
39
 
Despite the difficulties there was still much faith that cotton promised future 
prosperity. It was already bringing about noticeable change in the pace of life in Jaffa. 
In reply to Layard’s questionnaire, Kayat reported that the fellahin were making more 
money than they ever had in the past, and they were no longer indebted to the 
merchants who advanced them operating money. Those who planted American seed 
did doubly well. The American seed yielded 520 to 620 pounds per acre compared to 
a maximum of 300 pounds from indigenous seed. A number of hand-cranked English 
and American cotton gins had been imported and were in use. Local cotton merchants 
had just put two English steam engines into operation to power gins. One of the steam 
engines also ran a hydraulic bale press that made 400 pound bales. Five hand 
operated screw-type bale presses were also in use. Camel drivers were earning 8 
shillings per load, one load per day, bringing the cotton to Jaffa. Wheat and olive oil 
exports also increased, mostly to Egypt, where food production was being ignored in 
favor of cotton and where the thousands of workers toiling to dig the Suez Canal had 
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to be fed.
40
 Merchants were confident. Kayat reported that, “those who have money 
are buying all they can get at these prices, in the belief that ere long cotton will 
advance in value.”41  
Even greater changes seemed to be in the near offing. Ottoman customs 
officials obtained permission from Constantinople to construct a proper wharf for the 
landing of passengers and cargo from boats. A contract was let to a French company 
to build a lighthouse. Poles were being set and telegraph wire strung southward from 
Beirut, and the line was to be extended down the coast to Gaza and across the Sinai to 
Alexandria in Egypt. When completed, the telegraph line would put Jaffa in 
instantaneous communications with Constantinople and Western Europe. The 
Ottoman Porte granted a concession to a British company to build a railroad from 
Jaffa to Jerusalem in December 1864. Local merchants were impatient for 
construction to begin.
42
 
Forty miles away in Jerusalem, things did not look nearly so bright to Noel 
Temple Moore. Moore called Jerusalem, “the least commercial or industrial city I 
know.”43 Growing exportable cotton in the Jordan Valley had not materialized as 
James Finn had expected. No American or other foreign seeds had been distributed by 
the Ottoman government. Moore complained that local officials were doing nothing 
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to encourage cotton growing. Farmers were still following their traditional 
subsistence strategy, growing olives, wheat, barley, and maize. They were growing 
more cotton from native seed than they were before the American war began, but it 
was being used locally to make homespun, because English yarn and cloth was too 
expensive for local people to buy. Moore blamed the Ottoman government’s 
unwillingness to grant the concession to build and operate the proposed railroad to a 
foreign company as the primary reason for the dreary state of commerce. He 
complained that the government was not even willing to build good wagon roads. 
Moore also faulted the local Ottoman authorities for their failure to control predatory 
Bedouin tribes whose raids made farming in the Jordan Valley too dangerous. Yet, 
Moore thought that if only the government in Constantinople would assert its 
authority on local officials, the “vast fertile plains” then lying waste could be farmed 
in cotton and other crops.
44
 
Assaad Kayat realized that the price of cotton was likely to decline when the 
American war ended, and that if it was to remain viable as an export cash crop in 
Palestine two things had to be done. First, Jaffa’s infrastructure had to be improved, 
and Kayat recommended dredging the old natural basin and building a landing stage 
so that oceangoing ships could load directly from shore. Kayat thought that it could 
be done relatively cheaply. Improving the harbor was something that the Ottoman 
government would have to do, either directly or through the granting of a concession 
to a foreign company. Second, the fellahin had to be convinced to improve the quality 
of their cotton. This need Kayat sought to address himself. Sometime during the 1864 
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harvesting season, Kayat bought additional land, mules and English moldboard 
ploughs, had wells dug to furnish irrigation water, and had buildings erected for 
tenants who would work the land. Kayat’s intent was to set up a model farm, “for the 
produce of American cotton.”45 After investing heavily in land, equipment, and 
improvements, Kayat could not afford to buy a cotton gin, and asked the Cotton 
Supply Association to supply him with a good, simple English-made one, along with 
a screw press for making bales. He also asked for a supply of Sea Island, New 
Orleans, and Peruvian seed to use in demonstration test plots. The Cotton Supply 
Association sent the seeds, though it is unclear whether or not it supplied the cotton 
gin and bale press.
46
 
Telegraph wires reached Jaffa in the autumn of 1864, and brought same day 
market reports from the cotton exchanges in Liverpool, Marseille, and Trieste. This 
meant that prices offered by Jaffa merchants responded to the European market the 
next day. It is easy to imagine a crafty Jaffa merchant reading the latest price reports 
posted in the telegraph office window and then hurrying out to the sebil, or traveler’s 
rest-stop, it a domed structure resembling a miniature mosque, on the Jerusalem road 
about a mile east of town to meet a caravan of fellahin bringing their cotton to market 
in hopes of convincing them to sell at yesterday’s lower price. In Jaffa’s coffee shops, 
at its mosques and churches, and wherever men gathered to talk, the conversation, as 
conversation among farmers invariably does, no doubt ran to what price they thought 
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next year’s crop would bring, the merits of one plant variety versus another, and the 
new English plough, American cotton gin, or other piece of novel new equipment that 
a neighbor had just acquired. Out in the villages, there would have been talk among 
the village women who went to draw water from the well too, perhaps about the 
coming marriage of a daughter and how great a bride price the groom’s family had 
been able to afford because of their income from cotton. At planting time that spring, 
roundabout the time General Lee’s exhausted army was trudging toward Appomattox, 
there was grumbling, too. The price of cotton had fallen drastically, to 13 piasters per 
oke, so why did the price of English cloth not also come down? Some fellahin 
thought that the local merchants were conniving to get their cotton cheap, while the 
merchants suspected conniving speculators in Liverpool and Marseille of doing the 
same to them.
47
 
Those who were better informed knew that the approaching end of the war in 
America was behind the fall in cotton prices. The Levant Herald, the bi-lingual 
English-French newspaper published in Constantinople and circulated widely among 
the European expatriate community, reported, “It is natural that the Levant should be 
affected—even seriously affected, by the commotion in the cotton market, of which 
the prospect of the termination of the American struggle is one of the causes.”48 
Lower prices notwithstanding, confidence in cotton remained high. Acreage 
was again expanded. An American, identified only as “an American gentleman, who 
is from Carolina” toured the region in the spring and early summer of 1865, and 
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informed the Constantinople correspondent of the Daily News that he had seen “the 
best New Orleans” cotton growing near Nablus and along the road to Nazareth. The 
traveler also said that now that slavery had been abolished in the United States, “the 
negroes will never again take to field-work in sufficient numbers to bring down the 
price of the staple, so as to enable it to compete in any quantity with that grown in the 
Levant.”49 
As it had been the previous spring, the weather was nearly ideal for cotton. 
The young cotton seedlings looked magnificent. Then, during the second week in 
June 1865, a fearsome natural catastrophe that has periodically brought famine to the 
Near East since the beginning of agriculture descended upon Palestine: locusts. 
Assaad Kayat’s anguished despatch to The Times describing it reads equally like an 
account of a biblical plague and the description of an invasion of alien creatures from 
science fiction. A living cloud appeared out of the Syrian desert, crossed the Jordan 
River, swarmed over the rocky Judean hills, and then descended onto the Plain of 
Sharon. As they moved the locusts devoured every green growing thing in their path. 
The tiny insects seemed to display a malevolent intelligence. They did not eat the 
young oranges in Kayat’s garden, but after stripping the trees of their leaves, the 
locusts bit through the stems and let the fruits fall to the ground as if intentionally 
leaving nothing edible behind them. Despite efforts to seal them out, locusts found 
their way into houses and devoured the houseplants. They even attacked green 
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vegetables on people’s plates at mealtime.50 Kayat wrote to the Cotton Supply 
Reporter: 
[Locusts] in innumerable millions have reached Jaffa, and have 
already eaten nearly all the cotton, sesame seed, and vegetables, and 
have done much damage to the young trees. They have eaten about 
fifteen acres of my own land planted with American cotton seed, 
which ten days ago was most promising. … Everybody is doing his 
best to destroy the locusts; the inhabitants go out en masse, and bring 
daily each a bagful of these insects, five okes or 14 lb. weight of them, 
which are thrown into the sea. It is a great calamity; in all churches, 
synagogues, and mosques, prayers are being offered to God to remove 
the curse. 
If this despatch be published, I beg all scientific men who may 
take an interest in the cause to devise a means for the extermination of 
locusts. If any chemical waters can be produced to be pumped over the 
locusts when they are young to kill them, or traps, or anything for their 
destruction, such person or persons who may produce such a remedy 
will have the prayers and gratitude of the inhabitants of Palestine.
51
 
 
It was the last despatch from H.B.M. Consul Dr. Assaad Kayat that The 
Cotton Supply Reporter published. Before the August 1, 1865 edition containing it 
reached Jaffa in the mail, Kayat died in a cholera epidemic. He was fifty-four years of 
age. With Assaad Kayat’s death, the Palestinian fellahin lost an eloquent propagandist 
for their cotton at a time when one was most needed. Kayat’s son Habib replaced him 
as British consul at Jaffa, but his despatches never riveted the attention of the Cotton 
Supply Association as his father’s had.52  
Cotton was planted in 1866, but apparently not on the scale that it had been in 
1865. The two steam-powered gins remained in operation, but not much seems to 
have been done to alleviate the cargo handling problems. Ottoman officials were not 
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being cooperative, and just at the time when the fellahin were finally convinced to 
plant them, the free distribution of American seed stopped. Locusts again attacked the 
crop, but not nearly so destructively as they had the previous year. The market was 
volatile, with wild up-and-down swings almost daily, as wildly conflicting news of 
the American crop reached Liverpool and Marseille. Writing in July, Habib Kayat 
told the Cotton Supply Association that 7 d. per pound was necessary for cotton to be 
remunerative to growers in Palestine. If cotton fell below that price, he warned, the 
Palestinian fellahin would stop growing it.
53
 
Elsewhere in Palestine, the distribution of American seeds apparently 
continued, and in some locales even took place for the first time. Consul Moore, who 
had previously complained that the local officials in Jerusalem were not distributing 
free seeds as the government in Constantinople had instructed, reported that 50,000 
okes (137,500 lbs.) had been sown near Nablus in the spring of 1866, most on land 
held by small proprietors. Cotton was not popular with farmers in the Judean hills, 
however. Cotton required irrigation and water had to be drawn from wells that gave 
only a limited supply. Merchants were advancing operating money against the crop, 
but only at the low rate of 15 to 18 piasters per oke, or between 5 ½ and 6 ½ d. per 
pound.
54
 
Nothing about Palestinian cotton appeared in the pages of The Cotton Supply 
Reporter in all of 1867. When the American missionary Rev. Nathaniel Clark Burt 
landed at Jaffa from the Austrian Lloyds steamship Archduchesse Carlotta enroute to 
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Jerusalem on March 15, 1867, he penned a vivid description of Jaffa’s orange groves, 
sesame, and other crops but did not mention cotton.
55
 In March 1868, David 
Chadwick, a member of the Cotton Supply Association, returned from a tour of the 
Holy Land and wrote to John Cheetham, telling him that Dr. P. R. Vartan, a surgeon 
working with the Edinburgh Medical Missionary Association in Nazareth was 
encouraging a colony of Germans there to grow cotton. Chadwick informed 
Cheetham that Dr. Vartan was “willing to act as honorary agent of the Cotton Supply 
Association.”56 Chadwick talked with Habib Kayat, and reported that Kayat told him, 
“cotton cultivation in the valley of Sharon could be carried to a very large extent, if 
the growers had some assurance of the cotton being taken from them at some fixed 
minimum price.”57 
No such contractual agreement was forthcoming. At that point, the English 
cotton industry was in serious distress. Mills were working half time. At a special 
called meeting of the Cotton Supply Association held in Manchester Town Hall on 
Tuesday, December 22, 1868, with Mr. W. Pearson, who was a cloth manufacturer, 
not a spinner, in the chair, complaints were heard that, yes, the supply of cotton was 
short, but the price being paid for the supply that was available was too high. As a 
result, cloth cost more than overseas buyers could afford to pay for it. Such 
sentiments did not bode well for the future of cotton growing in Palestine, nor did the 
price for the year on the Liverpool Exchange. Cotton averaged 9.92 d. for the year, 
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well above what Habib Kayat said was the break-even price, but it had at times fallen 
below 6 d. With that kind of uncertainty, the fellahin were likely to abandon cotton in 
favor of grain and sesame.
58
  
The price of cotton rose in 1869, averaging 11.42 d. and were fairly stable. 
Cotton never sold below 8¾ d. nor higher than 14 d. during the year. Most daily 
prices were between 11 and 14.
59
 The Marseille market followed Liverpool, but with 
ample supplies available from Egypt that could be quickly and easily loaded at 
Alexandria’s superb new docks, the Messageries Maritimes steamers stopped tarrying 
to load cotton at Jaffa. No Jaffa cotton went to Marseille that year. Nothing more was 
ever said about Palestinian cotton in the pages of The Cotton Supply Reporter.
60
  
Palestinian farmers on the Plain of Sharon continued to grow small amounts 
of cotton and export it to France and Austria for some time, though in declining 
quantities. Those near Nablus produced primarily for local consumption.
61
 But 
cotton’s heyday was over, never to return. The newly arrived American consul in 
Jerusalem, R. Beardsley, in his annual report for Palestine sent on November 22, 
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1871, stated that, “The amount of cotton raised in Palestine is insignificant at present. 
But little attention is paid to its cultivation.”62
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Chapter 8 
Egypt 
 
Of all the many places around the globe where the Cotton Supply Association 
encouraged the growing of cotton during the American Civil War, only in Egypt did 
it achieve the success that it sought: the establishment of a cotton monoculture 
agricultural economy that became a reliable supplier of cheap, high quality cotton. 
This was possible because Egypt presented a paradigm that was very different from 
that which existed in the rest of the Ottoman Empire, and indeed from anywhere else 
in the world. 
Nineteenth-century Egypt was politically, economically, and diplomatically 
anomalous. Legally Egypt was a province of the Ottoman Empire. In practice the 
entire country was the personal fief of Muhammad Ali, an Albanian tobacco 
merchant who had come to Egypt as second in command of an Ottoman militia unit 
sent to fight Napoleon in 1801. After seizing power in 1805, Muhammad Ali ruled as 
an Oriental despot. All land in Egypt became state property. Muhammad Ali treated 
the Egyptian state as if it were a private company of which he was President, 
Chairman of the Board, and majority stockholder. In 1831 Muhammad Ali rebelled 
against the Sultan, defeated the Ottoman armies, and marched on Constantinople. 
When it appeared that the Ottoman state was endangered, Tsar Nicholas I of Russia 
sent a naval force and several thousand troops to defend Constantinople and forced 
him to retreat. After another rebellion in 1840, the Sultan was compelled to make 
Muhammad Ali viceroy for life. The governorship of Egypt became the hereditary 
possession of Muhammad Ali’s male descendants, although the Sultan remained 
suzerein and retained the right to choose which descendant became viceroy. 
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Muhammad Ali ruled Egypt until his death in 1849, upon which he was succeeded by 
his grandson Abbas I. After Abbas was murdered by his household slaves in 1854, his 
thirty-two year old uncle, Muhammad Sa’id, a younger son of Muhammad Ali and 
half-brother of Abbas’s father, became viceroy. Sa’id ruled Egypt until his death on 
January 18, 1863. He was succeeded by his nephew Ismail, who ruled until 1879, 
when Sultan Abdul Hamid II dismissed him at the behest of the British.  
Muhammad Ali and his successors pursued a policy that Modern Middle East 
historians call “Defensive Developmentalism.” Rulers sought to strengthen their 
government administrative apparatus and economic base in ways that would enable 
them to support the modern military capability necessary to assert control over their 
subjects and defend against foreign domination. In the case of Egypt, that meant 
being strong enough to maintain a large degree of independence from the Ottoman 
government and dominate Sudan and the Red Sea coastlands, while simultaneously 
blocking European encroachment on Egyptian sovereignty. From 1820 Muhammad 
Ali and his successors promoted cotton growing in Egypt as a way to pay for 
defensive development.
1
  
Initially Muhammad Ali attempted to manufacture cotton textiles using 
imported English and French machinery turned by oxen. At one time there were 
forty-four such factories, employing 20,000 laborers. There were also factories that 
produced other types of goods. These primitive factories could not compete with 
English goods once the Free Trade Treaty of 1838 between Britain and the Ottoman 
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Empire prohibited trade protectionism, however. Egypt them shifted to the production 
and export of agricultural raw materials of which cotton was the most important.
2
  
This shift away from industry and toward agriculture that occurred after 1839 
was regarded as almost providential by the Cotton Supply Association. In his 
secretary’s report to the Association in 1871 Isaac Watts dated the economic failure 
of Egyptian manufacturing from 1839, but made no mention of the Free Trade Treaty 
in connection with it. Watts instead attributed the miscarriage of Egyptian 
industrialization to the workings of natural law, commenting, “The valley of the Nile 
was evidently destined by nature for agricultural and not for manufacturing industry, 
and experience has proved it.”3 
Though unintentional, Muhammad Ali’s failed attempt at forced 
industrialization earlier in the nineteenth century did make one important contribution 
to the effort to increase cotton production during the Civil War. It accustomed 
Egyptian peasants to working in large factory-type establishments. Reports from 
Egypt during the Civil War make no mention of the resistance to industrial scale 
cotton ginneries as was repeatedly reported in other parts of the Ottoman Empire. As 
a result Egyptian cotton was processed in large industrial facilities from the start. 
Egypt’s potential as a rival to American cotton was recognized in the United 
States almost forty years before the Civil War began. In April 1824, Niles’ Weekly 
Register reported that a French engineer, Louis Alexis Jumel, had begun commercial 
cultivation of a species of shrubby perennial cotton of Ethiopian origin there in 1819. 
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Egyptian Jumel cotton (called Mahò or Mako in England) was a long staple type with 
fiber characteristics similar to Sea Island. It was the only type of Asian or African 
cotton considered superior to American Petit Gulf. Cloth woven from Jumel yarn was 
noticeably smoother and softer than cloth made from American upland cotton. French 
textile manufacturers, who specialized in finer quality, more expensive cloth than did 
the British, particularly favored Egyptian Jumel cotton for making bed sheets and 
undergarments. Most Egyptian cotton was grown on large plantations in the Nile 
Delta. The system of land tenure, social structure, and economy was organized on 
manorial lines. The fellaheen, as the Egyptian peasants were called, were required to 
do corvée forced labor on the plantations. As a result, in Egypt there was essentially 
no labor cost in cotton growing. A monopoly that was the personal enterprise of 
Muhammad Ali bought the cotton at set prices that were far below the free market 
rate and resold it to British and French manufacturers.
4
  
In order to comply with the Free Trade Treaty of 1838, Muhammad Ali 
grudgingly shifted Egypt to a freer marketing system during the last ten years of his 
rule. Land remained state property, but tracts of several thousand acres each were 
leased in perpetuity to landlords, many of whom were Muhammad Ali’s relatives and 
government officials. Some land leases were granted to favored foreigners. A heavy 
land tax was levied to replace the lost income from the state marketing monopoly. 
The landlord was responsible for collecting the tax for the government, but paying it 
was the burden of the fellaheen. At the most basic level, the system remained 
essentially feudal-manorial, with the vassal landlords in almost total control of the 
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fellaheen. A class of middlemen, most of them Greek or Jewish subjects of the 
Ottoman Sultan, came into existence. The Egyptian middlemen functioned in much 
the same way as cotton factors in the American South in that they advanced operating 
money to the planters and marketed the crop.
5
 
Simultaneous with the introduction of Jumel cotton, Muhammad Ali began 
improving Egypt’s system of irrigation by changing from a basin system, in which the 
Nile flood was contained within levees to soak the fields just before planting time, to 
a system of canals from which water could be drawn in small amounts throughout the 
growing season. Muhammad Ali pursued the project with ruthless determination. 
Digging the canals and subsequently keeping them cleared of muck deposited by each 
year’s Nile flood necessitated the employment of corvée labor on an immense scale. 
Every year tens of thousands of fellaheen were forced by whip-wielding overseers to 
labor in knee-deep water to scoop out the silt with no tools but their bare hands. Full 
season irrigation required controlling the flow of the Nile River. In 1833 Muhammad 
Ali employed a French engineer, Bellefonds de Linant, to design and build a 
“barrage” or weir across the Nile River at the head of the Delta to regulate the river’s 
flow during the dry months. This first Nile Barrage was begun in 1842 and completed 
in 1861. Though the structure failed in 1867 because of subsidence and erosion 
beneath its foundations, it operated as intended during the cotton boom caused by the 
American Civil War.
6
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The U.S. government undertook active efforts to gather intelligence about 
Egyptian’s cotton growing potential at least twenty-five years before the Civil War. 
In response to a resolution passed by the House of Representatives in January 1836, 
Secretary of the Treasury Levi Woodbury used published sources to compile a survey 
of the worldwide cotton economy. Data for Egypt was meager. For information, 
Woodbury relied on a single page in the Dictionary of Spanish Commerce and 
Finance and an article in the September 1835 issue of New Monthly Magazine.
7
 
Woodbury was not satisfied with the result. Two years later, Woodbury summoned 
George R. Gliddon, the son of John Gliddon, a merchant who served as U.S. consul at 
Alexandria, to Washington. He gave Gliddon a copy of the report submitted to 
Congress and instructed him to “fill up certain blanks therein” pertaining to Egypt. 
Gliddon had lived twenty-three years in Egypt and possessed a thorough first-hand 
knowledge of the country. Gliddon was appointed U.S. consul at Cairo, where he 
compiled a 64-page report entitled A Memoir on the Cotton of Egypt. He submitted it 
to Woodbury with a cover letter dated Cairo, March 31, 1841. A Memoir on the 
Cotton of Egypt was shortly thereafter privately published in London by James 
Madden & Company, the same trading company that would later play a role in 
distributing American cotton seeds overseas. Gliddon gave a year-by-year accounting 
of political and socio-economic developments in Egypt as well as highly detailed 
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descriptions of nearly every conceivable aspect of the country’s cotton production. 
The one detail that Gliddon did not address was transportation.
8
 
Gliddon probably omitted mention of transportation because it was not a great 
obstacle. All of Egypt’s cropland lay in the Nile River Valley. About four million 
acres lay in the Nile Delta. Thus all of it was readily accessible to riverine transport. 
The Mahmoudiya Canal, completed in 1820, enabled cargo to be transported in 
barges from the Nile River to Alexandria’s Western Harbor. Alexandria was the best 
port in the eastern Mediterranean.
9
 Its port facilities were probably as good as those 
of any cotton port in the American South except New Orleans. Steamers of the British 
Peninsular & Oriental line made the voyage from Southampton in fifteen days. 
Austrian Lloyds line steamers provided twice-monthly service to and from Trieste. 
The voyage took five days with a four-hour stopover at Corfu. French Messageries 
Maritimes ships provided bi-weekly service to Marseille. Mail service between 
Alexandria and northwestern Europe via Trieste or Marseille took eight days. 
Steamboats owned by the Egyptian government paddled the 450 miles from Cairo up 
the Nile to Aswan and back on regular timetables.
10
  
Planning and preparation for building Egyptian railroads was already well 
along when George Gliddon submitted his report to the Secretary of the Treasury. 
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Construction began in 1845 under the supervision of a British civil engineer, John 
Alexander Galloway. Little construction equipment was available, not even 
wheelbarrows. The first locomotive did not get underway on a track in Egypt until 
June 6, 1853, but after that date progress was rapid.
11
 The tracks reached Cairo in 
1856. The railroad tracks did not follow the direct route across the desert from 
Alexandria to Cairo, but curved through the cotton growing Nile Delta, crossed over 
the Nile River on a bridge just above the head of the Delta, and then ran parallel to 
the eastern bank of the Nile River to Cairo.
12
 In 1857 a railroad was completed from 
Cairo to Suez, the small Red Sea port that was to become the southern terminus of the 
Suez Canal. Feeder line railroad tracks were laid to the cotton market towns of 
Samanud and Zagazig in the Nile Delta shortly before the American Civil War 
began.
13
  
George Gliddon identified only one major technical impediment to producing 
large amounts of Egyptian cotton. The Whitney saw-type gin damaged the long fibers 
of Jumel cotton so badly that it could not be used to clean Egyptian cotton. Egyptian 
cotton’s seeds could only be removed by the old, tediously slow hand method. When 
Gliddon was writing his report in 1840, this seemed to assure that Egypt would never 
be able to produce much more cotton than it was then growing. Even as Gliddon was 
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penning his report in Cairo, however, Fones McCarthy, a cotton planter in Alabama, 
was inventing a roller-type gin that could separate the seeds from long staple cotton 
without shredding the fibers. Within five years of their invention, American-made 
roller gins were operating in Egypt, some of them in quite large ginning factories. 
One landlord, Khurshid Pasha, had twenty-four American roller gins powered by two 
steam engines in operation on his 30,000-acre estate in the Delta in 1845.
14
 Roller 
gins enabled Egypt to triple its cotton production between 1842 and 1852, to almost 
63 million pounds, the equivalent of about 157,500 American-size bales. Production 
stabilized at slightly less than 50 million pounds (125,000 American-size bales) for 
the remainder of the decade.
15
 The Cotton Supply Association tracked an increase in 
Egyptian cotton exports from 24 million pounds in 1849 to 47 million pounds in 
1855, a quantity that remained constant for the next five years. Revenue from cotton 
exports increased from £515,020 in 1849 to £1,113,419 in 1859. Total income from 
cotton in the eleven years 1849-1859 amounted to £10,769,004.
16
  
For comparison, in 1852 Egypt was producing more than one-third as much 
cotton as the state of Georgia did in that year. Alexandria’s exports of cotton to 
Europe in the marketing year ended September 30, 1859 were slightly more than half 
the amount exported from Savannah. Egypt’s cotton exports in that year exceeded 
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those of either Florida or the rapidly developing Texas plantations by nearly three 
times.
17
 
Information about the developments taking place in Egypt was readily 
available in the United States. Publications such as The American Railroad Journal 
and the popular agriculturalists’ magazine The Country Gentleman reported 
frequently about the progress of Egypt’s railroads and their strategic relationship to 
the country’s cotton growing potential. The New York Daily Times and its successor 
the New York Times printed over fifty articles that touched upon Egyptian cotton 
between 1851 and 1861. The newspaper also published occasional articles about 
Egypt that mentioned the progress of Egyptian railroads. 
Though overshadowed by the French and British, American influence in 
Egypt was considerable. Under terms of the autonomy agreement with the Ottoman 
Sultan, the viceroy was prohibited from conducting diplomatic relations with foreign 
nations. Foreign powers maintained a façade of respect for Ottoman sovereignty, but 
all of the consuls-general representing the European powers and the United States had 
the title of diplomatic agent in addition to consul-general. For all practical purposes, a 
consul-general functioned as his government’s minister to Egypt. As Secretary of 
State and later as President, James Buchanan considered Egypt to be a de facto 
independent nation.
18
 Perhaps reflective of this thinking, Egypt was listed under a 
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separate heading from the Ottoman Dominions in Commercial Relations of the 
United States in the mid-1850s.
19
 
Edwin De Leon, the American diplomatic agent and consul-general from 1853 
until the Civil War, may have been even more inclined to treat the Egyptian viceroy 
as an independent monarch than was Buchanan. As a private citizen twenty years 
later, De Leon openly advocated that Egypt become an independent kingdom. Edwin 
De Leon possessed considerable personal clout in Egypt. Following Abbas I’s murder 
the military governor of Cairo made moves to install Abbas’s young son as viceroy in 
a coup d’etat. This would have meant the Ottoman Sultan could choose a regent who 
would be the real ruler. De Leon and Sir Frederick W. A. Bruce, the British consul-
general, bluffed the garrison commander into backing down and secured the position 
for Sa’id. Edwin De Leon had a close personal friendship with Sa’id and later had 
nothing but effusive words of praise for him.
20
 
New England businessmen with ties to the Boston Associates had numerous 
business connections with Egypt. Stephen C. Massett, a much-traveled American 
comic entertainer, writer, and correspondent for the New York Evening Telegram 
who passed through Egypt on his way home from India in January 1858, wrote: 
The Viceroy is very desirous of creating a larger trade with the 
United States, and I am informed that his sympathies are most 
decidedly with America. 
As I have before said he has had steam vessels-of-war built 
here; and he runs American cars on his railways. 
                                                 
19
 Commercial Relations of the United States with Foreign Countries for the year ended 
September 30, 1856, viii. 
 
20
 Edwin De Leon, The Khedive’s Egypt; or, The Old House of Bondage under New Masters 
(London: S. Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington, 1877), 88; Wright, United States Policy toward Egypt, 
1830-1914, 43. 
 
 252 
It might be said that he could procure what he wants in the way 
of manufactures from England and France. But he does not like 
England. He has the sagacity to perceive that English influence has 
political as well as commercial objects in view. … He is less jealous of 
the French, but as America can have no possible interest beyond that 
which is purely commercial, he patronizes anything American.
21
 
 
Sa’id’s preference for American locomotives and American trainmen may 
have been further reinforced by a personal tragedy that struck a few months after 
Stephen Massett passed through Egypt. In the summer of 1858, Sa’id’s two brothers, 
Ahmet and Halim, were passengers on a train driven by an English engineer who 
failed to stop at the open drawbridge over the Nile River. The entire train plunged 
into the muddy floodwater and sank. Halim, the teenage younger brother, kicked out a 
window on the submerged railway carriage and swam to safety. Ahmet, who was 
Sa’id’s designated successor in the brother-to-brother line of succession established 
by Muhammad Ali, was trapped inside the wrecked train and drowned.
22
 
Muhammad Sa’id purchased two locomotives of the classic “American-type” 
design with 4-4-0 wheel configuration from the Mason Machine Works at Taunton, 
Massachusetts, in 1856.
23
 When Massett was in Egypt in 1858, the Egyptian railroad 
was reportedly considering buying locomotives manufactured by the Rogers 
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Locomotive and Machine Works in Paterson, New Jersey.
24
 One of the two partners 
with Thomas Rogers in the locomotive company was Morris Ketchum, a banker who 
was also a director and treasurer of the Illinois Central Railroad.
25
 From either Rogers 
or another company, Sa’id purchased “large supplies of American locomotives” 
before the Civil War began.
26
 Prior to January 1861, the Egyptian railways took 
delivery of forty passenger cars built by T. W. Wason & Company of Springfield, 
Massachusetts. These were contracted for through Messrs. Moore, Cassis & 
Company in Alexandria, a firm in which the American vice-consul was a partner. T. 
W. Wason & Company also built a luxurious, 67-foot long railway coach for Sa’id’s 
personal use. It was one of the largest, most lavishly finished railroad cars of its time, 
equipped with an observation platform, two sleeping compartments, a parlor, and a 
kitchen. Press reports do not disclose whether or not American mechanics 
accompanied the railroad cars to Egypt. It is logical to assume that they did, however, 
because the railway cars were disassembled for shipment at the Wason factory in 
Springfield and reassembled in Alexandria.
27
 American railroaders were certainly 
present in Egypt. American involvement in building and operating the branch-line 
railroad that ran along the coast from Alexandria to Rosetta in the Nile Delta was so 
great that Egyptians and Europeans alike called it “The American Railway.”28 
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Americans connected with the Boston Associates were also involved in the 
Suez Canal Company. When Ferdinand de Lesseps first applied for permission to 
excavate the canal in 1854 the British and French representatives in Alexandria and 
Constantinople opposed the project. His only initial diplomatic support came from the 
American and Dutch consul-generals in Alexandria. A portion of the Suez Canal 
Company’s stock was reserved for American investors should they choose to 
purchase it. Paul Forbes, president of the A. B. Forbes Bank in Boston and the cousin 
of John Murray Forbes, was a vice-president of the Suez Canal Company.
29
 
Nevertheless, when the Civil War broke out the United States found itself 
without a consul-general in Egypt. Edwin De Leon, though he was an ardent 
propagandist for Manifest Destiny and a prominent figure in the Young America 
movement, was a South Carolinian. When he learned that South Carolina had seceded 
from the Union, De Leon resigned, returned home, and offered his services to the 
Confederacy. When De Leon said farewell to Sa’id in March 1861, the Egyptian ruler 
anticipated that cotton prices would soon rise dramatically and told him, “Well, if 
your people stop growing cotton, I shall be glad to supply their place.”30 
President Lincoln nominated William Sydney Thayer, associate editor of the 
New York Evening Post, to replace Edwin De Leon as American diplomatic agent 
and consul-general to Egypt on March 18, 1861.
31
 When Lincoln appointed him, the 
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thirty-one year-old Thayer was working as the Evening Post’s Washington 
correspondent. Thayer was a native of Haverhill, Massachusetts, and was related to 
Massachusetts congressman Eli Thayer, probably a cousin.
32
 William S. Thayer had 
contacts with people in the inner circle of the Boston Associates. In 1850-52 he lived 
in the home of Robert Bennett Forbes, the brother of John Murray Forbes, where he 
was employed as a private tutor for the Forbes children.
33
 Thayer was apparently 
something of an adventurer, and made a grueling trip to Nicaragua in 1855. At the 
time Lincoln appointed him consul-general Thayer was in poor health. The consular 
post was evidently political patronage arranged by Thayer’s friends in Congress in 
hopes that the desert climate of Egypt would cure his illness.
34
 
Despite constantly worsening respiratory disease that finally killed him at his 
post in April 1864, William S. Thayer pursued his mission with staunch 
determination. In his reports to Seward, Thayer often displayed an experienced 
journalist’s sense for flavoring bare details with literary superfluities. Upon his arrival 
in Alexandria in June 1861, Thayer was greeted with diplomatic flourishes that 
included a ride to his first meeting with Sa’id in the viceroy’s state carriage, a 
“cavalcade of guards and janizaries [sic]” from the European consulates, a military 
honor guard, and a band. Interest in the American Civil War among the ruling elite of 
Egypt and its resident Europeans was high. Within a few days of his arrival Thayer 
scouted Alexandria’s bookshops and found them full of publications and maps 
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dealing with the United States and the Civil War.
35
 Interest in the American war was 
not limited to the educated elite. Thayer wrote to Seward that “so well understood is 
the condition of the cotton growing region in the United States, even the poorest 
fellahs, (peasants,) it is difficult to persuade them to sell on terms which heretofore 
they would have been delighted to accept.”36 
The Lincoln administration had three strategic concerns in Egypt, all of which 
Thayer promptly addressed. The first was preventing Confederate naval commerce 
raiders from operating from Egyptian ports. This was dealt with quickly, when Sa’id 
adhered to the Sultan’s closure of Ottoman ports to all vessels flying national flags 
that were not internationally recognized.
37
 The second involved getting assurances 
from the viceroy that manufacturers in the United States would be able to purchase 
Egyptian cotton on the same terms as Great Britain. This too was obtained before the 
end of 1861.
38
 The third, related strategic concern was to gather intelligence about the 
Egyptian cotton crop and encourage its increase.
39
  
To assist in accomplishing these goals, Thayer employed a secret agent, 
Ayoub Bey Trabulsi, to reconnoiter the seaports from Egypt eastward to 
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Alexandretta. Referring to Ayoub Bey in a despatch to Thayer dated November 7, 
1861, Seward directly ordered: 
You are requested also to direct his attention to the steps which 
have been undertaken for the growth of cotton in Egypt. It is the desire 
of the Department to be furnished with full statistics on this subject.
40
 
 
Thayer was understandably reticent about Ayoub Bey Trabulsi’s activities in 
his written communications. Ayoub Bey’s initial task was apparently to travel by 
steamer to the seaports between Alexandria and Alexandretta and find out if 
Confederate agents had made any preparations for secretly outfitting or servicing 
ships there. His cotton related duties were evidently as a researcher and translator. It 
was probably Ayoub Bey who gathered the stream of very detailed historical and 
statistical information about cotton that Thayer passed to Seward during the six 
months that he was employed. 
Taken in its entirety, the correspondence between Thayer and Seward 
indicates that Thayer’s function was considerably different from that of Julius Bing. 
Thayer’s role was much more diplomatic in nature. Whereas Bing concentrated on 
the cotton question, Thayer’s focus was much more on political and naval 
intelligence. Much of what Thayer sent Seward was in the nature of grand geo-
strategic economic information with no direct bearing on the Civil War. There is no 
documentary evidence that William S. Thayer involved himself in the Cotton Supply 
Association’s efforts to promote cotton growing in Egypt to the degree that Julius 
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Bing did in Smyrna. The impression from his despatches is that Thayer was a keen 
observer but not a participant. Thayer may have played a larger role than the 
documents reveal, however. 
 In the spring of 1862 Thayer learned that the viceroy Sa’id was planning to 
visit England in the near future. When Seward was notified of it he became worried 
that Confederate agents, meaning Sa’id’s friend Edwin De Leon, who was then in 
Europe as a Confederate diplomat, might try to influence him to adopt a less friendly 
attitude toward the United States. Seward promptly ordered Thayer to accompany 
Sa’id on the trip to Europe. Seward’s instructions to Thayer make it clear that Thayer 
was to cultivate a friendly relationship with Sa’id in order to meet as many persons 
involved with the Cotton Supply Association’s efforts to spread cotton production 
abroad as he could and obtain as much information about the subject from them as 
possible. Thayer accompanied Sa’id to Europe as ordered but there is nothing in the 
documentary record that directly reveals what he did during the trip.
41
 
 It is clear from later routine correspondence that Thayer did develop a rapport 
with Sa’id, his successor Ismail, and other princes of the viceroyal family. Ismail 
grew large amounts of cotton on his personal estates before becoming viceroy at 
Sa’id’s death. Ismail’s personal income from cotton grown on his estates amounted to 
one million dollars in 1862. Halim, the young brother of Sa’id who had escaped from 
the train wreck, also occupied himself as a cotton planter on a large scale. In the 
spring of 1862 he informed Thayer that he had ordered ten tons of American seed for 
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an experiment on his estates in Upper Egypt. Thayer did not disclose the source of the 
seeds but according to Isaac Watts, secretary of the Cotton Supply Association, they 
were furnished by the Association, which initiated the experiment. In one of his few 
mentions of direct assistance to the cotton growing effort, Thayer reported that he 
encouraged Ismail to test an irrigation pump designed by a Boston engineer.
42
 
William S. Thayer’s despatches to Seward concerning Egyptian cotton were a 
steady stream of highly detailed, ever more glowingly optimistic progress reports. 
There was no mention of any of the sort of difficulties that filled so many of Julius 
Bing’s reports from Smyrna. Egyptian cotton production increased by over two-thirds 
between 1860 and 1862, rising from slightly over 40 million pounds to over 66½ 
million pounds. Income from it increased slightly more than threefold, from 
$4,853,943 in 1860 to $19,511,497 in 1862.
43
 Under the influence of steeply rising 
prices, the quantity cotton grown and exported from Egypt increased to almost 129 
million pounds in 1863 and to nearly 174 million pounds in 1864. The escalation in 
revenue from it was phenomenal. Egypt’s annual income from cotton in 1864 was a 
breathtaking $74,213,500. Cumulative revenues for the three years 1862-64 were a 
staggering $152,753,650.
44
 Charles Hale, the U.S. Consul in Cairo who covered for 
William S. Thayer in Egypt while Thayer was in Europe with Sa’id and assumed 
Thayer’s duties upon his death, wrote to Seward in February 1865: 
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Gold and silver have poured into the country; many large 
fortunes have been quickly made, and scarcely anybody is free from 
the contagious feeling of prosperity. Although nothing but specie is 
known in business or in the common operations of trade, a rise in 
prices has been general; similar to that which in our own country has 
been attributed to the abundant use of paper money. Rents are doubled, 
and the cost of the necessities of life is augmented in an equal 
proportion, yet so widespread are the effects of the introduction of 
money into the country that very little inconvenience is experienced 
except among the poor people in Alexandria, and those others whose 
means are dependent on stated appointments from without the country. 
In the villages nearly all classes of the community share the general 
prosperity.
45
 
 
Never before in the history of any nation had there been such a tremendous 
leap in economic development as happened in Egypt during those years. English-
made “Macarthy” roller gins and steam engines to power them arrived in the country 
in constantly increasing numbers. At the end of 1862 there were eighty-five new 
ginneries, all built since the beginning of the Civil War, each with from 25 to 200 
individual gins. These were large brick factories with tall smokestacks reminiscent of 
Victorian era English or American factories built for permanence.
46
 Along with the 
money and machines came 75,000 Europeans. In February 1865 two or three 
thousand more were arriving in Alexandria each week.
47
 By the end of the year there 
were at least 90,000 Europeans in Egypt, most of them in Alexandria.
48
 In the words 
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of Charles Hale, “Many of them were mere speculating adventurers, but others bring 
capital and large business experience.”49  
In the midst of the boom it was predicted that with sufficient labor Egypt 
could produce three million bales of cotton weighing four kantars, or 396 pounds, 
each. Income from that amount of cotton “at the lowest computation would not be 
less than thirty millions sterling.”50 According to this calculation, the Cotton Supply 
Association expected that Egypt would eventually produce about three quarters of 
Britain’s needs in the 1870s at a cost of 6 d. per pound. Immediately after the 
American Civil War ended, it was generally believed in England and in Egypt that 
with the abolition of slavery in the United States the price of cotton would never 
again fall to pre-war levels.
51
 That is to say, it was thought cotton would never again 
fall below the average 5.10 pence that was paid for the least desirable types of cotton 
on the Liverpool exchange in 1858-60.
52
 Egypt could naturally expect to receive a 
premium over that base price for its high quality cotton. In 1870 the Cotton Supply 
Association sent a memorial to Ismail in which it expressed the opinion that Egypt 
might realistically expect to increase its annual growth of cotton to a million bales, or 
something not far under 400 million pounds.
53
 At the estimated price of 6 d. per 
pound this quantity of cotton would have generated £10 million each year. In terms of 
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growing capacity this was a realistic assumption. Egypt’s production dropped in the 
five years immediately after the war but then gained steadily until 1890, when it 
reached 412 million pounds. Production reached 500 million pounds in 1892 and was 
well over 600 million by the end of the nineteenth century. Had the prices held at 6 d. 
as expected, Egypt would have enjoyed more than enough income to pay the debts 
incurred to build infrastructure. No one anticipated the catastrophic drop in prices that 
began in 1876, when cotton averaged 4½ d. per pound, and continued in a downward 
plunge until 1894 when Egyptian cotton sold for an all-time low of 2
5
/8 d. per pound 
in Liverpool.
54
 
When Isaac Watts wrote his secretary’s report to the members of the Cotton 
Supply Association in 1871, a bright future for Egypt paid for by cotton seemed 
assured. Watts said of the situation in Egypt as it then stood: 
So firmly is the growth of cotton established in Egypt, and so fully are 
both the Government and the people alive to its importance and 
advantages, that there seems no reason to apprehend that it will be 
allowed to decline. Encouraged by past experience, and possessing 
additional facilities for the production of cotton, with the enormous 
wealth already derived from this branch of industry, whatever 
temporary fluctuations may occur from various causes, there need 
scarcely be any fear that Egypt will permanently lose its position as a 
source of supply. Any probable fall in the price of American cotton 
will not prevent the Egyptian crop from being still one of the most 
profitable that can be cultivated. … Whatever may be the case with 
India and Turkey, it may confidently be expected that Egypt will 
continue to foster a trade which has proved so fruitful a source of 
prosperity and aggrandisement.
55
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Egypt’s “prosperity and aggrandisement” depended upon the perspective and 
biases of the beholder. Little of the wealth generated by cotton remained in 
circulation in Egypt. Alluding to an ancient custom of the fellaheen, Charles Hale 
reported that almost all the money that came into Egypt was “taken into the villages, 
where it is generally buried in the earth.”56 A more likely scenario is that a large 
portion of the money that the fellaheen took home to their villages was spent on 
buying draft animals. In the early spring of 1863 a deadly bovine plague known as the 
cattle murrain, probably rinderpest, appeared among cattle in the Nile Delta. By 
August it had killed almost all the cattle in Lower Egypt. Among them were at least 
700,000 draft oxen. Horses, donkeys, and oxen had to be imported at great expense 
from abroad. The fellaheen had to go heavily into debt to purchase the replacement 
animals. Moneylenders, both Egypt’s indigenous Levantines and European finance 
companies like the British-chartered Ottoman Company, charged monthly interest 
rates of from 1½ to 4 percent. This added up to an annual interest rate of up to 48 
percent. Crops and land were pledged as collateral.
57
 Lenders were oftentimes 
dishonest, but an indebted fellah had little chance in disputes with them because, “the 
summary forms of justice adopted by the Egyptian government compel a prompt 
fulfillment of contracts, and do not tolerate the vexatious delays which attend 
litigation in Christian countries.”58  
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Larger landowners purchased English steam ploughs and steam-powered 
irrigation pumps to replace their dead animals. According to British customhouse 
records, between 1860 and 1866 agricultural engines and machines valued at 
£2,330,485 were sent to Egypt. To fuel the steam engines the Egyptians imported 
almost 2 million tons of English coal at a cost of more than £1 million. The retail 
price of coal in Egypt was five to eight times its customs value at Newcastle.
59
 
Food consumed another large portion of the cotton income. At the same time 
that the cattle murrain was devastating Egypt’s working livestock, the highest Nile 
flood in a hundred years broke over the levees and destroyed much of the peasants’ 
food crops. In 1864 the Nile was far lower than normal and food crops again failed. 
Enough maize and wheat survived the catastrophes for the village farmers to sustain 
themselves, but Egypt was forced to import costly grain from Russia, Mesopotamia, 
and elsewhere to feed the urban population and the thousands of corvée laborers 
toiling to dig the Suez Canal.
60
  
The plight of ordinary Egyptians was obvious even to observant tourists. 
Harry Harewood Leech, an American who toured Egypt in 1867, wrote, “the rich are 
powerful chiefs, and the poor are miserable slaves; whose monuments of an 
unparalleled grandeur rise from the centre of mud villages, where Justice hangs a 
fellah for theft, and holds out her hand to receive a sheik’s bribe for murder.”61 On 
Egypt’s material progress Leech commented with derision, “civilization (induced by 
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cotton speculation) has touched this land in a slight degree: the first and only 
evidence, at present, being a railroad from Alexandria to Cairo; but such a railroad! 
Battered cars on twisted bars, running over a boggy plain.”62 
People much more intimately acquainted with Egypt concurred. Baron Samuel 
Selig de Kusel, an Englishman who lived in Egypt from 1863 until 1887 and was for 
a time Controller-General of Egyptian Customs, recounted his first experiences there 
as a young engineer at the height of the cotton boom. De Kusel was employed in a 
new, large cotton-ginning factory in Zagazig that was owned by a Dr. Mustapha, who 
was educated in Edinburgh and married to an Englishwoman. De Kusel described the 
steam-powered factory as an ugly one-story brick structure that employed several 
hundred men, boys, and young girls. Of them de Kusel wrote, “moral suasion was of 
little use,” so the Arab overseer “carried with him a sort of kourbash or long whip, 
with which he encouraged industry.” The impoverished laborers frequently stole 
small amounts of cotton. Any cotton thief that was caught, man, boy or girl, was 
taken to the police, who summarily dealt them thirty or forty painful blows to the 
soles of their bare feet with a small whip or rod. Perhaps to salve his conscience, de 
Kusel revealed that he sometimes accompanied thieves to the police station and 
intervened to lessen the punishment meted out to the most pitiable of them.
63
 
The demand for laborers led to an upsurge in the illegal but largely tolerated 
slave trade from Sudan. In 1862 and 1863 reports reached Robert G. Colquhoun, the 
British consul-general in Egypt, that a number of Europeans, at least one Englishman 
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reportedly among them, were engaged in slave catching expeditions on the White 
Nile in cooperation with Arab slave traders based in Khartoum.
64
 These were large, 
well organized raiding operations. In 1864 at least 120 large boats, each with 50 to 60 
armed men, set out on the trip up the White Nile from Khartoum. Two boats thought 
to belong to an Austrian trader named Michael Luftolla, who was known as “Halil-il 
Sciane” in Egypt, were seized by Egyptian authorities upon their return to Khartoum 
and were found to have 850 emaciated slaves on board.
65
 Local authorities were 
powerless to stop most of the traffic, however. If stopped by Egyptian or Ottoman 
officials the European slavers hoisted their national flags and claimed immunity from 
search and seizure under terms of the Capitulations. At other times the slave boats 
operated as native craft that were not subject to European consular jurisdiction.
66
  
The Red Sea port of Massowah (Mesewa, Eritrea) became a major collecting 
point for Abyssinian slaves. Native boats then ferried them across the Red Sea to 
Jeddah (Jidda). Steamships of the Azizieh Steam Navigation Company, Egypt’s 
                                                 
64
 No. 214, Earl Russell to Sir Henry Bulwer, Feb. 22, 1865, in Great Britain. Parliament. 
Accounts and Papers, Session 1 February – 10 August 1866, Slave Trade, “Correspondence with 
British Ministers and Agents in Foreign Countries, and with Foreign Ministers in England, relating to 
the Slave Trade. From January 1 to December 31, 1865.” (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 
1866), 154. 
 
65
 Inclosure 2 in No. 216, Mr. Joyce to the Egyptian Trading Company, Cairo, Nov. 10, 1864, 
in , Great Britain. Parliament. Accounts and Papers, Session 1 February – 10 August 1866, Slave 
Trade, “Correspondence with British Ministers and Agents in Foreign Countries, and with Foreign 
Ministers in England, relating to the Slave Trade. From January 1 to December 31, 1865.” (London: 
Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1866), 155-156.  
 
66
 Inclosure in No. 212, Consul Stevens to Sir H. Bulwer, Jan. 7, 1865, in Great Britain. 
Parliament. Accounts and Papers, Session 1 February – 10 August 1866, Slave Trade, 
“Correspondence with British Ministers and Agents in Foreign Countries, and with Foreign Ministers 
in England, relating to the Slave Trade. From January 1 to December 31, 1865.” (London: Her 
Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1866), 153. 
 
 267 
government-owned shipping line, routinely brought slaves from Jeddah to Suez.
67
 
Attempts to stop the slave traffic at the ports of embarkation were unsuccessful. 
Neither the Ottoman Sultan nor the Egyptian viceroy had sufficient authority to 
compel local authorities in Massowah and Jeddah to curtail it.
68
 As a stopgap 
measure, Viceroy Ismail ordered the governor of Suez to personally board each ship 
that arrived from the Red Sea ports and inspect it for human contraband.
69
 The illicit 
trade nevertheless continued largely unhindered. During the first week in May 1865 
George West, the British vice-consul in Suez, searched a train bound for Cairo and 
discovered 68 slaves hidden in its freight wagons.
70
 George West subsequently 
complained that his efforts to suppress the slave traffic were “unsupported by the 
local authority.”71  
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Emmeline Lott, an Englishwoman who served as governess to the viceroy 
Ismail’s young son, wrote a scathing denunciation of the men who functioned as 
moneylenders and cotton factors in Egypt. According to Lott, the cotton buyers who 
traveled into the country villages, lent money, and purchased the crop were generally 
either Greeks or German Jews of low character. Most had come to the Ottoman 
Empire during the Crimean War as speculators in armaments and military supplies. 
When the American war began they moved to Egypt, where some of them quickly 
became very rich. Writing in October 1865 Lott said of them: 
 Prussian Jews, the very refuse of the good city of Frankfort, the 
Israelitish population of which is celebrated for its craft, together with 
the scum of Italy, Spain, France, Malta, Greece, and the Levant, 
became suddenly enriched by that [the Crimean War] disastrous 
struggle. Many who at the commencement of that war were literally 
homeless, shoeless, and penniless, are now millionaires in Egypt. … 
They keep large establishments, speculate in cotton, hold hundreds of 
bank, railway, and joint company shares, receive large deposits from 
Europeans, for which they give from twenty-five to thirty per cent. 
interest; in short they are the Hudsons of Egypt and the Ottoman 
Empire.
72
 
 
 Miss Lott described this group as “all powerful” in Egypt. They controlled 
banking and, through it, controlled the entire economy. Members of this group, either 
directly or as financiers behind the scenes, secured all of the concessions and 
contracts for public works let by the Egyptian government.
73
 Historian Roger Owen 
identified the central figures in this group of merchant-bankers as Jean Sandino and 
Jules Pastré, both of whom were Greeks who came to Egypt during the rule of 
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Muhammad Ali, and Edward Dervieu and Henry Oppenheim, who arrived after the 
Crimean War. Pastré and Sandino combined their operations to found the Anglo-
Egyptian Bank in 1864. Agra and Masterman Bank in England furnished the Anglo-
Egyptian Bank’s £2 million capital. Antoine Lucovitch, an Austrian who later 
founded the Sociéte Agricole bank, arrived in Egypt during the cotton boom and 
quickly became a prominent financier.
74
 Emmeline Lott alleged that the 
moneylenders put constant pressure on Ismail to plant more and more cotton, to use 
forced labor on the plantations and in infrastructure construction, and to levy heavy 
taxes on the fellaheen.
75
 Viscount Alfred Milner, who was under-secretary of finance 
in the British administration in Egypt in the 1880s, called the Alexandria merchant-
bankers a “gang of swindlers.”76  
 William Wing Loring, an ex-Confederate major general who served as 
Inspector General of the Egyptian army from 1869 until 1878, was as scathing as 
Emmeline Lott in his denunciation of the European banking interests. Loring wrote: 
Ismail attempted the impossible task of modernizing 
everything in Egypt in thirteen years. In this endeavor the state 
revenues and his own private fortune became involved beyond hope. 
The Rothschilds now enjoy millions, the wreck of his estates, and 
Englishmen boast of the splendid investment Disraeli made in buying 
the Suez Canal bonds for which Egypt had given her security.
77
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Loring cited an elaborate array of evidence to support his claim that much of 
Egypt’s debt was the result of predatory lending. Loring declared that the objective of 
Egypt’s creditors was to “get squarely at the naked backs of the fellaheen, the better 
to wring the last piastre from them, and to make them pay into the foreigners’ pockets 
all their hard earnings, even at the risk of starvation. This constitutes a crime against 
humanity which no words can properly stigmatize.”78 
General Loring wrote: 
When Ismail seized the reins of the state he found Egypt 
£8,000,000 in debt, with a strong European control in all the 
departments. The interior economy of the state was administered only 
for the rich, and despite all the good intentions which had animated 
Saïd, everything was in the hands of officials who ruled solely for their 
own aggrandizement. Never in the history of any nation were there 
greater exactions; the very last piastre was wrung from the poor 
wretches who tilled the soil.
79
 
 
The system under which Egyptian cotton was marketed was rife with graft and 
corruption. Emmeline Lott quoted a saying that was popular in Egypt: 
“The land of Egypt is ruled over by twenty princes; one of 
whom is the Viceroy, eighteen of the others are known as Consuls-
General of European nations, but the twentieth is the most powerful of 
all, and his name is Baksheesh (“Gift, Present, Bribery”).”80 
 
In the words of Miss Lott, “not a bale of goods can enter or be shipped out of 
the country without his leave; not a handful of cotton can leave it without paying him 
tribute.” She went on to add that “a firman from the Sultan himself” was useless in 
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trying to avoid paying bribes.
81
 Lord Milner also commented upon the pervasive 
corruption in the khedival administration.
82
 
Edwin De Leon also blamed Egypt’s new capitalist elite and European 
financiers for the debt problems that beset Egypt after the Civil War ended. 
Apparently unknown to William S. Thayer, De Leon secretly met the ailing Sa’id at a 
Paris hospital during his trip to Europe in 1862. At that meeting Sa’id confided to his 
old friend De Leon his misgivings about accepting loans that then amounted to a £5 
million debt. Looking back on it from the vantage point of fifteen years, De Leon 
called the influence of European bankers in Egypt a “poisonous fungus” in the vitals 
of the country.
83
 In a well studied and cited chapter of his memoirs about Egypt’s 
finances in 1877, when Egypt’s foreign debt stood at a crushing £100 million, De 
Leon revealed that the Khedive had netted only £45 million of the face amount of the 
debt. Of that amount, Egypt had repaid £31 million as of April 1876, when Egypt 
stopped making interest payments. The “dead loss to the foreign investor” should 
Egypt go totally bankrupt would be only about £15 million to £20 million.
84
 De Leon 
went on to say: 
Of the remainder, some £10,000,000 went to defray costs connected 
with the Suez Canal and the unjust awards of Napoleon III connected 
with it; so that a minute sum remains which the Khedive could by any 
possibility have spent on improving his country. He can hardly have 
thus spent even that minute sum, because it would be needed for 
commissions, discounts, and market operations and for the ‘service’ of 
the debt. Therefore, we have the huge floating debt as the sort of 
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lumber-room into which the costs of all his extravagances have been 
flung. The floating debt cannot reasonably be viewed as an investor’s 
loss at all.
85
  
 
Alfred Milner attributed Egypt’s debt to the “career of public extravagance” 
by Ismail.
86
 But Milner essentially agreed with William Wing Loring and Edwin De 
Leon that Egypt never realized more than half of the money from the loans. Milner 
noted that of the £32,000,000 loan of 1873, Egypt actually netted £20,700,000. Worse 
were the numerous smaller loans that were “renewed at ever-increasing rates, and 
swollen at each renewal by arrears of interest, resulting in the accumulation of an 
enormous Floating Debt, the total of which was treble or quadruple the original 
advances.”87 
Edwin De Leon admitted that some of the money was squandered but thought 
that most of it was spent on “public works as yet unproductive.”88 Those works were 
impressive. First and most impressive was the Suez Canal, completed at a monetary 
cost to Egypt of £10 million to £17 million. By the time De Leon wrote his book, the 
Suez Canal had already passed to British ownership. In 1876 Egypt possessed 1,300 
miles of railroad tracks. Building them cost £10 million. There were five hundred 
new railroad bridges. Telegraph lines extended to every city and town. Cairo, 
Alexandria, and other large cities had new sewerage systems, gas-making plants, and 
water works. There were new lighthouses and aids to navigation in the Red Sea. 
Alexandria’s new harbor facilities, among the best and most modern in the world, 
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cost £3 million to £4 million. Except for the Suez Canal, almost all of this 
development was related to the cotton crop. In contrast the failed Egyptian military 
campaign to conquer Abyssinia that British and French creditors often pointed to as 
exemplary of Ismail’s recklessness cost £2 million.89 And according to William Wing 
Loring, who did the military planning for it, the Abyssinian campaign’s objective was 
to acquire additional territory where “good cotton and cane can be cultivated, and a 
population of docile savages who can be made to work.”90 
The Cotton Supply Association’s success ultimately proved to be Egypt’s 
disaster. Khedive Ismail tried to break Egypt out of its cotton straitjacket after the end 
of the American Civil War. He achieved some success in restoring the country’s self-
sufficiency in food production. He looked to sugar as a second export crop. Despite 
an investment of £5 million in factories and another £2 million in special railroad cars 
to haul the cane to them, his sugar project collapsed.
91
 Sugar cane required far more 
irrigation water than did cotton, and the cost of irrigation was prohibitive. It was later 
discovered that Ismail’s sugar plantations and factories were able to sell sugar at a 
competitive price only because they employed unpaid forced labor.
92
 
British cotton manufacturers saw Ismail’s attempts to move away from cotton 
as a threat, and in 1874 their representatives in Parliament called upon the Foreign 
Office to intervene to avert the threat. Egypt could not meet the interest payments on 
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its loans, and in April 1876 suspended payments. In April 1878 France and Britain 
imposed an international debt commission, the Caisse de la Dette, on Egypt. Ismail 
resisted the commissioners’ demands. Under British pressure, Sultan Abdul Hamid II 
deposed Ismail on June 26, 1879. Ismail’s son Tewfik was installed as Khedive. Non-
payment of salaries and high taxes imposed by the Caisse de la Dette led to 
widespread civil unrest in Egypt. The unrest culminated in the nationalist Arabi 
Revolt by military officers in 1882. The Lancashire “Cotton Jingoes” in Parliament 
then swayed the British government to militarily occupy Egypt, an occupation that 
did not come to a final end until the Suez Crisis of 1956.
93
 
The British took steps to prevent other cash crops from competing with cotton 
in Egypt. Cultivation of tobacco, the traditional cash crop that reasserted its 
dominance in Turkey, Syria, and Macedonia, was first restricted and then outlawed in 
Egypt. Prior to the American Civil War, Egypt had a thriving tobacco industry. Some 
of the tobacco used was grown locally, and some was imported, primarily from Syria. 
Only tobacco grown in the Ottoman Empire could be imported legally. The Egyptian 
government taxed tobacco, but did not restrict its cultivation. Greek tobacco 
merchants arrived around 1870 and began operating factories that mass produced 
cigarettes for the Egyptian market and for export. Egypt levied high tariffs on 
imported tobacco, and smuggling became a problem for Greek merchants, since 
smuggled tobacco had a price advantage over their heavily taxed legal imports.
94
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Almost all of the smuggled tobacco came from Greece and the smugglers were 
Greeks.
95
 Smuggled tobacco entered the trade under the guise of locally grown 
tobacco. In 1878, the Greek tobacco merchants convinced the Egyptian government 
to raise the tax on tobacco grown in Egypt to a level comparable to the import duty, 
license tobacco cultivation, and strictly limit the amount of tobacco that could be 
grown. Increasing the tax on Egyptian tobacco, the Greek merchants argued, would 
make tobacco smuggling unprofitable and raise much needed tax revenue. In March 
1884, Egypt and Greece signed a commercial treaty that opened the Egyptian market 
to Greek tobacco. In 1890, Greek diplomats and tobacco merchants, working in 
cooperation with Edgar Vincent, the Egyptian government’s British financial advisor, 
used the same anti-smuggling argument that they had used in 1878 to convince the 
Egyptian finance minister to make growing tobacco illegal.
96
 
Revival of cotton production in the United States did not adversely affect 
Egyptian cotton. Egyptian “Jumel” cotton did not compete with American upland 
cotton. Egyptian cotton’s market niche was in fine silk-like fabrics used to make 
underwear and hosiery, uses for which American upland was unsuited. American 
textile manufacturers imported Egyptian cotton for those uses because the rival 
supply of American Sea Island was both too small and too expensive. In European 
mills Egyptian cotton had no competitors.
97
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Under British administration, Egypt continually enlarged its agricultural 
capacity by a program of massive irrigation projects, the most impressive of which 
was the first Aswan Dam, completed in 1902. Almost all of the increased agricultural 
capacity was used to grow cotton. Cotton production reached 320 million pounds in 
1889, exceeded 400 million in 1890, passed 500 million in 1892, and reached 650 
million in 1899. At the fiftieth anniversary of the American Civil War, Egypt was 
producing more than 750 million pounds of cotton annually.
98
 Income did not rise in 
proportion to poundage, however. In the 1890s, with cotton selling for around 3 d. per 
pound, Egypt earned less than £6 million annually.
99
 Nevertheless, cotton comprised 
90 percent by value of Egypt’s exports at the beginning of the twentieth century. 
Cotton still amounted to half of all Egyptian exports in 1970.
100
 
Most of the wealth that Egyptian cotton generated went to Greek landowners, 
middlemen, and bankers and to a small group of British cotton exporters. Two 
family-owned British firms, R. J. Moss & Company and Carver Brothers, dominated 
the Alexandria Cotton Exchange. Greeks held most of the clerical and administrative 
jobs in the cotton trade.
101
 Egyptian fellaheen did the manual labor for wages that 
were among the lowest in the world. Egyptian men, women, and children were still 
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occasionally subjected to forced labor in the cotton fields by the British authorities 
well into the twentieth century.
102
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Chapter 9 
Latin America and the West Indies 
 During the American Civil War, attempts were made to grow cotton in 
virtually every part of Latin America north of Buenos Aires. Considerable attention 
was devoted to growing cotton in Brazil, Peru, Panama, Nicaragua, Mexico, and the 
Caribbean Islands. All contributed some quantity of cotton to Britain’s imports. 
Others, like Venezuela, lessened the strain on Britain’s other sources by exporting 
cotton to Germany, France, and Spain.
1
 Brazil became Britain’s third largest supplier 
of cotton, after India and Egypt. Anglo-Americans were deeply involved in 
promoting cotton growing in Latin America, but left surprisingly few traces of their 
activities in the historical record. Brazil is the most remarkable case in point. 
Isaac Watts attributed much of Brazil’s increase in cotton production to the 
activities of John James Aubertin, superintendent of the British-owned São Paulo 
Railway.
2
 British historian Richard Graham followed this premise in his Britain and 
the Onset of Modernization in Brazil, 1850-1914, published in 1968.
3
  Citing the 
Brazilian Journal do commercio of January 1, 1871 as the source of his information, 
Graham wrote, “the British led the way in supplying cotton gins during the American 
Civil War.”4  
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Yet except for a few British roller gins sent for demonstration purposes, all of 
the cotton gins and bale presses in operation in Brazil in 1865 were American made. 
Starting with two gins ordered in October 1863, the Eagle Cotton Gin Company and 
the New York Cotton Gin Company supplied 2,357 saw gins and 52 bale presses by 
the end of 1865. Most of the cotton gins were small machines “adapted to the wants 
of small planters” but some were large, high capacity machines with 30 to 60 saws. 
To power them, the Brazilians purchased 81 American steam engines.
5
  
Americans were also heavily involved in the railroads necessary to get cotton 
to the seaports. A Philadelphia company began building Brazil’s Dom Pedro II 
(Central do Brazil) Railroad in 1857. The tracks ran from Rio de Janeiro to a coffee 
plantation district about 300 miles inland. The railroad’s first section, 40 miles in 
length, opened in June 1858. Col. Charles F. M. Garnett, a Virginian, supervised its 
construction.
6
 American manufacturers furnished much of the rolling stock on the 
Brazilian railroads. Cars were made by T. W. Wason & Company in Springfield, 
Massachusetts, and the locomotives that hauled them were products of the Baldwin 
Locomotive Works in Philadelphia.
7
 
Richard Graham’s mistake resulted from the fact that he used only British and 
Brazilian sources, his failure to take into account the routing of ocean transportation 
between the United States and Brazil during the Civil War, and a quirk in the way the 
Brazilian customhouse recorded imports. There was no direct steamship 
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communication between the United States and Brazil. Passengers, mail, and freight 
from New York had to go first to Liverpool or Southampton, where they then 
transferred to a British ship for the voyage to Brazil.
8
  Direct trade between the 
United States and Brazil was carried in sailing ships.
9
 Those ships were vulnerable to 
the Confederate warships Alabama and Florida, which were cruising in Brazilian 
waters. The threat that the Confederate commerce raiders presented gave added 
incentive to American shippers to seek protection of the British flag.
10
 It was common 
practice in many countries to record American goods that were trans-shipped through 
English ports as imports from Great Britain. Thus many items manufactured in the 
United States were entered on foreign customhouse books as British goods.
11
 
For twenty years prior to the American war, Brazil’s cotton exports were 
insignificant. During that time, Brazil exported an average of 119,000 bales of cotton 
to England each year. A normal year’s export was about 100,000 bales.12 At the Paris 
Exhibition in 1855 it was reported, “From Brazil not a single sample appeared.”13 Yet 
Brazil supplied 823,402 bales of the 8,719,620 bales of cotton imported by Great 
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Britain between 1862 and 1865. Brazilian cotton exports increased more than 240 
percent between 1861 and 1865, from 99,224 bales to 340,261 bales. Exports to 
England reached 636,897 bales in 1868.
14
 Brazil’s income from cotton increased from 
£468,214 in 1860-61 to £1,681,780 in 1862-63, the last year for which Isaac Watts 
gave income figures.
15
 If one extrapolates from the quantity of Brazilian cotton 
received in Liverpool and the average price for the years 1864 and 1865 less the 22 
percent under the Liverpool market average that British trading companies paid for 
Brazilian cotton in 1863, Brazil’s income in those years would have been £9 million. 
Total income from cotton in the ten years 1861-1870 would have been in excess of 
£33 million.
16
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Table 2 
 
Estimate of Brazil’s Income from Cotton during the Civil War 
(Extrapolated from Isaac Watts and average prices on the Liverpool Exchange less 
22% under average paid for Brazilian cotton in 1863) 
 
 
 Year     Bales @253 lbs. ea.   Pounds    Avg. Price – 22%      Amount £ sterling 
 
1860-61    99,224   21,467,520  5.23     468,214  * 
1861-62          133,807   27,910,720  6.69   778,615  * 
1862-63          137,142   34,740,096           11.61           1,681,780  * 
1863-64          212,192   53,048,000           19.70           4,354,356  † 
1864-65          340,261   85,065,250           13.96           4,947,962  † 
1865-66          407,646          101,911,500           11.85           5,031,880  † 
1866-67          437,208          109,302,000             7.78           3,543,206  † 
1867-68          636,897          159,224,250  7.73           5,128,347  † 
1868-69          514,200          128,550,000  8.90           4,767,062  † 
1869-70          402,760          100,690,000  7.33           3,075,240  † 
 
 
* From Isaac Watts 
† Extrapolated from number of bales and market prices in E. J. Donnell 
 
 
Political conditions in Brazil were advantageous for the cotton growing effort. 
Brazil was remarkable in Latin America for its stability. When the American Civil 
War began, Brazil was an independent constitutional monarchy ruled since 1831 by 
Emperor Dom Pedro II, a grandson of the Portuguese royal family. The Brazilian 
constitution was modeled on the French Constitution of 1791, with some elements 
adapted from the British parliamentary and United States federal governmental 
systems.
17
 Brazil’s law code was based on that of Portugal, which was based on 
ancient Roman law with a recent influence from the Code Napoléon. The 
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Commercial Code of 1850 standardized business law on the French model.
18
 Brazil’s 
government was dominated by a wealthy slave-owning planter elite, the wealthiest 
and most powerful of whom were the coffee planters of Rio de Janeiro. The Brazilian 
government was intensely conservative in both its social and fiscal policies.
19
 
Like its mother country Portugal, Brazil had strong ties with Great Britain. 
The only major complication in the Anglo-Brazilian relationship, slavery, appeared to 
be waning. In 1826, Dom Pedro I signed a treaty with Britain that banned the 
importation of slaves from Africa effective in 1830. Though illegal, the slave trade 
continued largely unhindered by Brazilian authorities until 1850, when threats of 
British naval action compelled Dom Pedro II to enforce the 1826 treaty. Slaves 
numbered about a quarter of Brazil’s population of 8-10 million people in 1860.20  
The United States established diplomatic relations with Brazil in October 
1825, just three years after Dom Pedro I declared Brazil’s independence from 
Portugal. The diplomatic rank of the American representative was upgraded from 
chargé d’affaires to Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in 1842. There 
was apparently not a U.S. Embassy building, however. During the Civil War the 
American Legation operated from a suite of rooms in the Hôtel de Larangeiras in Rio 
de Janeiro.
21
 Consulates were located in Rio de Janeiro, Pernambuco (Recife), Bahia 
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(Salvador), Parà (Belém), Maranhão (São Luís), Rio Grande (Natal), Santos (Vitória), 
and St. Catherine’s Island (Ilha de Santa Catarina).22  
When the Civil War began, Richard K. Meade, a Virginian, was United States 
Minister to Brazil. Meade resigned in July 1861 and went home to Virginia, where he 
died in Confederate service. President Lincoln appointed James Watson Webb to the 
post in August 1861, after Webb turned down the appointment to the Ottoman 
Empire. Webb was formerly editor of the New York Courier and Enquirer and a 
Seward partisan. His appointment was apparently purely political patronage.
23
 Webb 
was accompanied to Brazil by his private secretary, Peter Cornelius Bliss. Bliss 
traveled extensively in southern Brazil and in Argentina, but the nature of his 
activities are unknown.
24
 Lincoln appointed as Secretary of Legation Rev. James C. 
Fletcher, a Presbyterian missionary who had for many years been the American 
Seaman’s Friend Society’s chaplain in Rio de Janeiro.25 Fletcher was author of Brazil 
and the Brazilians, first published as a serial in the North American Review in 1857, 
and was regarded as an authority on the country. The previous Secretary of Legation, 
Thomas Biddle, remained at his post as well. Biddle apparently attended to the 
routine administration of the legation.
26
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All indications point to James C. Fletcher as the man in the American legation 
most concerned with cotton. Fletcher traveled extensively in Brazil, apparently 
gathering information. His journeys including a steamboat trip 1,000 miles up the 
Amazon River. In late 1863 he returned to the United States and gave an address 
before the Chamber of Commerce in New York. In his address, Fletcher explained 
the condition of cotton cultivation in Brazil and remarked that two thirds of Brazil’s 
territory was suited to cotton growing. The details of what Fletcher did to promote 
cotton cultivation in Brazil remain hidden, however. Fletcher said nothing about his 
wartime activities in Brazil in the 1866 edition of Brazil and the Brazilians.
27
 
The United States had a strong commercial relationship with Brazil. In each of 
the years 1859 and 1860, the United States bought $23 million worth of Brazilian 
products. According to James C. Fletcher, each year the United States sold Brazil 
about $6 million worth of manufactured goods. During the clipper ship era of the 
1840s and 1850s, American ships carried a substantial portion of Brazil’s foreign 
trade.
28
 More than nine-tenths of the average 286,000 tons of wheat flour that Brazil 
imported each year from 1848 to 1859 came from the United States.
29
 Lennon Hunt, 
the British consul at Pernambuco, reported that the United States’ share of Brazilian 
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exports was slightly less than half that of Britain in the years 1858, 1859 and 1860.
30
 
By far the largest item in Brazil’s exports was coffee. A New York firm, Maxwell, 
Wright and Company, bought the majority of Brazil’s coffee.31 
The American coffee trade and the British trade in cotton goods with Brazil 
were interconnected. The largest British coffee exporter in Rio de Janeiro, Edward 
Johnston and Company, bought for the American market and had offices in New 
York and New Orleans. In addition to exporting Brazilian produce, Edward Johnston 
and Company became the largest wholesale supplier of British cotton goods to the 
Brazilian market in the 1850s.
32
 
Brazil had long been considered a potential competitor to American cotton. In 
a paper read before the Royal Society of Arts in London on May 13, 1857, James 
Benjamin Smith, the president of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, placed 
Brazil’s potential second only to that of India.33 James Dunwoody Brownson De 
Bow, an outspoken Southern partisan of American cotton, also rated Brazil second 
only to Asia as a potential rival.
34
 John Crawford, a British colonial administrator and 
former governor of Singapore, repeated the same assessment in a presentation to the 
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Royal Society of Arts on April 17, 1861, after Fort Sumter had been fired upon but 
before the news reached Britain.
35
 
Brazil seemed to be geographically well situated. Brazil’s cotton growing 
areas were located in a roughly 150-mile-wide band on the coast from Maranhão in 
the north round Cape São Roque to Pernambuco and Bahia in the south. There were 
numerous seaports along the Brazilian coast. The most distant cotton plantations were 
300 miles inland from the seaports.
36
  
Progress was being made toward getting Brazilian produce to world markets. 
Four Brazilian railroads in addition to the American-built Dom Pedro II Railroad 
were in operation in 1860. The Mana Railroad was a short line that ran 10 miles from 
Guia de Pacobaíba on the north shore of the great bay of Rio de Janeiro to the town of 
Petropolis. Railroads of less than 25 miles in length ran inland to plantation districts 
from the port cities of Bahia and Pernambuco. The British-owned Recife and São 
Francisco Railway went 77½ miles inland from the port of Recife to a cotton 
plantation district. In addition, construction on the British-owned São Paulo Railway 
began in 1860.
37
  
Transportation remained the greatest obstacle, however. All of Brazil’s 
railroads combined amounted to only 140 miles of track in 1860. The total length of 
track in 1865 amounted to 314 miles.
38
 Large areas of the country, in some cases 
                                                 
35
 American Railroad Journal 17, no. 24 (June 15, 1861): 441-442. 
 
36
 Todd, The World’s Cotton Crops, 208 map. 
 
37
 Hunt’s Merchants’ Magazine 43, no. 5 (Nov., 1860): 635-637; Report by Mr. Consul 
Lennon Hunt on the trade of Pernambuco, for the Year 1863, in Commercial Reports received at the 
Foreign Office from Her Majesty’s Consuls between July 1st, and December 31st, 1864, 50. 
 
38
 Graham, Britain and the Onset of Modernization in Brazil, 30. 
 288 
whole provinces such as cotton growing Rio Grande do Sul, were without railroads, 
wagon roads, telegraphs, or modern infrastructure of any kind.
39
 Except for the 
Amazon, which did not flow through the cotton district, Brazilian rivers were not 
navigable. There were few wagon roads to connect the hinterlands with the seaport 
towns. Pernambuco Province, an area roughly 100 miles wide and 400 miles long, 
had only 130 miles of wagon roads in 1863. These were in the form of four roads that 
radiated from the town of Pernambuco into its immediate hinterland. Most roads in 
the countryside were simply dirt tracks worn by the hooves of pack mules, which 
were the primary freight movers.
40
 Costs were prohibitive. In the 1850s the cost of 
carrying one bale of cotton to the coast was equal to the bale’s value. Planters often 
paid the muleteer by giving him one bale of cotton for each bale transported to 
market.
41
 In 1863 the mule freight rate in Pernambuco was a minimum 1 shilling 6 
pence (18 d.) to carry a 250 to 300 pound load 25 miles.
42
  
Brazilian seaports were inadequate. Many, like Rio Grande, the port that 
served the province of Rio Grande do Sul, were located several miles up rivers where 
dangerous shallow river mouth bars prevented ships from leaving the port if fully 
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loaded.
43
 The port of Pernambuco, though which about one third of Brazil’s cotton 
passed, had an especially bad reputation. Its natural harbor was good, but the wharf at 
the Pernambuco customhouse could accommodate only two ships at a time. Most 
vessels had to load from lighters. The cartel that operated the harbor boats charged 
extortionate rates. The charge for ferrying cargo from the customhouse wharf to the 
ship was nearly equal to the ocean freight to England.
44
 Government regulations at 
the port were so vexatious, and its contractors regarded as such swindlers, that many 
ship owners instructed their captains to avoid Pernambuco even in emergency unless 
their vessels were in imminent danger of sinking.
45
 
Labor was in short supply. Immigration was discouraged by Brazil’s endemic 
tropical diseases, especially yellow fever, which was deadly to Europeans. Cholera 
was also endemic. Of the 175 English artisans who came to work in the railroad shops 
in Recife in 1855, disease had killed 26 men by 1863. Ten more men had to be sent 
home debilitated by disease. Among German and Belgian workmen excavating 
roadway and laying track the death rate was 60 percent.
46
 There was nevertheless a 
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sizable number of European colonists. These included an agricultural colony of 
40,000 Germans in Rio Grande do Sul.
47
  
Brazilian cotton was grown using primitive methods. Mid-nineteenth century 
farming practices were still the same as they had been during the Portuguese colonial 
era, and remained so for decades after the end of the Civil War.
48
 At least two and 
perhaps more types of cotton were grown in Brazil before 1860. One, a perennial 
plant that from its description resembled either Sea Island or Egyptian, was believed 
to be indigenous. Another perennial variety of unknown origin was introduced about 
1830.
49
 A herbaceous “green seed” cotton known as “caroço verde” was introduced 
into Rio Grande do Sul from the United States at an uncertain date. When American 
agricultural expert John C. Banner tried to ascertain its origin in 1885, he found that 
some Brazilian sources dated its introduction at around 1840. Others suggested that 
the foundation seed of caroço verde were brought to Brazil shortly before or during 
the Civil War by someone with the Germanic name Edward von Borusky.
50
 A few 
American saw gins were in use before 1836, but the primary method of cleaning 
cotton was a wooden machine similar to the East Indian churka, a primitive hand 
operated roller gin. As was the case in Egypt, the saw gin damaged the fibers of long 
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staple Brazilian cotton.
51
 Brazilians apparently did not use the American McCarthy 
roller gin. 
Surprisingly, the Cotton Supply Association does not seem to have focused as 
much attention on Brazil as it did upon several less promising countries. No location 
in Brazil is listed among the places to which the Association sent seeds and cotton 
gins in 1858.
52
 In 1861 the Association sent a supply of New Orleans seeds and one 
cotton gin to John James Aubertin in São Paulo province, where cotton was not then 
grown. These seeds were distributed free to local planters “by hatfuls.” Larger 
quantities of American seeds were sent to Aubertin in 1862. Cotton grown from the 
seed was known as “Santos” in Liverpool, after the name of the coastal town where it 
was marketed.
53
 British consuls said surprisingly little about cotton in their reports. 
Consul Lennon Hunt in Pernambuco devoted a page of his 1863 report to the cotton 
situation, but did not mention any British efforts to promote its cultivation.
54
   
The Brazilian government apparently took the lead in promoting cotton 
cultivation. Those efforts were initiated well before the American Civil War began. In 
1858, the Brazilian government sent a provincial civil servant, Senõr Joaquin Lopez 
de Siloa, to the United States to study American farming methods and examine 
American implements. Upon his return to Brazil de Siloa was instructed to, “bring out 
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with him a number of persons skilled in the growing of rice and cotton and in the 
manufacture of sugar.”55 A Brazilian Cotton Association was established at Rio de 
Janeiro to promote cotton growing in 1862.
56
 During the Civil War, Brazilian 
government agents purchased cotton seeds in New York and shipped them directly to 
Brazil in sailing ships flying neutral flags.
57
 Whether these purchases were made 
through agents of the Cotton Supply Association or directly from American suppliers 
or the Federal cotton ginnery at Atlantic Dock is not disclosed in the available 
documents. The seeds were distributed in Brazil through government agencies. 
Whether the seeds were given to planters free or sold is not known. The Brazilian 
government also established agricultural institutes in at least some of the provinces, 
and through them introduced modern agricultural tools and equipment.
58
 The 
Brazilians favored American agricultural equipment because, in the words of Senõr 
Franco de Almeida, a member of the Chamber of Deputies, American tools were, 
“extraordinarily cheap compared with Europe.”59 Brazil purchased $362,644 worth of 
cotton gins, cotton presses, steam engines, and other agricultural machines from the 
United States in 1863-65.
60
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Independent efforts to promote cotton were undertaken by British subjects and 
Americans. Christopher Gaybeard, the secretary of the Recife and São Francisco 
Railway, planted 120 cotton seeds mailed to him by the Cotton Supply Association in 
a highly visible garden on a hillside beside the railroad tracks in March 1862.
61
 A 
British trading firm in Rio Grande do Sul, Messrs. John Proudfoot and Company, 
distributed American and Egyptian cotton seeds free of charge. At an undisclosed 
date prior to July 15, 1864, Mr. Proudfoot purchased land and started a large cotton 
plantation that was evidently intended to be both a profit-making enterprise and a 
demonstration project.
62
 A shipment of Sea Island cotton seeds was sent to 
Pernambuco from Port Royal, South Carolina, in the autumn of 1863.
63
 At about the 
same time the seeds were sent to Brazil from South Carolina, an unnamed American 
merchant in Pernambuco sent samples of cotton grown from American seed to the 
New York Journal of Commerce.
64
 If the number of cotton gins sold in Brazil is an 
indicator, there must have been numerous salesmen representing New York and 
Boston manufacturers who would also be de facto promoters of cotton growing. 
Brazil had demonstrated an ability to surge cotton production in the twenty 
years preceding 1860. When fears that the Mexican-American War would interrupt 
supplies from the United States caused prices to rise in 1848, Brazilian exports to 
Britain increased from 100,000 bales in that year to 163,000 bales in 1849 and to 
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171,000 in 1850 before dropping abruptly back to their normal level.
65
 This suggested 
that Brazilian farmers would respond to a sudden increase in price by planting more 
cotton.  
Evidence suggests that the United States encouraged a surge in Brazilian 
cotton production by buying cotton during the first year of the Civil War. The British 
consul in Parà, Mr. Perry, noted in a table in his report to the Foreign Office for 1863-
64 that 15 million pounds of Brazilian cotton were exported to the United States in 
the twelve months prior to June 30, 1862. Curiously, although Perry listed the money 
amounts paid for cotton purchased by France and Portugal, and for American 
purchases of rice, cacao, and other products, he did not list a money amount for the 
American cotton purchase. This seems odd, but may only mean that the data 
somehow escaped being recorded in the unidentified sources that Perry used to 
compile his report.
66
  
The American cotton purchases were made in many different towns, and in 
small lots. A consignment of 300 bales arrived in New York from an undisclosed 
Brazilian port in February 1863.
67
 Another 650 bales arrived in New York from 
Paroiba near the same time.
68
 In Maranhão, out of 65,000 bales sold in 1862, an 
American firm purchased 431 bales for about $6,000. Assuming that each bale 
weighed 250 to 300 pounds, the payload of a Brazilian pack mule, the American 
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buyer paid from 4 ½ to 5 ½ cents per pound for the cotton. This was the first time that 
an American buyer had purchased cotton in Maranhão. In his report concerning the 
purchase, U.S. Consul William H. Evans commented, “The present high prices have 
done much to develop the natural advantages of the country for its production.”69  
The amount of money that Americans invested in this cotton speculation can 
be roughly estimated. Britain purchased nearly 28 million pounds of cotton at a cost 
of £778,615 during the same 1861-62 time period.
70
 If Americans paid for cotton at 
the same rate as the British, they paid over £417,000 into Brazil’s economy. An 
intriguing entry in the 1863 edition of The American Annual Cyclopædia and Register 
of Important Events cited James C. Fletcher as the source of a statement that the 
United States sent $6 million in gold to Brazil in 1861 to pay for produce.
71
  
High prices stimulated many subsistence farmers to grow cotton. U.S. Consul 
Thomas Adamson attributed much of the increased production in the Pernambuco 
district to “a class of poor people, small farmers, called moradores, or squatters.”72 
These were people who settled on wilderness land and planted crops using primitive 
slash-and-burn agricultural methods, without ploughs or draft animals. Adamson 
informed the U.S. Commissioner of Agriculture, “They produce only a few arrobas to 
each family, just enough to supply them with a little clothing and the very few 
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necessities of life which nature does not produce spontaneously for them.”73 
Adamson further commented that he thought the moradores would stop growing 
cotton for sale when prices returned to a normal level.
74
 
The famous naturalist Louis Agassiz was in Brazil in the winter of 1865 and 
recorded his observations of the cotton boom. Agassiz wrote: 
The increased exportation of cotton from Brazil during the last 
few years is a still more marked feature of its industrial history than 
the large coffee crops. … When the Rebellion broke out in our 
Southern States, Brazil thus found herself prepared to give a 
considerable impulse to the cultivation of a product as much sought for 
as bread in time of famine. … Provinces like San Paolo, where a foot 
of ground had never before been planted with cotton; others, as for 
instance Alagoas, Parahyba do Norte, Ceará, where the cultivation of 
cotton had been abandoned, produced extraordinary quantities, —so 
large, indeed, that two lines of steamers were established, and have 
prospered, between Liverpool and the above mentioned ports, chiefly 
for the transport of this crop.
75
 
 
Agassiz further stated that Brazil, “received no foreign capital for this 
undertaking.”76 Although not precisely true, Agassiz’s comment reflects a valid 
assessment of the fiscal policies of Brazil’s intensely conservative government. 
Insofar as can be determined, Brazil took out only one major foreign loan during the 
American Civil War, a £3,300,000 bond issue arranged through London banks in 
1863. The British consul in Rio de Janeiro attributed the loan to the Brazilian 
government’s need for money to tide it over after the sharp reduction in coffee 
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exports to the United States caused a substantial loss of tax revenue.
77
 There is no 
evidence in British or American consular reports that Brazil even contemplated 
development schemes like those undertaken in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt. The 
limited amount of railroads and other public works that the Brazilians built during the 
1860s were paid for with their own funds, without resort to loans.
78
 
Mexico presented a unique set of circumstances because of its domestic 
political situation, the country’s nearness to the United States, common border with 
the Confederacy, and the French military occupation that began in 1862. France’s 
need for an alternative to American cotton was at least as great as Britain’s. French 
textile workers, though they constituted a smaller portion of the total population than 
their counterparts in England, were politically more volatile. The danger of working-
class revolution in France was much greater than it was in England.
79
 M. Thiers, a 
Deputy in the French National Assembly, remarked in 1864 that there was a 
widespread expectation in France that Mexico would supply France with cotton.
80
 
Many American contemporaries shared the conviction that Napoleon III’s interest in 
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Mexico was primarily motivated by a desire to seize the country’s cotton-growing 
potential for France.
81
 
Mexico did not figure prominently in the efforts or expectations of the Cotton 
Supply Association.  Mexico was not listed among the locations where the 
Association sent seeds and cotton gins in 1858, and the country was seldom 
mentioned in The Cotton Supply Reporter.
82
 Isaac Watts did not mention any efforts 
to promote cotton cultivation in Mexico in his 1871 history of the Cotton Supply 
Association. The omission is puzzling unless the Association considered Mexico to 
be in the French sphere of influence and avoided involvement there in accordance 
with what seems to have been their policy in the case of Algeria. Historian Earl S. 
Pomeroy implied this in a short paper about French efforts to secure cotton published 
in 1943.
83
 Thomas Schoonover gave the Cotton Supply Association only one passing 
mention in his paper “Mexican Cotton and the American Civil War,” published in 
1974. In Schoonover’s account, the promoters of cotton in Mexico are identified as 
French and Americans, and the markets as France and the United States.
84
 The Cotton 
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Supply Association’s 1858 effort may have attracted Mexicans’ attention to the 
possibility of growing cotton for export, however.
85
  
As the United States was plunging into civil war, Mexico was just ending the 
bitter civil war known as the War of the Reform. In December 1860, the Liberal 
leader Pablo Benito Juárez ousted General Miguel Miramon and the Conservative 
faction that had usurped power in Mexico City several years previously. 
Characterized in the broadest terms, the Liberals represented the mixed race Hispano-
Indian mestizo majority of Mexico’s population while the Conservatives represented 
the wealthy criollo elite of pure Spanish descent. After its endemic political 
instability, Mexico’s greatest problem was its enormous backlog of unpaid foreign 
debts and claims for damages inflicted upon Europeans during past wars and civil 
disturbances. After decades of civil wars, Mexico’s economy was wrecked. Mexico 
was essentially bankrupt, and one of Juarez’s first acts was to impose a moratorium 
on interest payments on the foreign debt. Not long after Fort Sumter was fired upon, 
Mexican newspaper editors recognized that the Civil War in the United States 
afforded Mexico an opportunity to rebuild its economy and pay off its debts and 
began urging Mexicans to grow cotton for export.
86
  
A considerable amount of cotton was already being grown in Mexico. 
Mexico’s experience of a half-century of overlapping civil wars, regional political 
fragmentation, and lack of transportation had caused a unique economic situation to 
develop there. Lack of security on the roads and barriers imposed by different warring 
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factions made it too difficult and dangerous to transport goods from one region to 
another. This resulted in each regional center developing its own self-sufficient 
manufacturing base, including cotton mills. Each regional manufacturing center 
depended upon its own hinterland for its raw materials and its market.
87
 
The Juárez government never had the opportunity to embark on a program to 
promote cotton cultivation for export or to develop Mexico’s decentralized industrial 
base. Using Juárez’s stoppage of interest payments as a pretext, and recognizing that 
the United States would not be able to interfere, Napoleon III induced Britain and 
Spain to agree to joint military intervention in Mexico to collect the debts.
88
 Napoleon 
III’s real goal was to expand French imperial influence, a secret global grand strategic 
plan known as la Pensée de l’Empereur. The ambitious plan envisioned 
dismemberment of the United States into three independent nations, the Confederate 
States, a remnant United States in the north, and a western republic. Mexico would 
become a French protectorate ruled by an Austrian Habsburg monarch, Archduke 
Ferdinand Maximilian.
89
 
The British government would never have accepted French hegemony over 
North America as envisioned in la Pensée de l’Empereur. In a speech before the 
House of Commons on June 27, 1861, Lord John Russell, the British Foreign 
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Secretary, raised the possibility of making Mexico a British protectorate in order to 
secure a conduit through which Britain could obtain Texas cotton.
90
 This would have 
circumvented the Union blockade of Southern seaports. It also avoided the 
Confederate embargo because the Confederate congress never passed a formal 
embargo statute. It merely passed a law that prohibited cotton from being exported to 
the United States. The choice of whether or not to embargo cotton exports to other 
countries was left to the individual states. Texas continued exporting cotton to 
Mexico through the state’s land ports of entry. The cotton was then shipped to Europe 
from the Mexican port of Matamoros.
91
 As a result, a thriving cotton export trade 
across the Rio Grande was already in existence before Lord Russell made his 
proposal.
92
 
To obtain British support for sending French troops to Mexico, Napoleon III 
played on Lord Palmerston’s well-known fear of American expansionism. As the first 
battles of the American Civil War were being fought, France, Britain, and Spain, 
working at cross purposes to one another, were laying plans and assembling 
expeditionary forces for a hazily conceived collaborative imperial excursion to 
Mexico. An international fleet composed of British, French, and Spanish warships 
appeared at Veracruz on December 8, 1861. About 11,000 troops landed unopposed 
in January 1862. The largest contingent, about 6,000 men, was Spanish. There were 
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also 4,000 French regulars, a French naval brigade, and about 700 British Royal 
Marines. The British and Spanish withdrew from the expedition in April 1862, 
whereupon the intervention in Mexico became an entirely French affair. Mexican 
forces repulsed the first French attempt to take Mexico City, and it was not until June 
1863 that the capital surrendered to a French army of about 30,000 men. After the 
capture of Mexico City, the French expeditionary force and a much larger French-
organized Mexican Imperial Army set out to expand the area under control of the 
Regency, as Maximilian’s government was called. Juárez’s followers and a number 
of regional Mexican factions mounted a fierce guerrilla war of resistance.
93
 
This was the situation in Mexico when an Englishman, William Henry 
Bullock, made an extensive tour through the country in 1864-65. Bullock’s narrative 
of his travels, entitled Across Mexico in 1864-5, is minutely detailed, and his keen 
interest in cotton is obvious. Bullock’s travel narrative reveals a picture of British and 
American efforts to promote Mexican cotton growing that is unobtainable from either 
published consular despatches or The Cotton Supply Reporter. Bullock arrived at 
Veracruz as a passenger on the Royal Mail steamer R.M.S. Solent on November 29, 
1864. His travels took him to Mexico City, to several towns in central Mexico, and 
then west to Tepic on the Pacific coast. All of the areas that Bullock visited were 
under control of Emperor Maximilian’s French-backed government. By Bullock’s 
account those areas were peaceful and under the rule of law and order. It is obvious 
from his writing that Bullock approved of the Maximilian government and that he 
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looked favorably upon the Conservative criollo elite that returned to power with the 
arrival of the French.
94
  
Maximilian was courting the wealthy criollo elite, and his government was 
actively encouraging them to grow cotton on their estates. The Regency sponsored 
two cotton promotion publications authored by Mexico’s leading agricultural experts 
in 1863. One, written by Dr. Perfecto Badillo, was a six-page promotional pamphlet 
entitled Manuel para el cultivo del agodonero (Manual for the cultivation of cotton) 
that resembles pamphlets that the Cotton Supply Association distributed in other 
regions of the world.
95
 The second, by José Andrade, was a much more detailed 40-
page manual for cotton planters entitled Memoria sobre el cultiveo del algodón y de 
los gastos para situarlo en los puertos (Memorial upon the cultivation of cotton and 
of the expenses to move it to the ports).
96
 Andrade’s manual resembles the several 
regional handbooks for cotton planters that were published by the British imperial 
government in India. Both works appeared in the Boletín de la Sociedad Mexicana de 
Geografía y Estadística and in Mexican newspapers.
97
 
When William Henry Bullock arrived in Veracruz, cotton activities in the 
seaport were immediately obvious. Bullock observed that the cathedral in Veracruz, 
which had been abandoned for some time, had been converted into a warehouse 
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where, “bales of cotton and hardware were to be seen piled up on the high altar.”98 
French merchant ships were loading cotton at Veracruz destined for Havre.
99
 Cotton 
was also being carried to New York from Veracruz. U.S. Consul D. L. Lane reported 
the departure of seven American ships with a total of 2,646 bales of cotton during the 
months of January, February, and March 1864. Their cargo was valued at over 
$200,000, which amounted to over half the value of all goods exported from Veracruz 
to the United States during those months.
100
 
Bullock saw cotton fields almost as soon as the train that took him part way to 
Mexico City left the fever-ridden Veracruz lowlands and entered the Tierra 
Templada, the “temperate region” of Mexico that began at about 3,000 feet elevation. 
The railroad tracks ended at Camarón. Bullock continued his journey by carriage over 
a wagon road that he described as “wonderfully good” to Orizaba, a market town that 
was the seat of an enormous estate owned by Don Antonio Escandon, one of the 
wealthiest men among Mexico’s criollo elite. Escandon’s plantation manager, a 
German whom Bullock identified as Herr Fink, showed Bullock large fields of cotton, 
as well as coffee, sugar cane, and tobacco. Señor Escandon owned a cotton factory, 
which was managed by a Scotsman. Bullock mentioned that Escandon
 
 had originally 
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obtained the railroad concession from the Juárez government but had subsequently 
sold it to a British company, which used American-made railroad cars.
101
 
It was on the Pacific coast of Mexico that Bullock found the most cotton being 
grown. Mr. Woolrych, the British consul at Mazatlán, told him that in 1863 the 
district produced 500,000 pounds of cotton on 1,300 acres. In 1864 the figures were 
dramatically higher: 4,200,000 pounds of cotton from 10,500 acres. The cotton was 
not exported, however, but was used in factories in Sinaloa and Jalisco. Growers were 
paid about 12 American cents per pound for the cotton.
102
 Mazatlán’s lack of exports 
was probably attributable to the primitive state of transportation in the area and lack 
of shipping. At Acapulco, which had steamship service with Panama and San 
Francisco, local cotton factories suffered a shortage of cotton because more than one 
million pounds was drawn away by the export market, which paid farmers 26 cents 
per pound.
103
 
Bullock visited a cotton plantation on the Rio Santiago near Tepic where 
Joshua Mellor, an English cotton mill “mechanic” who had first emigrated to the 
United States and then moved to Mexico, had 1,500 acres planted in cotton. Mellor 
had one cotton field that contained 350 acres. Another field measured “900 yards 
square,” which would equate to about 160 acres. Mellor employed Mexican women 
and boys as cotton pickers at wages of “6 reals or 3 shillings” per 100 pounds. 
According to Mellor, a family of five persons could earn close to £5 per week picking 
                                                 
101
 Bullock, Across Mexico in 1864-5, 19-45. 
 
102
 Ibid, 319-321. 
 
103
 Consul Lewis S. Ely to Seward, Sept. 30, 1863, in Commercial Relations of the United 
States with Foreign Nations for the Year ended September 30, 1864, 718. 
 
 306 
cotton.
104
 Cotton gins and bale presses used to prepare Mexican cotton for market 
were imported from New York.
105
 
In 1864, the British Foreign Office attempted to find out how much cotton 
was being grown in Mexico. The British consul-general in Mexico City had 
questionnaires similar to the circular that Sir Austen Henry Layard sent to consuls in 
the Ottoman Empire printed and sent them to various consuls, Mexican officials, and 
landowners. The effort failed, however, because only one of the forms was 
returned.
106
   
The Panama Railroad and its subsidiary Pacific Mail Steamship Company, of 
which William H. Aspinwall was a director, played prominent roles in promoting 
cotton growing on the Pacific coast of Mexico and in Central America.
107
 Beginning 
in October 1861, the Panama Railroad began transporting cotton grown on the Pacific 
coast of Mexico, western South America, and Central America across the Isthmus of 
Panama (then still part of Colombia) to the port of Aspinwall and loading it into ships 
bound for Liverpool. By June 1862, the railroad had handled 5,663 small bales, with a 
cumulative weight of over 872,000 pounds.
108
  
In May 1863, David Hoadley, President of the Panama Railroad Company, 
and U.S. Commissioner of Agriculture Isaac Newton reached an agreement under the 
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terms of which the Panama Railroad agreed to pay the costs of transporting cotton 
seeds from the United States to Panama. Upon arrival in Panama the seeds were 
turned over to the American consul for free distribution in cooperation with the 
railroad.
109
 The British vice consul in Panama, Charles T. Bidwell, was privy to the 
written communications between Hoadley and Newton concerning the cotton 
seeds.
110
 A. R. McKee, the American consul, reported that many persons were 
interested in growing cotton, and that the Colombian governor of Panama was 
promoting its cultivation.
111
 One planter, Adolf Steffens, established a plantation with 
22,000 perennial Sea Island cotton trees on Gonzalez Island about 40 miles from 
Panama City.
112
 By 1866 about 3,000 acres of Sea Island cotton were being grown on 
the Pacific coast of Panama.
113
  
American cotton promoters had particularly high hopes that its cultivation 
could be established in Nicaragua on a large scale. A German-American immigrant, 
Oraldo Wormger, had established a 5,000 acre cotton plantation on the shores of 
Lago de Nicaragua, the great Nicaraguan lake, in the late 1830s and proven that 
cotton cultivation was possible in the area. Transportation to the Pacific coast via the 
lake and the Rio San Juan was possible, though difficult because of a short length of 
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shallows and rapids in the river.
114
 Prior to the Civil War a Tennesseean, Major John 
P. Heiss, experimented with growing cotton in Nicaragua. Heiss returned to 
Nicaragua in February 1861 with the intention of establishing a cotton plantation.
115
  
Americans may have bought Nicaraguan cotton to encourage production. The 
sailing ship Magdalena delivered 24 bales of Nicaraguan cotton to New York from 
Panama on September 4, 1861. This was reportedly the first time that Nicaraguan 
cotton had ever been sent to the United States.
116
  
Some success was achieved, but Nicaragua never produced anywhere near the 
quantity of cotton that was hoped for. Henry Swinglehurst, an agent of the Cotton 
Supply Association, toured Central America, the Pacific Coast of South America, and 
the West Indies in 1863. Swinglehurst reported that to the date of his visit to Panama, 
Don Pedro Marina, the “principal receiver of the Nicaraguan cotton” in Panama, had 
handled about 2,000 bales weighing about 250 pounds each.
117
 In January 1865, U.S. 
Consul B. S. Cotrell in San Juan del Norte reported, “Cotton planting in the interior is 
now quite an extensive business, in which many Americans, French, Italians, & c., 
are engaged. But it is not possible to state what their success has yet been.”118 
American buyers paid “10 to 20 cents” per pound for $21,047.70 worth of cotton in 
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1864 and sent it to New York.
119
 This indicates that approximately 140,000 pounds, 
or 350 American-size bales, were exported to New York at the peak of the cotton 
boom. Panama Railroad Company steamships carried the cotton from Nicaraguan 
ports to Panama and then from Panama to New York for a special low freight rate of 
¾ cents per pound. This was considerably cheaper than the freight rate charged for 
coffee and other produce.
120
 
Peru excited hopes even higher than Nicaragua. Prior to June 1861, the Cotton 
Supply Association induced several large Peruvian landowners to begin growing 
cotton on their estates.
121
 The cotton grown was a unique type of arboreal cotton, the 
plants of which were long lived and grew up to fifteen feet tall.
122
 One of the 
landlords brought in 250 Spanish immigrants to tend his cotton bushes, reportedly 
200,000 in number. His plan was to eventually have 14 million cotton trees. 
Excavations began in 1858 or 1859 on an irrigation canal 39 miles in length to bring 
water from the Andes Mountains to the estate.
123
 American interests assisted and 
encouraged these plantations. Alfred Duvall, an American engineer from Maryland 
who had for some years been employed by the Peruvian government, initiated cotton 
planting on irrigated land at Monte Abierto, a village in the valley of the Chira River 
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about 25 miles from Callao.
124
 Ships owned by the Panama Railroad Company 
transported cotton grown in Peru from Panama to New York, where it was then trans-
shipped to England.
125
 The Lowell Daily Citizen and News reported on December 6, 
1861, that “Messrs. Forbes & Company, Mexico” had contracted for the purchase of 
10,000 bales of Peruvian cotton.
126
 Whether or not this trading company was 
associated with the Forbes family in Boston could not be determined. 
The cotton boom even affected Peruvian Indian tribes that lived in the remote 
Amazonian rain forests on the eastern foothills of the Andes Mountains. A tree that 
grew in the forests produced a cotton-like fiber in its seedpods. Prices of “from six to 
twenty cents per pound” offered by traders encouraged the Indians to harvest the 
cotton tree pods and send them by mule back on the arduous journey over the 
mountains to the port of Callao. Indians in other regions harvested the cotton from 
Peru’s other indigenous cotton shrubs. Some of the Indians propagated the wild plants 
by planting the seeds but left the plants untended to grow wild. The traders’ 
transportation costs were excessive, however, at “$4 to $5 the cargo of 350 lbs.”127 
The Cotton Supply Association naturally looked to the West Indies as a source 
of cotton. Most of the islands had produced excellent Sea Island cotton prior to the 
rise of the American monopoly, and cotton cultivation had never been completely 
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abandoned. The West Indies consistently sent about 31,000 bales of cotton to Europe 
each year throughout the 1850s.
128
 The West Indies were also attractive because a 
sizable number of the islands were British territory.  
Five British companies were formed to grow cotton in Jamaica, where the 
Association placed its greatest hopes.
129
 The greatest problem that confronted cotton 
planters in Jamaica was lack of labor. In the fall of 1862, W. I. Plaideur, a cotton 
planter in Jamaica, suggested to the Cotton Supply Association that its agents recruit 
free blacks from the United States to come to Jamaica and grow cotton for the 
Jamaica Cotton Company.
130
 At about the same time, American abolitionists made 
plans to recruit 5,000 African-American contrabands and employ them on the British 
West Indian cotton plantations.
131
 These plans apparently never came to fruition, 
however. As a result, none of the Jamaican cotton companies ever produced more 
than token quantities of cotton and their plantations were abandoned almost 
immediately upon the end of the American Civil War. 
The Bahamas also held promise. Many of the whites in the islands were 
descendants of Loyalists from Georgia and South Carolina who had fled after the 
American Revolution and had enjoyed an era of great cotton prosperity that lasted 
until about 1830.
132
 Not long after the Civil War began, the British colonial 
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government, the Cotton Supply Association, and a private company in New York, the 
American and British West India Cotton Company, teamed to grow cotton on New 
Providence Island. The government built a public cotton ginnery at Nassau, the 
Association furnished gins and seeds to individual planters, and the American 
company invested $250,000 in leasing land and hiring labor.
133
 Another New York 
firm, Messrs. J. and C. Rahming and Company, sent one of its partners, Edward G. 
Rahming, to Long Island in the Bahamas to establish a cotton gin and start plantations 
by planting a demonstration plot of about 20 acres and distributing free cotton 
seeds.
134
 Cotton plantations were subsequently established on Watling Island, Exuma, 
and on New Providence Island.
135
 Some cotton was shipped to New York from the 
American plantations, but again as in so many other cases, plantations in the Bahamas 
ceased to be economically viable shortly after the American war ended.
136
 
Puerto Rico, then a Spanish colony, presented an unusual case of the 
employment of forced “free” labor on the cotton plantations. All free male laborers 
among the island’s 600,000 people were required by law to present documents 
provided by their employer to the administrator of their district each month that 
proved that they were employed and showed the number of days worked in that 
month. Free men who did not present the papers or who did not work the required 
number of days were imprisoned and compelled to work. With labor thus secured, 
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Puerto Rican plantation owners increased their export of cotton, which went to Spain, 
from 310,000 pounds in 1862 to over a million pounds in 1863.
137
 Cotton acreage 
increased a further five-fold from 1863 to 1865.
138
 
Latin America and the West Indies produced far more in the way of 
expectations and grandiose plans than they did cotton. Although cotton exports to 
Europe from the West Indies increased more than 600 percent between 1861 and 
1865, the total quantity of cotton amounted to only 415,000 bales. Brazil, where the 
greatest increase in production was achieved, contributed 1,032,000 bales during the 
years 1861-65, only 322,000 bales more than in the five years prior to the war.
139
 It 
was, as Isaac Watts lamented in the subtitle to the section of his report to the Cotton 
Supply Association in 1871, a case of, “Latent capabilities and disappointed 
hopes.”140  
The reasons that the Cotton Supply Association’s hopes were disappointed 
were multifaceted. The high cost of transportation from the plantations to the seaports 
was certainly the major reason why cotton did not become permanently established in 
Brazil.
141
 Because of its high bulk to weight ratio, cotton filled the cargo hold of a 
ship well before the ship’s weight carrying capacity was reached. Shipping companies 
compensated for the lost cargo space by charging high ocean freight rates on cotton. 
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Shipping companies considered about 800 pounds of Brazilian cotton to be equivalent 
to a ton of other cargo, for which they charged 13 shillings 10¼ pence (270¼ d.) 
freight from Pernambuco to Liverpool in 1871. The ocean freight rates for less bulky 
commodities such as grain and coffee were much lower.
142
 This differential in freight 
costs made coffee, Brazil’s major crop, much more attractive economically than was 
cotton after the price of cotton declined from its artificially high wartime levels. 
Inexperience on the part of first-time cotton planters played a significant role 
as well. Many fledgling cotton planters no doubt met the same fate as the British 
trader John Proudfoot, whose demonstration plantation in Rio Grande do Sul was 
hailed with such high hopes in 1864. Neither Proudfoot, the laborers that he brought 
to Brazil from Scotland, the Brazilian laborers that he hired, nor the German colonists 
to whom he distributed free seeds had any experience growing cotton. As a result, 
Proudfoot’s plantation failed before 1868. The German colonists likewise became 
frustrated with cotton and quickly abandoned its cultivation for more familiar, easier 
to grow crops that were more profitable.
143
 
British mill owners helped to hasten the Brazilians’ decision to abandon 
cotton in favor of coffee. When the cotton crisis ended, British spinners began to 
complain about the damage done to Brazilian long staple cotton by the American saw 
gins. The Cotton Supply Association demanded that Brazilians abandon the machines 
and purchase roller gins. The Brazilians ignored the demands and continued using the 
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nearly new saw gins, in which they had invested a considerable amount of money. 
Brazilian cotton soon fell out of favor in England.
144
 
 A natural climatic catastrophe contributed significantly to the decline of 
cotton in Brazil. The natural habitat of a large region called the Sertão in northeastern 
Brazil south of the Amazon basin is semi-arid grassland that is similar to the savannas 
of equatorial Africa. Throughout most of Brazil’s history prior to 1845 the Sertão 
received too little rain for commercial agriculture, and was divided into enormous 
open-range cattle ranches. It was accepted custom for indigenous peoples and 
moradores, or poor squatters, to settle near sources of water within the boundaries of 
the ranches and engage in small-scale slash-and-burn subsistence farming. For thirty 
years starting in 1845, the Sertão received considerably more rainfall than was normal 
in the past. The high Sertão’s dry climate made it generally healthier than the wetter 
coastal lowlands that were plagued with mosquito borne diseases.
145
  
The population of the Sertão, and in particular Ceará Province, increased 
dramatically during the long wet phase. During the cotton boom of the 1860s the 
moradores in Ceará began growing small plots of cotton as a cash crop.
146
 At its 
maximum in 1873-74 the actual quantity of cotton was quite small, 4,878,044 kilos, 
the equivalent of about 27,000 American-size bales, but still greater in value than all 
of Ceará’s other exports combined.147 The Brazilian government encouraged 
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immigrants to settle in Ceará, claiming that the province had the potential to produce 
abundant crops of cotton, coffee, wheat, and even sugar cane and rice. According to 
the Brazilian government, there were 729,686 people in Ceará in 1876.
148
  
In 1876 the long wet phase ended with a prolonged drought that caused a 
terrible famine in the Sertão region. Smallpox struck at the same time as the drought-
induced famine. Herbert Huntington Smith, an American naturalist who visited the 
region at the height of the famine in December 1878, estimated, “The entire mortality 
in Ceará, during 1877 and 1878, was probably not far from 500,000, or more than 
half the population.”149 Survivors emigrated to the coffee and rubber plantation 
districts.
150
 
When agronomist John C. Banner visited Brazil in 1883-84, he found farmers 
growing small plots of cotton and transporting it to market on pack mules much as 
they had done two hundred years earlier. Even those whose fields were located 
adjacent to railroad tracks used mules to take their cotton to seaport markets because 
by that date the price of cotton was too low to pay the cost of railroad freight.
151
 At 
one town where Sea Island cotton had been a major crop during the Civil War, he 
found that cotton was no longer grown and commented, “The press house was in 
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ruins, and the governor of the place was giving his attention to the cultivation of 
sugar, corn, and beans.”152 
Coffee and rubber dominated Brazil’s economy. In 1897, Brazil exported 
coffee valued at US$90,030,250, accounting for more than 59 percent of all Brazilian 
exports. Rubber amounted to $36,985,250, or more than 24 percent. All other 
products amounted to $24,332,500. U.S. Consul Frank D. Hill enumerated these as, 
“Cocoa, hides, and saladero produce, herba matta, tobacco, sugar, minerals, etc.”153 
Hill evidently did not deem cotton significant enough to warrant mention.  
The reason for cotton’s failure in the West Indies was socially and 
economically more complex. British colonial officials in the islands were always less 
optimistic about cotton’s prospects in their annual reports to London than were the 
Cotton Supply Association’s reports in The Cotton Supply Reporter. Most reports 
concerning cotton cultivation in the West Indies were similar to the one sent to 
London by the governor of Anguilla in the Lesser Antilles in 1861 in which he said, 
“Agriculture generally is in a very backward state. There is neither a plough nor a cart 
of any kind on the island, and the only implement of husbandry is the hoe.”154 Under 
such circumstances the island’s 2,400 residents were far more concerned with 
growing food than cotton. 
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Contemporary authorities almost universally agree with William Lawson, the 
author of Geography of the British Empire, who wrote in 1864, “the West Indies 
possess every facility—except labor—for producing this article [cotton] in great 
abundance, and of the finest quality.”155 Lack of labor was also blamed for the failure 
of efforts to resuscitate sugar production in the West Indies in the 1870s.
156
 Though 
almost all of the contemporary commentators based their reasoning on the racially 
based notion of the “natural indolence of the Negro,” it was true that the free black 
population of Jamaica and other British West Indian islands preferred subsistence 
farming on small plots of land of their own to working for wages on plantations.
157
 
Attempts to force Jamaican blacks to do plantation labor by charging them rent on the 
plots of land that they farmed and evicting them if they failed to pay sparked a bloody 
revolt in October 1865.
158
 A prolonged drought that caused food shortages in 1864 
and 1865 probably contributed to the rebellion and hastened the economic failure of 
the Jamaica Cotton Company’s plantations as well.159 
On the island of Antigua in the Lesser Antilles, King Cotton was deposed in 
an agrarian coup d’etat in the autumn of 1865. The astronomically high price of 
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cotton in 1864 led to a rash of cotton thefts from warehouses and docks in Antigua’s 
port of Saint Johns similar to those that occurred at Atlantic Dock in Brooklyn. In an 
attempt to stop the pilfering by making it impossible for the thieves to sell the stolen 
cotton, the colonial government resorted to an elaborate scheme of licensing and 
regulation of growers and buyers. The licenses were costly, and were enforced by a 
strict regime of surveillance, paid informants, and monthly inspections. Heavy fines 
were levied on cotton growers for even minor and unintentional infractions of the 
law. Antiguan farmers vented their dislike for the law in a peaceful but dramatic and 
effective act of lese majesty that elicited a gasp of horror from The Cotton Supply 
Reporter. They went into their fields with machetes and cut down their own cotton 
plants.
160
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Chapter 10 
India and the Far East 
 
India was by far England’s most important source of cotton during the 
American Civil War. Of the 14 million bales of cotton imported into Europe during 
the war, almost 7 million bales came from India. Indian cotton made by far the 
greatest contribution to the failure of the South’s King Cotton diplomatic strategy. At 
the critical moment in November 1861, just as arrivals of cotton from the United 
States ceased and the Trent Affair pushed England toward intervention in the war, 
ships carrying 153,364 bales of Indian cotton arrived in Liverpool. Without that 
Indian cotton, there would have been only 22,600 bales of cotton available on the 
Liverpool Exchange.
1
 The psychological effect of a near-total interruption of cotton 
deliveries might well have set off a panic in the market. Had a panic occurred at that 
critical juncture, the Cotton Supply Association might have altered its anti-
intervention stance. As it was, the Indian cotton helped to forestall panic and 
strengthened the Association’s position against war with the North. In 1862, the time 
when antebellum thinking indicated that an interruption of the cotton supply from the 
United States would threaten Britain with economic collapse, India contributed 
1,075,000 bales of the 1,586,000 bales that arrived in Europe from all sources.
2
 
European importation of Indian cotton increased from 573,000 bales in 1860 to 
1,897,000 bales in 1864.
3
 In that year, India contributed almost two-thirds of the 
                                                 
1
 Donnell, History of Cotton, 508-509. 
 
2
 Ibid, 517. 
 
3
 Ibid, 499-533. 
 
 321 
industrialized world’s cotton supply.4 The Cotton Supply Association justifiably 
considered India its greatest success. That success was not achieved without 
considerable difficulty, however.  
The Cotton Supply Association’s motto “Cotton Knows No Politics,” which 
appeared in the masthead of The Cotton Supply Reporter, certainly did not hold true 
in the case of India. The activities of the Cotton Supply Association in India took 
place against a backdrop of acrimonious, sometimes bitter political conflict between 
the Manchester cotton interests and the India Office. That conflict and the course of 
the cotton crisis in India have been well examined by Arthur W. Silver in Manchester 
Men and Indian Cotton 1847-1872, in The Cambridge Economic History of India, 
and in several other works that deal with the Cotton Famine and Anglo-Indian 
history, and need be reiterated only briefly here. 
When the American Civil War cut off the supply of cotton, India was in 
transition from rule by the East India Company to direct rule by the British Crown, a 
transition set in motion by the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857. Almost all of the new 
Government of India’s administrative apparatus, personnel, and conservative 
commercial mindset were inherited from the East India Company. The East India 
Company’s administration was itself in a state of transition at the time of the 
changeover as well, due to the reforms begun by the Earl of Dalhousie, the governor-
general of India from 1848 to 1856. Relations between the East India Company and 
the Manchester cotton manufacturers had never been particularly good. Manchester 
manufacturers accused the East India Company of taxing the Indian farmers, called 
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ryots, so heavily that they could not buy British goods. The Manchester men also 
complained about the Company’s failure to build an adequate system of hard-
surfaced roads for getting cotton from the interior to the seaports. For its part the 
Company complained that the Manchester manufacturers were unwilling to pay a 
consistently high enough price for Indian cotton, and did not sustain a constant 
enough demand for it, to encourage the ryots to grow it.
5
 
The tensions between the Manchester manufacturing interests and the India 
Office intensified after 1858. The Cotton Supply Association particularly disliked the 
fact that the personnel and organizational structure of the East India Company in 
India were retained in their entirety, along with many of the East India Company’s 
policies. The East India Company had a long-standing policy that discouraged 
European settlers from colonizing India. The Cotton Supply Association felt that the 
new government retained this policy in practice if not in name. The old East India 
Company policy of protecting native Indian land tenure rights and maintaining the 
socio-economic status quo stood in the way of Europeans establishing cotton 
plantations on the large-scale, wage labor model envisioned by the Cotton Supply 
Association. The Association also believed that the new government was as averse to 
spending on public works such as roads, irrigation projects, and improvements to 
river navigation as the East India Company had been. As seen from Manchester, it 
appeared that the government was not willing to either build the desired infrastructure 
itself or allow private entities to build it. India Office officials countered that the 
government was willing to build, and had built, such roads and other improvements 
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as its finances allowed. The government refused to borrow to pay for those 
improvements, however. The India Office further complained that private capital was 
unwilling to invest in Indian development unless the government offered guaranteed 
returns on the investment.
6
 
Under pressure of the Cotton Famine, the long-standing friction between the 
Manchester manufacturers and the India Office rapidly escalated into a bitter political 
feud between Sir Charles Wood, the Secretary of State for India, and the Cotton 
Supply Association. The flashpoint came because of a dispute over contract law. 
Under the prompting of indigo planters, a law was enacted in 1860 that criminalized 
failure to fulfill a contract to deliver indigo, cotton, or any other commodity to the 
buyer as promised. Those imprisoned under the law could not appeal to a higher 
court. An investigation revealed that indigo planters had in many instances used 
violence and intimidation to force the ryots to sign contracts and accept small 
advances for indigo at prices which were far too low to be remunerative. Sir Charles 
Wood, seeing the contract law as both a violation of the most cherished tenets of 
English justice and a potent source of rebellion, vetoed it.
7
  
The Cotton Supply Association nevertheless came out strongly in favor of a 
law that made a ryot’s failure to fulfill a contract a criminal offense. In its November 
15, 1862, issue, The Cotton Supply Reporter copied an editorial from the Bombay 
Gazette in which the editor said: 
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With regard to the ryots, all acquainted with them will bear us out in 
affirming that, when they enter into a contract, they have no thought of 
fulfilling it, and feel no responsibility concerning it. They are 
concerned only about the means of subsistence, and think only about 
the advance of money they are to receive, and how little of it can be 
made to suffice for putting seed into the ground.
8
 
 
The Cotton Supply Association contended that a law to “summarily and 
effectually punish fraudulent agents and contract breakers” was necessary in order for 
English merchants to enter the cotton trade in the Indian interior, which was still 
dominated by native merchants, and invest capital in cotton cultivation. Native Indian 
merchants, the Association complained, were disinclined to modify the existing 
system of cotton cultivation and trade in such a way as to improve either the quality 
of cotton or increase the amount produced. In the Association’s view, criminalization 
of contract breaking was necessary because, since the ryots did not own their land, 
but only rented it from the government under a lifetime lease that protected them 
from foreclosure, civil legal remedies were ineffective. English cotton merchants also 
complained about the excessive length of time required for civil litigation in the 
Indian courts. The government had failed in its duty by not making contract breaking 
a criminal offense, the Association contended.
9
  
The proposed breach of contract law’s key provision read: 
On failure to pay damages, the defendant is to be committed to gaol 
for a specified period, there to be kept at his own expense, or, failing 
that, at the expense of the Government. If the latter, he is to be allowed 
the same diet as prisoners in the criminal gaol, and to be subject to 
hard labour in the civil gaol for the period of his imprisonment. Once 
discharged, the defendant cannot again be imprisoned under the same 
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decree, but his property is to continue liable until the decree has been 
satisfied.
10
 
 
Trials under the contract law were to be before a local magistrate, and the 
proceedings were summary in nature. The term of imprisonment was left to the sole 
discretion of the local magistrate. As in the 1860 statute, those imprisoned under the 
law were denied the right to appeal to a higher court.
11
  Among Indians the contract 
law was called the “Slavery Bill.” Sir Charles Wood heeded their complaints and 
again vetoed the law.
12
 
Wood’s refusal to cooperate infuriated the Manchester cotton barons. Starting 
in the spring of 1862, G. R. Haywood of the Cotton Supply Association, the 
Manchester Chamber of Commerce, and Manchester’s representatives in Parliament 
launched a ferocious political assault on Wood in the press. Hugh Mason, a cotton 
spinner and chairman of the Manchester Cotton Company, demanded that Lord 
Palmerston, the Prime Minister, dismiss Wood. Palmerston, who was often at 
loggerheads with the Manchester industrial middle class, ignored Mason’s demand. 
The assault upon Wood in the press intensified throughout the fall and winter of 
1862. The Manchester Guardian vilified Wood as the key obstructionist who was 
preventing Indian cotton from reaching the British mills.
13
 In mid-December 1862, 
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The Cotton Supply Reporter copied a lengthy article from the Money Market Review 
headlined, “Sir Charles Wood an Impediment to the Progress of India.”14 
Sir Charles Wood weathered the attacks for several months without 
responding until, choosing the time and place carefully, he struck back in a blistering, 
well reasoned two hour speech before a friendly crowd in his home town of Halifax, 
Lancashire, on January 13, 1863. The Times of London, which was generally hostile 
to Manchester’s upper middle class industrialists, and the influential Economist then 
came to Wood’s defense. Prominent economists of the Manchester School harshly 
criticized the Manchester Chamber of Commerce and its members for abandoning the 
principles of laissez-faire free trade. The Lancashire cotton interests’ attack on Sir 
Charles Wood failed, but the hostility between the Manchester cotton men and Wood 
embittered relations between the Cotton Supply Association and the India Office for 
the remainder of the cotton crisis.
15
 
Partisans on both sides of the acrimonious debate clung to their positions long 
after the American Civil War ended and the cotton crisis passed into history. Isaac 
Watts, who as editor of The Cotton Supply Reporter participated in and sometimes led 
the attack on Sir Charles Wood, wrote in 1871: 
Never certainly was any Government so chary of its sympathy and 
assistance as that which with Sir Charles Wood as Secretary of State 
for India was entrusted with the functions of the Court of Directors and 
the Board of Control. Unfortunately the old leaven was still left to 
work, and the new India Council was largely composed of the 
members of the old Court of Directors, and has continued so ever 
since. Whilst on the one hand the natural immobility of the natives of 
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India has ever presented a formidable obstacle to progress, on the other 
hand not less formidable has been the acquired immobility of the 
antiquated members of the Indian Council, and the conviction 
produced by a lengthy acquaintance with the proceedings of that 
venerable body is that until the translation of some portion of it shall 
permit the introduction of younger and more enterprising men to the 
seats now occupied, no great or rapid development of the vast 
capabilities of our great Eastern empire can be expected. … Our hopes 
of India must often be dashed, until its Government is committed to 
men untrammeled by the traditions of the old East India Company.
16
 
  
Sir Charles Wood’s defenders were no less adamant. Algernon West, who was 
Wood’s private secretary, wrote of the episode:  
Lancashire manufacturers called loudly for extravagant expenditure on 
cotton cultivation, without, perhaps, inquiring or knowing what had 
already been done, and what was then doing. Without considering the 
capabilities of India, or the tenure on which the land was held, or the 
position of the native ryots, they inveighed against Sir Charles Wood, 
because he did not consider that “India meant cotton, and cotton meant 
India,” but held that his duty, as Secretary of State, was to “govern 
India for the good of the greatest number of the hundred and eighty 
millions consigned to the care of England.”17  
 
 
Despite the Cotton Supply Association’s complaints, Sir Charles Wood’s and 
the Government of India’s efforts to promote cotton cultivation in India were 
considerable. Officials at the India Office foresaw the possibility that the secession 
crisis in United States could lead to war and an interruption of the American cotton 
supply in early 1861, and took immediate action to circulate the information to 
governing bodies, officials, and the public in India. Administrative mechanisms were 
put in place to quickly communicate market news from Liverpool to the cotton 
growing areas. An extensive survey of roads was begun, with a view toward their 
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improvement. From 1861-62, approximately £500,000 annually was spent on 
construction of cotton roads. This amounted to about one-tenth of India’s total annual 
expenditure for public works. The East India Company’s previous experiments with 
cotton growing were extensively reviewed. Handbooks for cotton planters were 
compiled for each region and distributed by the government.
18
 In 1863, the 
government began subsidizing experiments with cotton seeds imported from Egypt, 
the United States, and Peru. Although most of these experiments failed, Indian 
farmers in the Dharwar district eventually developed a hybrid variety, called Dharwar 
American, that combined the hardiness and drought resistance of Indian Surat plants 
with the fiber characteristics of American New Orleans cotton.
19
 
Seen from India, it was the Cotton Supply Association, not Sir Charles Wood 
or the government, that was not doing enough to promote cotton cultivation. Wood’s 
supporters further charged that the Cotton Supply Association was mismanaging what 
it did do. Algernon West wrote: 
In July of the same year [1861] the Manchester Cotton Supply 
Association deputed Mr. Haywood, their secretary, to proceed to India. 
The services of Mr. Forbes, superintendent of the Dharwar Cotton Gin 
Factory, who was in England at the time, were at once placed by Sir 
Charles Wood at the disposal of the company. Mr. Haywood, however, 
on his arrival in India, refused to buy any cotton. The people, believing 
that he had come to purchase, flocked round him, offering even to 
keep their cotton till his return from upper India; but his authority to 
purchase for the company had been withdrawn, if ever granted, before 
he touched the shores of India.
20
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Algernon West drew no distinction between the Cotton Supply Association 
and the Manchester Cotton Company, of which Haywood was respectively secretary 
and managing director. West defended the government’s policies of limited, carefully 
targeted public works and legislation. West wrote: 
All having been done that was legitimate on the part of a 
Government, and perhaps a little more, in furtherance of the growth of 
cotton, the rest was wisely left to private enterprise, and to those 
unfailing laws which govern supply and demand; and the increase in 
the amount of cotton received from India has justified the expectation 
that to those laws might be safely left the encouragement of its 
production.
21
 
 
Political economist and lawyer William Nassau Lees went to the heart of the 
dispute when he reviewed the failure of past cotton growing experiments in India in 
1863. Lees wrote: 
India has not supplied England’s demand, for a double, yet very 
simple, reason. England is rich. India is poor. The Capitalist has not 
supplied the Cultivator with the means of relieving his distress. 
Speculating on peace, England has denied India even the guarantee 
that she will take what is grown at a fair price; and the result has been 
quite in accordance with those sound principles of Economic Science 
which ordinarily regulate the laws of production and consumption. 
Manchester and Lancashire have been loud in their demands on the 
Home and Indian Governments to encourage the cultivation of Cotton, 
—nay even to compel the Indian ryot to undertake it. But Manchester 
and Lancashire, having reserved to themselves the right of buying in 
the cheapest and best markets of the world that may be open at the 
moment, have no just ground for complaint against India, or any other 
country that refuses to grow any staple for which circumstances have 
created a spasmodic demand—that prefers certain to uncertain 
profits.
22
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If the Cotton Supply Association and the Manchester Cotton Company did 
nothing to manipulate the laws of supply and demand in India, the group of Boston 
manufacturers associated with Edward Atkinson certainly attempted to do so, at least 
in a limited way. Boston merchants purchased 30,000 bales of Indian Surat cotton in 
1862, at the same time that cotton was being bought from locations around the world 
to stimulate production. According to Atkinson, this coarse Indian cotton was not 
suitable for making clothing, and the Boston importers disposed of it by selling it to 
makers of grain bags.
23
  
Americans were peripherally involved in other ways as well. Emery Brothers 
in Albany, New York, won a competition in 1862 to supply cotton gins adapted for 
Indian Surat cotton to the Cotton Supply Association.
24
 The American farm 
implement manufacturer subsequently opened a large factory near London to make 
cotton gins for India. Emery’s machines were so designed that they were portable and 
could be used, “in the open field if necessary.”25  
The American contribution to promoting cotton in India never approached the 
level that it did in the Ottoman Empire and Brazil, however. Americans were simply 
not in a position to do more. Although Boston traders were active in India from the 
late-1700s, and American trade with India was twice that with China, Americans 
never established commercial houses in India as they did in China and the Ottoman 
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Empire. American firms did not establish the kind of partnerships, formal and 
informal, with British firms in India that they did in the Ottoman Empire. The United 
States consular presence in India was limited to the major ports. Great Britain did not 
recognize American consuls in India until 1840, and even after that date the consular 
representatives were usually British subjects employed to represent the United States 
as commercial agents and paid on a fee-for-service basis, not salaried American 
citizens with full consular status.
26
  
Americans were skeptical that India could become a viable source of cotton. 
That skepticism toward India was rooted in the failed cotton growing experiments of 
the recent past. Many Americans in the North believed, as did Charles Francis 
Adams, Jr., that India’s natural environment precluded the growing of cotton with the 
requisite fiber characteristics.
27
 A stream of intelligence that reinforced that belief 
flowed back to the United States. This encouraged Southerners in their belief that 
Indian cotton was a chimera. It discouraged Northerners from investing the kind of 
effort in India that they did in the Ottoman Empire and Brazil. The belief that India 
could never produce cotton equivalent in quality to American and that Indian cotton 
would cease to be competitive economically persisted among Americans throughout 
the Civil War.
28
 Only after the Civil War was India’s contribution to the South’s 
defeat fully recognized, when William H. Seward remarked upon visiting a cotton 
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market in India during his around the world tour in 1870-71, “From the tomb of the 
Mogul monarch of India, Akbar, we passed to the tomb of the pretended monarch of 
America, King Cotton.”29 
The lasting social, political, and economic impact of the cotton boom and 
subsequent bust upon the Indian ryots is difficult to gauge. Historians’ views are 
sometimes diametrically opposed. Sven Beckert asserts that the cotton boom brought 
about, “a permanent change in the agricultural structure and trade of India.”30 Beckert 
states that as “people the world over refused to work for wages on cotton plantations” 
an entirely new system of labor control came into existence, one in which, “cotton 
would be grown by cultivators who work their own or rented land with the input of 
family labor and metropolitan capital. Sharecropping, crop liens, and powerful local 
merchants in control of capital characterized the countryside in which they lived.”31 
Indian historian Laxman D. Satya contends that European cotton interests and the 
colonial government engaged in tacit collusion with village moneylenders to reduce 
the ryots to a condition similar to serfdom in order to compel them to grow the 
maximum amount of cotton.
32
 Dietmar Rothermund takes a position opposite that of 
Beckert and Satya. He wrote, “The colonial rulers did not introduce any innovations 
into Indian agriculture and even their investment in irrigation was fairly limited. They 
preserved the existing structure of the peasant economy and only saw to it that the 
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revenue was paid fully and punctually.”33 Rothermund points out that the system of 
sharecropping, crop liens, and indebtedness described by Satya and Beckert was 
already in existence in India decades before the 1860s.
34
 British authorities enacted 
legislation that protected the class of ryots that he called “richer and middling 
peasants” against the predatory practices of moneylenders and landlords.35 Dharma 
Kumar states in The Cambridge Economic History of India that India’s ryots had 
already become heavily indebted because loss of markets for their produce had 
severely depressed conditions in India’s agricultural economy during the first half of 
the nineteenth century.
36
 
Cotton was one of the products for which markets had been lost. In some 
districts where cotton cultivation increased after 1861, cotton had been a major crop 
at the beginning of the nineteenth century, but had declined. Berar, for example, had 
supplied large amounts of cotton to weavers in Bengal until around 1830 but had 
reduced acreage after the weavers began using English manufactured cotton yarn.
37
 
The increase of cotton in proportion to other crops was not a new situation, but a 
return to the conditions of fifty years earlier. Cotton monoculture never developed. Of 
5 million acres under cultivation in Berar in the 1870s, 3.5 million acres was devoted 
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to crops other than cotton, mostly food grains.
38
 This ratio remained almost 
unchanged until the beginning of the twentieth century. Under normal circumstances, 
cotton growing areas remained self sufficient in food and produced a surplus for 
export.
39
 Farms remained small. The average land holding in Dharwar, for example, 
was 24 acres. Farming practices remained largely unchanged. Cotton yields were not 
improved from the 66 pounds per acre obtained by Mercer in 1845.
40
  
Cotton played an important role in lifting India’s agricultural economy out of 
the prolonged depression that was its defining characteristic during the first half of 
the nineteenth century. Tales of Indian ryots becoming so rich from cotton that they 
put silver rims on the wheels of their oxcarts were almost certainly exaggerations, but 
windfall profits from the cotton boom enabled at least some of the Indian ryots to pay 
off old debts and to raise their standard of living considerably.
41
 The more prosperous 
farmers purchased English clothing and household goods, these being both practical 
goods and status symbols. Some invested their new wealth in digging wells and 
irrigation canals, building granaries, and otherwise increasing the productive potential 
of their land. Cotton income enabled some Indian farmers to afford English-made 
farm implements to replace age-old traditional ones. These implements were as useful 
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for growing grain as they were for cotton.
42
 The benefits from cotton cultivation were 
spread unevenly, however. Those who benefited from cotton tended to be people with 
larger land holdings. Farmers with small plots of land and landless laborers generally 
did not share in the increased prosperity. Food prices were driven up by the increased 
amount of money that cotton brought into the rural economy. Price inflation benefited 
farmers who grew grain for the market, but harmed landless laborers because wages 
did not increase in proportion to the increase in the price of grain.
43
 
India’s foreign trade, measured in value, showed a dramatic increase during 
the American Civil War. In 1864, India’s exports were more than double what they 
were in 1860.
44
 At the peak of the cotton boom, cotton accounted for more than 55 
percent of India’s exports.45 Although Indian exports declined from their high of 
6,802,700 rupees in 1864 to 4,566,540 rupees in 1866, this reduced figure was almost 
double India’s total exports in 1855 and 40 percent above 1860. Moreover, Indian 
exports continued to increase. The total fell just short of the 1864 high in 1879 and 
surpassed it in 1880. Imports of foreign goods, although they showed a slight 
acceleration in 1863-66, grew steadily throughout the two decades from 1855 to 
1875.
46
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The building of railroads, the most visible gauge of development, accelerated 
during the cotton boom. India had about 850 miles of railroad in 1860. Ten years later 
4,800 miles of railroad track was in use. Track mileage increased 569 percent during 
the 1861-70 decade, but increased only 332 percent during the next twenty years. 
Most of the new lines connected cotton-growing areas with the seaports.
47
 However, 
the figures may represent a statistical fluke. Routes of the railroad lines had already 
been planned more than a decade earlier.
48
 Although the cotton boom did help 
accelerate railroad construction by bringing money into India, the Indian railways 
were not built specifically as a result of the cotton crisis. Nor were the railways 
completed in time to play a large role in getting Indian cotton to market during the 
crisis. The Great Indian Peninsular Railway did not reach the Berar district, described 
as “the great cotton field of India,” until the winter of 1865-66. It was not completed 
through the district until 1870.
49
  
British-Indian law made it a criminal offense, “Fraudulently to deteriorate 
cotton by exposing it by night to heavy dews, by putting dirt, stones, earth, or any 
other substance, or salt-water amongst it, with the view of making it heavier.”50 The 
rigors of transportation made the law irrelevant, however. Cotton grown in central 
India was ginned in the interior, but not baled. Instead, it was packed into large, rough 
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sacks called dorkas, each weighing about 250 pounds. The dorkas were loaded on the 
backs of bullocks and carried 500 miles to Mirzápur on the Ganges River, where the 
cotton was loaded aboard native boats for the 450-mile trip down river to Calcutta.
51
 
Cotton spent about 100 days in transit.
52
 Alfred C. Lyall, the Commissioner of West 
Berar, reported, “cotton is eaten by the bullocks, stolen by the drivers, torn off by the 
jungles through which the road passes, and damaged by the dust and weather, as well 
as by having to be loaded and unloaded every day, often in wet and mud.”53 Once the 
cotton arrived at Mirzápur it was loaded into one of the more than 5,000 locally built 
boats that were engaged in transporting cargo to Calcutta and poled down the Ganges 
River. Some of the Ganges River cargo boats had an overhead cover to protect the 
cotton from the weather, but most did not. After delivering their cargo to Calcutta, 
boatmen had to laboriously tow their vessels back upstream to Mirzápur with ropes.
54
 
The Dharwar district, where farmers were growing 25,000 acres of cotton 
from New Orleans seed in 1864, likewise remained without a railroad. Just as had 
been done when the American planter W. R. Mercer conducted the cotton growing 
experiments in 1845, the Dharwar-American cotton was transported 300 miles to 
Bombay on the backs of bullocks. It suffered significant damage in transit.
55
 After 
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observing a caravan of cotton-laden bullocks on the trail from Dharwar to Bombay in 
1862, Walter R. Cassels wrote: 
Cotton is exposed to every species of depreciation during its 
transit to Bombay. Moving along at the rate of one or two miles an 
hour in rude carts, or on the back of bullocks, over bad roads, the dew 
and dust do their worst. The bullocks are loaded and unloaded twice a 
day, generally in the neighbourhood of watering places, and their 
packs are rolled in the mud. Each bullock consoles himself during the 
march by keeping his nose in his leader’s pack, and steadily eating the 
cotton. The loss in weight, which has not been compensated by the 
accumulated dust of the journey, is too often supplied in water at its 
close.
56
  
 
Conditions at the seaports were equally primitive. Bombay, the main cotton 
loading port, had no modern dock facilities until 1875, when the privately owned 
Sassoon Dock was opened.
57
 The piers in use in the 1860s dated from the seventeenth 
century, and were inadequate for the demands made upon them during the cotton 
boom. Warehouses were non-existent. Cotton was stacked in a 1½-mile square 
outdoor sales bazaar and storage yard on the Colaba Causeway known as Cotton 
Green.
58
 Two modern, steam powered hydraulic cotton bale pressing facilities, the 
Colaba Press Company and the Hydraulic Press Company, were located in factory 
buildings adjacent to Cotton Green.
59
 Workmen at the two press facilities opened the 
dorkas of cotton from the interior and repacked it into compact bales for ocean 
shipment. Frederick J. Jobson, a British missionary who visited Bombay in 1862, 
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observed that thousands of bales of cotton awaiting shipment were left piled on the 
waterfront, unprotected from the elements.
60
  
Calcutta, the seaport to which the cotton grown in Bengal, Berar, and the 
Ganges Valley was brought by native boats down the Ganges River, had no wharves 
or other cargo handling facilities until 1870. Ships had to anchor in mid-stream along 
a 15-mile stretch of the Hooghly River and load from boats moored alongside.
61
 In 
the twelve months preceding April 30, 1861, more than a thousand ships loaded over 
600,000 tons of cargo in this way.
62
 The volume of cotton handled at Calcutta 
increased exponentially during the cotton boom. Fewer than 6 million pounds of 
cotton was exported from Calcutta in the 1861-62 cotton season. The figure jumped 
to nearly 40 million pounds, the equivalent of 100,000 American-size bales, in 1862-
63.
63
 In 1865, the port of Calcutta handled 411,180 bales of cotton.
64
 Conditions in 
the busy river port were appalling. Great quantities of silt washed down the Ganges 
River with every rain. The Hooghly River channel below Calcutta was frequently 
blocked by mudflows, and ships running aground on newly deposited mudbanks was 
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a common occurrence.
65
 U.S. Consul General N. P. Jacobs described navigation on 
the river between Calcutta and the ocean as, “difficult and even dangerous.”66 
Cotton loaded at lesser ports was handled under even more difficult 
conditions. At Broach, a market town at the mouth of the wide, shallow Narmada 
River 190 miles north of Bombay that was the shipping point for cotton grown in the 
black soil Guzerat region, cotton bales were simply rolled down the river bank and 
then dragged across mud flats to the native coastal craft that carried them to Bombay. 
At the peak of the shipping season in 1864 as many as a hundred boats were being 
loaded in this way at one time.
67
 In some instances, cotton was loaded aboard ships in 
locations where there was not even a natural harbor. In the fall of 1861, the British 
sailing ship Myrtle loaded 4,600 bales of cotton at Tuticorin (Thoothukudi), on the 
eastern Malabar Coast of India near the southern tip of the subcontinent. Tuticorin 
was then a mere village, and separated from the sea by a barren, sandy beach four or 
five miles in width. There was no sheltered anchorage, nor port facilities of any kind. 
The Myrtle simply anchored off the beach and the cotton was ferried through the surf 
to the ship in boats.
68
  
Cotton cultivation was long established at Tuticorin, but it had not previously 
been exported from the village. The price of cotton, the equivalent of 11½ d. per 
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pound, made ship captains and merchants willing to go to difficult to access locations 
like Tuticorin. Merchants arrived in the village not long after the American Civil War 
began and started buying its cotton for export. The merchants brought portable cotton 
gins with them. Captain Warden of the Myrtle told the British consul in Havre, 
France, where he delivered the cotton in February 1862, that the cotton in his ship’s 
cargo hold had, “been imperfectly cleaned by the natives with the hand-mills of old 
times, and subsequently brought into a cleaner state by the merchants with cotton 
gins.”69 
Immense numbers of laborers were needed to handle the cotton at every stage 
of its transportation. The populations of Bombay and Calcutta increased dramatically 
during the cotton boom. The increase was particularly rapid in Bombay, where the 
population reached 800,000 before the boom ended, up from 500,000 ten years 
earlier. That the increase in population was people attracted from the countryside to 
work as laborers in the cotton trade is attested to by the fact that when the cotton 
boom ended, Bombay’s population rapidly declined and did not recover to its 1865 
level until the First World War.
70
 
Because they remained in control of the cotton trade with the ryots in the 
interior, Bombay’s Hindu and Parsi merchants profited from the cotton boom. In 
additional to their traditional role as middlemen between growers and English buyers, 
some became ginners and packers. Others became importers and distributors of 
manufactured goods. Indian names figure prominently in Bombay’s 1864 business 
                                                 
69
 Ibid. 
 
70
 Karmon, Ports Around the World, 183.  
 
 342 
directory, and include skilled craftsmen such as clockmakers, gunsmiths, goldsmiths, 
jewelers, and a ship chandler.
71
 A few cotton merchants, like Jamsetji N. Tata (1839-
1904), the founder of one of modern India’s great industrial dynasties, became 
fabulously wealthy.
72
  
J. N. Tata was the most outstanding example of the native Indian merchants 
whose control of the cotton trade the Manchester interests found so objectionable. 
Tata was the son of a family of Parsi merchants that had been long established in the 
Indian trade with China. The Parsi were descendants of Zoroastrian refugees who fled 
Iran at the time of the Muslim conquest and settled in India. They were outside the 
Hindu caste system, and thus could engage in a wider range of mercantile activities 
than could most Hindus. They were also on generally good terms with India’s 
Muslims. This had enabled the Parsi to establish themselves as commercial agents 
and middlemen for the East India Company. Parsi merchants had long dominated the 
commerce of Bombay, and many of them were already quite wealthy. At the time of 
his death in 1859, the dean of the Bombay merchants, Sir Jamsetjee Jeejeebhoy, was 
one of the wealthiest men in the British Empire.
73
 Many upper class Parsis, 
particularly members of the younger generation like J. N. Tata, were thoroughly 
Anglicized. J. N. Tata went to work in the family business, Nusserwanji and Kalindas 
Company, in 1859. When the American Civil War began, the Tata family company 
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established agencies in the inland cotton growing districts, where they made advances 
against future delivery of cotton and bought the crop in the traditional mode of native 
agricultural finance and marketing.
74
 
More important in the long run, the cotton boom brought about a profound 
change in Indian thinking. Every major town in India was connected by telegraph 
before the American Civil War began.
75
 In the Bombay Presidency alone there were 
thirty-one telegraph stations. The government-operated telegraph provided a regular 
news service.
76
 This brought market news to such remote locations as Dharwar on a 
daily basis. As American historian-agronomist Frenise A. Logan wrote: 
When England substituted Indian for American cotton during 
the four years of war in the United States, the thinking of the Indian 
cultivator was in a measure internationalized. The war enabled him to 
look beyond the narrow market of his village, and even the 
subcontinent.
77
 
 
The telegraph’s importance and its impact on Indian thinking should not be 
overstated, however. Telegraph lines did not penetrate into the rural hinterlands far 
from the railroad tracks and market towns. Rural villages remained isolated from 
modern communications until the twentieth century.
78
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The change in thinking was much greater among India’s native elite than it 
was among the ryots. Jamsetji Tata and other Indian entrepreneurs invested some of 
the wealth that they had amassed during the boom to import British-made machinery 
and start modern industrial cotton mills in Bombay, the first of which began operating 
in 1872. Tata’s huge Empress Mill at Nagpur, the flagship of Indian industry, opened 
in 1874. The mills used Indian cotton, inexpensive labor, and the advantage on 
transportation costs to undersell English manufacturers in the huge Indian market. 
Indian mills were soon exporting cheap cloth and yarn to China as well. India’s tariff 
on imported English cotton goods, which was imposed as a revenue measure, also 
served to protect this domestic industry. Lancashire demanded that it be lowered, but 
in 1875 the Bombay Mill Owner’s Association was formed to counter Lancashire’s 
demands. The Indian mill owners used the mercantilist argument that by exporting 
their goods they too were bringing wealth into the British Empire, and prevented 
Lancashire from strangling the Indian textile industry. During the next four decades 
India’s indigenous cotton merchant-manufacturers poured the wealth generated by 
their cotton mills into starting other industries, building infrastructure, banking, and 
endowing educational institutions. Indian educational institutions in turn became the 
cradles of Indian nationalism.
79
  
Just as it deceived most Americans, the hybridization problem encountered in 
the experiments with American cotton in India misled many people in Britain to 
believe that India’s natural environment precluded producing cotton with the sought 
after American-type characteristics. British historian Iltudus Thomas Prichard stated: 
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There is a tendency, however, in the long staple when introduced into 
India to degenerate into short staple. Everything degenerates in India. 
The Anglo-Saxon degenerates; cattle, horses, sheep, dogs, and cats 
degenerate. The vegetable world follows the same inexorable law, and 
cotton forms no exception.
80
 
 
As a result, Great Britain’s imperial strategists and the Cotton Supply 
Association looked eastward beyond India’s borders for a reliable cotton supply. 
China and Southeast Asia seemed the best and most likely sources of cotton should 
India prove unviable, as many feared it would. Lancashire cotton interests began 
lobbying for construction of a railroad from the port of Rangoon north through Burma 
to China’s Yunnan Province in 1852.81 Initially the efforts were aimed at opening the 
area to British manufactured goods, but shifted to getting cotton out after 1861. It was 
thought that the wild, sparsely populated borderland area of northwestern Burma then 
known as the Shan States was better suited to American-type cotton than was India or 
northern China. In a memorial to Lord Palmerston in 1863, John Cheetham suggested 
that a railroad would, “induce Chinese to come down from the south-west of China to 
settle these waste lands, which, under their cultivation, would furnish large supplies 
of cotton.”82  
The Cotton Supply Association also looked to neighboring Siam (Thailand) as 
a possible source of cotton. A British agent explored the remote areas of the upper 
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Mekong River Valley in 1848 and reported that cotton was grown there by Chinese. 
This report led to a belief that large quantities of cotton could be grown there if only 
Chinese laborers could be induced to move to the area.
83
 The British government sent 
a cotton gin and a modern hydraulic bale press furnished by the Cotton Supply 
Association as gifts to the King of Siam in Bangkok in 1861.
84
 An Englishman, J. W. 
Thies, obtained a concession from the King of Siam that amounted to a monopoly on 
the cotton trade. Thies was authorized to grow, gin, press, and export cotton, and was 
empowered to collect the “inland revenue,” an excise tax on agricultural produce.85  
These efforts produced a great deal of fanfare, but very little cotton. U.S. 
Consul A. J. Westervelt reported 14,000 piculs (1,866,200 pounds) of cotton exported 
from Thailand in the twelve months prior to July 27, 1864.
86
 This would have been 
equal to 4,665 American-size bales. On December 31, 1864, Westervelt reported that 
12,638 piculs were exported during the calendar year.
87
 There was no consular report 
from Bangkok for 1865. In January 1868, a new American consul, J. M. Hood, 
reported exports of 11,102 piculs of ginned cotton and 11,466 piculs of unginned 
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cotton for the calendar year 1867. All of it was carried to China in 11 Chinese junks. 
None went to Europe or the United States.
88
  
J. W. Thies abandoned his cotton business and left Thailand sometime prior to 
the 1869 marketing season.  An English traveler reported that on July 9, 1869, he saw 
a large number of native boats bringing cotton down the Chao Phraya River to 
Bangkok. At that time, Thai cotton was being exported exclusively to China by native 
Thai merchants and carried in small Chinese sailing vessels.
89
 The English traveler 
added the often-heard lament, “The cultivation of cotton and the collecting of the 
inland revenue, [sic] is again in the hands of natives, who have neither the energy, nor 
the moral principle, necessary to increase the production of this article.”90 
China was the only overseas competitor that cotton planters in the American 
South feared. In January 1860, John Mitchell, an exiled Irish nationalist who was 
editor of the Richmond Examiner, was in Europe and warned that the ultimate 
strategic goal of the British in waging the Second Opium War was to seize control of 
China and turn the country into a cotton field. Mitchell believed that China produced 
six times as much cotton as the American South, and because China had the requisite 
combination of soil, climate, and labor, it had the potential to produce much more. In 
Mitchell’s estimation, China did not suffer from the natural conditions that most 
Americans believed would prevent India from becoming a successful cotton 
producer. Transportation was not thought to be a problem because China’s cotton 
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growing provinces lay along the Yellow (Huanghe) and Yangtze Rivers. Further, it 
was thought that China could produce abundant cotton far more cheaply than could 
the American South.
91
 Mitchell wrote in a letter from Paris addressed to the 
Charleston Mercury that was reprinted in several other newspapers: 
Labor also is far more abundant, and costs literally nothing at all. Once 
the country is subjected, the English cotton growers may have many 
millions of laborers, all anxious to work for their bare subsistence; for 
what would subsist one negro would be a luxurious supply for five 
Chinamen. The Chinamen, too, will be apprentices, not slaves, and so 
there will be no obligations to care for them, to feed and clothe them, 
when the work is got out of them. In short, if the cultivation once 
begins on these two rivers [the Yellow and Yangtze], you may bid 
adieu to the Liverpool and Manchester markets, and that’s the real 
meaning of this China war.
92
 
 
John Mitchell’s appraisal of China’s cotton-growing potential was given great 
weight in the North because he was considered an expert on cotton economics and he 
was an ardent secessionist.
93
 It stood to reason that if Mitchell feared Chinese cotton, 
China’s cotton-growing potential was real. John Minor Botts, a prominent Virginia 
Unionist, expressed similar sentiment when he warned the Virginia secession 
convention, “England and France have already, by the Chinese War, made 
arrangements for a supply of cotton from that region of the world, which, together 
with the supply from the East Indies, will render them independent of the Cotton 
States.”94 
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 John Mitchell had no first hand knowledge of China, however, and his 
appraisal of China’s cotton-growing potential ignored several major obstacles to 
successful cultivation and exportation of cotton. By comparing the Yangtze River to 
the Mississippi and the Yellow River to the Alabama River, Mitchell left readers of 
his assessment with the impression that both Chinese rivers were navigable like the 
American streams.
95
 While the Yangtze River was navigable, the shallow, silt-choked 
Yellow River was not. Mitchell probably based his erroneous assumptions on the 
geographic information available to him, much of which was faulty. Miss Julia 
Corner, an Englishwoman who had spent time in China and was purportedly an 
expert on the county, stated in her book China: Pictorial, Descriptive, and Historical 
that the Yangtze and Yellow Rivers, “surpass all the rivers of Europe and Asia, and 
are secondary only to the Amazons [sic] and the Mississippi in America.”96 In 1852 
the Yellow River changed its course so that it emptied into the Gulf of Bohai north of 
the Shandong Peninsula, 200 miles north of its previous course into the Yellow Sea 
south of Shandong. Sir John Francis Davis, a British geographer who authored a 
geography of China published in 1857, seemed only vaguely aware of the 
implications of this natural disaster on agriculture, commerce, and navigation.
97
 Even 
so respected an authority as the Hydrographic Office of the British Admiralty, though 
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it admitted that Westerners knew almost nothing about the Yellow River, called it 
“little inferior to the Yang-tse kiang (Yangtze) in magnitude.”98  
Mitchell also ignored the Taiping Rebellion, which at the time of his writing 
was devastating the very areas that he thought would be ideal cotton fields. Mitchell’s 
failure to take the Taiping Rebellion into account is puzzling. Most likely he thought, 
as did the editors of The Times, that the rebellion would lead to the collapse of the 
Chinese government and the breakup of China.
99
 Such a collapse, Mitchell may have 
thought, would enable Britain to establish control over China. Alternatively, Mitchell 
may have believed that the Taiping regime would open the interior of China to free 
trade. This belief was prevalent among Western observers. Jardine, Matheson & 
Company, the largest British trading company operating in China, contended that the 
breakdown of the Chinese central government’s authority was beneficial to trade. The 
company openly urged the British government to ignore all regulations and tariffs 
issued by the Chinese government.
100
 Colonel W. H. Sykes, a British officer in China 
who viewed the Taipings favorably, adamantly denied reports of the devastation 
wrought in the countryside by the Taiping forces and contended that the Taiping 
regime was eager to establish trade with foreigners.
101
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There was some validity in those beliefs concerning trade. Although the 
Taipings held Nanjing, and thus controlled the passage of shipping on the Yangtze 
River, trade continued. In 1861 the Yangtze River downstream from Nanjing to the 
sea was open to commerce and patrolled by British gunboats. Foreign merchants 
could operate on the river unhindered by Chinese customs officials and government 
regulations. Commander Lindesay Brine, a Royal Navy officer who served aboard 
one of the British gunboats, reported, “Fleets of native vessels under foreign flags, 
laden with merchandise the property of foreigners, are now everywhere met with.”102 
When Chinese government authorities reasserted control over the Yangtze below 
Nanjing in the summer of 1862, customs officials put an end to this unregulated 
trade.
103
 
Whatever the dynamics of the situation may have been, China responded to 
the demand for cotton. Prior to the American Civil War, China did not export any 
cotton to Great Britain, and imported raw cotton from India to meet domestic needs. 
During the years 1862-1865, British manufacturers imported more than 154 million 
pounds of Chinese cotton. This was the equivalent of about 386,500 American-size 
bales.
104
 The 1912 edition of the authoritative Shepperson’s Cotton Facts put the total 
amount of Chinese cotton exported to Europe in the years 1863-1865 at 405,000 
                                                 
102
 Lindesay Brine, The Taeping Rebellion in China; A Narrative of its Rise and Progress 
(London: John Murray, 1862), 306. 
 
103
  Pelcovits, Old China Hands and the Foreign Office, 25. 
 
104
 Frederick Martin, The Statesman’s Year-Book: A Statistical, Mercantile, and Historical 
Account of the States and Sovereigns of the Civilised World, a Manual for Politicians and Merchants 
for the Year 1869 (London: Macmillan and Co., 1869), 633. 
 
 352 
bales, but did not cite the source of its information.
105
 During one 40-day period at the 
peak of British cotton imports from China, January 1 to February 11, 1864, twenty-
two ships arrived in English ports with 101,628 bales of Chinese cotton, weighing 
over 16 million pounds.
106
 In addition, starting in 1863 an unknown quantity of 
Chinese cotton was shipped to Bombay, where Indian merchants mixed it with Indian 
Surat.
107
  This was apparently done to increase the value of the Surat, because the 
fiber characteristics of Chinese cotton were more like those of American cotton than 
was the Indian fiber.
108
 The blended Chinese cotton consequently lost its Chinese 
identity and entered England as Indian cotton. 
Cotton acreage increased substantially in some Chinese provinces. In 
Chekiang (Zhejiang) Province, cotton acreage increased from 54,000 acres in 1863 to 
106,000 acres in 1864. Little or none of the province’s cotton was exported prior to 
1861, but nearly 64 million pounds of cotton was exported through the province’s 
port of Ningpo in 1863.
109
 Exports from Shanghai increased from 15 million pounds 
to all destinations, mostly to Japan, in 1861, to over 40 million to England alone in 
1862, and to nearly 74 million in 1863. Exports then dropped to 44 million in 1864 
and to 10 million in 1865.
110
  Cotton exports for China as a whole followed the same 
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pattern, rising from less than 2 million pounds of cotton sent to England in 1862, to 
over 30 million in 1863, and to 86 million in 1864. Exports then dropped to slightly 
under 36 million in 1865, to less than 6 million in 1866, and to a only a half million 
pounds in 1867.
111
 
 This increase was apparently achieved purely through the influence of the 
market. Insofar as The Cotton Supply Reporter reveals, the Cotton Supply 
Association did not undertake any active promotion efforts in China. Isaac Watts said 
nothing about China in his 1871 report. Chinese cotton exports rose almost 500 
percent in response to the increase in price from 11.25 Chinese taels per picul at the 
end of 1861 to a high of 26 taels per picul in 1863. Exports then showed a similar 
price-correlated downward curve as prices fell to 14.5 taels per picul in 1865.
112
 
Chinese cotton sold on the Liverpool exchange for 8 
5
/8 d. per pound in June 1862, 
varied between 14 d. and 20 d. during 1863, peaked at 20½ d. in the first weeks of 
1864, and then declined to 15¾ d. at the end of the year. Prices paid for Chinese 
cotton at Liverpool fell steadily during the first five months of 1865, to a low of 7 d. 
per pound.
113
 These prices paralleled those paid for Surat-type cotton from India and 
elsewhere fairly closely.
114
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All of the cotton grown and exported was indigenous Chinese varieties. Only 
one small experiment growing cotton from American seed was attempted in the 
Shanghai area in 1865 by the British trading firm of Messrs. Hogg and Markham. 
That experiment failed for undisclosed reasons.
115
 Judged from the scanty 
information provided in The Cotton Supply Reporter and in reports from British 
consuls, the cotton boom encouraged an increase in cotton growing. Cotton was 
grown and processed in traditional ways. Mr. Fittock, the British consul in Ningpo, 
commented that farmers in Chekiang were planting cotton in rows interspersed with 
wheat and beans, but neglected to say whether this was normal planting practice or 
something new.
116
 However, the practice was common fifty years later and was then 
thought to be ancient, indicating that Chinese farmers probably did not change their 
cropping methods.
117
 No cotton gins or bale presses were used in the Chinese 
hinterlands.
118
 Merchants in Shanghai were using a few hand-operated cotton gins by 
1865, but they were a rarity.
119
 This and mention of China as a destination for their 
gins by Emery Brothers in their advertising would seem to indicate that some cotton 
was sold “in the seed” to merchants who then ginned it using imported gins.120 
Some adverse side effects of the cotton boom were felt in China, although it is 
impossible in most cases to differentiate between side effects of increased cotton 
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production and the dislocations and disruptions caused by the Taiping Rebellion. 
Consul Fittock reported that while in the past Chekiang Province had not imported 
rice, in 1862 the province imported $9,706,182 worth.
121
 Fittock’s report leaves the 
impression that this deficit in rice production was because of increased cotton 
production, though the Taiping Rebellion may have been the real cause. The steep, 
rapid increase in cotton prices was explicitly blamed for disrupting the normal routine 
of transactions between farmers and the Chinese merchants who bought their cotton. 
As prices rose, farmers were prone to break contracts to sell their cotton for a pre-
agreed price and sell instead to whoever offered the highest price.
122
 Again, however, 
the real reason may have been desire on the farmers’ part to sell their cotton as 
quickly as possible rather than risk its confiscation or destruction by either the 
Taiping rebels or government forces. 
Evidence suggests that New England cotton manufacturers and merchants 
may have attempted to encourage cotton production in China by making small 
purchases in a fashion similar to the purchases made in the Ottoman Empire, Brazil, 
and Central America, although details are unclear and contradictory. On June 12, 
1862, the Lowell Daily Citizen and News reported that the first Chinese cotton 
imported into the United States was 735 bales that had just arrived in New York from 
Macao aboard the merchant ship Levanter.
123
 News accounts of this delivery of 
Chinese cotton did not identify the ship’s owners nor name the importer. Sometime 
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prior to August 13, 1863, the sailing bark Emily Banning delivered 159 bales of 
cotton from Shanghai to San Francisco. Finding no market for the cotton in 
California, the unidentified importer shipped it to Panama on the steamer Golden Age, 
for trans-shipment to New York.
124
 More than three decades after the Civil War, in 
June 1898, Captain Arthur E. Knights, a retired merchant ship captain who had spent 
his career commanding ships engaged in the Far East trade, told Murray Bain, the 
editor of the China Mail newspaper, that he had commanded the ship that brought 
what he believed to be the “First Cotton from China to America.” Captain Knights 
identified the ship as the Neimen, a sailing vessel owned by Messrs. Russell and 
Company of Boston. The Neimen departed Hong Kong bound for New York on May 
24, 1864. Captain Knights stated that the Chinese cotton sold for $1.50 per pound in 
New York, indicating that his recollection of the date was correct. According to 
Captain Knights, the importer was Paul Forbes.
125
 
China’s failure to meet expectations can be attributed to two factors. First, the 
Taiping Rebellion severely disrupted village life, agriculture, commerce, and 
transportation. From 1860 to 1863, Taiping forces controlled the Shanghai hinterlands 
from bases 25 miles in every landward direction from the city and had the seaport 
under what amounted to a land blockade.
126
 Destructive raids penetrated to within ten 
miles of the city on several occasions.
127
  In January 1861, the rebels launched a 
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major assault on the city that was repulsed by a battalion of the British Indian Army, 
a battery of British artillery, and a contingent of foreign volunteers.
128
 Taiping forces 
seized the port of Ningpo on December 9, 1861, and held it until driven out by an 
Anglo-French naval force on March 10, 1862. According to historian H. B. Morse, 
the Taipings subsequently laid waste to the countryside around the city.
129
 Yet the 
devastated area exported 64 million pounds of cotton in 1863.
130
 The large export of 
cotton from Ningpo during the time when the Taipings controlled the seaport’s 
hinterland suggests that the rebels may have been protecting and encouraging the 
cotton trade, perhaps as a source of revenue to finance military operations. 
Had the Taiping Rebellion not interfered, China might have followed a pattern 
similar to that of India. Smallholdings were the general rule, and farmers utilized their 
limited amount of land in such a way as to maximize its return in both food for home 
consumption and cash. This involved an intensive, balanced system of mixed 
cropping.
131
 When the price of cotton increased dramatically as a result of the 
American Civil War, Chinese farmers opportunistically increased the amount of land 
and labor devoted to cotton. They did not change their fundamental system of 
agriculture to accommodate cotton, however. When cotton prices fell, they relegated 
it to its previous lesser status within the crop mix.  
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Second, the Cotton Supply Association’s failure to introduce American cotton 
seeds into China meant that most Chinese cotton remained an undesirable product.
132
 
Chinese cotton exports ceased after 1866 because British mills stopped buying it, not 
because Chinese farmers stopped growing it. After 1908, when the Chinese 
government introduced American seeds in large quantities and energetically 
promoted cotton growing as an alternative to opium, the quality of Chinese cotton 
improved dramatically, enabling it to compete with the lower grades of American 
cotton in Japanese mills.
133
 
Japan too felt the ripple effects of the American Civil War, and had its own 
short-lived cotton exporting boom. Cotton had been grown in Japan for many 
centuries. Most Japanese peasants in regions south of Tokyo grew small plots of 
cotton for domestic use. A cotton market began in Osaka in the early 1600s. Japan’s 
cotton merchants were already well established in the trade, though their activities 
were confined within Japan. A few were importers who brought in Chinese cotton to 
supplement the Japanese crop, which usually fell short of domestic needs. When the 
price of cotton skyrocketed because of the American Civil War, a Tokyo cotton 
merchant, Manpei Kashima, who already had a business relationship with British 
merchants in Japan, began exporting Japanese cotton to Britain.
134
 Manpei Kashima’s 
activities are remarkable when it is considered that the commercial treaty between the 
United States and Japan that opened Japanese ports to world trade was signed in 
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February 1858. Under the terms of that treaty, Kanagawa (Yokohama) was opened to 
foreign trade on July 4, 1859. Edo (Tokyo) was not officially opened to foreign trade 
until January 1, 1862.
135
 
American consular reports from Japan for the year ended September 30, 1862, 
do not mention cotton among Japanese exports. However, in a report dated October 1, 
1863, U. S. Consul George S. Fisher in Kanagawa informed Secretary of State 
Seward that exports of cotton were increasing rapidly due to demand from Europe. 
According to Fisher, 16,310 piculs (2,174,123 pounds) of cotton were exported in 
1862 and 41,714 piculs (5,560,476 pounds) in the first nine months of 1863. Fisher 
cited the Japanese customhouse as his source for the data, but it is unclear whether his 
figures are for all of Japan or just for the port of Kanagawa.
136
 The price paid for 
cotton was “$13.50 to $20 per picul.”137 This indicates a price of from 10 cents to 15 
cents per pound. It is unclear whether Fisher meant U.S. dollars or Mexican silver 
pesos, as he uses the “$” sign expressly for “Mexican dollars” in later reports. The 
1869 Mexican silver peso weighed 24.44 grams and was made of silver bullion 
refined to 90 percent purity.
138
 The 1865 U.S. Liberty silver dollar weighed 26.73 
grams and was composed of 90 percent pure silver alloyed with 10 percent copper.
139
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In terms of silver content, the Mexican peso was worth slightly less than 91½ U.S. 
cents, so prices in American currency would be in the 9 cents to 13¾ cents per pound 
range. After the Japanese currency revision of February 1860, Japanese coins had a 
face value roughly equivalent to their silver content. U.S. silver dollars and Mexican 
silver pesos could be exchanged for Japanese currency at a 1-to-1 rate based on their 
silver content.
140
  
George Fisher kept careful track of the cotton situation in Japan and reported 
prices and exports regularly to Washington. Fisher observed that the increase in 
Japanese cotton exports involved an actual increase in the amount of cotton grown. 
He also noted that Japanese cotton, though it was a short staple variety, was superior 
to the average Chinese cotton and that it was, “better than the best India cotton.”141 
His reports, though they give details of prices and quantity, are lacking in some 
details. Fisher did not, for example, mention cotton gins, nor did his British 
counterparts. Prices for Japanese cotton climbed sharply during November and 
December 1863, doubling in just sixty days to $35 per picul.
142
 Japanese cotton 
exports from Kanagawa increased from 9,645 bales in the 1862-63 reporting year to 
74,000 in the 1863-64 year.
143
 All Japanese cotton was pressed with machinery at the 
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ports, resulting in a uniform bale that weighed an average 300 pounds.
144
 This seems 
to indicate that Fisher expected about 22 million pounds of Japanese cotton to be 
exported in 1864. The Cotton Supply Association, using information supplied to the 
Foreign Office by the British consul in Kanagawa, Mr. Winchester, on October 7, 
1864, estimated 8 million pounds.
145
 It should be noted that both these figures were 
projections based on estimated acreage and estimated yield, not reports of actual 
exports. Winchester’s report, made in October, after harvest, was probably more 
accurate than Fisher’s, which was made in June, when the cotton had just been 
planted. 
 American buyers were active in the Japanese cotton markets. In a letter sent 
from Kanagawa in March 1864, the British consul reported that 6,736 piculs (897,908 
pounds) of Japanese cotton valued at $134,720 was exported to the Untied States 
during the previous twelve months. This calculates to 15 cents per pound.
146
 If the 
cotton arrived in New York in September 1864, after six months at sea, it would have 
returned a 1,000 percent gross profit, as the price in New York was over $1.80 at that 
time.
147
 Curiously, as was the case in Brazil as well, the American consul did not 
mention any shipments of cotton to the United States in his reports. 
 Circumstantial evidence suggests that the American cotton merchants 
transacted their business with Manpei Kashima. In 1864, soaring prices drove British-
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made cloth out of reach of most Japanese consumers. Kashima suggested to the 
Tokugawa government that foreign spinning and weaving machines be imported and 
installed in a factory to use Japanese cotton at home. The machines were ordered not 
from Great Britain, but from the United States. Manpei Kashima established his own 
cotton textile factory in 1867, also with American machinery and the assistance of an 
American engineer.
148
 
Great and rapid as the increase in Japanese cotton exports was, there was 
never any assumption that Japan would become a permanent cotton supplier. In a 
letter to the Foreign Office, the British consul in Kanagawa warned, “No dependence 
can, however, be placed on the permanence of trade in this article, stimulated as it has 
been by the enormous value which the blockade of the Southern States had 
produced.”149 A little more than one year later, George Fisher commented in his 
annual recap for the year ended September 30, 1865, that cotton had, “entirely 
disappeared from market, and has ceased to be talked about. Since July 1 not a bale 
has been shipped, and not one is likely to be during the year.”150 
The cotton boom and subsequent bust in Asia followed the same general 
pattern as in Brazil and the Ottoman Empire. India’s cotton merchants, anticipating a 
coming collapse of the market, ceased advancing operating money to the ryots upon 
learning that the Civil War in America had ended. Farmers responded by greatly 
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reducing cotton acreage. That acreage, and additional land made usable with the 
profits from the cotton boom, was sown in wheat and other cereals.
151
 By 1870, 
cotton exports to Britain had declined to the point that many shipping companies 
found it difficult to secure return cargoes from India. In an effort to sustain falling 
cotton exports, the Great Indian Peninsular Railway cut the freight rates that it 
charged for hauling cotton in 1871, but to no avail. Lancashire simply did not want 
Indian cotton after American cotton production recovered.
152
 When compared to the 
Ottoman Empire and Egypt, a major difference was that India’s native merchants 
invested their earnings in developing India’s own cotton textile industry. They 
subsequently managed to keep that industry alive in the face of Lancashire’s attempts 
to drive them out of business. This kept cotton growing economically viable in India, 
though it was not the only nor even the major crop.  
India never developed the necessary agricultural techniques, infrastructure, 
and institutions to grow, transport, and market cotton necessary to compete with the 
United States. Indian cultivation methods remained basically static for more than fifty 
years after the end of the American Civil War. The 1912 edition of Shepperson’s 
Cotton Facts reported, “The methods of cultivation are very primitive and rude. 
Everything is done by hand and no commercial fertilizers are used.”153 Railroads 
gradually improved transportation, but handling remained rude. The marketing 
system also remained pre-modern. Thirty years after the end of the American Civil 
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War, cotton continued to be sold and stored in the open air on Bombay’s Cotton 
Green.
154
 Even when India was producing 6 million bales in 1913, its production 
methods and handling facilities remained far behind those of the United States. At 
that time, British agronomist John A. Todd was forced to lament, “It is all the more 
regretted, therefore, that India’s present position in the world’s cotton-supply should 
be such a bad second.”155  
In China, the effects of the Taiping Rebellion crippled agriculture and 
transportation, but despite the disruption the high prices paid for cotton during the 
Cotton Famine led to some increase in cotton production. In the rest of Asia, the 
world cotton crisis was merely an economic ripple, a brief wave that came suddenly 
and passed just as quickly, without leaving any discernable trace in the long-term. By 
the time the Japanese legation in Washington, the trading firm of Mitsui & Company, 
and the Naigai Wata Kaisha industrial combine in Osaka provided the information for 
the brief history of the Japanese cotton industry that appeared in the annual edition of 
Shepperson’s Cotton Facts for 1912, Japan’s experience as a cotton exporting nation 
during the Civil War was omitted.
156
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Chapter 11 
The Friendly Islands 
 
The global cotton crisis brought on by the American Civil War affected even 
remote islands in the South Pacific. Two years before the American Civil War began, 
Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper said of the Fiji Islands: 
For a cotton country it is said to be particularly adapted; and 
there are over 200,000 Feejeeans, who if they could once be made to 
feel certain of enjoying the produce of their labor, would speedily send 
forth a large supply of this vegetable fleece. The growth of cotton, and 
its first preparation for raw export, require very little manual labor, and 
no agricultural or mechanical skill. It is singularly suited, therefore, to 
the capacity of such people as those islanders.
1
 
 
Eleven days after the article about “Feejee” appeared in the New York 
newspaper, the Charleston Mercury reported that in Britain, “Mr. W. Arthur, a fellow 
of the Asiatic, Ethnological, and other learned societies,” had published a pamphlet 
extolling Fiji’s cotton growing potential.2 In August 1859, the Mercury worried that 
the Cotton Supply Association might convince the British government to annex the 
South Pacific island group and turn it into a cotton plantation. The same editorial was 
reprinted in The Weekly Mississippian a week later.
3
 Charles Francis Adams, Jr., 
thought that Fiji was better suited to cotton growing than was India.
4
 With hindsight, 
the belief that Fiji could be transformed into an idyllic Polynesian cotton plantation 
seems incredibly naïve. It was attempted nonetheless. 
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The Fiji group are a chain of over three hundred reef-laced volcanic islands 
comparable to Hawaii in size, topography, and natural habitat located in the tropical 
South Pacific some 2,000 miles east of Cairns, Australia. The Fijis lie at the eastern 
extremity of Melanesia; the Tonga group, 200 miles to the east, are in Polynesia. No 
European set foot in Fiji until 1774, when Captain James Cook touched briefly at 
Vatoa Island. Cook mistakenly thought that the Fijis and Tonga were a single island 
group, and he named them the Friendly Islands. It was a misnomer. Warfare was 
constant, and conducted with unlimited brutality.
5
 
The Fijians’ aboriginal socio-political organization, in common with that 
found on all the South Pacific islands, was a patchwork of hereditary complex 
chiefdoms, i.e. a primitive system of vassalage in which subordinate chiefs were 
tributary to a superior chief, who was in turn subordinate to a chief who ranked higher 
still. This hierarchy terminated in a dozen or so paramount chiefdoms. The Fijians 
practiced subsistence agriculture based on taro, yams, bananas, and breadfruit 
supplemented with pigs, fowl, and seafood. Their principal agricultural tool was the 
wooden digging stick. Primitive as their agricultural implements were, Fijian farming 
methods were well adapted to the local habitat and provided food in abundance.
6
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Distant and inaccessible though it was, Fiji’s location brought the islands to 
the attention of Americans, particularly New Englanders. Before the advent of steam 
power, prevailing winds dictated the course that sailing ships took to reach their 
destinations. In order to ride the cyclonic and anti-cyclonic winds in the Atlantic, 
ships outbound from New England to the Far East steered an elongated backward “S” 
course southward almost to Cape São Roque, the easternmost tip of Brazil, then 
curved south and east to the southern tip of Africa. Ships then followed a track, “from 
the Cape of Good Hope…round New Holland through the South and North Pacific 
Oceans, and went as far to the eastward as…the northwestern extremity of the 
Friendly Islands.”7 Ships rode the strong westerly winds known as the “Roaring 
Forties” across the Indian Ocean at about 40 degrees south latitude and passed south 
of Australia before steering a great curve northward through the Tasman Sea that 
passed close to the Fijis. They then came round to a westward heading that enabled 
them to ride the easterly equatorial winds on a track several hundred miles north of 
the Solomon Islands and New Guinea to the southern Philippine Sea before turning 
north to Luzon Strait, where they turned west to Canton.
8
 
 Starting with the wreck of the ship Argo in 1798, a handful of Americans took 
up permanent residence in Fiji. Some of them were shipwrecked sailors who survived 
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as best they could until rescued. Others were misfits who jumped ship from passing 
whalers and traders. A few were men from trading ships who initially remained 
behind intending to stay only long enough to barter for the ship’s next cargo but 
gradually integrated themselves into Fijian culture. Fijian chiefs valued these 
Americans as intermediaries in trading with the ships. Men with practical craft skills 
such as metalworking that the natives did not possess were highly sought after. The 
chiefs formed bonds with favored newcomers, often through marriage alliances.
9
  
One of the most notable of the resident Americans was David Whippy, the 
scion of a family of Nantucket sea captains and merchants. Whippy arrived as a 
young trader in 1824 and remained in Fiji until his death in 1871. He would play an 
important role in the efforts to establish Fijian cotton plantations in the 1860s. Unlike 
the illiterate castaways, ship jumpers, and shiftless rogues who were the general run 
of seamen cast up on Fiji’s shores, Whippy was a well-read man who possessed 
considerable strength of character. He assimilated into Fijian society, but on his own 
terms. Whippy established himself at Levuka village on Ovalau Island and made 
himself indispensable as a business agent representing Fijians in trade negotiations 
with American merchant ship captains. He rose to prominence in Fijian society, 
became a kind of inter-chiefdom ambassador, married two high-ranking Fijian 
women, and acquired several large parcels of land.
10
 
Visiting ships brought cotton seeds to Fiji sometime around 1830, along with 
many other plants not indigenous to the islands, including tobacco, maize, and 
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cassava. The Fijians readily adopted tobacco, maize, and cassava, and integrated them 
into their garden farming. They evidently planted cotton, but found no use for it and 
abandoned its cultivation. The cotton seeds introduced into Fiji arrived at different 
times and came from different locales. Six distinct varieties were later identified. One 
was indigenous to Peru, one was the Chinese variety known as Nankin, two were 
“kidney” cotton akin to American or South Asian upland varieties, and two were 
probably naturally hybridized strains the progenitors of which could not be 
determined. Whatever their native character, in Fiji’s tropical oceanic climate all 
types of cotton grew as shrubby perennials, the woody plants sometimes reaching 
twelve feet in height. Feral cotton plants spread everywhere along the island littorals, 
growing as weeds. Nearly every account of Fiji published prior to 1860 remarked 
upon the thriving cotton plants that grew wild in the islands.
11
 
Two Wesleyan-Methodist missionaries from the London Missionary Society, 
William Cross and David Cargill, arrived with their families in 1835. More followed. 
With the missionaries came encouragement to grow cotton and engage in the 
capitalist commercial economy. Rev. Arminius Burgess, a British missionary who 
arrived in 1839, wrote that on his very first day in Fiji he urged the natives to, “use 
the earth so abundantly given to them, by planting sufficient food for their own 
consumption and for sale, and cotton and coffee.”12 Converting the Fijians to 
Christianity proved to be a slow, difficult process, however. The Fijians, and 
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especially the chiefs, were by all accounts obstinate heathens who much preferred 
leisure, feasting, fighting, and sex with their multiple wives to lotu, as the Christian 
lifestyle of pacifism, monogamy, frugality, and hard work preached by the 
missionaries was called.
13
 U.S. Navy Captain Charles Wilkes, commander of the 
United States Exploring Expedition that arrived in 1840, described the Fijians as, “the 
most barbarous and savage race now existing upon the globe.”14 
At the time of Wilkes’ exploration of the islands, Fiji’s two largest paramount 
chiefdoms, Bau and Rewa, were engaged in a struggle for primacy. The root of the 
conflict was personal enmity between Cakobau (pronounced Thak-om-bau), the 
paramount chief of Bau, and Qaraniqio, the paramount chief of Rewa. The two men’s 
mutual hatred seems to have known no bounds. The feud apparently began as a fight 
over ownership of a pig. It escalated when Qaraniqio seduced one of Cakobau’s 
wives. Cakobau had one of Qaraniqio’s wives and her three children killed in reprisal. 
A tribal war then erupted. Eventually Cakobau began calling himself “Tui Viti,” a 
title that foreigners translated to mean King of Fiji. Though Cakobau never presented 
a mortal threat to the missionaries, he forbade conversion to Christianity by anyone in 
his domain. In 1849 the Wesleyans converted Tui Nayau, chief of Lau atoll on the 
eastern fringe of the group and a vassal of Cakobau, to Christianity. Cakobau 
considered Tui Nayau’s religious conversion an act of rebellion. The fight between 
Tui Nayau and Cakobau took on the character of a religious war between Christians 
and heathens. It soon drew Henry Ma’afu, a Christianized and politically ambitious 
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Tongan chief into the power struggle as an ally of the Christian partisans. Ma’afu was 
on cordial terms with the Wesleyan missionaries, who naturally gave him their 
support.
15
 
This was the situation when the United States appointed a commercial agent 
with consular powers to represent American interests in Fiji in 1846. The American 
agent, John Brown Williams, from Salem, Massachusetts, had been in the Pacific 
since 1840, operating as a trader. Insofar as it suited his own ends, Williams 
recognized Cakobau’s pretensions to be King of Fiji and held him responsible for all 
injury and damages done to Americans in the islands, even in areas that Cakobau did 
not actually control. When a derelict American merchant ship drifted aground on one 
of the island group’s many coral reefs and natives looted it, Williams demanded that 
Cakobau compensate the owners. Cakobau refused to pay. On July 4, 1849, Williams’ 
house and trading post burned in an accidental fire. In the ensuing pandemonium 
natives stole some of Williams’ trade goods and personal possessions. He demanded 
that Cakobau pay $5,000 compensation for the damages. Cakobau again refused. In 
1855 Commander E. B. Boutwell, captain of the ship-sloop U.S.S. John Adams, held 
Cakobau prisoner aboard the warship until Cakobau agreed to pay Williams $45,000 
in three installments over two years. The illiterate Cakobau put his mark on a written 
agreement to that effect, although it was impossible for him to honor the pledge. 
There was no money in the islands. Indeed, it is doubtful that Cakobau then fully 
understood the meaning of money. Nevertheless, Williams continued to demand 
payment. Williams also used threats of punitive action by American warships to 
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coerce other Fijian chiefs into selling him a considerable amount of land in exchange 
for small quantities of trade goods. The British missionaries began to suspect that 
Williams was plotting to use the unpaid reparations debt as a pretext for American 
annexation of Fiji.
16
  
Williams had underestimated his opponent, however. In what was probably a 
shrewdly calculated stratagem intended to gain the assistance of the British 
missionaries in thwarting Williams, Cakobau announced his conversion to 
Christianity and underwent an ostentatious baptism ceremony on Sunday, April 30, 
1854. Cakobau thereupon ordered his people to convert to Christianity en masse. A 
year later Rewa’s resistance collapsed and Qaraniqio died, leaving Cakobau the 
victor. That did not mean that Cakobau was in fact as well as in name King of Fiji, 
however. Ma’afu wielded at least as much power and influence as Cakobau did, and 
probably more. Great Britain appointed the Empire’s first consul to Fiji, William 
Thomas Pritchard, the Tahiti-born son of missionaries, in 1858.
17
 At that time Fiji had 
about fifty white residents. Some of them were British subjects engaged in trade with 
the natives, but Pritchard’s appointment owed more to British concerns about 
American activities in the islands than to commerce. Three weeks after Pritchard 
arrived, the U.S.S. Vandalia appeared. The Vandalia’s Captain Sinclair reiterated the 
demand that Cakobau pay Williams’ reparations claim and threatened bloody 
reprisals if he did not. Cakobau turned to Pritchard for help, and Pritchard drafted for 
him a formal petition to Queen Victoria asking that Fiji be made a British 
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protectorate. In return for Great Britain paying the American reparations debt, 
Cakobau promised to bestow upon Queen Victoria and her heirs a 200,000-acre Fijian 
estate.
18
 
Pritchard set out on the long voyage to England in mid-November 1858, and 
arrived in London in February 1859. He presented Cakobau’s petition to the Earl of 
Malmesbury, then the Colonial Secretary in Lord Derby’s cabinet. Pritchard urged 
that Britain accept Cakobau’s offer, pointing out that Fiji, “Situated on the highway 
of commerce between Australia and Panama, its capacious and secure harbours, in the 
possession of an enemy, would afford shelter to an imposing fleet, and a basis for 
offensive operations against our commerce in the southern seas and the coast of 
Australia.”19 He brought with him samples of the cotton found growing wild in Fiji, 
and reported, “Cotton may be grown extensively, and there is no scarcity of labour.”20 
Support for the proposal came forth almost immediately, and from many quarters. In 
a memorandum dated March 12, 1859, Admiral John Washington, Hydrographer of 
the Admiralty, affirmed the geostrategic importance of Fiji to the security of 
Australia. He also noted that Fiji would be a convenient location for a coaling station 
on a future Panama-to-Australia steamship route.
21
 The London Missionary Society, 
whose views oftentimes shaped British colonial policy in the Pacific islands, noted 
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that there were now in Fiji some 60,000 Christian converts in need of Britain’s 
benevolent protection and civilizing influence. The Royal Geographical Society, of 
which Pritchard was a member, lent its support.
22
 The Manchester Chamber of 
Commerce lobbied the Government to accept Cakobau’s offer. In April The Cotton 
Supply Reporter published a feature article extolling the virtues of Fiji as a potential 
cotton-growing country.
 23
 
While the proposal was being discussed and debated, the Royal Navy detailed 
a warship, H.M.S. Cordelia, to return Pritchard to Fiji. He arrived there on November 
1, 1859, bringing with him a few bags of New Orleans cotton seeds provided by the 
Cotton Supply Association. Upon arrival Pritchard found the islands in turmoil, with 
Cakobau and Ma’afu  engaged in a power struggle. They were arming for a violent 
showdown. Pritchard discovered that the Fijian chiefs were offering young women in 
payment for firearms, and that the white traders had acquired numerous concubines in 
this exchange. This incensed the missionaries, but there was nothing that they or 
Pritchard could do about it. Neither the Fijian chiefs nor the white traders would 
brook interference in that they considered their private affairs. This was especially 
true of the American traders, over whom Pritchard’s consular authority did not 
extend. The Christian ruler of Tonga, King George Taufa’ahau, a close kinsman of 
Ma’afu, was maneuvering to thwart the British protectorate and add Fiji to his 
Tongan kingdom. There was also trouble between Wesleyan and Roman Catholic 
missionaries and their native partisans, raising the prospect that French warships 
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cruising in the vicinity might intervene to protect the Catholics. This presented the 
danger that the French might impose their own protectorate in Fiji as they had done 
earlier in Tahiti. With consummate diplomatic skill and a bit of intimidation provided 
by the Royal Navy gunboat H.M.S. Elk, Pritchard arranged a truce between Cakobau 
and Ma’afu. Acting far in excess of his authority as a consul, Pritchard then accepted 
the rival chiefs’ suggestion that he assume the power to make and enforce laws under 
the aegis of a still non-existent native government. This immediately made Pritchard 
referee in every squabble that occurred in the islands, and ultimately caused the 
Foreign Office to dismiss him as British consul in January 1863.
24
  
Meantime, the Colonial Office appointed a commission headed by Colonel W. 
J. Smythe of the Royal Artillery to go to Fiji and investigate the situation there. In 
addition to Smythe, the commission included Dr. Berthold Seemann, the head 
botanist at Kew Gardens and a renowned authority on tropical plants. The 
commission sailed from Southampton bound for Australia via the Cape of Good Hope 
in a Peninsular and Orient Line steamer on February 12, 1860, and finally reached 
Fiji in the missionary schooner John Wesley on May 12, 1860. Seemann departed Fiji 
on November 17, 1860. Colonel Smythe remained until March 1861. While in Fiji, 
the commissioners had the assistance of Consul Pritchard, the missionaries, and the 
Royal Navy ship-sloop H.M.S. Harrier, Captain Malcolm M’Gregor commanding. 
They also enjoyed the unexpected cooperation of the acting American vice-consul, 
Dr. Isaac Mills Brower, a former U.S. Army surgeon and seagoing trader who 
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assumed John Brown Williams’ duties when Williams died of dysentery on June 10, 
1860.
25
  
Colonel Smythe devoted most of his attention to the strategic value of Fiji, 
and to assessing the many problems likely to be encountered in administering the 
proposed protectorate. Smythe quickly discovered that despite his pretensions, 
Cakobau was merely one of twelve paramount chiefs, not King of Fiji, and could not 
deliver on his promises. The 200,000 acres that Cakobau promised to Queen Victoria 
turned out to belong to another paramount chief, he one of Cakobau’s enemies. Only 
one page of Smythe’s book-length report was devoted to cotton. Smythe thought that 
if cotton were to be grown commercially in Fiji it would have to be done by white 
settlers. Whether or not they succeeded would be “a question of land and labour.” The 
natives would have to supply the land and the field workers, and Smythe did not think 
them likely to do so.
26
  
Mr. M. Bensusan of the Royal Geographical Society, who was not a member 
of the commission but was in Fiji at the same time, agreed with Smythe’s dim 
assessment. In reference to the outlook for cotton cultivation in the islands, Mr. 
Bensusan reported back to the Society: 
[T]he real stop to all such enterprise is the actual want of native 
labour—the natives will positively not work. People inquire why they 
will not work. My answer is, because they have no wants. The 
spontaneous supply of food far exceeds their wants. They make their 
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own scanty dresses, build their own houses, their own canoes; make 
their own mats to lie upon, their own cooking utensils of pottery; and 
they are independent of the white man.
27
 
 
Seemann was more optimistic. Pritchard and the missionaries had induced the 
Christian chiefs to order their people to begin cultivating cotton. Seemann 
commented that, “cotton has been thickly spread over all the Christianized districts, 
and imparts to them a characteristic feature, occasionally very striking in places 
having a mixed religious population.”28 This leads one to wonder whether the natives 
considered growing cotton a commercial activity or a Christian religious obligation. 
The Fijians did not adopt large-field plantation methods. Instead, they planted the 
cotton seeds in the same traditional manner as they did food crops, in garden plots of 
about fifty plants each. In many gardens cotton plants were intermingled with maize, 
taro, yams, cassava, and other food plants. Because of this planting method, Seemann 
agreed with Smythe that natives working on their own would never produce 
anywhere near enough cotton to make the enterprise worthwhile. Surprisingly, neither 
Smythe nor Seemann addressed the logistical problems of getting Fijian cotton to 
market.
29
 
Pritchard and Seemann began cotton demonstration projects aimed at 
encouraging the adoption of monoculture plantation methods. Prichard acquired a 
parcel of land on an island in the Rewa River Delta on Viti Levu and planted the 
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American cotton seeds that he brought with him from England. Seemann brought 
with him from England an unspecified “large” quantity of Sea Island and New 
Orleans cotton seeds supplied to him by the Cotton Supply Association. Some of 
these were planted at Nukumoto, in the Rewa district. Twenty native laborers were 
hired to tend the plants under the supervision of Seemann’s assistant, identified only 
as Mr. Storck. Seemann gave seeds to a Captain Wilson, who owned land at 
Somosomo, and to M. Joubert, a settler recently arrived from Sydney, who started a 
plantation on Taviuni Island. Seemann established another demonstration plantation 
at Somosomo supervised by a native Fijian, a man named Koytoo. The Sea Island 
seeds proved faulty and did not germinate, but the New Orleans cotton thrived. The 
vigorous young plants were already sufficiently mature when Seemann departed for 
England that he was able to carry sample bolls from them with him. These he 
presented to the Cotton Supply Association.
30
 
Simultaneous with the cotton experiments begun by Pritchard and Seemann, 
the longtime American resident David Whippy began cultivating cotton. In 1860, 
Whippy, in partnership with an Englishman, William Simpson, exchanged less than 
$400 worth of trade goods for 9,000 acres of land at Wainunu Bay on the northern 
coast of Vanua Levu Island and established a cotton plantation there. It is unclear 
whether Whippy and Simpson planted imported seed or merely began tending and 
harvesting the feral cotton plants already growing on the land.
31
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Isaac Mills Brower’s position as acting U.S. Vice Consul in Fiji was irregular. 
He held no commission or appointment from the government. His status rested purely 
on the fact that John Brown Williams had entrusted him with looking after U.S. 
consular affairs until such time as a new consul was appointed.
32
 President Lincoln 
appointed Thomas J. Johnston of Michigan to be U.S. Commercial Agent in Fiji on 
December 5, 1861. Johnston declined the appointment.
33
 The Fiji consular post was 
then given to Edwin F. Bunnell, a Californian. Bunnell sailed from San Francisco in a 
trading ship in May 1862, but died before the ship reached Fiji.
34
 The State 
Department apparently remained unaware of Bunnell’s death until after the end of the 
Civil War, when Isaac M. Brower wrote to ask why official correspondence was 
being sent to him.
35
 Secretary of State Seward officially designated Brower as consul 
in 1866.
36
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Little can be said with certainty about Isaac Mills Brower before he assumed 
the duties of acting vice consul in Fiji. British colonial historian Ronald Albert 
Derrick, in the official A History of Fiji, stated that Brower was a Southerner by birth, 
and that he had been a surgeon in the U.S. Navy prior to coming to Fiji as an island 
trader and ship captain in the 1850s.
37
 However, in his first letter addressed to the 
Secretary of State from Fiji, Brower wrote that he was, “Born in the State of Ohio, 
and have served in the U.S. Army.”38 There seems to have been some confusion at the 
State Department about Brower’s identity. Reports from Brower published in 
Commercial Relations of the United States were sometimes attributed to J. M. Brown, 
most likely because his signature was illegible. 
Though without salary or official commission, Brower energetically pursued 
American interests in Fiji. In 1859 Brower acquired ownership of a plantation on 
Wakaia Island, an enclave inhabited by the half-caste offspring of white 
beachcombers and their Fijian wives, and made his home there.
39
 In 1861 or early 
1862, Brower planted about fifteen acres of cotton using New Orleans seed at his 
estate.
40
 A story in the Boston Daily Advertiser in 1872 stated that Brower introduced 
Sea Island cotton seed into the islands “several years ago.”41 The source of the seeds 
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that Brower planted is unknown. Later, Brower and David Whippy partnered to 
develop and operate cotton plantations.
42
  
Brower was also involved in establishing a settler from Australia, Robert 
Swanton, as a cotton planter. Robert Swanton came to Fiji in 1857 as a passenger 
aboard Brower’s small schooner, the Mechanic, apparently at Brower’s behest. 
Swanton first tried to raise sheep on Brower’s Wakaia estate, but the project failed 
when a mysterious wasting disease killed the sheep. Swanton then began 
experimenting with cotton, using various types of seed furnished by the Cotton 
Supply Association and Fiji’s feral plants. Through trial and error, Swanton 
eventually developed a variety of Sea Island cotton and cultivation methods that were 
adapted to the Fijian habitat. Swanton kept extensive notes, and also amassed a 
collection of literature about cotton cultivation, much of it articles clipped from 
British, Australian, and American newspapers.
43
 
While these efforts to explore the horticultural potential of cotton cultivation 
were being made in Fiji, a parallel effort was underway in Australia to finance the 
establishment of commercial cotton plantations. In March 1861, Mr. Bensusan, 
despite his misgivings about the viability of native labor in Fiji, was in Melbourne, 
proposing that merchants in New South Wales charter a company with £100,000 
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capital to purchase land in Fiji upon which to establish cotton plantations. Men from 
Australia were to be encouraged to go to Fiji and take up cotton planting.
44
  
News of these promising experiments with cotton growing in Fiji arrived in 
England just as the American Civil War precipitated the long-feared cotton crisis. Mr. 
Bensusan’s letter reporting his activities in Fiji and Australia was delivered to the 
Cotton Supply Association’s office in Manchester in May 1861. The Colonial Office 
forwarded a copy of Berthold Seemann’s short preliminary report from Fiji to the 
Association in July, in time for it to appear in The Cotton Supply Reporter published 
on August 1, 1861.
45
 In the meantime, the British government decided not to accept 
Cakobau’s offer, meaning that Fiji would be without effective civil government 
during the coming cotton boom.
46
 
Judging from the time it took Mr. Bensusan’s March 21, 1861 letter to the 
Cotton Supply Association to reach Manchester from Melbourne, news of the 
outbreak of the Civil War in America probably did not reach Australia until two 
months after it was known in England. The news probably did not reach Fiji for 
something over a month later than that, as there was no mail service to the islands 
except that provided by the irregular voyages of tramp trading vessels and the London 
Missionary Society’s small support schooner John Wesley.47 Thus it was probably 
sometime in August or September 1861 before anyone in Fiji knew that the world 
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cotton economy had been disrupted. What the immediate reaction was in Fiji to the 
news that a world cotton shortage was imminent is hinted at by a brief article in The 
Cotton Supply Reporter of March 1, 1862. It reported receipt of a letter from a Mr. 
Henry Crawford in which he reported having harvested 1,500 pounds of cotton grown 
on his newly established plantation on the “Reeva” (Rewa) River in Fiji. Along with 
his letter to the Association, Crawford sent a half-pound sample of his cotton for an 
appraisal of its value. In common with many other aspiring cotton planters in locales 
around the world, Crawford requested that the Association send him instructional 
literature.
48
  
Henry Crawford was among the first of about 2,000 aspiring cotton planters 
who came to Fiji between 1862 and 1870.
49
 Dr. W. C. Pechey, a resident medical 
missionary who in 1870 published a manual for planters titled Fijian Cotton Culture, 
and Planters Guide to the Islands reported that, “During the last few years the Fiji 
Islands have risen into public notice as a locality where cotton may be produced. … 
From Australia and New Zealand, colonists have and are still flocking to Fiji.”50  
Most of the new colonists were British subjects, but the American influence in 
Fiji remained strong. Fijian natives and resident whites were long accustomed to the 
value of trade goods being expressed in American money, and when local traders 
began making advances to planters the price of Fijian cotton was also expressed in 
dollars, not in British pounds sterling. Those prices were a matter of guesswork. 
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Cotton market news was always at least three months out of date by the time it 
reached Fiji due to the islands’ remoteness. Getting cotton to market was difficult. 
Access to the islands was from Sydney by small schooners, and these did not keep 
regular schedules. Sailing among the reef-girded islands continued to be extremely 
dangerous, and few ship owners were willing to risk valuable ships among them. 
Cotton had to be sent first to Sydney by schooner, and then shipped to England.
51
 The 
distance meant that planters never knew what their cotton would bring when it 
eventually reached Liverpool. It also meant that twelve to eighteen months elapsed 
between the time a shipment of cotton left Fiji and the planter received his payment.
52
 
Smythe’s prediction that Fijian land and labor would be difficult to obtain 
proved accurate. For a cotton plantation to be commercially viable, 300-400 acres of 
arable land was deemed necessary. Land could be purchased from a Fijian chief for a 
relatively small quantity of trade goods. However, it was unclear which chief owned 
what parcel of land. Two or more chiefs oftentimes claimed ownership of the same 
land. People living on the land often did not recognize the chief’s sale of it. Tract 
boundaries were almost never clearly delineated. Moreover, there was no law code, 
no courts, and no institutionalized way to settle land ownership disputes. There was 
not even a way to record land deeds except to deposit them with the British or 
American consuls. Land tenure was very insecure for settlers and natives alike.
53
 
Working a 300-acre plantation required about 30 laborers. Hiring Fijians to work for 
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wages proved next to impossible. W. C. Pechey echoed Col. Smythe and M. 
Bensusan when he wrote that the Fijian native, “does not stand in need of food, for he 
can grow all he requires; clothes, or the want of them, do not trouble him.”54 To solve 
the labor problem, the cotton planters turned to Cakobau, the presumed King of Fiji. 
Cakobau offered to compel native laborers to work for the cotton planters in return 
for a payment to him of £1 per man per year. The laborer was to be paid annual 
wages in the amount of £1 or £2 worth of trade goods. Pechey thought that this 
system, “if properly carried out, would leave nothing to be desired.”55 The natives 
failed to see its merits, however, and resisted Cakobau’s press gang. Some of 
Cakobau’s men were killed. Cakobau quickly abandoned the scheme.56 
Most of the new settlers who came to Fiji early in the boom were young 
laboring-class men from Australia who lacked sufficient capital to buy land enough to 
establish commercial-size plantations. In a letter written to the Cotton Supply 
Association in April 1864, the acting British consul William Owen reported that 
although a “considerable number” of newly arrived settlers had established cotton 
plantations none was bigger than 15 or 20 acres. These fields the planters had to work 
themselves, with hand tools. Owen remarked that “not one plough” was in use. There 
was only one cotton gin in the islands, a small machine sent to Fiji by the Cotton 
Supply Association in 1861. It was operated by a makeshift windmill and could clean 
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about 500 pounds of cotton per day.
57
 Optimism nevertheless ran high in Fiji. In an 
unsigned letter to the Cotton Supply Association probably written in November or 
December 1865, a planter reported that there was at that time about 5,000 acres under 
cultivation. High prices were encouraging more planting. The writer commented that, 
“although cotton may fall quickly on the settlement of the American war, it could be 
produced in Fiji as cheaply as in any part of the world.”58  
Some of the early reports sent from Fiji were undoubtedly exaggerated. The 
quantities of cotton being harvested were in fact quite small. In a consular report 
dated July 27, 1863, it was stated that, “7½ tons have left this group since January, 
viz., 2 tons cleaned, and 5½ tons in the seed, the former realised in Sydney 1s. 6d. per 
lb., and the latter 7d.”59 Cotton production was increasing rapidly, however. At the 
end of 1867, Mr. John B. Thurston, a planter and acting British vice-consul at 
Levuka, sent a letter to The Cotton Supply Reporter in which he reported that Fiji 
exported 240,000 pounds of cotton in 1865, 588,000 pounds in 1866, and 758,600 
pounds in 1867. Thurston had just put an American-made Brown’s cotton gin into 
operation, using it to gin planters’ cotton and accepting a share of the cotton as his 
fee. Despite high shipping costs, which Thurston put at 4½ d. per pound, the prices 
paid for Fiji cotton in Liverpool remained sufficiently high to return the planters a 
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good profit.
60
 Consul Edward March reported that cotton returned £9,300 in 1865, 
£19,800 in 1866, £34,004 in 1867, £30,975 in 1868, and £45,000 in 1869. He 
estimated that the return in 1870 would be £100,000.
61
 
It seems that no one really knew how much cotton was planted in Fiji. A few 
months after the anonymous planter reported 5,000 acres, Consul Henry M. Jones 
gave the Cotton Supply Association a “rough estimate” that there were 3,000 acres 
planted by settlers, plus some small plots tended by natives.
62
 He described the 
plantations as very small. Cultivation methods were primitive. As of April 1865, only 
one plough was in use in the islands. Most of the crops were still being tended with 
primitive native tools. There were, however, several newly imported cotton gins.
63
 
After much experimentation with native, American and other seeds, the planters had 
settled on Sea Island and an upland variety from Brazil. Both types of cotton 
performed well, but two devastating typhoons, one in January 1866 and another in 
March, roared across the islands. The two storms destroyed half the cotton plants. The 
Fijian chiefs were being uncooperative, obstructing land acquisition and refusing to 
supply labor. Jones suggested “deporting the obnoxious chiefs to other islands.”64  
Another typhoon, a monster storm that Jones described as “the worst in 20 
years” swept over the islands in the spring of 1867. Villages were flattened and the 
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cotton plants were again severely damaged. Nevertheless, Jones was optimistic that 
there would be enough cotton in two years time to begin shipping it direct to England. 
Cotton was by then starting to change the character of Fiji’s white population. The 
beachcomber days of castaway sailors “gone native” were ending, and an era of 
settler families appeared to be in process of starting. Jones reported that the white 
population now numbered “400 souls, 31 of whom are women, and 53 children under 
twelve years of age.”65  
Except that they were almost all young, unmarried men, the whites were a 
diverse group. The majority of the new planters were British subjects, from England, 
Australia, and New Zealand. There were also a small number of Americans, most of 
them of New England origin. These Americans wielded considerable influence in the 
developing cotton trade and in Fijian native affairs.
66
 Two American traders, brothers 
Jack and Will Macdonald operated as seagoing cotton factors in their schooner 
American Brothers. German settlers established a plantation colony on Lau Island. 
Three Germans, Frederick, Gustavus, and William Hennings, formed the trading firm 
of Hennings Brothers and began advancing supplies to planters on credit with future 
cotton pledged as collateral.
67
 
Political changes were underway among the Fijian natives. In April 1867, 
Cakobau asked Samuel A. St. John, an American friend who had been in Fiji for 
fifteen years and was married to a high-ranking Bau woman, to write a constitution 
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for his Kingdom of Bau. St. John wrote a constitution that provided the structure of a 
civil government with supreme authority vested in King Cakobau, a rudimentary law 
code, independent courts, and secretaries of state, treasury, and war. The British 
consul was leery of this government, probably because of the strong American 
influence in it, and refused to recognize its authority. When Cakobau’s embryonic 
government attempted to levy taxes on the British settlers, they refused to pay.
68
 A 
worry arose in British circles that the United States, now that the Civil War was over, 
was again looking to acquire Fiji as a Pacific outpost, perhaps as a stepping-stone to 
Australia. Ominously, the steam sloop U.S.S. Tuscarora appeared at Levuka on July 
11, 1867 to again demand that Cakobau pay the reparations debt owed to the late John 
Brown Williams’s estate. A correspondent in Melbourne subsequently wrote to The 
Cotton Supply Reporter warning that if Great Britain did not soon secure its position 
in Fiji, “the United States will before long make arrangements for assuming the 
protectorate of the islands.”69 The writer went on to say that the Fijians preferred “a 
protectorate un-English in race and institutions.”70 
In the spring of 1868, a group of Melbourne investors belatedly acted on the 
proposal that M. Bensusan had made seven years earlier.
 71
 The Australian capitalists 
formed the Polynesian Company to encourage cotton growing in Fiji. In July, two 
agents of the Polynesian Company identified in documents as Dr. Brewer and Mr. 
Evans negotiated the purchase of 200,000 acres of land on the big island of Viti Levu 
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from Cakobau and six of his subordinate chiefs. The purchase contract stipulated that 
the Polynesian Company was to assume responsibility for Cakobau’s reparations debt 
to the United States. This and some small considerations were the purchase price. The 
company paid the sum of £9,000 in three installments, settling the debt in full on 
November 19, 1870. Fears lingered in Britain that the United States would still make 
Fiji its protectorate because the Polynesian Company’s investors included “a large 
American element.”72 The Polynesian Company’s tract included the town of Suva, its 
harbor and facilities, and ran along the coast in the direction of the Rewa River. In a 
separate transaction in July 1869, Cakobau and another chief named Natika sold 
another 27,000 acres to the Polynesian Company. Jacob Brache, the managing 
director of the Polynesian Company, began subdividing the land and selling it to 
settlers in August 1870. Plantations of 80-200 acres now became the norm. Some 
were considerably larger.
73
 
Simultaneously, a solution to Fiji’s shortage of field laborers was found. Inter-
island traders began recruiting laborers from the New Hebrides Islands about 400 
miles to the northwest and bringing them to Fiji. These workers were usually signed 
to five-year indentured labor contracts. Almost from its inception, missionaries and 
the Anti-Slavery Society condemned this indentured contract labor system as being 
nothing other than thinly disguised slavery.
74
 Planters in Fiji vigorously denied that 
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the contract labor system was a form of slavery. On July 9, 1869, William Scott, a 
planter on Ovalou Island penned a letter to The Cotton Supply Reporter in which he 
refuted claims that the contract labor system was a form of slavery and contended that 
all that was needed was the installation of a British-supervised civil government in 
Fiji with the power to regulate the practice.
75
 
The charges leveled by the missionaries were in fact well founded. Whatever 
the original intent may have been, the contract labor system rapidly degenerated into 
the infamous practice of kidnapping islanders for forced labor known as 
“Blackbirding.” Life for the contract laborers on plantations in Fiji was little different 
from that experienced by slaves on cotton plantations in the American South. Wages 
were so dismally low as to be a legal fig leaf to avoid violating British anti-slavery 
laws. Floggings and other harsh punishments, though rare on Fiji’s plantations, were 
sometimes inflicted. Employers deterred their contract laborers from running away by 
instilling the not-unfounded fear that if they fled to the hills the Fijians would kill, 
roast, and eat them.
76
 
 Fiji’s cotton economy peaked in 1870, though production increased for 
another two or three years. The U.S. consular report for 1870 indicates that Fiji’s total 
exports amounted to $492,400 in value. Of that amount $463,500 was cotton. The 
value of cotton exported would never again reach these amounts. But at the time, the 
future looked bright. Fiji imported $347,255 worth of goods, of which $147,970 was 
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for items such as provisions and groceries, cotton gins and other equipment, and 
livestock.
77
 Many planters purchased small hand-cranked cotton gins made by the 
English firm Dobson and Barlow. The Cotton Supply Association sent out one of the 
latest British-made Macarthy steam-powered cotton gins for display and 
demonstration at the British consulate at Levuka, with hopes of encouraging sales of 
the machines. English ploughs and Australian draft horses were being imported. A 
total of 104 vessels called at Fiji during the year, 99 of them British. Every boat from 
Australia brought new settlers.
78
 
Three men who arrived in Fiji during the cotton boom era left written records 
of their experiences. John Hall James was probably fairly representative of the 
general run of planters. James Turpin was something of a shady character. His value 
to history lies in his diary, the surviving manuscript of a never-published book 
Anecdotes, Narratives and Legends of Fiji, and a Fijian Almanac and Directory that 
he published in 1873. In the almanac, Turpin listed the names and occupations of 
some 1,500 whites living in Fiji. James Lyle Young arrived in 1875, after the cotton 
boom had become the cotton bust. Young was himself never engaged in cotton 
growing, but he preserved in his journal accounts of it heard first hand from those 
who had been directly involved. 
James Turpin, then a young man 24 years of age, came to Fiji from New 
Zealand as a passenger in the Macdonald brothers’ schooner American Brothers in 
1866. Turpin’s past is obscure. He did not say much about himself beyond the fact 
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that he was born in 1842 into a working-class family in Tontes, Devonshire, England. 
He married and had a family in Fiji, but said next to nothing about them. Turpin 
worked for a short time for the British consulate, but was dismissed for some 
undisclosed reason. He then went into business as a land agent. His real estate 
activities fell just short of criminal fraud. Turpin and a partner, John B. Macomber, 
also owned and operated a plantation with 85 acres of cotton, where they employed 
72 contract laborers. James Turpin was never a leader in the white community, and 
indeed did not get along with many people, including eventually his business partner, 
Macomber. Turpin eventually lost his property in Fiji to creditors and moved to 
Australia, where he died in 1917. During most of his time in Fiji, Turpin and his 
family lived in near poverty.
79
  
John Hall James was a young Englishman of lower middle class parentage 
who arrived in 1870, just as the cotton boom peaked. He brought with him a new 
Snyder breech-loading rifle and 400 rounds of ammunition, enough money to buy 
100 acres of land at Tuvu on Viti Levu Island, and a burning desire to “go big licks” 
as a colonial cotton planter. James hired about 25 native men, whether contract 
laborers or locals he did not say, and set about clearing his land and planting cotton. 
Settler life in Fiji in the early 1870s was still very much a frontier existence, and a 
dangerous one. The mountainous interiors of the larger islands remained unexplored, 
and the hill dwelling natives known as “Bigheads” because of their bushy Afro-like 
hairstyle were still savage cannibals untouched by civilization. No sooner had James 
set to work on his plantation than came a raid by men from one of these hill tribes. 
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The raiders brutally killed two of James’ white neighbors and several natives from a 
nearby village. Whites from the neighborhood joined forces with local Fijians in 
launching a retaliatory attack on the offending hill village, the white men using their 
rifles to support their more numerous but less well armed native allies in the attack. 
James put his quick-firing .577 caliber Snyder rifle to good use in the battle, killing 
several enemy warriors. James and his companions then plundered the enemy village 
and, as he wrote to his father on October 8, 1871, “burnt everything destroying all 
else we could.”80 
His first experience of South Pacific frontier warfare behind him, James 
resumed work on his plantation. It was a subsistence existence. James slept in a native 
grass hut and ate food grown in his own gardens. Hennings Brothers supplied the rest 
of his needs on long-term credit. A typhoon shredded the crop in 1872, but in April 
1873 James was able to write to his mother that, “the cotton fields look like a very 
large garden.” 81 By that time, however, prices had declined sharply. Although Fiji 
exported more cotton, the total monetary return in 1872 was a third less than in 
1870.
82
 
In May 1873, another raid by hill “Bigheads” sparked a brutal war that 
became known in Fijian history as the Ba Campaign. Whites, James among them, 
again joined forces with local Fijians to launch a reprisal attack. This time they aimed 
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at the total destruction of the hill people. The campaign aimed at destroying their 
villages, gardens, and stored food supplies was reminiscent of the so-called “feed 
fights” waged by English settlers against the Indians in colonial Virginia.83 
As that bloody war came to an end, the already weak cotton prices collapsed. 
In a letter to his father dated July 8, 1873, James wrote, “every thing is bad—cotton 
down to 6 cents or 5½ cents & they say, no prospect of rising.”84 At that price, cotton 
would not pay the cost of freight. To worsen matters, the settlers became involved in 
a dispute with Cakobau. Cakobau ordered John Hall James’s native workers to cease 
working for him, and forced them to leave the plantation by burning their houses. 
James lamented that although he had a large crop of good cotton, he could get no 
workers to pick it. A tense confrontation between the white settlers and Cakobau 
occurred, and James complained that had Captain Chapman of H.M.S. Dido not 
interfered, the settlers would have “sent the government & their cannibal King to a 
very hot place.”85  
Similar complaints were heard from other planters. In a letter to the Cotton 
Supply Association, planter R.B. Leefe wrote, “The only thing wanted to make you in 
England get cotton from the whole of this group is a Government.”86 Leefe wanted 
the Cotton Supply Association to urge the British government to take over the islands. 
The influential Manchester Guardian newspaper, whose articles The Cotton Supply 
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Reporter frequently reprinted, also continued to extol the virtues of Fiji as a cotton-
growing country.
87
 Isaac Mills Brower apparently still believed that Fiji could 
become a major cotton producing country as well. In May 1872, Brower traveled to 
Washington and while there prompted a Washington Chronicle reporter to write that 
cotton was, “likely to become the leading article of shipment and culture.” The article 
reported that Sea Island cotton grown in Fiji “sells in Europe at from three to five 
shillings sterling per pound.”88 This was the equivalent of saying cotton was selling 
for 36 to 60 d. per pound, when in fact the price on the Liverpool exchange for the 
best grades of cotton in 1872 averaged slightly under 11 d. per pound.
89
 
Not everyone was optimistic, however. An American resident in Fiji, H. C. 
Victor, wrote a long letter to the San Francisco Daily Evening Bulletin on January 30, 
1871, in which he presented figures that showed growing cotton in Fiji was fast 
becoming unprofitable. Victor advised Americans who might be thinking of coming 
to Fiji to become cotton planters, “My advice to any well-to-do American may be 
summed up in very few words, and they are—stay at home.” Victor warned, “Fiji is a 
long way off, hard to get to, and harder to get away from.”90 To illustrate his point, 
the letter took over eleven weeks to reach San Francisco and, if it went via the British 
mail, traveled via Australia, India, Suez, London, and New York.
91
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King Cakobau continued to behave in a way that the white settlers viewed as 
hostile. In November 1873, John Hall James told his father that the Fijian government 
had confiscated several plantations from their owners, apparently by disallowing the 
sales by which the land was obtained. James became increasingly disparaging of 
Fijians, who he deemed lazy and shiftless because of their refusal to work for wages. 
Contract laborers were scarce and he could get only 10 men, not nearly enough to 
pick his cotton. When the time to pay those men off came in August 1874, James had 
no money. He was soon reduced to a bare subsistence mode of survival. He was still 
hopeful, however. Hennings Brothers were still extending him credit, and the 
Hennings were as optimistic as he was that the cotton market would soon recover. It 
did not.
92
 
Not long after he arrived in Fiji in the summer of 1875, James Lyle Young 
wrote in his journal: 
It is inexpressibly sad to look back on the roll of sanguine, 
adventurous, highspirited [sic] young men who came to Fiji 5 or 6 
years ago, and invested their all in land and labourers, and to consider 
that in every case they have lost their money, their time, and some of 
them their characters. Most of them are entirely penniless, there is no 
employment to be obtained in Fiji and those who are fortunate enough 
to have friends who will send them money to leave the country do so, 
those who have not are living almost on charity. And saddest of all, 
not young men alone, but married men, and fathers of families are in 
the same position. … They spent all their cash in getting land, labour, 
etc. and in getting off the first crop of cotton, and then they had to wait 
12 or 18 months for returns from England, and to run in debt to the 
store-keepers (who were very willing that they should do so, for they 
were “cotton mad” like everybody else) and when the long looked for 
returns came out, behold!, their cotton had only realized 2/ per lb. 
instead of 4/—. This one would think would be a damper, but no, they 
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said, and the storekeepers said, it was nothing, cotton would soon 
“rise” again, alas it never “rose”, but continued to fall until it would 
not pay to grow at all.
93
 
 
It was the obituary of the cotton industry in Fiji. In the final analysis, Fiji 
never produced a significant amount of cotton. At its peak, annual production 
probably did not exceed 1 million pounds. That was less than half of England’s needs 
for one day, and it did not come to market until after the cotton crisis had passed. 
Within a year or two of Young’s visit to Fiji, the cotton fields lay abandoned, the 
untended cotton plants growing wild.  
The cotton boom caused by the American Civil War brought about profound 
changes in Fijian society and had a lasting affect on its future, however. Faced with 
growing hostility from the financially distressed British and American settler-
planters, Cakobau appealed in desperation to the British government for protection in 
the spring of 1874. This time, the government headed by Prime Minister Benjamin 
Disraeli agreed. In a ceremony held on October 10, 1874, Cakobau formally 
surrendered his war club, the symbol of his chiefly power and authority to Sir 
Hercules G. R. Robinson, who accepted it on behalf of Queen Victoria. Sailors of the 
Royal Navy then raised the Union Jack over Fiji, where it flew for ninety-six years, 
until Queen Elizabeth II formally restored Fiji’s independence on October 10, 1970.94 
At the time Britain assumed her protectorate over Fiji, hopes were still high that the 
islands would become a major source of cotton.
95
 Those hopes never materialized 
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despite repeated attempts by the British colonial government to encourage cotton 
growing.
96  
                                                 
96
 Todd, The World’s Cotton Crops, 337. 
 400 
Chapter 12 
The Restoration of King Cotton 
 
 On the sunny, pleasantly warm afternoon of Sunday, April 23, 1865, a 
seagoing steam launch intercepted the Cunard Line’s paddlewheel packet steamer 
R.M.S. Asia as she was passing Cape Clear, the bleak, rocky promontory at the 
southwestern extremity of Ireland. The fast, iron hulled Asia was nearing the end of a 
thirteen-day Atlantic crossing from New York to Liverpool with the American mails. 
As the speeding packet passed the hove-to launch, a sailor on the fantail of the Asia 
dropped a special waterproof metal message canister into the sea. A crewman aboard 
the launch retrieved the buoy-like canister from the water with a boathook, and then 
the boat turned northwest and sped 8½ miles toward the white lighthouse that marked 
the two rocky headlands between which lay the narrow inlet that served as harbor for 
the tiny fishing village of Crookhaven, Ireland. Upon arrival at Crookhaven, the 
message canister was rushed to the British and Irish Magnetic Telegraph office.
1
 
Inside the canister was an urgent dispatch to The Times from its correspondent in 
New York dated April 10. The Crookhaven telegrapher immediately sent the message 
over the wires to London. The telegram’s header read, “Surrender of Lee.”2 
News that General Lee had surrendered was not initially taken to mean that 
the Civil War was over. As had been the case at its beginning, realization that the 
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Civil War was over was slow to dawn in Britain. On the Monday following the arrival 
of the Asia with the news that Lee had surrendered, the price of American cotton on 
the Liverpool Exchange rose slightly, from the previous Friday’s 13 d., the lowest 
price during all of 1865, to 14¼.
3
 Convincing news that the Civil War was over came 
on May 12, 1865, when the Cunard packet Persia brought news that General Edmund 
Kirby Smith, commander of Confederate forces in Arkansas and Texas, the last 
Confederate army in the field, had notified Union commanders of his intention to 
surrender if permitted to do so on the same terms as Lee and Johnston.
4
 No one knew 
what the war’s end would bring, nor what it meant for the cotton supply situation. 
Many feared that an enormous quantity of American cotton grown during the war and 
stored would now swamp the market. The price of American cotton remained static at 
fractionally over 14 d. until May 26, when speculators bid up the price to 15¼ d. after 
reports arrived that large amounts of cotton had been burned during the last weeks of 
the war.
5
  
There were doubts about whether or not the independence from American 
cotton that Britain had achieved during the war could be maintained. In its first issue 
after news that the Civil War was definitely over arrived in England, The Cotton 
Supply Reporter said: 
The war is over, it has come to an end rapidly and suddenly, 
like the breaking of a winter’s frost. With its termination comes also 
the critical period long expected for all new cotton growing countries. 
During its process the most strenuous efforts have been made 
                                                 
3
 Donnell, History of Cotton, 534-535. 
 
4
 Times (London), May 13, 1865. Gen. Kirby Smith formally surrendered at Galveston, Texas, 
on June 2, 1865. 
 
5
 Donnell, History of Cotton, 534-535. 
 
 402 
everywhere to meet the emergency which had arisen; are these efforts 
now to be paralysed, and must we, as regards our future cotton 
supplies, return to the status quo ante bellum?
6
 
 
Cotton prices from June 1865 until the end of the year reflected the 
uncertainty about future supplies. Prices reached 19¾ d. on June 30, and then 
stagnated until August 11, when they dropped to 18¾ d. and remained unchanged for 
five weeks. A brief flurry by speculators pushed the price to 24½ d. on October 13, 
and then reports that large amounts of cotton had been grown and hidden during the 
war triggered an erratic decline that ended the year with the price at 20¾ d. per 
pound.
7
 The Cotton Supply Association began the year 1866 with the observation: 
The year opens upon us with still much uncertainty as to what 
are to be our future supplies of cotton. Prophets have appeared, and 
prognostications, cheering and gloomy as interest or prejudice 
dictated, have been published, but the vexed question yet awaits a 
satisfactory solution.
8
 
 
About the only thing that virtually everyone agreed on was that the American 
cotton plantation system was dead. The “no slaves, no cotton” premise remained very 
much alive. It was therefore assumed that the new normal for cotton prices would be 
considerably higher than it was before the war. There were several reasons for this 
assumption. 
Within weeks of the end of the Civil War, the British Foreign Office sent 
Captain W. Hickens of the Royal Engineers on a reconnaissance through the Southern 
cotton belt states in an effort to discover the potential for recovery. Misled by the 
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horrible conditions of chaos, destitution, disease, and death among newly freed slaves 
that he saw in the South, Hickens concluded that wartime mortality among blacks was 
far higher than it really was. He reported to London that one-fourth of the pre-war 
black population had died.
9
 Hickens went on to lament, “I very much fear that we 
must look forward to a still further decrease year by year, and ultimately to the almost 
total extinction of the race.”10 Further, Hickens concluded that black labor would be 
only half as productive as it had been before the war. Hickens doubted that free 
blacks would work beyond what was necessary for their subsistence. Although 
Hickens thought that white laborers could work in the cotton fields, he predicted that 
so long as the South was treated as conquered enemy territory and kept under martial 
law immigrants would be deterred from going there. As a result, Hickens thought that 
an American crop of 2 million bales was all that could be expected for years to come. 
American mills would consume most of it. This combination of factors led Hickens to 
conclude: 
Whatever the amount of cotton in future produced in America, and I 
believe that it will eventually be as large each year as before the war; it 
is not likely that it will ever again be nearly as cheap as in the old 
days; indeed, the only temptation to white immigrants to undergo the 
enervating effects of agricultural labour in the South, is the very high 
money reward promised by the extravagant price of cotton.
11
 
 
Maurice Williams, the Liverpool cotton broker, assumed that the number of 
African-American laborers had been reduced by one-half, “owing to deaths from 
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disease, war, and destitution.”12 In his estimation of prospects for the future, Williams 
stated that without forced labor, American cotton production was unlikely to exceed 1 
million bales in 1866 and for many years thereafter. With American mills expected to 
use 750,000 bales of the American harvest, and with stocks of cotton goods exhausted 
worldwide, Williams expected the supply situation to remain critically tight. He 
warned that, “until the time arrives when the production of Cotton throughout the 
world exceeds the manufacturing power in existence, they [spinners and cloth 
manufacturers] cannot expect to witness a return to a low scale of prices.”13 
Americans from North and South shared the beliefs expressed by Hickens and 
Williams to one degree or another. George M’Henry, a Pennsylvanian living in 
London, declared, “cotton can only be cultivated extensively in the Southern States 
by negro labour, and negro labour can only be controlled under the semi-patriarchal 
system called slavery.”14 Unlike Hickens, M’Henry thought that the hot climate of the 
South precluded employment of white labor in the cotton fields. M’Henry shared 
Hickens belief that unless employed in the cotton fields, the Negro race was doomed 
to eventual extinction in North America. M’Henry thought that the United States 
would soon backtrack on emancipation and put in place some form of compulsory 
labor.
15
 The alternative was a permanently reduced supply of cotton and continuation 
                                                 
12
 Williams, “The Cotton Trade of 1865,” in Seven Years History of the Cotton Trade of 
Europe, 1861 to 1868, 19. 
 
13
 Ibid, 20. 
 
14
 George M’Henry, The Cotton Supply of the United States of America (London: 
Spottiswoode & Co., 1865), 26. 
 
15
 M’Henry, The Cotton Supply of the United States of America, 25-30. 
 
 405 
of the high prices then prevailing, a situation that would compel a restructuring of the 
Western world’s capitalist-industrial economy.16  
Other Northerners were more optimistic. They believed that the end of the 
plantation system would result in redistribution of the land into smaller parcels on the 
model of midwestern grain farms. Southern landlords would be forced to sell by 
economics, not by confiscation. In this projected scenario, white farmers would buy 
the subdivided plantations, hire the freedmen as wage laborers, and mechanize 
Southern agriculture. Cotton would remain the principal crop. Interestingly, the 
Boston elite opposed giving land to the freedmen. In a report prepared for the Boston 
Board of Trade in 1867, a committee composed of Edward Atkinson, E. R. Mudge, 
George L. Ward, C. W. Freeland, and C. O. Whitmore wrote that doing so ran, “the 
great risk of ruining the negro population by bestowing land upon them before they 
have, by earning it, educated themselves to its proper use.”17  This committee thought 
that the system of small farms that they envisioned would soon produce cotton crops 
of 3 million bales, making the aggregate world supply 6 million bales. The increased 
supply would bring prices down to somewhere between 10 cents and 13 cents per 
pound.  These prices would be high enough to sustain efficient American cotton 
farmers, but so low that marginal overseas competitors would be forced out of cotton 
growing. The United States would then, “regain the monopoly or absolute control of 
the markets of the world.”18 
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Table 3: United States Cotton Production & Prices 1870-1913 
(From John A. Todd, The World’s Cotton Crops, and Shepperson’s Cotton Facts) 
Year       Bales (000s)      Price US cents  Price Liverpool pence / fraction 
1870  4352   17.00    9  15/16 
1871  2974   20.50    8    9/16 
1872  3931   18.20              10   9/16 
1873  4170   17.00    9     ---- 
1874  3833   15.00    8     ---- 
1875  4632   13.00    7     3/8 
1876  4474   11.70    6     1/4 
1877  4774   11.30    6  15/16 
1878  5074   10.80    6     1/8 
1879  5755   12.00    6  15/16 
1880  6606   11.30    6  15/16 
1881  5466   12.20    6    7/16 
1882  6950   10.60    6    5/8 
1883  5713   10.60    5    3/4 
1884  5682   10.50    6   ---- 
1885  6576     9.40    5    5/8 
1886  6505   10.30    5    1/8 
1887  7047   10.30    5     1/2 
1888  6938   10.70    5    9/16 
1889  7473   11.50    5   15/16 
1890  8653     8.60    6    ---- 
1891  9035     7.30    4   11/16 
1892  6700     8.40    4     3/16 
1893  7493     7.50    4      5/8 
1894  9901     5.90 Liverpool Low> 3   13/16     
1895  7161     8.20    3   27/32 
1896  8533     7.30    4   11/32 
1897          10,898     5.60    3   29/32 
1898          11,189     4.90     <US Lowest  3    5/16 
1899  9393     7.60    3    9/16 
1900          10,102     9.30    5   16/100 
1901  9583     8.10    4   78/100 
1902          10,588     8.20    5   44/100 
1903  9820   12.16  <Sully’s corner 6   94/100 
1904          13,451     8.66    <Sully’s corner 4   93/100 
1905          10,495   10.94    5   94/100 
1906          12,983   10.01    6   38/100 
1907          11,058   11.46    6   19/100 
1908          13,086     9.24    5   50/100 
1909          10,073   14.29    7   86/100 
1910          11,568   14.69    7   84/100 
1911          15,553     9.69    6     9/100 
1912          13,489   12.05    6   76/100 
1913          13,983   13.07    7   27/100 
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William J. Barbee, a De Soto County, Mississippi, physician wrote, “What 
changes may be brought about by the abolition of slavery we are not fully prepared to 
say. We presume, however, that the arrangements will not be quite so extensive, and 
the bales will not be piled quite as high.”19 At the time of Barbee’s writing, a 
precursor of the sharecropping system was already in place in Mississippi, with the 
freed slave given one-third to one-half of the crop in return for his labor. Barbee 
believed that the freedmen’s lack of a work ethic precluded its success, however. He 
wrote, “when left alone to themselves, they do precisely as all the race have done who 
have gone before them. They sink down into idleness, filth, disease, and death.”20 
Provided that the price of cotton remained at 30 cents per pound or above, Barbee 
foresaw a closely supervised wage labor system in which one man would be able to 
work 15 acres of land; 10 acres in cotton and 5 acres planted in corn, fodder, and food 
crops. Cotton farms would be 100-200 acres, each employing six or more black 
laborers.
21
 Barbee scoffed at the notion that cotton farming could be mechanized. In 
Barbee’s words, advertisements for cotton-picking machines placed in the 
newspapers by Northern inventors, “remind us of the wonderful virtues of infallible 
patent medicines.”22 There was, Barbee declared, “no machine equal to the fingers of 
a good stout, brisk negro” for picking cotton.23 Barbee warned that unless a system of 
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compulsory contract labor was put in place to compel the freedmen to work, “they 
will degenerate and become extinct.”24 
The prices offered for cotton on the Liverpool market reflected the uncertainty 
about future supplies. The price for “Middling Orleans” grade American cotton 
peaked at 31¾ d. on July 22, 1864.
25
 At that point the speculative mania on the 
Liverpool market had “increased almost to recklessness.”26 Many of the speculators 
were not professional cotton brokers, but amateurs who had been drawn into the 
market by the phenomenal rise in prices from 1862 until 1864.
27
 When the 
speculative bubble was at its greatest, cotton was literally too valuable to spin into 
yarn. In September 1864 the bubble burst in what Maurice Williams called “a 
complete panic.”28 In March 1865 “a continuous panic prevailed amongst Cotton 
Holders” as fear that the South’s collapse was imminent gripped speculators.29 Prices 
fell to 13½ d. on April 28, 1865.
30
 Fortunes were lost as the price of cotton fell. 
Amateur speculators were hit especially hard, and many of them were financially 
ruined. By November 1865, the supply of cotton was plentiful enough that the mills 
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were again running at full capacity.
31
 There were worries that the market would 
collapse amid fears of a deluge of accumulated American cotton suddenly becoming 
available. News that enormous amounts of cotton had been burned in the last few 
weeks of the war temporarily restored confidence, however.
32
 Prices rose slowly to 
24
3
/8 d. on October 13, 1865 and then began a slow decline to end the year at 20¾. 
Prices held near 20 d. until mid-March 1866.
33
 
In his prospectus for the upcoming 1866 American crop written on December 
30, 1865, Maurice Williams advised his customers, “We cannot expect, I think, a crop 
in America in 1866 to supply their own and afterwards the consumption of the world 
for 1867, of more than 1,000,000 bales.”34  
News about the American crop planted in the spring of 1866 seemed to bear 
out the supposition that the United States was finished as a cotton producer. In 
January 1866 fears that the freed slaves might rise in a general rebellion were 
expressed in The Times. A more realistic concern was that planters had no money to 
pay laborers to plant and harvest a crop.
35
 American newspapers reported concerns 
that cotton seed that planters had kept stored since 1861 would not germinate. This 
seemed to be borne out when reports appeared that much of the seed planted in April 
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in Louisiana, Mississippi, Florida, Arkansas, and Georgia had failed to germinate.
36
 
Floods in June inundated large areas in Alabama and Georgia, drowning the cotton.
37
 
A summer drought “unprecedented in our history” then withered crops across the 
entire Cotton Belt.
38
 An unseasonably early frost on the night of October 31, 1866, 
cut the growing season short over a large portion of the South.
39
 The New Orleans 
Price Current estimated that the 1866 crop would not exceed 500,000 bales and 
might be as little as 400,000 bales. American mills were expected to need 750,000 
bales, which would leave little for export even if the higher estimates of 800,000 to 
1,000,000 bales proved correct.
40
  
For a time in the spring and summer of 1866 it seemed that the U.S. Congress 
might kill any hope of a recovery of cotton growing in the United States through tax 
policies. In July 1862, a tax of ½ cent per pound was imposed on cotton. On January 
30, 1864, the tax was increased to 2 cents. On March 3, 1865, the tax was increased to 
2½ cents.
41
 In June 1865, Revenue Department official David A. Wells proposed that 
the tax be raised to 5 cents per pound. Senator Thaddeus Stevens argued for a tax of 
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10 cents per pound, apparently as punitive war reparations from the South.
42
 The tax 
proposals brought howls of protest not only from the South, but from Northern 
business interests as well. On May 15, 1866, the New York Chamber of Commerce 
sent a petition to Congress in which it stated: 
At this very time, when [the Southern farmer] is struggling for 
existence, a tax of five cents per pound is proposed, which being 
practically an export duty, is equivalent to charging him with that 
amount for the purpose of paying it over to the cultivators of India, 
Egypt, and Brazil.
43
 
 
Despite the protests, Congress raised the tax to 3 cents on July 3, 1866.
44
 On 
the day that the 3 cents per pound tax was imposed, “middling” grade cotton was 
selling for 37 cents in New York.
45
 That made the effective tax rate slightly over 8 
percent. But because the tax was a fixed amount per pound, the percentage rate 
increased as the price of cotton fell. A particularly detrimental feature of the tax was 
that it was not collected at the point of sale, but had to be paid in advance by the 
planter before cotton could be shipped to market. Small farmers often lacked the 
money to pay.
46
 Moreover, the tax was a cost that could not be passed on to 
consumers, since the Liverpool spinners, not the American planters, set the price paid 
for cotton. 
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This was the situation when the Cotton Supply Association held its ninth 
annual meeting in the Mayor’s Parlour in Manchester Town Hall on Friday afternoon, 
June 29, 1866. The tone was one of self-congratulation. Everyone present seemed to 
think that the American cotton monopoly was no more. During 1865 Britain had 
imported 2,755,000 bales of cotton, more than in any previous year. Over half of it 
came from India. Only 462,000 bales, or less than 17 percent, came from the United 
States. It appeared that Britain would henceforth receive most of her cotton from 
India, while Egypt, the Ottoman Empire, and Brazil would provide the remainder.
47
  
No one seems to have expected that when the market data was tallied the 1866 
American crop would come to 2,154,476 bales, more than double the highest estimate 
and more than five times the lowest. Debate raged about how much of the cotton that 
came to market in the 1866-67 selling season was grown in previous years and how 
much was new crop. 
48
 Despite the quantity of cotton sold, the 1866 crop was 
regarded as a failure. Northern capitalists who lent money to finance cotton-growing 
enterprises in the South were disappointed, as were the Northerners who went south 
and became cotton planters. Most of them failed to turn a profit. In his prospectus for 
the 1867 crop dated December 31, 1866, Maurice Williams wrote, “The pecuniary 
loss reported to have been experienced by the great difficulty of obtaining efficient 
and permanent labor, in addition to the great falling off in their anticipated large crop, 
will it is thought operate unfavorably as regards planting the coming season.”49  
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British buyers purchased 1,162,745 bales of American cotton during the 1866-
67 marketing season, bringing Britain’s total importation or cotton from all sources to 
3,749,000 bales, another record. This put the American share of the market at about 
one third, India’s share at one half, and the remainder split between Brazil, Egypt, the 
Ottoman Empire, and numerous smaller suppliers.
50
 The total supply of cotton from 
all sources was 760,000 bales more than expected. This surplus supply drove a surge 
in the production of cotton goods similar to those seen before the American war.
51
 
The surge did not bring prosperity to Britain, however. In the summer of 
1866, Britain was in the midst of a severe economic convulsion. The obvious reasons 
for the economic difficulties were paradoxical. One reason was the enormous losses 
suffered when the cost of cotton fell from its 1864 high. Another reason was that 
cotton was still too high priced to make into cloth that could be priced low enough to 
sell on the world’s markets. During the peak delivery season from October 1866 to 
March 1867, American cotton in Liverpool averaged over 14 d. and sometimes sold 
for as high as 16 d. per pound. Prices on the New York Cotton Exchange for the 
1866-67 marketing season averaged over 32 cents and were occasionally as high as 
44 cents.
52
 Yet high as the prices were, they were down nearly one-third from the 
average of nearly 20 d. in 1865 and were only half the prices seen in 1864.
53
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Britain’s economy was suffering from deeper problems as well. During the 
Civil War, at least 263 new limited liability corporations known as “financial 
companies” were formed. Most of these institutions were brokerages, but the list 
included 27 banks and 15 discount companies. Their business was to finance risky 
long-term overseas development projects, mostly railroads that were dependent on 
revenues from cotton growing in the remote areas that they served, by issuing what in 
modern terminology might be called “junk” bonds. The companies also issued bonds 
to finance shipping firms engaged in the highly profitable but risky business of 
blockade running. These bonds were then discounted (bought at less than face value) 
by banks as investments. In March 1864, more than £78 million worth of these bonds 
had been issued.
54
 
With the end of the American Civil War, many of the railroad projects, such 
as the Euphrates Valley Railway, were cancelled. It was realized that others, such as 
Egypt’s and India’s railroads, would take many years to be completed and return a 
profit to investors.
55
 The end of the war also brought a sudden halt to the profitable 
business of blockade running. Companies that had been formed specifically to engage 
in it, most of which were limited liability corporations that owned no assets except for 
their one ship, went out of business almost immediately. Further, new steamships 
built specifically as blockade-runners sacrificed cargo capacity, seagoing endurance, 
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and seaworthiness for high speed, characteristics that made them unsuited for use in 
peacetime trade.
56
  
In January 1866, a cascading collapse of the financial companies began with 
the failure of the Joint Stock Discount Company. At the end of April 1866, Barned’s 
Bank failed, with over £3 million in losses. The London firm of Overend, Gurney & 
Company, one of the largest of the finance companies, went bankrupt shortly 
thereafter. Overend, Gurney & Company’s liabilities in excess of its assets amounted 
to over £10 million, and its bankruptcy was called, “the most stupendous failure that 
ever took place in the City.”57 Starting on May 13, 1866, the Bank of England 
advanced over £12 million in five days in an effort to prop up the banking system, but 
to no avail. Consolidated Bank of London, Oriental Commercial Bank, the 
Commercial Bank of India, and the New Zealand Bank failed in rapid succession 
before the end of May. Agra and Masterman Bank failed on June 7. In July, the Bank 
of Birmingham and the Preston Banking Company failed. In reaction to the banking 
crisis, the Bank of England raised the discount rate (the interest rate that it charged on 
loans to other banks) to 10 percent in May and maintained it throughout most of the 
year.
58
 The financial crisis forced a massive sell off of cotton by speculators, while at 
the same time high interest rates and tight credit hampered manufacturers’ ability to 
buy cotton for production. The outbreak of war between Austria and Prussia in June 
aroused fears that Europe might become embroiled in a general war. The war scare 
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caused further disruptions in the financial markets that had an adverse affect on the 
cotton trade.
59
  
By October 1866 mills were again closing and laying off workers.
60
 The 
problem was not over production of cotton goods, but the deepening economic crisis. 
Maurice Williams wrote in his recap for the year that, “the Stocks of Cotton Goods 
now in Manufacturers’ hands is exceedingly small.”61 A poor grain harvest caused 
food prices to rise sharply, and cloth manufacturers began to worry about the English 
domestic market. The export market was in trouble as well. A large number of trading 
companies engaged in the export of goods to India and China failed in November. 
Their bankruptcies caused severe losses to banks that specialized in financing the Far 
East trade. The banks, fearing that other trading firms would fail, became increasingly 
reluctant to finance export shipments. Exporters, anticipating a collapse in prices, 
became reluctant to place orders for cotton goods.
62
 Maurice Williams described 1866 
as the “most disastrous” year in the Liverpool cotton trade’s history.63 
By the spring of 1867, expectations about the future of American cotton 
growing varied so widely as to be meaningless. Maurice Williams reported estimates 
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for the next crop of from 2,100,000 bales to 2,800,000 bales.
64
 H. P. Walker, the 
British consul in Charleston, South Carolina, informed the Cotton Supply Association 
in May 1867 that Charleston would ship only 150,000 bales from that year’s crop, 
whereas before the war the seaport exported 550,000 bales. There was a shortage of 
labor. Famine conditions had induced many of the freedmen in South Carolina to take 
to the road looking for better prospects elsewhere. Draft animals were in short supply. 
Railroads and other infrastructure was completely wrecked. Walker did not think that 
there was much if any chance for improvement.
65
  Planters had no money to meet 
expenses or pay labor. Many had gone heavily into debt to buy slaves before the war, 
and although the slaves were now free, the debts were still due. Further borrowing to 
finance the cotton crop was not possible. Credit was tight, and banks were charging 
interest rates of 1½ percent per month.
66
 Reports that army worms were doing great 
damage to the cotton crop in the Mississippi Valley added further gloom to the dismal 
outlook.
67
 Had H. P. Walker’s estimate for Charleston been extrapolated to the entire 
Cotton Belt based on the 1860 crop, the expected American 1867 crop would have 
been about 1,275,000 bales. The weather that summer was in the words of Columbus, 
Mississippi, planter A. S. Humphries, “most propitious for the growing crops, and the 
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yield of cotton and corn surpassed the expectations of the most sanguine.”68 Almost 
twice the expected amount of cotton, 2,520,000 bales, actually came to market.
69
  
While the 1867 cotton crop season was in progress, a campaign to repeal the 
cotton tax was underway by cotton planters, businessmen from both the North and 
South, and Reconstruction state governments. Many of those who had previously 
sought to destroy the American cotton monopoly now sought to restore it. A 
committee of the Boston Board of trade that numbered Edward Atkinson among its 
members wrote in its petition to Congress, “Your committee urge the repeal of the tax 
upon cotton, because it indirectly gives too great encouragement to the growth of 
cotton in other countries.”70 Opposition to the tax in the South came from all classes 
of people, black and white. Alabama provides some vivid examples. Governor Robert 
M. Patton, a wealthy planter who had owned 300 slaves before the Civil War, and 
who, though an anti-secessionist Whig, had supported the Confederacy after the war 
began and whose two sons were killed while serving in the Confederate army, 
petitioned Congress to repeal the tax.
71
 Benjamin Sterling Turner, a freed slave who 
was then serving as a city official in Selma and who would be elected to Congress in 
1870, denounced the cotton tax, calling it, “unjust, inequitable, and 
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unconstitutional.”72 Alabama’s freedmen, including 10,000 who had served in the 
Union army, and poor white farmers, about 2,500 of whom had also served in the 
Union army, joined with ex-Confederates to protest against the tax. Congress heeded 
the protests and enacted legislation that reduced the cotton tax to 2½ cents per pound 
effective September 1, 1867. The legislation stipulated that the cotton tax was to be 
abolished effective August 31, 1868.
73
 
In Britain, the ongoing economic crisis and declining prices for raw cotton 
had a synergistic effect upon one another. Cotton opened the year 1867 in the 
Liverpool market at 15
5
/8 d. and remained around 15 until the end of February, when 
it peaked at 16½ d. per pound. A combination of larger than expected supplies of 
cotton from all sources, but particularly American, and news of slack orders for 
cotton goods then sent the market into a steady downward trend until mid-April, 
when prices stabilized at slightly over 11 d. per pound. Prices remained stable until 
the end of June, when another large arrival of cotton from India caused prices to drop 
to around 10½ d. These prices held and even showed a slight recovery to the 11 d. 
range before dropping to 9 d. in the middle of September.
74
 
Then, at ten minutes before 3 o’clock on Monday, October 21, 1867, a 
disaster struck the British cotton industry. At that moment, the president of the Royal 
Bank of Liverpool announced that the bank could not meet its obligations and ordered 
that the bank’s doors be closed. The stated reason was that London banks had refused 
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to discount notes held by Royal Bank for loans to shipping companies.
75
 A 
preliminary report by H. W. Banner, an outside accountant hired by the shareholders, 
indicated that Royal Bank had assets of £2,470,000 against a projected loss of 
£770,000.
76
 The losses were in fact far worse.
77
  
Royal Bank’s failure shook popular confidence in banking. An investigation 
revealed that Royal Bank had operated in “a character compelling the conviction of 
great and reckless mismanagement.”78 It was revealed that insider loans were largely 
to blame for Royal Bank’s insolvency. In the words of a scathing editorial in The 
Times, “some of the directors are indebted to the Bank far beyond the value of any 
securities deposited by them, and, indeed, beyond the hope of recovery.”79 Favored 
firms had received loans far in excess of what prudent banking practices allowed. It 
was alleged that Royal Bank had agreed to finance Messrs. Wilson, Cunningham, and 
Company, a shipping firm whose balance sheet indicated that it was bankrupt, under 
terms that virtually guaranteed the proprietors of the company against personal 
losses.
80
 It was further alleged that Royal Bank’s manager and two paid directors had 
made the several large, high-risk loans that led to the bank’s collapse without the 
knowledge or consent of the other members of the board of directors.
81
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Seddon and Company in Liverpool was one of the firms to which the Royal 
Bank made questionable loans. According to a letter sent to The Times by the 
management of Seddon and Company, in June 1864 the firm had pledged its entire 
assets, for which it had paid an actual capital investment of £200,000, to the bank as 
security for operating loans. The assets included, “first, a cotton factory of nearly 
100,000 spindles; secondly, in about 21,000 tons of shipping, nearly all new; and, 
finally, in a large quantity of cotton, in the import of which the firm had gradually 
increased their business from the quantity necessary to supply the factory.”82 At the 
time it mortgaged its assets to the bank, Seddon and Company had a surplus of 
£42,000 cash on hand.
83
 When the company went into liquidation, it owed the Royal 
Bank £250,000 in loans and had overdrawn its revolving operating account £40,000.
84
 
Seddon and Company’s management told The Times, “The times have been too hard 
for us; losses on operations already entered into in cotton were of necessity realized, 
and to a serious amount.”85 The company was forced to sell its mill, described as “a 
splendid property and economically built,” for half its original cost, an actual capital 
loss of £45,000. Seddon and Company sold its nearly new ships at a loss of at least 
£125,000.
86
 
Several probabilities can be deduced from Seddon and Company’s statement 
and the available information. First and foremost, the company’s distress was likely 
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the result of speculative purchases of cotton during the months following June 1864, 
when cotton was at its highest price. The benchmark “Middling Orleans” grade 
American cotton peaked at 31¾ d. on July 22, 1864. Indian Surat cotton peaked at 24 
d. on the same day. The Bank of England, in an attempt to quell the speculative 
bubble, tightened credit and raised interest rates from 7 to 9 percent during the 
summer. By October 1864, as cotton prices declined steadily, rumors were rife that 
several large Liverpool trading firms were on the verge of failure.
87
 On April 28, 
1865, Middling Orleans cotton sold for 13½ d. per pound. Indian Surat cotton was 9 
d. per pound on that day. The Middling Orleans price recovered to 20¼ d. and Surat 
to 17¾ d. on December 31, 1865, but still the loss to speculators who had purchased 
cotton at the height of the bubble was severe.
88
 The price of Middling Orleans cotton 
declined from 21 d. on January 4, 1866 to 12½ d. on May 17. This led to speculators 
incurring further losses. The market’s recovery to 15¼ d. at the end of the year set the 
stage for another round of losses in 1867.
89
 During 1867, prices for Middling Orleans 
declined steadily from 15¼ d. to 7 
3
/8 d. on December 31. Indian Surat type cotton 
declined from 12¾ d. to 5¼ d. per pound.
90
 
Royal Bank was not a limited liability corporation. Under English banking 
laws of the time, Royal Bank’s shareholders, many of whom were connected with the 
cotton trade, were personally responsible for the bank’s debts in proportion to the 
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number of shares of stock that they owned.
91
 Depositors and shareholders alike were 
understandably furious. Subsequent attempts by Royal Bank’s managers to conceal 
the causes of the bank’s failure only increased the anger.92 At a special meeting in 
Liverpool on November 14, 1867, at which the Lord Mayor, Edward Whitley, was 
present as an aggrieved depositor, it was agreed after much negotiation and wrangling 
that the Royal Bank would pay its depositors and creditors in installments at 6, 12, 18, 
and 24 months.
93
 When the final settlement was made, Royal Bank’s capital, reserve 
fund, and physical assets were insufficient to cover its liabilities. Shareholders had to 
make up the shortfall, an amount between £400,000 and £500,000.
94
 
New York cotton broker E. J. Donnell listed the collapse of Royal Bank as the 
reason for the massive sell off of cotton that began in November, as persons involved 
with the bank were forced to sell their cotton to raise cash. Prices on the Liverpool 
Exchange dropped more than 30 percent between November 7 and December 31, 
1867. American cotton ended the year at 7 
3
/8 d. per pound. Surat-type cotton 
followed a steady downward trend from 12¾ d. at the beginning of the year to 5¼ d. 
on December 31, 1867.
95
 The new Atlantic telegraph cable brought news of Royal 
Bank’s failure to the United States on the same afternoon, and American newspapers 
followed the story as it developed, but prices on the American cotton markets were 
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not affected.
96
 Prices on the New York Cotton Exchange remained steady, hovering 
between 16½ and 18½ cents from November 22 until the end of the year.
97
 So 
confused was the situation at that point that Maurice Williams wrote in his prospectus 
for 1868, “we decline at the present moment to indulge in any prognostication as to 
the future of Cotton.”98 
The prognostications that were made turned out to be wrong. The Times of 
London, in its “The Trade of 1868” recap, stated that at the beginning of the year, 
“The demand for yarns and goods had been so small [in 1867] compared to the 
production, while foreign markets were then fully supplied, that it was not believed to 
be possible the trade during 1868 would increase their consumption of cotton.”99  
Demand for goods in fact increased in 1868. Manufacturers ended the year with only 
a small inventory of goods on hand. There were contradictory indicators in the 
situation, however. Stocks of unsold goods were accumulating in India and China. 
Manufacturers in the United States were meeting more of the American demand, with 
the result that less cloth was imported from Britain. Domestic sales were also weak 
because of the effects of the financial crisis that began in 1866.
100
 
In its front-page New Year’s Day editorial on January 1, 1868, The Cotton 
Supply Reporter expressed confidence that the cotton supply situation had 
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stabilized.
101
 Other observers were less optimistic. David A. Wells, the U.S. Special 
Commissioner of Revenue, pointed to an ominous portent for the cotton economy’s 
future trajectory when he wrote, “In short, under the stimulus of high prices, the 
world has produced more cotton than it can consume at the prices of the day.”102 The 
situation did not bode well for the British cotton industry. High prices were disastrous 
for the industry, but Maurice Williams worried that the decline in prices that had 
occurred since 1864 might cause countries that had boosted production because of the 
high prices to abandon or curtail their cotton growing. Low prices and the necessity 
of paying what Williams described as “high wages” to free laborers in the United 
States might check the recovery of cotton in America. Williams warned, “we may yet 
have to witness a repetition of higher prices, should there be, even for one season, any 
cessation or serious diminution in the growth of Cotton throughout the world.”103  
Cotton now seemed to conform to the conventional law of supply and 
demand, but with a new paradox. High prices for the raw material were disastrous for 
the cotton manufacturing industry, because the price of goods were too high for the 
markets, but only high prices for raw cotton could assure a large enough supply of 
cotton to keep the industry operating at full capacity. This new economic paradigm of 
scarcity and high prices, though bad for the British manufacturers, looked promising 
for cotton growers, and encouraged them to plant all of the cotton that they possibly 
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could. In cotton country towns such as Columbus, Mississippi, there was a prevailing 
sense of recovery, reviving commerce, and returning prosperity.
104
 
The world was receiving conflicting messages, however. John Everitt, the son 
of Northern businessman and politician Edward Everitt, toured the Mississippi Valley 
in the winter and early spring of 1868. In a letter to the British Morning Star 
newspaper dated Memphis, Tennessee, March 23, 1868, John Everitt wrote: 
The entire system of planting as it was, is utterly at an end. Since the 
war they [plantation owners] have lost in endeavouring [sic] to keep 
up the old régime six hundred millions of dollars. Every Planter is 
ruined, and they have pulled down with them every Southern 
merchant; the machinery of labor as it was, is broken up, and neither 
the late slaves or their masters are equal to the new situation. … About 
one-third [of the freed slaves] have died off, and the general leaning of 
most of them is toward cities. … [T]he children of the colored people, 
particularly the young ones, suffer most; and multitudes are dying out, 
and unless some great change takes place, the race seems destined to 
melt away altogether. … The only course open to the people of this 
country is to cut up the large plantations into small ones, cultivate all 
kinds of crops, multiply all kinds of industries, and betake themselves 
to self-help.
105
 
 
The American crop that was being planted as John Everitt was writing his 
letter to the Morning Star defied attempts to predict what production would be. At the 
beginning of picking season, the New Orleans Price Current predicted a crop of from 
2,750,000 to 3,000,000 bales. A yield greater than 3,000,000 bales was thought to be 
impossible because of insufficient labor.
106
 The pessimism seemed to be justified 
when the 1868-69 marketing season saw only 2,260,557 bales of cotton come to 
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market. This was not only 490,000 bales short of the lowest estimate, but 170,336 
bales less than the previous year. The decline was consistent across all the cotton 
growing states. Louisiana showed a decline of 24,974 bales, Alabama a decline of 
135,467 bales, Georgia a decline of 137,752 bales, South Carolina a decline of 41,282 
bales, and Tennessee a decline of 52,969 bales.
107
 The American recovery seemed to 
be faltering. As a result prices for American cotton in Liverpool averaged 10.64 d. 
during the calendar year 1868, and were at times over 12¾ d. per pound.
108
 It 
appeared that the new paradigm of scarcity and high prices would be permanent for 
the foreseeable future. 
High prices on the American cotton markets encouraged planters to increase 
production to the greatest extent possible. On December 12, 1868, 20 cents per pound 
was being paid for cotton in Columbus, Georgia. Fifty thousand bales were expected 
to sell in Columbus, for a gross amount of $5 million. From that amount, planters 
were expected to net a profit of $4 million. The editor of the Columbus Sun remarked, 
“Somebody will have some funds, and a few men will not have it all.”109 For the first 
time, Liverpool buyers ventured into the hinterlands to buy cotton directly from 
growers. Their presence in the countryside and active buying attracted attention, as 
was the case in Selma, Alabama, where in late December an English buyer purchased 
several hundred bales of cotton for shipment to Liverpool.
110
 On December 31, 1868, 
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cotton was selling at New Orleans for prices ranging from 12¼ cents for the lowest 
grades to 15½ cents for the best quality. The New Orleans Commercial Bulletin told 
its readers that there was “spirited demand” for cotton, and that the supply was 
“inadequate to the demand.”111 
The profitability of the short 1868 cotton crop financed the boost in 
production that occurred in 1869. In December 1868, a resident of Cleveland, Ohio, 
wrote to the Daily Cleveland Herald from Georgia, “The tendency is to plant 
everything in cotton another year.”112 The letter writer reported that in many instances 
widows had taken over operation of their dead husbands’ plantations and were, 
“discussing the comparative merits of various fertilizers, subsoil plows, & c., with as 
much interest as the oldest planters.”113 Northern livestock traders had begun to arrive 
with horses and mules to replace draft animals lost during the war. The writer 
reported that the fresh animals were, “selling out rapidly at high prices.”114  
The nature of cotton cultivation in the United States was changing. In 1869, 
David Dixon, a Georgia planter and merchant, began selling Dixon’s Compound, the 
first commercial fertilizer for cotton. Dixon’s Compound was a blend of nitrogen-rich 
Peruvian guano and crushed mineral phosphate, enormous deposits of which were 
discovered buried within a few feet of the surface near Charleston, South Carolina.
115
 
Fertilizer’s potential was demonstrated that same year at Concordia, Louisiana, where 
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a Dr. Alford applied 350 pounds of phosphate per acre to a 2¼-acre test plot 
described as “poor pine land” and harvested 2,999 pounds of clean cotton, or more 
than three bales per acre. An adjacent unfertilized test plot yielded less than one bale 
per acre.
116
 A larger demonstration was conducted by M. C. Hammond on his 
plantation at Beach Island, South Carolina. Hammond achieved yields of over 1,200 
pounds of seed cotton per acre on land fertilized with Peruvian guano and phosphate. 
Neighboring unfertilized fields yielded less than 500 pounds of seed cotton per 
acre.
117
  
New instructional manuals for cotton planters began to appear in the late 
1860s that were remarkably different from their antebellum predecessors. One of the 
first to be published, Cotton Culture coauthored by Joseph B. Lyman, a Louisiana 
native who had relocated to New York and become a cotton broker some years before 
the Civil War, and J. R. Sypher, an agricultural scientist, extolled the merits of 
improved tillage, seed selection, and the use of fertilizers. The lavishly illustrated 
book described and gave instructions in the use of the latest new implements, 
including horse drawn mechanical planters, cultivators, and other new equipment 
from Northern manufacturers especially designed for cotton.
118
  
As 1869 began, the Hinds County Gazette of Raymond, Mississippi, reported 
that a “Revolution in Cotton Planting” was in progress as planters applied science to 
agriculture. The editor vowed that with the improved cotton growing methods, “we 
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shall overcome all competitions and monopolize the cotton producing of the 
world.”119 
New York and Liverpool brokers’ estimates of the 1869 crop lagged behind 
the Mississippi editor’s optimism. A cool, rainy spring that caused a slow start led 
many to believe that the 1869 crop would be about the size of the 1868 crop. In 
August 1869, estimates ranged from 2,750,000 to no more than 3,000,000 bales.
120
 
When the 1869-70 marketing season ended on August 31, 1870, the 1869 crop came 
to 3,114,592 bales.
121
  Prices in Liverpool dropped to as low as 7¾ d. at the end of 
July 1870, but were in the 11 d. range for most of the year.
122
  
 An incidental event may have shaped consequences that encouraged 
American planters to maximize their efforts to increase cotton production in 1869. 
During the week of September 21 thru 27, 1869, Jay Gould, president of the Erie 
Railroad, and a group of associates that included the unscrupulous stock broker and 
alleged wartime cotton smuggler James Fisk, President Ulysses S. Grant’s brother-in-
law Abel Rathbone Corbin, stock broker Henry Smith, and British financier James 
McHenry conspired to manipulate the American gold market. Their attempt resulted 
in the Black Friday Panic of September 24, 1869. Gould’s scheme was not merely 
speculation in gold as a commodity. It was an attempt to alter the value of United 
States currency in international trade. James B. Hodgskin, an official of the Gold 
Exchange in New York, explained the role of the Gold Exchange in international 
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trade in testimony before the House Committee on Banking and Currency while it 
was investigating the Black Friday Panic: 
The Liverpool cotton merchant telegraphs to the New York 
commission house: ‘If you can buy one thousand bales of middling 
cotton so as not to cost me more than ten-pence, or twenty cents, gold, 
per pound, laid down here in Liverpool, you can do so.’ The 
commission merchant finds that the freight, insurance, and other 
charges will amount to about two cents. He can, therefore, afford to 
give eighteen cents, gold, for the cotton itself. [Cotton is priced in 
currency, not in gold.] The commission merchant telegraphs to 
Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, and New Orleans. From all these 
places he gets the same answer: Middling cotton is selling for about 
twenty-seven cents a pound in currency. … [H]e next proceeds to the 
gold-room to ascertain the price of gold, so as to know how much, in 
currency, he can afford to pay for the cotton without exceeding the 
orders of his Liverpool correspondent. He finds gold selling at 150 
[meaning gold coins with a face value of $100 can be sold for $150 in 
greenbacks]; in other words his eighteen cents gold are worth exactly 
twenty-seven cents in currency, per pound, for his middling cotton, 
without exceeding his correspondent’s orders. Now if business were 
all as simple as some people imagine, the proceeding of the 
commission merchant would be simple enough. He would only have to 
take as much gold as would pay for the thousand bales of cotton, to 
sell it at 150, and with the currency pay the cotton dealer, and the 
whole transaction would be concluded. But, to begin with, he has not 
got the gold. The Liverpool cotton merchant did not send the gold to 
pay for the cotton; and if he had sent it, it would not arrive for some 
time, as the order came by the Atlantic cable, which is not yet arranged 
for the transportation of specie. The way in which the New York 
commission merchant expects to get the necessary gold is this: He 
receives the order by cable on Monday, and concludes the purchase of 
the cotton the same day. He then has to engage a vessel to take the 
cotton to Liverpool, the arrangements for which occupy the next day. 
On Thursday or Friday the vessel is ready to take her cargo on board, a 
process which is perhaps completed by next Monday. The captain of 
the vessel signs the receipt for the cotton on a document called a bill of 
lading; the merchant makes out a bill for the amount of the cotton at 
the price in gold which his Liverpool correspondent authorized him to 
pay, attaches the bill of lading to it as evidence that the cotton has been 
shipped, and takes the bill to one of the foreign banking houses, like 
Belmont’s or Brown Brothers’, who thereupon pay him in gold the 
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amount of the bill, less a small commission for forwarding the bill and 
collecting it from the merchant in Liverpool.
123
 
 
When the greenback dollar was high in value compared to gold, it was 
detrimental to foreign buyers of American cotton and other products. That was 
because when the price of gold in American greenback currency was low, the British 
pound sterling was worth less in relation to the greenback. The result was that even 
though the price of cotton on the American markets might remain constant in dollars, 
as the price of gold fell in relation to the paper dollar, cotton cost more in British 
pounds sterling.
124
 
Jay Gould later claimed in testimony before Congress that the intent of the 
scheme, the economic theory of which he attributed to James McHenry, was to bid up 
the price of gold in order to devalue the dollar in foreign exchange. Devaluation of 
the paper greenback in relation to gold would have the effect of making a British 
pound sterling buy more American greenback dollars, and thus make American wheat 
competitive with Russian wheat in the English market. Jay Gould expected to make a 
profit from the increased volume of wheat that would pass through grain elevators 
owned by the Erie Railroad and on freight earned from transporting it. In preparation 
for executing the scheme, commencing in April 1869, Gould secretly bought $7 
million worth of gold on the New York Gold Exchange. When Gould began his 
purchases, U.S. gold coins with a face value of $100 could be sold for $130.25 in 
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paper greenback dollars. This was the lowest price for gold in three years, meaning 
that the dollar was high in value compared to the British pound sterling. In the course 
of making Gould’s purchases, the three brokers commissioned by Henry Smith to buy 
the gold, none of who knew that Gould was the real client or that the other two were 
buying for the same account, bid up the price of $100 gold to $140 in greenbacks. 
Other brokers and speculators followed the market trend and continued bidding up the 
price of gold until it peaked at $144.87 on May 20, 1869. The price then declined to 
136 and remained in the upper 130s until September.
125
  
As an unintended consequence of the alteration in paper currency’s value, 
brokers on the New York Cotton Exchange, whose orders for cotton from overseas 
buyers expressed in gold were now worth more in paper greenbacks, bid up the price 
of cotton. Cotton was stable at between 29 and 29¾ cents through March, April, and 
May. Starting on June 1, the price of cotton rose steadily to 35 cents per pound on 
July 1. Cotton prices then held steady at between 34 and 35¾ cents until the middle of 
September, when prices began a steady decline to end the year at slightly over 25 
cents per pound.
126
  
The rise in cotton prices would have had a positive psychological affect on 
American cotton planters, but they had no detrimental affect on the British mills. 
Gould’s gold manipulation actually increased the purchasing power of the British 
pound sterling on the American cotton markets. As the price of gold increased in 
relation to the U.S. dollar, the pound sterling became worth more in U.S. dollars as 
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well. At the same time, cotton deliveries from Brazil and India were at their seasonal 
peak, and the prices for Indian and Brazilian cotton were not affected by the currency 
manipulation in the United States.
127
  
The price trend was steadily downward during the marketing season that 
began on September 1, 1869, but the Black Friday Panic did not devastate the cotton 
markets. Prices on the New York Cotton Exchange fell from their artificial high of 35 
cents at the start of the marketing season, but stabilized at slightly over 25 cents from 
November 1869 to the end of February 1870, the period when the bulk of the 1869 
crop came to market.
128
 Prices in Liverpool held steady at slightly over 11 d. for that 
same period.
129
  
The 1870 crop repeated the 1869 crop’s performance in the field, but with an 
even greater disparity between estimates and actual outcome. Estimates in June 1870 
put the crop at slightly over 3,000,000 bales. Above average rainfall in portions of the 
South in July caused concerns that the crop might fall below the estimates.
130
 The 
July rains had the opposite effect, however.
131
 On December 1, 1870, the U.S. 
Commissioner of Agriculture estimated that the crop then coming to market would be 
more than 3,500,000 bales, and possibly as much as 3,800,000 bales.
132
 To 
everyone’s surprise, when the 1870 crop marketing season ended on August 31, 1871, 
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the tally final came to 4,347,006 bales, only 328,764 bales short of the record set in 
1859-60.
133
 
As American cotton farmers were plowing their fields in preparation for 
planting the 1871 crop, rumors were circulating throughout the cotton world that the 
Cotton Supply Association was about to be dissolved. On April 1, 1871, the editor of 
The Cotton Supply Reporter denied the rumors. He expressed worries that the 
opportunity that the Association had been afforded by the American Civil War to 
make India Britain’s main cotton supplier was about to be lost.134 At that time, Britain 
was in the midst of another cotton glut. On May 1, 1871, there were 1 million bales of 
cotton on hand in Liverpool. English mills ran at full capacity for the first half of the 
year, producing an over supply of cotton goods. In the first nine months of 1871, 
Britain exported more than 2 ½ billion yards of cotton cloth. Almost half of it went to 
India and China, where a glut of unsold goods was developing because the price was 
too high for the market.
135
  
As the 1870 crop was being harvested and sold, it appeared that the supply of 
cotton and the demand for it had reached equilibrium. Robert Somers, editor of the 
Glasgow, Scotland, Morning Journal and a recognized expert in trade and commerce, 
spent several months touring the South during the 1870-71 cotton marketing season. 
Somers wrote: 
The British merchants and manufacturers say they can take an 
indefinitely increasing quantity of American cotton, but it must be 
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produced at softening rather than hardening prices, since every 
substantial advance in value at once checks in all the markets of the 
world the profitable consumption of cotton goods. If the South cannot 
meet these conditions, the progress of British manufacturing industry 
will be so far retarded. If the British manufacturers cannot extend their 
operations at the price necessary to produce the raw material, the 
progress of the South, so far as it depends on the growth of cotton, will 
be retarded also. Such is the equal disability which the question of 
cotton imposes on both sides, and there does not appear to be the 
slightest room for any misunderstanding.
136
 
 
Early predictions put the American 1871 cotton crop at 4 million bales. Prices 
were expected to be lower than those of the previous year, which was good news for 
the British manufacturers.
137
  In the United States, there were complaints that the 
prices paid to growers for the 1870 crop were barely sufficient to cover the cost of 
production. There was talk that spring that cotton planters might intentionally limit 
production in order to sustain the price.
138
 The Cotton Supply Reporter dismissed 
such reports, saying, “Efforts to restrict the production of cotton, with a view to 
enhance the price, will prove about as successful as attempts to prevail upon spinners 
and manufacturers to stop their machinery because of a glut in the market. The real 
question is will other crops pay better than cotton?”139 The general consensus was 
that American planters were not likely to find another crop that could replace 
cotton.
140
 But the indicators reaching the cotton trade were contradictory. The U.S. 
Commissioner of Agriculture’s estimate made in July predicted that the 1871 crop 
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would be 3,885,000 bales. This was 462,000 bales less than the previous year’s crop, 
and 115,000 bales short of the estimates made at planting time.
141
  
At its meeting held in Louisville, Kentucky, in the spring of 1871, the 
National Commercial Convention commissioned Robert T. Saunders, a Mobile, 
Alabama, cotton broker and ex-major in the Confederate army whose firm Saunders 
& Company had operations Mobile, Memphis, Savannah, and New Orleans, to 
represent the United States at the Russian trade fair to be held at Novgorod that 
autumn. Saunders made a stopover in Liverpool on his way to St. Petersburg, and 
while there delivered a speech to the British Association, the British equivalent to the 
National Commercial Convention. Saunders brought with him a letter from the 
Memphis Commercial Convention to the Cotton Supply Association, and read from it 
in the speech: 
 
Cheap Cotton, then, and in sufficient supply, is what the world 
requires, and must have. Lancashire and the continent of Europe must 
obtain cheaper cottons, or their mills must stop. For the past two years 
they have paid for ‘American Middlings,’ and ‘Fair Egyptians,’ an 
average price of over 10 d. per pound and many mills are now closed, 
or working ‘short time’ in consequence of the continued high price of 
raw cotton. … 
One of two things must take place—consumption must 
continue materially to diminish, or cotton supply must be increased in 
proportion to the wants of the world. After all, I can but think that the 
whole future ‘Cotton Supply’ question depends on the production of 
the Southern States of America. That grown in East India, China, 
Brazil, Peru, West Indies, Egypt, Turkey, and the Levant, is required 
to be sent back to those countries, for they all import in the aggregate 
more cotton in the shape of goods and yarns than they export, thereby 
showing that they do not raise sufficient collective supply for their 
own wants. It will be found that cotton growing will be followed 
steadily only in those countries where it can be made more profitable 
than other pursuits. Where indigo, coffee, tobacco, sugar, or 
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breadstuffs will bring better prices, or suit the climate, soil, or 
conditions of a people better than cotton, cotton-culture may be forced 
for a few years by the power of high prices, and the necessities of a 
resolute, intelligent and persistent manufacturing people. But such 
culture will only be temporary, because in defiance of the laws of true 
economy. Other nations can and will produce cotton when stimulated 
by high prices; but what Great Britain and Continental Europe require 
is a regular supply of cheap cotton.
142
 
 
Saunders predicted that in thirty years the world would require almost 9 
million bales of cotton to meet its needs. The United States would need over 3 million 
bales to meet its domestic consumption. Saunders expressed the firm opinion that 
other nations of the world would not be able to meet the demand for cotton. Saunders 
told his audience that the United States could by utilizing, “improved seeds; with 
deep ploughing, commercial manures, an enlightened system of cultivation—using all 
the appliances of improved husbandry, and employing every available means to 
render the soil increasingly productive—we could easily extend the average yield of 
the Southern cotton crops again to five millions instead of two million five hundred 
thousand bales.”143 
 As Robert T. Saunders spoke in Liverpool, the Illinois Central Railroad and 
the Louisville & Nashville Railroad were engaged in a track-building race toward the 
Gulf of Mexico that would revolutionize the marketing of American cotton. On 
August 6, 1866, the L&N opened a new track that ran southwest from Louisville to 
Memphis through the cotton-growing region of western Tennessee. The next year, the 
L&N began operating a freight service from Nashville through Meridian, Mississippi, 
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to Mobile, Alabama, on a new track that ran through prime cotton country about 25 
miles west of the Mississippi-Alabama state line. Simultaneously the Illinois Central 
Railroad was building a parallel track 100 miles to the west that ran south from East 
Cairo, Kentucky, through Jackson, Mississippi, to New Orleans.
144
  Another new 
L&N main line ran south from Nashville through Birmingham and Montgomery, 
Alabama, to Mobile. Lateral feeder lines to these main tracks brought large areas of 
Mississippi and Alabama that had previously been too far from the navigable rivers 
for cotton to be grown profitably into range of the cotton markets. Before 1875, a web 
of new short line railroads that served as feeder lines for the L&N crisscrossed 
southwestern Georgia and southeastern Alabama, another area where lack of 
navigable rivers had in the past inhibited cotton growing, and gave the region an 
outlet to the world cotton markets at Mobile.
145
 The L&N’s tracks connected with 
those of the newly rebuilt Central of Georgia Railroad at Macon, giving access to 
Savannah as well.
146
 In 1870, Alabama had 1,157 miles of railroad track. Mississippi 
had 990 miles of railroad.
147
  
Railroads opened huge new areas for cotton growing. In 1880, the Illinois 
Central Railroad began extending its feeder lines into the low lying alluvial plain 
known as the Yazoo Delta in southwestern Mississippi, which had previously been 
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thought unfit for agriculture. In 1884, the Illinois Central built a cotton handling 
facility at Yazoo City. Within ten years one tenth of all the cotton grown in the 
United States came from plantations in the Yazoo Delta.
148
  
Texas developed as a major new source of cotton after the Civil War. On the 
eve of the Civil War, Texas produced 308,000 bales of cotton. By 1878 the total had 
risen to more than a million bales. The total reached 1.5 million bales in the decade 
1880-90. Despite the ravages of Mexican boll weevils, the Texas crop exceeded 3 
million bales before 1900. In 1906 the Texas crop amounted to more than 4 million 
bales.
149
 By 1890 Texas was growing more cotton than was India.
150
 Texas railroad 
mileage grew apace with the state’s cotton production. In 1860 the state had 307 
miles of railroad track. In 1870 the amount of railroad track in Texas had more than 
doubled, to 711 miles. Texas had 3,244 miles of railroad in 1880, 8,710 miles in 
1890, and 9,722 miles in 1900. Railroads radiated north, west, and southwest from 
Galveston to the cotton growing regions. Two lines ran eastward, one from Dallas 
through Shreveport and Vicksburg to Meridian, Mississippi, where it met the Illinois 
Central, and the other from Houston to New Orleans.
151
  
Great improvements were also made at the seaports from which American 
cotton was exported. Charleston’s docks, cotton presses, and warehouses, which were 
burned during the war, were rebuilt before 1871.
152
 The damage inflicted upon 
                                                 
148
 Corliss, Main Line of Mid-America: The Story of the Illinois Central, 232-240. 
 
149
 Watkins, King Cotton, 213-219. 
 
150
 Shepperson, Cotton Facts, 117. 
 
151
 Watkins, King Cotton, 219-232. 
 
152
 Somers, The Southern States Since the War, 38. 
 441 
Savannah, Georgia, was repaired in a remarkably short time.
153
 Mobile was 
constricted by the shallow bar of sediment at the mouth of the Tensaw River, which 
prevented large ships from reaching the docks, but by 1870 an efficient system of 
large steam barges was in operation to ferry cotton from the railroad terminal to ships 
anchored in Mobile Bay.
154
  
New Orleans suffered almost no physical damage from the Civil War, and the 
seaport was back in business even before the war ended. In 1870 the city’s cotton 
merchants organized the Cotton Exchange Board to regulate and standardize trading 
and cotton handling practices.
155
 The New Orleans Cotton Exchange opened the 
following year. The New Orleans Cotton Exchange was more than a regional cotton 
market. It was a brokerage with global reach. The New Orleans Cotton Exchange 
operated its own commercial intelligence service that collected information via 
telegraph from a network of agents in every cotton-growing region and textile-
manufacturing center in the world, collated that information on a continuous basis, 
and disseminated it to its subscriber-members in daily bulletins. At any given time, 
the members of the New Orleans Cotton Exchange had in their possession timely, 
precise, and detailed information about the cotton situation everywhere in the 
world.
156
 Ten years after the end of the Civil War, New Orleans boasted sixteen 
cotton press companies, numerous storage warehouses, street railways for the drayage 
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of cotton, and other facilities. Fees for pressing, warehousing, and handling services 
was set by the Cotton Exchange Board and published in an annual schedule.
157
 Even 
greater improvements came in 1896, when the Illinois Central Railroad opened 
Stuyvesant Docks, an enormous new port facility that stretched nearly a mile along 
the New Orleans waterfront. Stuyvesant Docks included the largest and most modern 
cotton terminal in the world. Fire totally destroyed Stuyvesant Docks in 1905, and an 
even more modern facility was quickly rebuilt on its ashes.
158
 
 Galveston grew from a minor seaport with only the most rudimentary 
facilities before the Civil War to become a cotton port that rivaled New Orleans in the 
1890s. Harbor improvements at Galveston began in 1874, when the U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers began dredging to deepen Galveston Bay and building breakwaters to 
protect the harbor.
159
 In 1895 Galveston had more than four miles of wharfage, with 
berths for 120 ships. Fifty berths were equipped to handle cotton, and the port could 
load 50,000 bales per day. The entire length of the Galveston waterfront was served 
by railroad tracks with spurs to every ship berth.
160
 
The disparity between transportation infrastructure in the cotton-growing 
region of the United States and in India was staggering. In 1880 the ten American 
Cotton Belt states had 15,458 miles of railroad track.
161
 The Indian subcontinent had 
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only 8,095 miles of railroad track.
162
 The Great Indian Peninsular Railway was 
completed through the center of Berar, which produced about one-quarter of the 
cotton exported from Bombay, in 1870.
163
 The total length of track was 366 miles, 
including two short feeder lines each less than 10 miles in length. This railroad served 
an area almost as large as the states of Mississippi and Alabama combined. No 
additional railroad track was built in Berar until after the turn of the twentieth 
century.
164
 Cotton grown in Berar had to be hauled as much as 100 miles from the 
fields to railroad market towns such as Khamgaon in oxcarts.
165
 
The British colonial authorities built a system of wagon roads to bring cotton 
from the hinterland to the market towns along the railroad. The best of these, called 
pucca roads, were 10 to 12 feet wide and were surfaced with crushed basalt gravel. In 
1884 Berar had about 1,500 miles of pucca roads and another 1,500 miles of wagon 
tracks of graded dirt.
166
 British authorities also improved the age-old Indian oxcart by 
replacing its solid wooden wheels with lighter wooden spoke wheels and using the 
saving in weight to increase its hauling capacity by 50 percent. More than 25,000 of 
these improved oxcarts were in use hauling cotton and other freight in Berar by the 
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1890s.
167
 For comparison, in 1880 the states of Alabama and Mississippi had 2,970 
miles of railroad track.
168
 
Cotton brought to Bombay by railroad was still being sold and stored on 
Bombay’s open air Cotton Green in 1912 just as it had been in 1862. At a time when 
cotton brokers on the floor of the New Orleans Cotton Exchange were in continuous 
telegraphic communications with buyers in New York, Liverpool, and elsewhere in 
Europe and Asia, Indian cotton merchants were still renting plots of ground on the 
Cotton Green, erecting temporary shanties or huts from which to do business, and 
offering their cotton for sale to foreign buyers just as they had fifty years earlier.
169
 At 
the same time trains were pulling alongside freighters berthed at New Orleans and 
Galveston and cranes were hoisting cotton bales directly from boxcars into ships’ 
cargo holds, an American schoolteacher who visited Bombay in 1912 reported seeing, 
“All day long an endless string of carts, drawn by zebu oxen and driven by coolies 
sitting astride the tongue, plod on in a slow gait, hauling cotton to the docks.”170 
 Indian agricultural technology and practices remained unchanged during the 
fifty years after the American Civil War. The 1912 edition of Shepperson’s Cotton 
Facts said of cotton culture in India: 
The methods of cultivation are very primitive and rude. Everything is 
done by hand and no commercial fertilizers are used. The only 
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fertilizing done is turning under the soil the old cotton plants which 
have remained in the fields from the previous season. This makes good 
fertilizer, and is the only kind available. … The average yield is 
thought to be about 75 to 100 pounds lint cotton per acre. … 
Plantations are generally small, ranging from 5 to 30 acres in extent, 
but there are some larger plantations cultivated by hired labor.
171
  
 
While its competitors’ cotton production increased incrementally as the 
amount of land and labor devoted to it increased, production in the United States 
increased through both increased land and labor and, more importantly, improved 
agricultural methods. The American crop surpassed 4 million bales in 1873, passed 5 
million bales in 1878, exceeded 6 million in 1880, was over 7 million in 1887, passed 
9 million in 1891, exceeded 10 million in 1897, and passed 11 million bales in 1898. 
Only twice after 1900, in 1901 and 1903, did the American crop yield less than 10 
million bales. In 1911, the first crop to exceed 15 million bales was grown.
172
 At that 
point, the United States was again furnishing 75 percent of the world’s total supply of 
cotton.
173
 
As the size of the American crop grew, prices fell below the level necessary 
for cotton to be profitable in remote areas with poor transportation. After the small 
1872 crop’s 10 9/16 d. average price, cotton prices fell steadily until 1876, when they 
stabilized at around 6½ d. until 1883, when the price dropped to 5 ¾ d. per pound. 
Prices rose to 6 d. in 1884, and then settled into a new normal of between 5 
1
/8 d. and 
5 
15
/16 d. for the next five years. However, a fortuitous variation in the exchange rate 
meant that prices in the United States remained nearly constant at between 10.5 and 
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12 cents from 1876 until 1889. The American crop of 1891 was the first to exceed 9 
million bales, and the average price for the year fell to 4 
11
/16 d. in Liverpool, with a 
corresponding American price of 7.3 cents. Prices remained below 5 d. despite 
significantly smaller crops in 1892 and 1893. In 1894 American cotton averaged 
3
13
/16 d. per pound in Liverpool. At one point, the price of benchmark “Middling 
American” on the Liverpool Exchange was under 3 d. per pound, the lowest price in 
history. The average price in the United States dropped to 5.9 cents. That same year 
also saw the lowest price paid for Indian cotton in history, with an average of 2 
5
/8 d. 
per pound. The average price remained below 4 d. in every year from 1894 until the 
turn of the century except for 1896, when it reached 4
11
/32 d. per pound. The lowest 
average price recorded in the United States was in 1898, when the first crop to exceed 
11 million bales sold for 4.9 cents per pound. In 1899, the Liverpool market again 
reached the record low set in 1894, 3 d., and ended the year with an average of 3 
9
/16 
d. per pound.
174
  
In 1911 the United States produced 15,553,073 bales of cotton on 37 million 
acres of land, compared to 3,976,000 bales on 22 million acres in India.
175
 The second 
largest competitor, Egypt, produced the equivalent of 1,838,400 bales. Brazil 
produced only 300,000 bales.
176
 No one knew how much cotton was being grown in 
China, but estimates were around 4 million bales. In a new development, China was 
exporting 750,000 bales of cotton to Japan each year. Quantities of from a few 
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hundred to a few thousand bales were grown in various locations in Russian Central 
Asia, the Ottoman Empire, Africa, Southeast Asia, Korea, and Latin America.
177
 
Gradually increasing supplies of cotton at progressively lower prices fueled an 
expansion of exports of cotton goods and the building of new mill capacity during the 
twenty years after 1875 similar to the expansion during the first rise of the American 
cotton monopoly after 1815. The prosperity masked deeper structural problems in the 
cotton economy, however. In the summer of 1894, when cotton was plentiful and 
prices reached their lowest in history, the Lancashire cotton manufacturing industry 
was suffering serious difficulties almost identical to the situation in 1861. There were 
simply too many mills in operation, too many new ones were being built, and they 
were producing more finished goods than the world’s markets could absorb at the 
prevailing prices. Labor costs were rising, as industrial unions arose in the 1880s and 
began demanding higher wages.
178
 In February 1895 British manufacturers formed 
the Manchester Cotton Association, a cartel with 240 member firms who agreed to 
cooperate to control production of cotton goods, negotiate collectively with the labor 
unions, and reduce the price paid for raw cotton.
179
 
The latter goal was impossible to achieve if cotton growing was to be 
sustained in the United States. The average price paid for cotton in the United States 
in 1894 was 5.9 cents per pound.
180
 Agronomic research conducted by the U. S. 
Department of Agriculture in 1896 revealed that the cost incurred to grow a pound of 
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cotton was 5.27 cents. It was thought that no further reductions in production cost 
could be achieved through greater efficiency or improved cultivation methods, “until 
a machine is invented that will reduce the cost of gathering the crop.”181  
Ironically, the worst pestilence ever to befall American cotton may have 
helped prevent a collapse of the agricultural sector of the cotton economy in the 
1890s. Starting in 1892, Mexican boll weevils devastated the cotton crop in Texas, 
doing progressively more damage each year as they spread northward. The boll 
weevils’ ravages reduced the 1895 crop to 7,161,000 bales, 2,740,000 less than in 
1894. Prices recovered to 8.2 cents in 1895, but progressively larger crops in 1896, 
1897, and 1898 exerted constant downward pressure on the market. In 1898, the 
average price for American cotton fell to 4.9 cents, which was below the cost of 
production estimated by the Department of Agriculture.
182
  
After the disastrously low 4.9 cents average price in 1898, American cotton 
brokers began cooperating with one another in informal cartels called “Bull Pools” in 
an effort to drive up the price of American cotton. These efforts culminated in 1903-
04 when Daniel J. Sully, a New York cotton broker, organized a market manipulation 
that became known as “Sully’s corner.” Sully made no secret of what he was trying to 
do. He gave interviews to newspapers in which he framed the effort to form an 
American cotton cartel in patriotic Populist rhetoric. Sully urged sellers to accept 
nothing less than 14 cents per pound, the minimum amount that he deemed adequate 
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to cover the cost of production and return the grower a fair profit.
183
 In the summer of 
1904, Sully and the brokers known as “Cotton Bulls” who supported him temporarily 
drove the price up to 18¼ cents. British mill owners hastily formed the International 
Federation of Master Cotton Spinners’ and Manufacturers Associations and broke 
Sully’s corner by an organized slowdown of the mills and cessation of cotton buying, 
in essence a lockout of American cotton. American mill owners assisted the British 
effort by doubling the price of cotton cloth, an action that turned American retailers 
and consumers against Sully’s effort. Sully fell seriously ill at the critical time and the 
Cotton Bulls broke ranks, resulting in the collapse of the effort.
184
 Nevertheless, the 
average price of American cotton in the 1903-04 marketing season was slightly over 
14 cents, the highest price since 1874.
185
  
Daniel J. Sully subsequently formed an alliance with Georgia agrarian 
Populist editor Thomas E. Watson and continued to urge American cotton planters 
and brokers to organize cooperatives, set minimum prices, and break the British 
manufacturers’ control over the price of cotton.186 For a time it appeared that 
American cotton growers might be heeding Sully’s advice. A flurry of organizing 
efforts took place among cotton growers. The 1905 crop of 10 million bales was 3 
million bales smaller than the 1904 crop, and the price increased from 8.66 cents to 
10.94 cents. American cotton remained nearly double the record low 1898 average of 
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4.9 cents in every year after Sully’s Corner, and again exceeded 14 cents in 1909 and 
1910. The huge 15 million-bale crop of 1911 saw prices drop to 9.69 cents, but the 
1912 crop was 2 million bales smaller, and prices climbed back to slightly over 12 
cents.
187
 
From the perspective of the Manchester cotton manufacturers, the record low 
price of 1894 became a benchmark against which the price of cotton in subsequent 
years was judged.
188
 Despite a steadily increasing supply of cotton from 1896 to 
1913, the price, with minor fluctuations, rose steadily from the idealized normal of 
1894 to more than double it in 1909 and 1910. The manufacturers’ remedy, as 
always, was more cotton. On June 12, 1902, the Manchester Chamber of Commerce 
resurrected the Cotton Supply Association as the British Cotton Growing Association. 
Its stated mission was identical to that of the Cotton Supply Association, to promote 
cotton growing in the British Empire in order to break Britain’s reliance on American 
cotton. The new Association raised a war chest of £500,000 and began a campaign to 
promote the growing of American-type cotton in India, Australia, and in the British 
Empire’s African colonial possessions.189  
The British cotton industry’s problems were more than a matter of the cost of 
raw material. Economist Lars G. Sandberg dated the beginning of the English textile 
industry’s long, slow decline at around 1880.190 From that date, the industry was 
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plagued with excess productive capacity, increasing foreign competition, and 
progressively more obsolescent technology, problems that it never solved. In 1870, 
American cotton mills began using a new spinning machine called a “ring spindle” 
that was superior to the “mule spindle” used in British mills. A ring spindle could 
spin twice as much yarn in a given length of time as a mule spindle. Along with its 
advantages of greater speed and efficiency, the ring spindle was adjustable, so that it 
could be used to spin various types of cotton. Almost all American mills built after 
1870 used the ring spindle. British spinners were reluctant to adopt the ring spindle, 
however, largely because it could not be integrated into the other existing machinery 
in older mills. Of the more than 57 million spindles in operation in British mills in 
1913, only slightly more than 10 million were ring spindles.
191
 The technology in 
British cloth weaving factories also lagged behind. In 1894 the American mill 
machinery manufacturing firm of George Draper & Sons in Hopedale, Massachusetts, 
patented and began selling the Northrup automatic loom. The Northrup loom 
produced cloth at a rate about 10 percent faster than previous looms and, more 
importantly, was automated so that one operator could tend up to 16 looms, as 
opposed to one operator for every 6 power looms like those then in use in British 
factories. Over the next twenty years, George Draper & Sons sold 286,000 Northrup 
automatic looms. By the outbreak of the First World War, nearly half of all American 
textile mills, and all of the newest mills, were equipped with automated Northrup 
looms. George Draper & Sons attempted to sell their automated looms in Britain, but 
encountered the same kind of compatibility problems that prevented adoption of the 
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ring spindle. As a result, of the 157,000 new looms installed in British factories 
between 1894 and 1914, at most 10,000 were automated Northrup looms.
192
 
The problem of excessive mill capacity and over production was global. In 
1912 British mills had over 57 million spindles. There were almost 43 million in 
continental Europe, over 29 million in the United States, over 6 million in India, and 
2 million in Japan. In that year the number increased by 1.6 million. All but 250,000 
were outside Britain. The number of bales of cotton consumed in continental Europe, 
Britain, the United States, India, and Japan increased 1.6 million over the total in 
1911. No one seems to have accepted the idea that it was possible to produce too 
much cotton cloth, however. The old idea that China was a virtually unlimited market 
for cotton goods remained alive. All that was deemed necessary to maintain 
constantly increasing production of cotton goods was the preservation of peace and an 
ever-greater supply of raw cotton at lower cost.
193
  
During the 1913-14 marketing season, British agronomist Dr. John A. Todd, 
professor of economics and commerce at University College in Nottingham, England, 
made a fact-finding trip to the cotton growing states of the American South, part of a 
global survey of cotton undertaken on behalf of the British cotton industry.
194
 It is 
evident from his writing that Todd left England believing that the price of American 
cotton was inflated. After observing conditions across the South, Todd came to very 
different conclusions. The global cotton economy had arrived at what seemed to be 
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another intractable paradox. In Todd’s words, “spinners were being crushed between 
the upper and nether millstones of high cost of raw material and low selling 
prices.”195 Cotton growers in the United States were being similarly crushed between 
high costs of production and low prices for their cotton. Todd wrote, “The profits of 
cotton growing are by no means so large as we were apt to imagine. The position is 
practically this, that under such conditions cotton cannot be grown at a profit if all the 
labour that it requires must be paid for.”196  
The situation did not bode well for the future of the cotton industry. Todd 
noted that among American cotton growers, and especially among small farmers and 
sharecroppers, there was a widespread feeling that they were being treated unfairly by 
the cotton textile manufacturers.
197
 Todd expressed concerns that if the prices that 
American farmers were paid for their cotton did not increase, or especially if prices 
fell, they would stop growing it. However, manufacturers could not afford to pay 
higher prices.
198
 In what was intended to be the closing paragraph of his book, Todd 
wrote:  
There is nothing that can happen in the world, from a revolution in 
China to a bad monsoon in India, the opening up of a new world’s 
route by the construction of a canal across an isthmus, or the building 
of a railway across a continent, which does not affect cotton in many 
ways. It is a fascinating study, and a subject of the most direct 
economic importance to many millions of the world’s inhabitants. Of 
no industry is it more true that the one half of the world does not know 
how the other half lives.
199
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John A. Todd signed and dated the manuscript of The World’s Cotton Crops 
in Nottingham on July 22, 1914. Twenty-four hours later, in Belgrade, the Austro-
Hungarian minister to Serbia handed the ultimatum that set the First World War in 
motion to the Serbian foreign minister. As Europe slid toward war, the system of 
international banking and monetary exchange upon which trade depended ceased to 
function. As a result, on Friday, July 31, 1914, every cotton exchange in the world 
closed. The global cotton economy was paralyzed until the exchanges reopened in 
November after a special arrangement was made between the Bank of England and 
the U.S. Federal Reserve.
200
 As the war progressed, the British government decreed 
several reductions in cotton imports in order to free space on ships for materials more 
vital to the war effort. Textile workers were conscripted into the armed forces or to 
work in munitions factories. By June 1918, the cotton mills were operating at less 
than 50 percent of their pre-war level.
201
 When the First World War ended in 
November, King Cotton was among the many monarchs that had been toppled from 
his throne.
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Conclusion 
Success of the Cotton Supply Association’s attempt to globalize the growing 
of cotton during the Civil War did not cause the destruction of local economies, 
indebtedness and impoverishment of people and nations, and the loss of personal and 
national independence. The Cotton Supply Association’s attempt to spread cotton 
production widely around the world and break the American cotton monopoly 
succeeded only temporarily. It ultimately failed. The things blamed on the effort’s 
success were in reality the consequences of its failure. 
When the 1861-71 decade is viewed in isolation, it appears that British efforts 
to increase the amount of cotton grown in India, Egypt, the Ottoman Empire, and 
elsewhere were phenomenally successful. This can be seen in Sven Beckert’s charting 
of the increase in cotton exports from India, Egypt, and Brazil in the period 1860-66.
1
 
It can also be seen in Laxman D. Satya’s case study of Berar. The same pattern 
appears in the Ottoman Empire. Only in the case of Egypt is this picture accurate, 
however. 
When one views the global history of the cotton economy over the span of the 
century from 1815 to 1915 the picture that emerges is of two macro-economic cycles 
or curves, each about fifty years in length. Each cycle was characterized by ever-
increasing cotton production in the United States and steadily declining prices that 
drove less efficient cotton producers in remote regions without access to the most 
modern means of transportation out of the world market. Each cycle was also 
characterized by over-production of cotton goods near its end that threatened the 
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cotton economy with a potentially catastrophic crisis. The first cycle began around 
1815 and was nearing its culminating point when the American Civil War intervened. 
Fantastically high prices for cotton during the interruption of supplies from the United 
States led to a dramatic resurgence of cotton growing in countries where it had 
declined as the American monopoly arose and prices fell during the first half of the 
nineteenth century. The second cycle began in 1865 and was essentially a repetition 
of the first. The second cycle was nearing its climax when the First World War 
intervened in 1914. 
Numerical statistics viewed in isolation contribute to the illusion that the 
effort to globalize cotton growing succeeded. India did export more than double the 
quantity of cotton in 1866 than it did in 1860. India’s bale count is numerically large 
as well, rising from 865,000 in 1860 to over 2 million in 1866. Seen in isolation from 
the global context, it seems impressive that in the thirty years after 1870 India 
doubled its cotton production to 4 million bales. However, 4 million bales is not as 
significant when measured against the world’s total supply of 20 million bales in 
1910 as 2 million was when measured against the world’s total supply of 5 million 
bales in 1860.
2
 India actually lost market share, going from 40 percent in 1866 to less 
than 20 percent in 1910. This indicates that the problem of indebtedness that Satya 
and Beckert blamed on the fact that the ryots were growing more cotton after 1860 
than they were before really resulted from their struggling to maintain a dwindling 
market share against American competition that caused prices to decline steadily 
from 1865 until 1894. Cotton exports from Bombay, the port through which most of 
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India’s cotton passed, remained virtually static at about 1,100,000 bales per year from 
1865 until 1891. Exports then began a steady decline to 500,000 bales in 1899.
3
 This 
decline coincided with the period of very low prices from 1894 to 1900. The sharp 
rise in Indian exports that Beckert cites beginning in 1901 was a response to the rise 
in prices of American cotton that occurred between 1900 and 1913.
4
 The nearly 
doubling of Bombay’s exports from about 550,000 bales to 950,000 in 1903 and 1904 
coincided with Sully’s corner, when British manufacturers were engaged in their 
deliberate effort to reduce purchases of American cotton and the comparatively low 
price of Indian cotton compared to American made it more attractive to Japanese 
buyers. What appears to be an increase in Indian exports from 1900 to 1913 was 
really a recovery from the losses incurred from 1892 to 1900. Bombay’s exports in 
1910 were slightly over 1,100,000 bales, the same as in almost every year from 1869 
until 1891.
5
 
The same statistical fluke holds true for Brazil, where exports increased 373 
percent between 1860 and 1866. The weight of cotton is also impressive if viewed in 
isolation. Brazil increased its exports from 24.4 million pounds in 1860 to 102.3 
million in 1866.
6
 The numbers become less impressive when it is considered that 
102.3 million pounds only amounts to 255,750 American-size 400 pound bales. 
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Beckert’s inference that Brazilian farmers became enslaved to cotton collapses when 
it is realized that cotton shrank to insignificance in Brazil not long after the Civil War 
ended. Brazil’s economy became synonymous with coffee, not cotton. 
A case study focused on a single discreet region taken in isolation from the 
larger global picture can also lead to misleading conclusions about the impact of 
cotton. This can be seen from Laxman D. Satya’s statement concerning the railroad in 
Berar, “The colonial state constantly struggled to achieve maximum efficiency from 
its instruments of exploitation. The railway was one such crucial instrument.”7 This 
type of mistaken conclusion can be picked up and incorporated into the thinking of 
subsequent historians, skewing their conclusions. This phenomenon can be seen in 
this statement, which Sven Beckert drew from Satya: 
The annihilation of both space and time was at the core of 
Berar’s transformation. Before the 1850s, cotton sent to Bombay was 
transported on bullocks in journeys taking weeks. During the Civil 
War years, however, railroads began dissecting Berar, enabling 
merchants to ship cotton rapidly and cheaply. … Market integration 
advanced rapidly and once telegraphic communication with England 
had become possible in 1868 and the Suez Canal opened in 1869, a 
Liverpool merchant could wire an order for cotton to Berar and receive 
it on the shores of the Mersey just six weeks later.
8
 
 
 It would be accurate to say that by 1880 the Illinois Central and Louisville & 
Nashville Railroads had “dissected” Mississippi and Alabama with 2,970 miles of 
railroad track, but the Great Indian Peninsular Railway merely bisected Berar with 
one 366-mile track and for feeder lines relied upon 3,000 miles of wagon roads, half 
of them mere dirt tracks, and 25,000 oxcarts. India was not integrated into the world 
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cotton economy, but remained on its periphery. The premise that mobilizing the 
maximum amount of labor was the key to maximizing cotton production proved false 
in India. Fifty years after the end of the American Civil War, India, with nearly as 
much land and vastly more labor devoted to growing cotton, could produce only a 
quarter as much cotton as the United States. The reason was that India never 
achieved, nor did the British colonial power ever seriously try to achieve, the synergy 
between labor, land, agricultural science, and transportation and communications 
technology that characterized American cotton production in the second half of the 
nineteenth century.  
 The case of the Ottoman Empire most clearly demolishes the premise that 
“infusing European capital into peasant production” would automatically lead to a 
system of indebtedness that guaranteed that they would become serf-like cotton 
producers.
9
 When the price of cotton fell after the war, peasants in Anatolia, Syria, 
Palestine, Mesopotamia, Cyprus, and Macedonia quickly abandoned cotton in favor 
crops that were more profitable and less difficult to transport. Internal improvements 
built by the Ottoman state in the hope of becoming a cotton supplier led to its 
bankruptcy, but the railroads and other facilities did not bring the desired cotton to 
Europe. 
 Egypt was an aberrant situation. Muhammad Ali and his successors had 
already reduced Egypt’s rural cultivators to a state of serfdom and partially integrated 
Egypt into the global cotton economy before the American Civil War began. The 
tremendous infusion of European capital into Egypt, in the form of railroads and other 
infrastructure, greatly enhanced Egypt’s ability to get cotton to market. The steep 
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decline of cotton prices that prevented Egypt from paying the resultant national debt 
enabled Europeans to supplant Egypt’s ruling elite, most of whom were themselves 
not Egyptians. Under British control, Egypt was prevented from either growing cash 
crops other than cotton or industrializing. Further, Egyptian cotton did not compete 
directly with American cotton. This enabled the British to develop Egypt exclusively 
as a cotton plantation. 
 Fiji is representative of the effect of the cotton crisis of the 1860s in locations 
on the extreme periphery of the world economy. The cotton boom brought a wave of 
European settlers to Fiji, and cost the Fijians their independence, but despite the fact 
that Fiji was incorporated into the British Empire, the islands never became a cotton 
plantation. Attempts to establish cotton as a cash crop during the first fifty years of 
British rule were notable for their failure. Fiji added to Great Britain’s cost of empire, 
but the islands did not add any cotton to Lancashire’s supply. 
From the strategic perspective of the United States, the effort to spread 
commercial cotton growing around the world during the Civil War was fantastically 
successful. Cotton grown in India, the Ottoman Empire, Brazil, and numerous other 
locations averted the crisis in Europe that Senator Hammond had predicted would 
happen if no American cotton were furnished for three years. Supplying the necessary 
cotton seeds cost the United States very little. The Cotton Supply Association did the 
work overseas and paid the bill. And in the end the British effort to end the American 
cotton monopoly came to naught. The United States regained its position as supplier 
of three-quarters of the world’s cotton within a decade after the end of the Civil War. 
American cotton would maintain that position until the last quarter of the twentieth 
 461 
century, long after petroleum had replaced cotton as the dominant commodity in the 
world’s industrial economy.
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